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ABSTRACT 
 
New protectorates, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor and Kosovo, have experienced a medium to 
long term international presence, which has sought to ensure security and implement liberal 
democracy. Given that social movement activity has been linked to democratic development, the 
presence and development of social movements in new protectorates presents a novel and interesting 
context in which to study social movements. Using a political opportunity framework as a guide, this 
research examines the extent to which international actors in new protectorate contexts influence 
the strategy of social movements. A case analysis of two entities, Vetëvendosje, a social movement 
and social movement organisation (SMO) in Kosovo, and Afghanistan 1400, a civil society organisation 
(CSO) in Afghanistan, is supported by documentary sources and a range of interviews with members, 
and employees of international actors and CSOs. 
 
To date, there has been little research on the wider effects of this type of international presence and 
the consequences for social movement activity have been largely overlooked. This study analyses the 
influence of international actors on two levels. The first is seen via the impact of international actors 
on political opportunities. The second is seen via the strategic decisions made in response to the 
international presence, by the case studies. Although the international presence generally increases 
political opportunities, the level of opportunities in Afghanistan and Kosovo is still low. Both case 
studies have taken the decision to participate in electoral politics alongside their existing activities in 
an attempt to exert a greater level of influence. The study concludes that international actors play a 
key role in shaping social movement strategy within new protectorates, but that this influence often 
occurs in unexpected and indirect ways. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This project began with the broad idea of studying social movements in new protectorates to gain an 
understanding of how movements might develop within a context that has not been considered in 
the social movement literature. New protectorates are territories in which “a medium- to long-term 
international presence […] was established with transformative goals at their core” (Mayall and 
Oliveira 2011: 1). They provide a fascinating context in which to study social movements as they 
represent many of the shifting norms within the international system in the post-Cold War period.  
 
Those involved in new protectorates often present such projects as multilateral efforts conducted by 
the international community, and although each actor involved has different approaches and 
methods, they tend to be largely initiated by Western-led international actors pushing a broadly liberal 
democratic agenda (Mayall and Oliveira 2011). This includes the promotion of values and rights such 
as voting, gender equality, minority protection and the development of civil society. This type of 
project raises questions regarding state sovereignty, democratisation, neoliberal governance, civil 
society development, and the responsibilities and effectiveness of state and international institutions. 
Many of these issues have been considered in the existing literature, but social movement activity has 
been largely overlooked. 
 
Social movements have long been associated with the consolidation of democratic political systems 
(Caruso 2015; Johnstone 2012; Tilly 2004a; 1986, 1985; Goldstone 2004; Marks and McAdam 1996; 
Tarrow 1996; Tilly 1984) and Western governments and development organisations are increasingly 
recognising that social movements are important actors in democratic processes (della Porta 2014). 
Some also hold the belief that democratisation itself promotes social movement activity (Tilly 2004a; 
Amenta and Young 1999). Therefore, if social movements were important to the establishment of 
democratic states, it would follow that they could also be important to new protectorates in which 
international actors are attempting to implement democratisation. Thus, the presence of social 
movements in new protectorates is extremely interesting, as is the way in which the presence of 
international actors may shape the landscape in which movements operate. Given the often extensive 
executive authority held by international actors at the domestic level, which presents a distinct form 
of international influence on domestic democratic development, the emergence of social movements, 
SMOs and similar grassroots activities in this context may provide important signs of democratic 
development. As international actors commit huge amounts of time and resources to new 
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protectorates, it is appropriate to question whether the presence of these actors influences the 
development of social movement activity, and if so, how?  
 
The preliminary research for this thesis highlighted groups within new protectorates that self-identify 
as movements and on first look demonstrate some movement attributes, such as collective action and 
the involvement of networks of citizens. However, after looking closer these groups tended to 
resemble social movements as defined in the literature less. The type of activity found in new 
protectorates tended to represent a mixture of organized and unorganised protests, which are 
sometimes spontaneous but are generally over short periods of time and do not necessarily represent 
a social movement. At the other end of the scale, many groups appear to be too organized to be 
termed social movements, and instead are closer to social movement organisations (SMOs), civil 
society organisations (CSOs) or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This issue in itself raised a 
number of questions about the presence of social movements (or lack of) within new protectorates. 
As a result, I have applied an exploratory approach using qualitative methods, which focuses on the 
analysis of two case studies and drawn upon a political opportunity framework to guide the analysis. 
The first case is that of movement turned SMO, Lëvizja Vetëvendosje!, or ‘Movement for Self-
Determination’ in English (which I will refer to as Vetëvendosje throughout the thesis) in Kosovo; the 
other is the Afghan CSO, Afghanistan 1400. Both case studies define themselves as movements to 
position themselves as alternatives, which has also raised some interesting questions.  
 
Anecdotal evidence from members of those involved in Afghanistan 1400 provoked the initial interest 
in this subject, and further enquiries demonstrated that there was a lack of information or existing 
literature in this area across new protectorates. Guided by preliminary research, the central question 
of this thesis is: How, and to what extent, does the presence of international actors shape social 
movements? Conducting a case study analysis of a movement and CSO has allowed me to assess the 
extent to which international actors present within new protectorates influence and shape social 
movement activity and this approach has also allowed me to determine how other entities respond 
to the international presence and gauge the influence of the international presence on the lack of, 
and potential for, movement activity. 
 
As well as using a political opportunity approach, this thesis also draws on the literature on social 
movement strategy, which proved useful in assessing the strategies of the two case studies. Social 
movement scholars have acknowledged that social movement strategy can be profoundly affected by 
a variety of changing, exogenous factors (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996), yet there is little research 
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that considers how international actors can influence the strategy of social movements and SMOs, a 
gap in the literature which this thesis addresses. The influence by international actors on the case 
study organisations has been assessed on two levels. First, I examine the impact of international actors 
on the political opportunities broadly available to such organisations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
exploring an otherwise under-researched set of exogenous factors. Second, I analyse specific strategic 
decisions of the case studies themselves.  
 
The research is informed by, and situated within, a number of fields of academic scholarship, including 
new protectorates, international interventions and state-building, post-conflict societies, 
development, democratisation, civil society and social movement studies. Although there is a great 
deal of literature on these broad areas, there is significantly less that considers social movement and 
grassroots activity in the context of new protectorates. The majority of studies on new protectorates, 
interventions and state-building tends to be concerned with military, diplomatic and security 
elements, or on specific aspects of state-building such as the conduct of elections (Lindberg 2009). 
There are some exceptions within the literature (for example Lemay-Hébert 2013), but largely the 
wider impacts of new protectorates are left underexplored. This thesis contributes to addressing this 
gap in the literature by focusing on one dimension of the social and political changes occurring during 
and after a new protectorate context, shedding light on an area that has so far been neglected in the 
literature on new protectorates and social movement studies. 
 
In recent years, social movement theory, which sits within the field of social movement studies, has 
paid increasing attention to previously understudied movements and social movement organisations 
(for example, see Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013; Benin and Vairel 2011; Review of African Political 
Economy 2010; Escobar and Alvarez 1992). Many of these are active in regions outside of Western 
Europe and the United States which have been the traditional focus of social movement study (see 
Fominaya and Cox 2013). This has inevitably led to the analysis of a broader range of contexts in which 
social movements and SMOs function, including studies in authoritarian, democratic and hybrid 
states. Despite these recent trends, there are still a number of contexts in which the development, 
mobilisation and strategic choices of social movements and SMOs have not been considered.  
 
The development of social movement activity in post-conflict states generally receives less attention 
than other developments regarding civil society and democratisation, despite the potential of social 
movements to play an important role in the transition the state is experiencing (Banks 2007). Much 
of the literature addressing this area is produced by, or largely reliant upon, reports produced by 
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policymakers, institutions or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and often tends to focus on 
activities which are funded or supported by international donors (see Kelmendi 2012; Fagan 2010; 
Pula 2005). This understandably relies on the data available, such as voter turnout or the numbers of 
registered NGOs in an area, whereas data on more grassroots developments such as informal 
community groups and social movements is more difficult to obtain. Social movements appear to be 
peripheral to the development policies of international actors involved in new protectorates, which 
may also contribute to grassroots developments receiving less attention than other more formal 
organisations, a gap in the existing literature which this thesis fills.  
 
Despite the considerable academic attention paid to Kosovo and Afghanistan there is little literature 
on locally organised political activity in these two states. There is no academic literature on 
Afghanistan 1400, although there has been a small amount of media coverage (see Bhatti 2014; 
Huffington Post 2014; Druzin 2013; Kazemi 2012). There is significantly more coverage of 
Vetëvendosje. The latter movement has existed longer, and some of its activities have been widely 
reported on. There is also some literature on Vetëvendosje (see Lemay-Hébert 2013; Schwandner-
Sievers 2013), however the movement has not been analysed in this way before. This analysis 
therefore provides new empirical evidence on social movement and grassroots activities in Kosovo 
and Afghanistan and allows a comparative analysis of the two case studies. It focuses on more 
domestic grassroots political rather than on the power structures and networks that are the usual 
focus of studies on new protectorates. In doing this, the thesis draws attention to political activism 
demonstrating societal adjustments to post-conflict realities and the processes of state-building. 
 
This research is concerned with the ways in which the presence and actions of international actors 
can shape the nature of social movement activity and the political context in which they function. It is 
only by understanding the mechanisms through which international actors operate, as well as the 
mediating role of domestic factors, that the potential influence of new protectorates on social 
movement activity can be determined. In this thesis, I explore the economic, social and political 
agendas of international actors and their implementation. The nature and structure of new 
protectorates shift over time, along with the variable nature of the domestic contexts. These shifts 
are considered in relation to the activities and strategic choices of the two case studies. Some of the 
influences may be more obvious or direct, such as meetings with representatives of international 
actors. While these more direct influences will be examined, my analysis here attempts to look beyond 
direct interactions, and applies a wider approach that also considers more indirect interactions and 
influences of international actors. 
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Chapter One includes a review of the existing literature on new protectorates, including the types of 
international actors usually involved. The presence of international actors is explored in detail 
including the goals of these actors, particularly democratisation and civil society development. I then 
provide an assessment of the literature on social movements and their presence within new 
protectorates. The chapter also explores the relationship between social movements and civil society. 
Chapter One and its review of the literature provide the background to the following chapter that 
considers the influence of international actors on political opportunities. It also lays the foundations 
for an enquiry into the two states in which the case studies of this thesis were conducted.  
 
Chapter Two outlines the research strategy, beginning with an assessment of the case study analysis, 
including a brief overview of the two case studies and the reasons for their selection. Following this, I 
have outlined the methods of data collection and analysis, including the use of interviews. The second 
part of the chapter details the political opportunity framework by first providing an overview of the 
concept of political opportunities and how they may affect strategy. I then outline my political 
opportunity framework that utilises the existing literature on political opportunities and new 
protectorates and includes four categories that have been applied during the case study analysis. 
 
Chapters Three and Five build upon the literature review in Chapter One, focusing the field of enquiry 
to the specific contexts of Kosovo and Afghanistan respectively. Gaps in the existing literature are 
highlighted relative to each state, as well as in reference to the broader topics outlined in Chapter 
One. In addition to an analysis and narrowing of the relevant literature, both chapters provide a brief 
historical overview of the state and an assessment of the involvement by international actors. The 
actors active within each state are identified and their remits, goals and actions are explored in order 
to provide an overview of the contextual factors that may influence social movement activity. This 
overview helps establish the political opportunities available within each territory and sets the scene 
for the analysis of both case studies in Chapters Four and Six.  
 
Chapter Four considers the first case study, Vetëvendosje. It draws on information collected from 
documentary sources, including those produced by Vetëvendosje, particularly its English-language 
newsletter, as well as interviews with its members and employees of embassies, international 
organisations and civil society. A number of key elements of Vetëvendosje are analysed, including the 
reasons for its formation, and its strategic decisions such as its choice of tactics and allies. 
Vetëvendosje formed as a direct result of international intervention and in opposition to the way 
international actors saw the future of Kosovo. This position changed somewhat with the declaration 
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of independence and the following ‘supervised independence’ by international actors. Vetëvendosje 
then expanded its claims and tactics, eventually forming a political party alongside its existing 
activities. Several of the changes made by Vetëvendosje arguably resulted from the ways in which 
international actors and Vetëvendosje framed each other and the future of post-conflict Kosovo. 
 
Chapter Six considers the second case study, Afghanistan 1400, also drawing on a number of 
interviews and information produced by the organisation. The aims of Afghanistan 1400 were not 
directly opposed to aspects of the international presence. Interestingly, Afghanistan 1400 has sought 
to maintain its independence from both international and domestic groups, which is symbolic of a 
wider yet still unusual trend in Afghanistan. It has found its momentum difficult to sustain at times, 
often due to a number of domestic and cultural factors, and, at the time of writing, is focusing on 
internal issues and making plans to form a political party. 
 
Chapter Seven draws together and discusses the findings of the thesis. I analyse and compare the 
international influence over political opportunities broadly in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as in 
relation to the two case studies specifically. The conclusions in Chapter Eight reflect on the three key 
areas of literature drawn on throughout this thesis: new protectorates, social movements and political 
opportunity, and suggest potential research.  
 
The primary contention of this thesis is that the new protectorate context provides a setting for 
democratisation that is systematically different from those found in more conventional states, in 
which the level of international intervention in domestic politics is not as profound. The findings are 
particularly relevant to those interested in Afghanistan and Kosovo, as well as other states that have 
experienced state-building activity more broadly. The research is also relevant to the analysis of post-
conflict states or those with a less direct international presence but that receive international aid or 
experience a short-term international military presence. The conclusions of this thesis will therefore 
be useful to academics, policy-makers and practitioners who are working in the fields of state-building, 
development, governance, democratisation and civil society promotion.  
 
  
7 
 
CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This introductory chapter will present and discuss the relevant literature on new protectorates and 
social movements in order to provide vital contextual information to the case study analysis and the 
political opportunity framework found in Chapter Two. Below, I begin with a discussion of the concept 
of new protectorates and briefly explore their emergence and some of their key features addressed 
in the literature on new protectorates and related fields. I follow this with an assessment of the types 
of international actors that are involved in new protectorates and their various roles and 
organisational structure. I have then paid particular attention to the efforts made by international 
actors to state-build and democratise within new protectorates, which form a significant part of their 
activities and are key areas of international activity that affect political opportunities. In the second 
part of the chapter I provide an overview of the literature on social movements. This includes a 
discussion on what a social movement might consist of, why the development of social movements 
within new protectorates is of interest, such as their historical link to democratisation, as well as how 
they feature in relation to civil society development. 
 
New protectorates 
New protectorates are a feature of the post-Cold War international system, in which state sovereignty 
is the key organising principle and security threats are viewed in a global context. New protectorates 
are “territories where a medium- to long-term international presence, multilateral yet under de facto 
Western leadership, was established with transformative goals at their core” (Mayall and Oliveira 
2011: 1). New protectorates have been present in Kosovo and Afghanistan (where the case studies 
are active), as well as East Slavonia (1995-1998), East Timor, Iraq, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. All of 
these territories have seen an extensive and intrusive governance role at the domestic level by 
international actors, either via international trusteeship (as was the case in Kosovo (1999-2008), East 
Slavonia and East Timor), or they have experienced international actors playing a direct and influential 
role in shaping the nature and direction of a new political regime, i.e. state-building. Although some 
of these territories are located in different regions and have been subject to differing levels and types 
of international influence, there are a number of broad contextual similarities to be found in new 
protectorates, which I explore below. 
 
There are a number of terms that are used to refer to the processes that take place in new 
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protectorates such as liberal state-building, state-building, nation-building1, democracy promotion, 
post-conflict reconstruction, or peace-building. Some of these terms are used interchangeably in the 
coverage of such situations, though they can have different implications or uses depending on who is 
using the term or intended audience (Bain 2011). In order to provide a fuller contextual background, 
this research draws on the literature on new protectorates, as well as the literature related to these 
terms from several other disciplines.  
 
It is clear that protectorates and state-building attempts are by no means a new phenomenon. 
Mandates and trusteeship systems were part of the activities of the League of Nations a century ago. 
One example was the mandate, authorised by the League of Nations, which placed Iraq under British 
control from 1920 until 1932. There have also been more ad hoc civil administrations, such as those 
in Congo and West Papua in the 1960s. Despite similarities with earlier protectorates2 there are some 
novel elements to more recent interventions and state-building efforts in the post-Cold War period, 
which arguably justify the addition of the word ‘new’ (see Bain 2011). The starkest difference can be 
seen in the justifications for intervention and the manner in which interventions are conducted. 
Mayall and Oliveira (2011) argue that new protectorates stand out from their predecessors because 
of the narrow scope in the form of governance that is applied, regardless of the context. 
 
State building 
Modern state-building was adopted by Western policy-makers in the early 1990s as part of a broader 
peace-building strategy for dealing with problems, such as security threats to the international system, 
arising from what were referred to as post-conflict societies, fragile or failed states3 (Kostić et al. 2012; 
Boege et al. 2008; Kostić 2007; Chandler 2006; Mac Ginty 2006; Chesterman 2005; Paris 2004). This 
                                                          
1 The focus of state-building is to reconstruct institutions and should be differentiated from nation-building, which focuses 
on establishing a common identity. The concept of nation-building was heavily discussed in the 1950s and 1960s and was 
strongly linked to modernisation theories of development (for more on the use of the term see Scott 2007: 3-4; on nation-
building see Swain and Krampe 2011; Kostić 2007; Dinnen 2006; Hippler 2005; Hobsbawn 1990; Gellner 1983). Despite these 
differences, the terms nation-building and state-building are often used interchangeably, particularly in the US (see Dobbins 
2008, 2007, 2003). 
2 Bain (2011) uses the example of Britain’s declaration of the Buganda (Uganda) protectorate in 1894. He argues that 
although this was defended in a similar way (for peace, order and preventing ‘barbaric behaviour’ (see Chamberlain 1897: 
117-28)), it is very different to the US and EU supported independence of Kosovo, for example. 
3 There are a wide variety of terms used to describe these types of states and a blurring of the distinctions between them 
(see Debiel and Klein 2002). It should also be noted that those that are considered to be ‘fragile,’ or ‘failed’ are largely viewed 
from the perspective of Western security concerns (see Bøas and Jennings 2005: 388). 
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differed from the market-orientated approach that was prominent in the 1980s when structural 
adjustment programmes were viewed as the best way to deal with ‘troubled’ states (Morgan Edwards 
2010). At the end of the Cold War, discourse on globalization, human rights, humanitarian 
intervention, global governance, neoliberal economics, sovereignty and international society became 
increasingly prominent, and a shift occurred in the thinking behind Western security policy (Sedra 
2012: 47). Both George W. Bush and Barack Obama emphasised the threat posed by fragile and failed 
states in National Security Strategies, and an increasing number of other Western states and 
international agencies began to develop strategies and policy approaches that involved addressing 
these security concerns. Part of these approaches involved liberal state-building, which focused on 
building the capacity of the state, democratisation, the introduction of a market economy and the 
Western concept of statehood (Sedra 2012; Kostić et al. 2012; Kostić 2007; Chandler 2006; Kaldor 
2006; Mac Ginty 2006; Chesterman 2005; Paris 2004; Mandelbaum 2002; Atwood 1994). 4 
 
Efforts by international actors to ‘state-build’ are inevitably state centric. However, there are different 
assumptions about what ‘the state’ should be within the state-building literature (see Chesterman et 
al. 2005; Brock 2001; Zartman 1995), the prevailing concept is that a state is a liberal market 
democracy within a particular territory, and there is little debate over the type of state that 
international actors should attempt to build (Samuels and von Esiedel 2004). Boot (2002) argues that 
the way that Western states have conducted their post-intervention presence reflects a convergence, 
albeit a vague one, of liberal values prominent at the time. As a result, the form of democracy which 
is promoted, and the development programmes used to implement this, are intended to mould the 
state into one that emulates a European liberal Weberian version. This type of state is characterised 
by a top-down, centralised focus, with an emphasis on the state maintaining a monopoly the use of 
force, the ability to mobilise and manage resources and to provide services to the population. 
However, the premise that the Weberian model is the best fit for all territories is questionable, 
particularly for cases where historical developments are dissimilar.  
 
Western European states formed via a significant amount of coercion and violence (Tilly 1985; Mann 
1993) and many scholars have argued that the substantial changes that have occurred within the 
international system since the formation of Western European states make this type of state 
formation unlikely now (Vu 2010; Eriksen 2010, 2005; Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Kostovicova 2008; 
Ayoob 2007). Surprisingly there is little in the new protectorate or related literature that addresses 
                                                          
4 For more on the aims of state-building see Chandler and Sisk (2013), Berdal and Zaum (2012), and McMahon and Western 
(2010). 
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the issue of nationalism (with some exceptions, see Del Rosso 2013; Lemay-Hébert 2009; Laremont 
2005), which, although hard to define (see Brubaker 1996; Smith 1993; Greenfield 1992; Hobsbawm 
1990; Gellner 1983; Deutsch 1966), has been explored in depth in the literature more generally. Based 
on the existing literature it appears that attempts to state-build often “encourages mobilisation 
processes in ideology, politics and sentiment” that has meant “installing culturally and socially blind 
policies that followed a rationality of nationalism” (Seifert 2014: 239). This is thought to inform and 
influence the behaviour and policies of those governing new protectorates (Blumi 2003; Doubt 2000). 
This has the potential to create a backlash against external actors in the form of an anticolonial 
opposition and nationalist discourse (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Stroehle 2011).  
 
State legitimacy is necessary for the state to function and, although the term is used without 
consensus on its meaning or outcomes (Jones and Elgin-Cossart 2011), it is increasingly recognised as 
a key part of state-building by those agencies involved (USAID 2011; World Bank 2011; Zoellick 2009; 
OECD/DAC 2008). International interventions and subsequent state-building projects often face 
legitimacy issues in relation to their presence and actions (see Lemay-Hébert 2013; Narten 2009; Hehir 
2009, 2007, 2006; King and Mason 2006; Caplan 2005; Yannis 2004, 2001; Chesterman 2005). Lemay-
Hébert (2009: 66) argues that international administrations, in particular, suffer from a legitimacy 
dilemma due to the presentation of the project as exogenous to society, leading to the conditions for 
a backlash by local societies. This dilemma can also extend to the domestic actors that international 
actors choose to collaborate with. 
 
Legitimacy can be strengthened in a number of ways, such as the deployment of international police 
units, such as UN-deployed international police units, often with military forces (for example, UN 
Police (UNPOL) in East Timor or the Civilian Police (CIVPOL) in Kosovo), which, as Boyle (2011) argues, 
are meant to involve democratic policing, and can boost support and legitimacy for the new political 
regime (see Bayley 2005: 206-215; Duffield 2001; Nield 2001: 21-42; Marenin 1998: 159-77. The 
establishment of the law is one of the many elements that contribute to the state’s monopoly on the 
use of violence. Other policy areas regularly deployed by international actors in post-conflict 
territories are disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants and security 
sector reform (SSR), which should provide the state with a monopoly on the use of force and allow 
international security forces to leave (Rubin 2013). Post-conflict societies are often still coming to 
terms with ethnic, racial or religious divisions, and solutions to this are often integrated into the 
transition process. 
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These are just some of the areas which those involved in new protectorates must address, along with 
humanitarian issues, in order to achieve the broad goals of putting an end to conflict, strengthening 
the state by building, or rebuilding, transparent and accountable democratic institutions with the 
capacity to provide citizens with physical and economic security and to support political and economic 
developments (Kostić et al. 2012; Paris 2004; Chesterman 2005). The establishment of a sustainable 
market economy is a key priority for many international actors and is usually representative of the 
broader neoliberal agenda associated with new protectorates. Usually the types of economic policies 
promoted by international actors focus on privatisation, improving conditions for foreign investment 
and increasing urbanisation (Kostić et al. 2012: 41). There has been criticism that economic 
reconstruction agendas are ill-fitting (Cramer 2006: 245 ff.), and that the prioritisation of privatisation 
has resulted in destabilising consequences (Castillo 2008); for example, see Chandrasekaran (2008) on 
Iraq. 
 
Scott’s (2007) review of the state-building literature highlighted the key concerns of some of the 
different disciplines, which, he argues, can appear self-contained in their assessments of state-
building, though collaborative work has increased. Scott (2007) found that the security related 
literature is dominated by discussion of exit strategies (see Rubin 2006; Fearon and Laitlin 2004); the 
international relations literature is predominantly concerned with the role external actors play in 
restoring the state (see Etzioni 2004; Mallaby 2002; Jackson 1990); and the social studies and political 
science literature attempts to focus on the historical and socio-political context (see Dodge 2006; 
Ottaway 2002; Brock 2001). In terms of comparative literature, much of the early research on these 
types of efforts can be seen as having taken a relatively narrow form, using single case studies, 
resulting in limited comparative scope. More recent works, however, have attempted to develop more 
systematic studies highlighting common features, influences and potential lessons (for example, see 
Monten 2014; Zaum 2007; Caplan 2005; Chesterman 2005).  
 
Scott (2007) highlights a number of gaps in the literature which he suggests would drive debates within 
state-building forward, including issues surrounding gender, how cultural identities emerge and are 
shaped, local ownership, comparative historical analysis, transferability and mechanisms for 
supporting the development of civil society. Elements of the peace-building literature appear to 
address some of these issues in more depth due to its consideration of a wider range of formal and 
informal politics (Campbell and Peterson 2013). Peace-building is also largely concerned with state-
building though it is considered to be ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (UN 1992). The literature on 
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peace-building does appear to be more concerned with the voices of ordinary people that are often 
unheard in the state-building process (Mac Ginty 2006; Richmond 2005; Bendaña 2003; Fetherston 
2000). Rubin (2013: 190) argues that “[s]tudies of state-building operations often try to identify “best 
practices” without asking whom they are best for.” 
 
Significantly more has been written on the failures, rather than the successes of international actors 
state-building efforts (Scott 2007: 9), resulting in much critical discussion on the effectiveness and 
implementation of such projects (see Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Narten 2009; Bickerton 2007; 
Chesterman 2005; Chopra 2002). Criticism of international actors ranges from accusations of neo-
colonial or imperial exercises (see Berdal and Zaum 2012; Mayall and Oliveira 2011: 13; Amin 2004) 
to under-resourcing (Dodge 2006) and the failure to create peace while state-building (Jones 2010; 
Egnell 2010; Goetze and Guzina 2008; Call 2003), and short-termism (Campbell and Peterson 2013; 
Krebs and Rapport 2012). The US-led intervention in Iraq has received particularly strong criticism for 
being a predominantly neoliberal exercise that involved very little thought for the future of Iraqis 
(Bridoux 2011; Dodge 2010; Harvey 2007, 2003; Herring and Rangwala 2006; Juhasz 2006; Kiely 2005). 
 
A number of authors within the state-building literature have suggested that external actors can only 
play a limited role in state reconstruction and that state-building efforts must come from within the 
state (see Narten 2009; Carothers 2007a; Chesterman 2005). These authors argue that  
  
[w]here external actors do play a leading role in state-building, they undermine the ability of 
the emerging state to learn to govern independently and they disrupt patterns of local 
ownership, often breeding resentment and creating spoilers (Scott 2007: 7). 
 
These spoilers are “groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict 
settlement though a variety of means and for a variety of motives” (Newman and Richmond 2006: 1). 
Newman and Richmond (2006) state that the term is potentially subjective and cannot be applied in 
a binary fashion and that most actors have the capacity to act as spoilers. Determining what consists 
of a spoiler requires value judgments, particularly because the values associated with a liberal peace 
are contested, such as human rights, democracy and self-determination. 
 
Success of new protectorate projects is perhaps subjective and probably not only difficult to achieve 
but also difficult to measure. The process of state formation and democratic development can occur 
at a much faster rate than it might elsewhere, which can result in what may be lauded as a success at 
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the time being reflected on differently in light of subsequent events. This research does not set out to 
clarify the success or failures or international actors but instead seeks to establish what influence their 
presence has, positive or negative, and to contribute to the small body of literature that considers the 
developments of local grassroots political organisations, whilst also providing, to some extent, a 
comparative analysis of elements of the international presence over a significant time period. 
 
International actors 
Before continuing to assess some of the goals and the role of international actors within new 
protectorates, it is worth outlining who is being referred to when talking about ‘international actors’ 
in this context. As mentioned, interventions and subsequent new protectorates in the post-Cold War 
period have been presented as enlightened, multilateral efforts to solve problems affecting the 
security of the wider international community (Bain 2011; Mayall and Oliveira 2011b). This supposed 
multilateral and enlightened approach is one of the novel elements of new protectorates and 
highlights the shift from unilateral clientalism that was present during the Cold War. In recent decades, 
Western-led interventions, particularly humanitarian interventions (see Barnett 2005; Bellamy 2004; 
Ayoob 2002), have been presented as though sanctioned and implemented by the international 
community.  
 
The term ‘international community’ is used extensively in academic and policy circles, by politicians 
and the media (Jacques 2006; Blair 1999; Simma and Paulus 1998), and regularly appeared in 
documentary sources and interviews throughout this research. Therefore, some explanation of the 
term is required in order to establish what the term really refers to in relation to the potential 
influence of international actors on political opportunities.  
 
The term ‘international community’ is frequently used in reference to the international system, 
including international actors such as governments and NGOs, and their relations with each other 
(Simma and Paulus 1998) and is often used to suggest there is an international consensus on an issue. 
The international community conveys a sense of solidarity or a ‘community’ in the international sense, 
most associated with the UN and embodied in the General Assembly. Yet, despite the widespread use 
of the term, the real meaning, or the specifics being referred to, is more difficult to establish, and 
appears to vary depending on who is using the term and in which context. 
 
Lindberg (2014) argues that the term potentially serves as a legitimising tool for intervention and 
state-building efforts. This need for legitimacy was demonstrated by the US when, after it failed to ally 
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with many other international partners or Iraqis, the US was forced to ask the UN to assist it. This case 
also highlighted that, despite the US’s adoption of a doctrine of preventative war, in which the US 
sought to neutralise what it perceived to be security threats, the US, at some point, had to act within 
international norms that warrant multilateralism.5 Efforts to legitimise actions on behalf of the 
international community can also be seen in the high-profile international conferences often 
conducted before or after interventions, such as those on Afghanistan in Bonn (2001), Berlin (2004) 
and London (2006). Ogata (2002: 40) argues that such events are often an “attempt to force 
compromise in the name of some vague consensus. At the end of such gatherings, leaders can claim 
success in the name of the international community.” 
 
Some critics question the very existence of an international community (Haas 2013), while Gowers 
(2002: 32) argues that it more often   
 
obscures than illuminates. It allows bien-pensants everywhere to propose optimal imaginary 
courses of action for the betterment of humankind to hypothetical enlightened actors. And 
the phrase makes it easy to avoid hard thinking about who might act, out of what motive, and 
to what effect. 
 
Ogata (2002) suggests that the idea of an international community is symbolic of aspirational aims 
rather than representative ones. Others have also argued that the idea is not all that representative 
and primarily refers to Western countries, organisations and ideas (see Jacques 2006; Appadurai 2002; 
Chomsky 2002; Simma and Paulus 1998). Rao (2011) has argued that often, the perspectives and 
interests of the developing world are neglected or ignored, while Lindberg (2014: 11) argues that it is 
“the preoccupation of a subset of international actors whose claim to speak for all is highly dubious.” 
It is the case that Western states have still dominated proceedings in most cases of interventions, 
even those that received UN authorisation or when the UN became involved post-intervention.  
 
The US is one of the key proponents of the idea of an international community, and soon after 
September 11th, Paulus (2003: 74-75) suggested that the international community was in danger of 
                                                          
5 Haas (2013) argues that there is a “multilateralism’s dilemma” in which multilateralism benefits from “the inclusion of more 
actors increases an organization’s legitimacy at the expense of its utility.” Wedgewood adds that there is a problem with the 
“diffusion of responsibility” within the international community that “excuses countries that have no intention of lending a 
hand” (Wedgewood 2002: 44). However, some remain sceptical of attempts at multilateralism, so that as Bain (2011: 26) 
suggests, “[a] special place is also given to multilateralism in the belief that obtaining the blessing of the international 
community somehow vacates standard objections to alien rule.” 
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becoming indistinguishable from American perspectives and aspirations.6 The majority of states have 
little to do with new protectorates, many states are strong defenders of the concept of state 
sovereignty, particularly China and Russia (see MacFarlane 2005; Baranovsky 2001), and many African, 
Asian (Clapham 2011) and postcolonial states.7 This partly explains the lack of interest or opposition 
to interventions and liberal state-building efforts, based on principle and self-interest that stems from 
concerns about domestic secessionist issues and that precedents may be set. It is also possible that 
some states view liberal state-building as a hegemonic exercise by Western powers (Suzuki 2011: 94). 
Vocal opposition from other states is unlikely due to the potential benefits for states that take a less 
prominent role, such as investment opportunities, recognition as a member of international society 
or the maintenance of good relations. Therefore, rather than being a fully representative term, the 
reality suggests that the interests supposedly represented by the international community, 
particularly in the case of interventions and new protectorates, are actually quite limited. 
 
Despite the frequent use of the term ‘international community’ there is lingering uncertainty about 
what it represents. Therefore, it is not a term that can be relied upon to give a clear indication of the 
international actors involved, their roles and goals in new protectorates. With this in mind, it is 
important to distinguish which actors are actually involved in new protectorates generally, and those 
present in the relevant case study states, which are outline in Chapters Three and Five. Throughout 
this thesis the term ‘international actors’ is used to refer to a wide range of external actors, including 
states represented by embassies, NGOs, military forces as well as international organisations or 
institutions. Some of these actors may have less of a physical presence in the state, but may provide 
funding or support to both domestic and international recipients. Generally, international actors are 
                                                          
6 Some have argued that the US is keen to promote the idea of the international community as it legitimises elements of its 
foreign policy, aiding the perception of the US acting in the service of the international community (Chomsky 2002). 
7 For instance, China and India have not participated in the interventions leading to new protectorates. For China, the 
concepts of sovereignty and intervention are closely linked. Suzuki (2011: 92) argues that new protectorates and similar 
forms of peacekeeping are viewed “with considerable suspicion” by China. However, the stability of a new regime in 
Afghanistan was beneficial to both China’s and India’s interests. China supported UN resolution 1511 in 2003, that placed 
Iraq’s sovereignty under CPA authority, and supported the 2005 resolution on R2P (Suzuki 2011), and there is discussion 
about a future Chinese ‘peacekeeping force’ and participation in humanitarian and law enforcement efforts (Gill and Huang 
2009: 3). India takes a similar position to China, and does not feature much in the policy discourse on these issues, again 
most likely due to the desire to maintain the sovereignty norm, due to its own secessionist issues, colonial memory and some 
scepticism of US foreign policy (Ray 2011). India has been the fifth largest donor towards reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan, also donating to reconstruction efforts in Iraq, from both the private sector and aid programmes. However, 
there has been media criticism that Western donor policies are self-serving (Ray 2011), but, Both China and India 
demonstrate some desire to be recognised as a member of international society (Ray 2011; Suzuki 2011).  
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working in a coalition coordinated by the UN, NATO or another state or organisation. The huge range 
of tasks and actors involved inevitably leads to a wide variety of policies and strategies being employed 
by different international actors and some tend to take responsibility for different tasks and policy 
areas or regions of the territory. 
 
It cannot be overlooked that the US has featured as a prominent actor in several new protectorates, 
often as the instigator of the intervention and subsequent state-building. Since the end of the Cold 
War, the US has been considered the sole military superpower (Gelb 2009), giving it wide-ranging 
influence on the international stage. The US has taken different levels of responsibility in each new 
protectorate project it has have been involved in, often taking a novel approach, delegating and 
relying on allies, which may enter agreements with the US and act as junior partners in a coalition. 
Many US-led actions have been supported by some European powers, encouraging an assumption of 
their shared values and culture. Relations between the US and European powers were viewed by some 
to have drifted apart somewhat in the post-September 11th era, after an initial period of solidarity 
(Marsh and Mackenstein 2005; Gower 2002),8 although there have been a number of attempts to 
strengthen co-operation, particularly between the US and the EU (see Rice 2005). 
 
The wide variety of actors and levels of influence involved in new protectorates leads to an 
unsurprisingly complex structure and governance system. Generally, there is little clear hierarchy, and 
power is shared between various partners across different sectors. Existing research on the 
organisational elements of state-building projects suggests that organisations tend to work in a 
networked fashion (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Holohan 2005; Duffield 2001). These ‘network 
organisations’ contain a number of traditionally hierarchical (usually horizontal rather than vertical, 
see Slaughter [2009]) and bureaucratic organisations that are temporarily brought together. Mayall 
and Oliveira (2011: 18) suggest that governance in new protectorates occurs through “a patchwork of 
loose, decentralized arrangements and ill-defined and sometimes non-existent hierarchical 
relationships”.9 Poor communication, in particular, is often cited as the cause of some of the 
disorganisation occurring within these projects (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Berdal and Keen 2011; 
Holohan 2005). Several authors have suggested that, in reality, the organisational structure has limited 
                                                          
8 Some argue that European states show a general tendency towards multilateral solutions to a variety of problems, whereas 
the US is more sceptical of multilateralism (Haas 2013; Kirkpatrick 2002; Rice 2000).  
9 There have been some efforts to rectify these issues, such as the establishment of the OCHA (the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and the Brahimi Report, which argued for more integration within missions (Panel on 
UN Peace Operations 2000), though little research has arisen since to confirm whether these have delivered any 
improvements. 
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the effectiveness of state-building projects (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Holohan 2005). In addition to 
working alongside other international actors, the relationship between international actors and 
domestic elites is of vital importance to the transition of the state (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Tansey 
2009; Holohan 2005). I will discuss the relationships among international actors, as well as those with 
domestic actors in relation to political opportunities in the following chapter.  
 
Democratisation 
One of the core features of a new protectorate is a transition to democracy. The attempts to establish 
democracy by international actors can have a significant impact on political opportunities, which will 
be discussed in the following chapter. Here, I will briefly explore the approach of international actors 
to democractisation, its appropriateness for new protectorates, and the role of elections. 
 
Democratisation put simply by Potter (1997: 3), means that a country experiences “political changes 
moving in a democratic direction”. The process of democratisation is largely subjective and the 
concept has been debated at length as part of a subfield within comparative politics. Since the mid-
1980s there has been a substantial amount of literature on the causes, processes and outcomes of 
democratic transitions (see Tansey 2009; Carothers 2002; Linz and Stepan 1996). International 
institutions, donor governments and development agencies have upheld the centrality of 
democratisation as a means to achieve stability and development in post-conflict contexts since the 
1990s (Lake 1994), and has been encouraged via democracy promotion. The promotion of democracy 
involves external actors attempting to install or aid democratic governance in other territories 
(Hobson and Kurki 2012). This is usually done via democracy assistance (a mixture of financial, 
technical and symbolic tools), conditionalities or the use of force (see Burnell 2000). Proponents, who 
come from both liberal and realist schools of thought, see democratic states as politically and 
economically open and free, and argue that democratisation lessens, or even removes the potential 
for conflict between democratic states and increases stability (see Bridoux and Kurki 2014; Suzuki 
2011; Barnett et al. 2007; Gurtov and van Ness 2005; Paris 2004). The use of force, as well as the overt 
promotion of democracy, became much less popular after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan 
damaged the legitimacy of democracy promotion (Carothers 2007b).  
 
The US is one of the main proponents of democracy promotion, which features heavily in its liberal 
internationalist foreign policy. European states, as well as the EU, have also committed increasing 
resources for the purposes of democracy promotion in the post-Cold War period, albeit with a 
different approach to the US. The EU is now seen as one of the most successful actors in this field 
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(Bridoux and Kurki 2014; Youngs 2001). In addition there are a variety of other democracy promoting 
actors, such the UN, OECD, international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, 
which are increasingly interested in governance structures and tend to promote a neoliberal 
democratic model (Kurki 2013). Western states such as the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Germany implement various projects directly or have political foundations. Private companies, NGOs 
and CSOs such as Amnesty International, are also all involved in the promotion of democracy. 
Interestingly, a study by Kurki (2013) revealed that the dominant conception of democracy among key 
donors is a broadly ‘liberal democratic’ framework, which has been largely accepted. These actors, 
which pursue the promotion of liberal democracy, are largely the same as those that have been 
involved in new protectorates to date. 
 
There are still some different approaches to democracy and what internationally-promoted 
democratisation should comprise of, or what its end-goal should be. However, several uniform 
assumptions have been made based on the key tenets of Western liberal democracy, such as 
individual voting, property and other citizenship rights, gender equality, the development of civil 
society and freedom of the press. In theory, when democracy is promoted it is not only meant in the 
practical sense, but also in relation to the wider values and ideas seen by Western democracy 
promoters to be an implicit and essential part of a democratic state.  
 
Like the concept of state-building, whether the promotion of liberal democracy is appropriate for all 
contexts is a hotly debated topic (see Bridoux and Kurki 2014). Many have criticised the promotion of 
democracy as the imposition of certain ideas, values and practices by Western governments on ‘weak’ 
states. This serves the governments promoting democracy but leaves those within the state without 
much of a say (see Pridham 2005; Whitehead 1996). In response to this criticism the language of 
democracy promotion has changed in recent years. Some actors have attempted to adjust their 
strategies by encouraging more ‘local’ initiatives and ‘bottom up’ democratisation, local ownership 
and civil society development (see EC 2012; UN 2011; UNSC 2005). Despite these efforts, several 
scholars argue that there is still a tendency for the modern, democratic and powerful West to 
enlighten those that are not or that these efforts still serve as a means to implement the will of 
international actors (Vogel 2016; Bridaux and Kurki 2014; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Teivainen 
2009). Bridaux and Kurki (2014: 73) also argue that instead new forms of power have emerged which 
are “being exercised in implicitly and covert, if sometimes unacknowledged and unintentional ways.” 
 
In early research carried out in this field, domestic factors were considered to be the primary 
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influences on democratisation and internationally influences were explicitly given subordinate roles 
(see for example, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Przeworski, 1991; O'Donnell et al. 1986). However, from 
the early 1990s onwards, the focus on domestic factors came under increasing criticism. Recently, 
more attention has been paid to the variety of international actors and contexts that can affect the 
likelihood and nature of regime change. This has resulted in the identification of a broad range of 
international variables and mechanisms which are thought to influence democratic transition, such as 
the effect of the number of democratic neighbours (see Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2009; Munck 
2007; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditch and Ward 2006; Pevehouse 2005; Wejner 2005; Whitehead 
2001; Pridham et al. 1997; Huntington; 1991). This research is most concerned with the international 
influences as it seeks to explore the impact of international actors on the democratic transition within 
new protectorates, in order to establish how they influence political opportunities. 
 
In new protectorates, the conduct and outcome of elections plays a key role in the establishment of 
democracy and in legitimating the post-war state (Sisk 2013). The process of establishing elections in 
post-conflict contexts has, in most cases proved difficult, and has often led to violence and even the 
re-emergence of war, or has created the conditions for state capture by factions or heightened 
existing divisions (Mulaj 2011; Sisk 2008; Mansfield and Snyder 2007, 2005; Paris 2004; Lyons 2002). 
There is wide range of factors that can affect the conduct of elections, such as the type of elections 
held (local or national), their timing, and the preparation, including the drafting of electoral law, the 
establishment of electoral bodies, efficient voter registration and successful DDR. The potential effects 
of elections on political opportunities are outlined in the next chapter, followed by an overview of the 
processes and outcomes of the elections that took place in Kosovo and Afghanistan in Chapters Three 
and Five. 
 
Civil society development 
International actors have placed a lot of emphasis on civil society development in new protectorates, 
which also has the potential to open or constrain political opportunities as explored in Chapter Two. 
Here, I will briefly discuss the concept of civil society and how it became part of the policy and 
discourse of international actors. 
 
Without delving too deeply into the literature on civil society it can be said that the concept is 
ambiguous. Taylor (1991: 52) defines civil society as “a web of autonomous associations independent 
of the state which, bound together in matters of common concern by mere existence or action, could 
have an effect on public policy”. Civil society development became an integral part of democracy 
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promoting foreign policy in the 1980s. Political upheavals in Latin America and Eastern Europe were 
largely perceived as positive examples of democratisation from below, and civil society was seen as 
crucial element of the revolutions that took place (della Porta 2014; Carothers 1999: 207-208; Hann 
and Dunn 1996: 144). An increasing amount of aid has been put into developing civil society, 
particularly since the shift in rhetoric on democracy promotion. The focus of support by international 
actors then shifted from party building to incentivising civil society groups.  
 
The development of civil society is of particular interest to this research because of the role it can play 
in the democratisation process, the efforts by international actors to promote it, and its potential 
effect on political opportunities. Some consider civil society to be a significant part of the 
democratisation process (see Chandhoke 2007; Linz and Stepan 1996; Diamond 1994: 5). Diamond 
(1999) argues that civil society generally has a positive influence on democratisation, as it can keep 
checks and balances on the power of the state, increase political participation, help the development 
of a democratic culture and institutions, and create additional channels through which a variety of 
interests can be put forward.  
 
In a similar vein to the discussion on democratisation and state-building, the concept of civil society 
has been considered by some to maintain a historically Western and ethnocentric bias. Some argue 
that it has not transferred particularly well to other regions (Bain 2011: 36; Lewis 2002; Hann 1996: 
3). There are different approaches to civil society, for instance, mainstream American or neo-liberal 
approach, which views the emergence of NGOs as desirable due to their contribution to economic 
efficiency and political pluralism. The European or activist approach, on the other hand views civil 
society as active citizenship and growing self-organisation outside formal political circles (Kaldor 2003: 
8). There are also differences in the approaches of various institutional and collective actors, such as 
social movements (della Porta 2014). 
 
However, the way the concept of civil society is framed by international actors who attempt to 
promote democracy is quite different to the way it is discussed within traditional discourses of liberal 
modernity (Chandler 2013). Some argue that just like the ‘term international community’, the term 
‘civil society’ obscures more than it illuminates (Veltmeyer 2004). Many civil society organisations 
provide services as a supplement to state provisions (della Porta 2014). For this reason, they can be a 
popular choice for donors, particularly if the latter believe that the state itself is incapable of handling 
the donations or providing certain services. However, although CSOs may effectively fill this role, in 
the long term, this practice can arguably lead to the undermining of the state’s capacity (Stephenson 
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and Zanotti 2012). Aside from service providers, Belloni (2008) identifies two broad areas of civil 
society that are generally supported by international actors. One is support for ‘democracy groups,’ 
which includes NGOs that educate or advocate inclusive civic principles. The other is for NGOs that 
advocate for a pluralism of political identities such as youth and women, which have the potential to 
break down dominant collective affiliations (Chandler 2013).  
 
The focus on civil society support by international actors is less overtly political than previous efforts 
to promote democracy via the support of institutions or political parties (Bridaux and Kurki 2014). 
Several scholars have argued that the type of civil society promoted by international actors is 
depoliticised (Bridaux and Kurki 2014; Chandler 2013; Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009) which can result 
in local actors and efforts being side-lined (Vogel 2016; Pouligny 2005; Veltmeyer 2004; Kasfir 1998), 
and more radical, contentious or ‘uncivil’ elements of civil society losing their ability to advocate for 
radical change (Heathershaw 2008; Sen 2005; Richmond 2005; Bendaña 2003; Fetherston 2000). 
Esteves, Motta and Cox (2009: 3) argue that the ‘civil’ usually consists of “officially-approved versions 
of popular participation in politics geared towards the mobile[s]ation of consent for neo-liberalism 
through institutional channels.”  
 
Some scholars go further to suggest that international actors actually work against civil society groups 
that are considered spoilers to liberal state-building and peace processes (Chandler 2013; Sisk 2008). 
Chandler (2013: 88) argues that civil society becomes “central to the international statebuilding 
paradigm […] when civil society becomes a sphere of external or international policy-intervention 
rather than an unproblematic sphere of autonomy.” He goes on to argue that the policy interventions 
that take place within the framing of civil society are not always about developing civil society but are 
“organised around minimising the opportunities and raising the costs of rebellion” (Chandler 2013: 
90). This side-lining of more radical or ‘uncivil’ elements of civil society is particularly relevant to this 
research, given the effect it could have on social movement activity, which is considered in more detail 
below. 
 
The development of a more depoliticised civil society is also supported by more specific criticisms such 
as the impact of external funding, which has led to the professionalisation of civil society, increased 
competition between organisations, and a growing gap between those who claim to be 
representatives and those they claim to represent (Smith 2015; Lynch 2013; Choudry and Kapoor 
2013; Paffenholz 2009; Aksartova 2009; Alvarez 2009; Rajagopol 2003).  
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The literature on the strength and effectiveness of civil society in post-conflict and post-totalitarian 
contexts presents a mixed picture. Some studies have suggested that civil society is often weak due 
to a wide range of issues such as distrust, as well as due to the external funding of civil society (see 
Fagan 2010; Kerr 2009; Demjaha and Peci 2004). It is very difficult to establish how local civil society 
might continue to develop without intervention by international actors. It does appear that some 
elements of local civil society may be overlooked or ignored by international actors. For example, the 
constitution writing process had minimal local input in Iraq (see Arato 2009) and East Timor (Garrison 
2005). Banks (2007: 105) argues that generally in post-conflict states, constitution writing generally 
goes on out of sight, with “no input from average citizens or civil society.” However, there are some 
cases that have seen a more participatory approach to the constitution writing process (see Banks 
2007; Samuels 2006; Ghai and Galli 2006; McCool 2004). The level and type of civil society 
development in Kosovo and Afghanistan will be considered in Chapters Three and Five, as well as the 
resulting political opportunities. 
 
Social movements  
Even a brief consideration of the literature on social movements highlights an array of definitions, 
perhaps reflecting the different theoretical assumptions or empirical requirements of researchers 
(Fominaya and Cox 2013). As discovered in the course of this research, the term ‘movement’ is often 
applied to entities that do not fit with traditional definitions of movements. Batliwala goes as far as 
saying that the term ‘movement’ has “become so au courant and loosely used in current discourse to 
become almost devoid of meaning” (2002: 393). Many scholars have attempted to address the 
definitional issues surrounding social movements by comparing social movements to pressure groups 
or NGOs (see Igoe 2003; Hilhorst 2003; Foweraker 2001; Taylor 1997; Masden 1997; Fisher 1997; 
Schlaepfer et al. 1994). Diani (1992: 7) has identified four common and linked factors to many 
definitions of social movements: collective identity, shared beliefs and solidarity, collective action, and 
networks of informal interaction. 
 
Whittier (2002) describes the shifting nature of social movements, perhaps highlighting why a 
universally accepted definition seems to be so elusive:  
 
Social movements are neither fixed nor narrowly bounded in space, time, or membership. 
Instead, they are made up of shifting clusters of organisations, networks, communities, and 
activist individuals, connected by participation in challenges and collective identities through 
which participants define the boundaries and significance of their groups (Whittier 2002: 289). 
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Movements can take many different paths but generally go through four stages (Blumer 1969). The 
first stage is the emergence of the movement, which can occur for a variety of reasons (see della Porta 
and Diani 2006; Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Tarrow 1998; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tilly 1978; Mauss 1975; 
Blumer 1969). Stage two is coalescence, during which members are recruited and strategies are 
determined. Stage three involves institutionalisation of bureaucratisation, which often involves the 
payment of some staff. Movements might begin to work within the system rather than outside it by 
becoming an NGO or by participating in electoral politics. Decline is considered to be the fourth stage 
of a movement, which can occur for a number of reasons such as a lack of resources, a decline in 
enthusiasm or they may experience repression (Voss 1996; Tilly 1978; Mauss 1975; Blumer 1969). It 
is also possible, and perhaps almost inevitable in some cases, that a movement might fizzle out once 
their goals have been reached or if the political situation changes enough. Tilly (2004a) has argued 
that political decentralisation, a move from democratisation, or the privatisation of the governmental 
or political sphere are the circumstances most likely to affect movement sustainability. 
 
Given the shifting nature of movements, there is a tendency for activity levels to rise and fall due to 
changing contextual factors, previous successes and failures and fluctuating membership. The number 
of social movements active at any time tends to fluctuate more than other types of civil society actors 
functioning in what Tarrow (1998) calls ‘cycles of contention’. Most studies of movements focus on 
the periods when they are most active. This results in little attention being paid to a movement’s 
latent periods and the reasons for it. Neglecting their latent phases may, however, lead to some 
important and interesting elements of movement development being overlooked (see Meyer 1999). 
An assessment of how movements react to the shifting context within a new protectorate is an 
essential part of this study; therefore attempts have been made to consider the less active periods of 
both case studies as this may symbolise a shift in strategy or the impact of political opportunities.  
 
As already mentioned, social movements can emerge for a number of reasons and the goals and 
tactics of a movement can be incredibly varied. A standard typology of social movements does not 
exist though some movements are easier to distinguish. Some movements can for example be 
considered revolutionary, nationalist, conservative, religious, or reformist. Generally, movements 
tend to politicise their aims and demonstrate resistance to the status quo, typically forming organically 
with financial support provided by their membership. Social movements are considered to be more 
organised entities than ad hoc formations or coordinated protests, though they are not organisations 
(Tilly 1988; Oliver 1989; della Porta and Diani 2006).  
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As Whittier (2002) states, social movements can include organisations, which are known as SMOs. A 
number of SMOs may form part of a social movement and often coordinate and conduct tasks 
necessary for a movement to succeed. Movements and SMOs can express challenges and demands 
using a variety of tactics, which can include institutional or non-institutional methods, such as direct 
action, protests, lobbying or campaigns. SMOs, according to McCarthy and Zald (1977), make claims 
on authorities by combining an organisational element with the direct participation of a movement’s 
constituents. Zald and Ash (1966: 327) state that “[s]ocial movements manifest themselves in part, 
through a wide range of organisations. These organisations are subject to internal and external 
pressures which effect their viability, their internal structure and processes, and their ultimate success 
in attaining goals.” 
 
An increasing amount of attention has been paid to the development, actions and theories of social 
movements, particularly since the 1980s (della Porta and Diani 2006; Morris and Herring 1987). Social 
movement theory (SMT) attempts to explain why and how social mobilisation occurs, and what the 
consequences of this mobilisation are. There are a number of theories, including relative deprivation, 
rational choice, resource mobilization, and political opportunity. That latter is the aspect of SMT that 
is of interest to this thesis and elaborated on in Chapter Two. 
 
Until recently, the majority of research on social movement activity and the application of social 
movement theory has concentrated on cases in Western democracies in the United States and Europe 
(see Fominaya and Cox 2013; della Porta and Diani 2006). Outside of these areas, there has been some 
research of non-Western movements (Arbatli and Rosenberg 2017), a significant amount of research 
on Latin America (see Petras and Veltmeyer 2011; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Calderón, Piscitelli and 
Reyna 1992;), some research on post-communist states (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013; Mendelson 
and Glenn 2002), and other states, such as India (see Shiva 1989; Shet 1987; Kothari 1987) and Russia 
(see Ivanou 2013; Chebankova 2012; Fröhlich 2012; Richter 2002; Sperling 1999), some of which have 
included comparative and regional assessments (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013; Beinin and Vairel 
2011; Petras and Veltmeyer 2011). The protests in the MENA region that emerged in 2011 have led to 
increased research on movements and political activism in the region (Beinin 2016; Abdelrahman 
2015; Povey 2015; Beinin and Vairel 2011). One area of social movement studies that remains 
understudied, however, is social movement activity in post-conflict states or states that have 
experienced international interventions. It is this area, which this thesis contributes to.  
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Social movements and new protectorates 
The activity of social movements within the context of new protectorates is of particular interest 
because of the emphasis placed on democratisation by international actors involved in state-building. 
Many scholars have acknowledged the historical significance of social movements in the 
establishment of democratic states (Tilly 1985) and the consolidation of political systems, which can 
often be seen through the relationship between social movements and political parties (see Caruso 
2015; Johnstone 2012; Tilly 2004; 1986; Goldstone 2004; Marks and McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996; Tilly 
1984). Even at a basic conceptual level, democracy and the Western nation-state are strongly 
interconnected and the development of the social movement as a form is closely tied to the 
development of the state as a political entity (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1984). 
 
Generally, social movements are thought to promote the processes of democratisation and to 
encourage a feeling of citizenship amongst movement members (Earle 2011). At the same time social 
movement activity is considered to be galvanised by increasing democratisation (Tilly 2004a). Norris 
argues that there is strong evidence that many of the actions taken by social movements, such as 
demonstrations, petitions and boycotts “encourage a vibrant and active democratic state” (Norris 
2006: 16). Avritzer and Santos (2003: 21) highlight the important role which social movements have 
in recovering local forms of participation that have been excluded by the state, referred to as the 
‘constituent power’ of social movements by Hardt and Negri (2001: 42). Earle (2011: 4) suggests that 
where more formal channels for expressing demands do not exist or function, movements provide an 
alternative means to make demands.  
 
Despite these elements, it should be acknowledged that some scholars suggest that movements are 
not always beneficial to democratic development as understood from Western perspectives. For 
instance, some argue that the presence of social movements, can, in fact, generate instability (Earle 
2011). Also, not all movements are progressive, they do not reach everyone they claim to represent, 
and they can be internally undemocratic, overshadow or marginalise other groups, and may become 
less participatory if they enter electoral politics (Foweraker 1995). Earle (2011: 12) argues that “even 
those that provide some benefits locally, may not be stimulating democratic values, as understood by 
Western governments” (also see DRC-Citizenship 2010: 13). 
 
The broader, less technical aspects of democratisation require the development of democratic norms 
and practices in order to reform a political sector capable of supporting the building and functioning 
of democratic state institutions. These broader aspects are often harder to quantify, and therefore 
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most assessments of democratisation focus on measurable elements such as voter turnout. A number 
of ways of measuring democracy have been utilised, including the qualitative methods which were 
used by Tilly (2007) as well as quantitative comparisons like the Polity Model by Jaggers and Gurr 
(1995) or the works of Freedom House (2011) and Vanhanen (2000). These comparisons determine 
how democratic a country is by using several indicators, such as election frequency, competitiveness, 
officials’ responses to citizens’ demands, and how ‘free’ civil society activism is in opposition to 
government. International actors tend to focus on these types of indicators and on the progress of 
technical issues as signifiers of being on the right track, such as the passing of certain legislation, 
elections and time frames for the military and civilian presence. Therefore, despite the use of these 
models, there is little information about how much democratisation beyond the technical level has 
really occurred, particularly in new protectorate contexts. As a result these measurements are quite 
limiting when trying to assess levels of grassroots activity, political protest or social movement activity. 
 
There is little written about the role or development of social movements, SMOs and grassroots 
political organisations in the state-building literature or in the contexts of post-conflict or fragile states 
more broadly (Oosterom 2009:5). This may be, in part, due to the limitations on such developments 
in these areas, as well as the difficulty in gaining access or information. One useful source is a literature 
review produced by The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) on the 
Dynamics of Social Movements in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States that gives some useful insights 
into movement activity in fragile states but the literature covered in the review largely focuses on 
states in Africa and the MENA and not those that have experienced extensive state-building (Earle 
2011).10 
 
The lack of literature also highlights the tendency in the state-building literature, to focus on 
international actors, as Scott notes, the bulk of state-building literature is “less self-consciously 
altruistic and carries overtones of meeting the needs of the external actors in the international 
community, rather than the needs of poor communities on the ground” (Scott 2007: 5). Although a 
number of authors have emphasised the importance of local ownership (Marten 2006; Chesterman 
                                                          
10 The literature review highlights several themes arising from the literature on movements in fragile states, particularly in 
reference to the types of movements, which include work on women’s movements (see Fallon 2008; Norris 2006; Molyneux 
2002 (on Sub-Saharan Africa); Gbowee 2009 (on Liberia); Castillejo 2008 (on Sierra Leone); Kaufman and Williams 2010), 
peace movements (see Castillejo 2008; Press 2010 (on Liberia); Kaufman and Williams 2010; Shrestha and Adhikiar 2010 (on 
Nepal)), socio-economic movements (see Mochizuki 2009; Obi 2005), faith-based movements (Kirmani 2008 (Palestine); 
Grynkerich 2008; Ladbury and Khan 2008 (both Egypt); Gunming 2007; Casonova 2001; Beckford 2001) and youth 
movements (USAID 2006; Bernard 2005). 
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et al. 2005) and reforms moulded to suit the local context (see Migdal 2001), the majority of the 
literature in this area focuses on the technical aspects of democratisation and ‘high politics’ (Scott 
2007). This thesis contributes to the smaller body of literature that considers the consequences for, 
and reactions from, citizens within a new protectorate context.  
 
Elements of the literature on societies in conflict, fragile states and post-conflict states highlight 
several features that are likely to affect a post-conflict society and the potential development of 
grassroots political activity such as movements. Several authors also suggest that there are generally 
low levels of trust in the state and other communities (Howard 2003; Earle 2011: 4) and that societies 
are “often polarised in ethnic, religious or class-based groups, often as a result of a legacy, or, some 
argue, colonialism” (Mcloughlin 2009: 23) (see also Howard [2003] on the effects of communism). 
Generally, Mcloughlin (2009:23) argues, “these societies are often dislocated from – and ambivalent 
towards – the state” and lack the “virtuous cycles of cooperation, trust, reciprocity and collective well-
being that are vital in forming the social contract.” This can be damaging for the positive development 
of state-society/citizen relations such as the ‘capacity to aspire’ - “the desire or ability to engage in 
collective action” (Earle 2011: 4). These factors, along with violence and repression, also have the 
potential to stimulate engagement (Earle 2011: 4), as well as the agency and determination of some 
within post-conflict societies. Social movements can be seen as a demonstration of the presence of 
active citizens who show a desire to engage with the state and provide a way to increase the level of 
interaction between citizens and the state (Earle 2011: 30). 
 
Social movements and civil society 
There is little in the social movement literature that directly addresses whether social movements are 
a part of civil society. To start with “civil society and social movements often have complex and 
contradictory practices and relationships which do not always fit within easily definable categories” 
(Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009: 3). Della Porta (2014) states that social movements are largely missing 
from the civil society literature, and that the study of the two fields has grown apart, each with their 
own approach and different conceptions of democracy. Howard (2003: 39) argues that the 
differentiation between social movements and civil society has been underspecified due to the 
tendency for academics to study one and not both. Movements active at the global level have been 
discussed (see della Porta 2014; Costoya 2007) and a small number of authors have linked social 
movements and civil society more broadly (see della Porta 2014; Mercer 2002; Baker 2002). While van 
der Heijden (2010) argues that there is an important overlap between social movements and the 
public sphere as part of civil society, Habermas (1992: 443) provides one of the few definitions of civil 
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society that specifically mentions movements as an inclusive part.  
 
Civil society is made up of more or less spontaneously created associations, organi[s]ations 
and movements, which find, take up, condense and amplify the resonance of social problems 
in private life, and pass it on to the political realm or public sphere (Habermas 1992: 443).  
 
Proponents of deliberative democracy (see Dryzek 2000; Offe 1997; Mansbridge 1996) have argued 
that social movements can play a key role in the development of autonomous public spheres, by 
contributing to the dialogue and interaction between individuals and the state that forms the ‘public 
sphere’ (Wainwright 2004: 94; Howard 2003).11  
 
The literature on civil society suggests that it is more appropriate to consider social movements and 
SMOs to be civil society actors, but not civil society organisations (CSOs). A CSO, as defined by the 
OECD (2009), can include “all non-market and non-state organisations outside of the family in which 
people organize themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain.” CSOs, which include 
NGOs, generally have less disruptive methods than social movements, which tend to have a more 
grassroots base and their claims are often considered to be radical (della Porta 2014). Van der Heijden 
(2010: 39) argues that movements challenge prevailing politics and highlight alternatives using a 
“critical, sometimes counter-hegemonic way of defining problems and solution strategies.” This may 
result in movements being considered spoilers or ‘uncivil’ as discussed above. NGOs also tend to 
possess more resources and are organised in a more formal manner (della Porta 2014). NGOs tend to 
receive funding from external sources, while social movements do not, which allows the potential for 
movements to be subject to exclusion by international actors (Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009). 
 
There is little mention in the academic or policy literature of any direct interest by international actors 
in social movements. Earle’s (2011) literature review on social movements in fragile states does point 
to ways in which international donors may support social movements, but there is little other 
literature like this. There are a number of reasons that direct funding of social movements does not 
seem to be particularly common. From a movement perspective, it may wish to remain as 
                                                          
11 Guidry writes in a mix between Habermasian and Gramscian terminology about a dominant public sphere, controlled by 
the state, the elite, and the media, and opposed by several counter public spheres fronted by social movements putting 
forward the views of those marginalised by the dominant public sphere (Guidry 2003: 499). According to this model the 
democratic arena is extended when views from a counter public sphere are adopted in the dominant public sphere and the 
opinion of marginalised groups is thus heard. 
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independent as possible and not want to risk the possibility, or perception, of co-option or a loss of 
autonomy (Earle and Pratt 2009). International funding of social movements has the potential to 
create the same competition for resources (DRC-Citizenship 2006) that exists amongst NGOs and civil 
society. Paffenholz (2009) notes a move towards the professionalisation and formalisation of activist 
networks as they seek funds from international donors, dubbed the “taming of social movements” 
and the “NGOization of social protest,” which can generate competition between organisations and 
“shifted accountability from the societies concerned to the donors themselves” (Paffenholz 2009: 24; 
also see Smith 2015; Lynch 2013; Choudry and Kapoor 2013; Aksartova 2009; Alvarez 2009; Esteves, 
Motta and Cox 2009; Rajagopal 2003). International funding may encourage social movements to 
behave in a certain way, responding to donor’s interests over those of their members (Earle 2011: 7; 
Earle 2009), which may impact their abilities to mobilise or sustain the movement.  
 
From the perspective of international actors, they may not be interested in funding movements if they 
view them as unpredictable or too politicised, as discussed above. International actors may view social 
movements as spoilers, a hindrance to state-building that may also create resentment from national 
governments, particularly if these groups are viewed as opposition (DRC-Citizenship 2006: 15). Della 
Porta (2014: 140) argues that when civil society actors are viewed as non-contentious, donors are 
content to fund them. She argues that this has the effect of marginalising those movements “that 
could claim social and political reforms, as well as practicing different conceptions of democracy” and 
are “excluded from the understanding of ‘civil society’ that is key in current donor strategies.” 
Nuscheler (2003) suggests that aside from a number of large NGOs with more resources and access, 
smaller, grassroots-orientated organisations that can survive only on the basis of volunteer work tend 
to articulate civil society more. This literature suggests that internationally donor-funded civil society 
development in new protectorates provides a crucial link between international actors and those 
seeking political change and is highly likely to impact upon political opportunities available. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has highlighted the wide range of literature that applies to social movements and new 
protectorates. It has demonstrated that the presence of international actors within a territory is 
systematically different to more conventional domestic political settings, in which such extensive 
international intervention is absent. International actors not only provide assistance and guidance 
regarding domestic development, and in some cases also hold temporary executive authority over 
some or all of the functions of government, but can have considerable influence over a wide variety 
of political factors, including the form of governance, rule of law, institution building, economic and 
social reforms, and civil society development. International actors often assume roles usually filled by 
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domestic actors, and therefore have a wide variety of mechanisms of influence. The level of such 
influence is variable over time and delivered by different actors. It is also the case that the existing 
domestic context will shape the influence and role of the international actors. However, it is inevitable 
that international actors contribute to the shaping the political context in which movements in these 
territories have to function, the extent to which is explored throughout this thesis.   
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
This chapter outlines the research strategy I used to answer my research questions. Here I introduce 
the approach of the research and the methods used, including an outline of the case studies 
themselves and the reasons for their selection. I also detail the way data was collected and analysed 
in support of the case analysis. Following this, I introduce the political opportunity framework, which 
incorporates the literature on new protectorates into four categories that are used to assess the 
political opportunities available. 
 
Given the lack of existing academic research on elements of social movements within new 
protectorates and on the two case studies, the research strategy and goals of the study required an 
exploratory approach. Concepts were developed and refined throughout the collection and analysis 
of the data. Primarily qualitative methods were used to collect data and to interpret the complex 
social processes of interest to the study. Documentary sources and interviews were the key methods 
of data collection that contributed to the case study analysis. These methods, which are detailed 
below helped to gather a variety of data necessary to analyse the situation in both territories and 
assisted in the attempt to apply existing research on social movements to the specific context of new 
protectorates, enabling the research to make a contribution to the literature. The lack of data or 
existing research into the areas of interest to this study made it difficult to provide concrete variables 
in relation to the movements’ activities and influences. Therefore a formal variable model was not 
appropriate. 
 
A political opportunity framework, explained later in this chapter, was used as a guide to analyse the 
impact of the presence of international actors via their influence on political opportunities. Given that 
a political opportunity framework has not previously been applied to a new protectorate context, I 
drew on the political opportunity and new protectorate literatures to provide an altered framework 
that could be used to better assess the influence of international actors on movements.  
 
Case studies 
The selection of viable case studies for the case study analysis was a vital part of the research process. 
The specific context of new protectorates significantly narrowed the number of territories and time 
periods from which the cases could be selected. Once the new protectorates had been established 
several initial ideas were explored within each new protectorate territory before it was possible to 
decide which cases to select. I began by seeking out reports of social movement activity in new 
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protectorates from internet and academic searches, news reports, social media, and personal 
knowledge. This preliminary research highlighted a number of groups that considered themselves to 
be movements and, on first look, demonstrated some movement attributes, such as collective action 
and the involvement of networks of citizens. However, often after further research, the less they 
resembled social movements as defined in the literature. The grassroots political activity found in new 
protectorates often represented either that of a mixture of organised and unorganised protests, which 
were sometimes spontaneous and generally over short periods of time, and did not necessarily 
represent a social movement. At the other end of the scale, many groups appear to be too organised 
to be termed social movements and were in fact NGOs. 
 
It cannot be said that local actors are entirely deprived of agency and it is possible that the new 
protectorate context has the potential to galvanise social movement activity (Earle 2011: 4). There are 
clear instances of protests and cases of resistance by local actors against the methods of political, 
social and economic reconstruction, often initiated by international actors, within new protectorates. 
A number of studies on Iraq have assessed local resistance and protests that were organised against 
the ongoing occupation, corruption and demands for better security and infrastructure (see Isakhan 
2015, 2012, 2009, 2008, 2006; Bridaux and Kurki 2014), and more recently an increasingly prominent 
workers’ movement (Isakhan 2009). There are also a number of religious movements that existed in 
Iraq before the US invasion, particularly the Sadr movement. There have been women’s movements 
present in Iraq since the 1920s and international actors have emphasised women’s rights since the US 
intervention in 2003. However, this emphasis has actually changed the way women’s groups function 
and Al-Ali and Pratt (2009) argue that the calls for women’s liberation by international actors may 
actually end up oppressing women in Iraq in the long term. 
 
Another example can be seen in East Timor, which was administered by the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) from 1999 until independence in 2002, followed 
by a UN support mission, the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), and 
peacekeeping forces until 2005. After this, police and administrative staff remained, as part of the 
United Nations Office in Timor Leste (UNOTIL). After the intervention in 1999 political participation 
was limited and a number of students, opposition elites and former veterans had protested to increase 
it (Salmon and Anderson 2013). In 2006, what started as a peaceful protest turned into violent clashes, 
prompting a military intervention by Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Portugal and eventually 
resulted in a change of leadership (Simonsen 2006; Chopra 2002, 2000; Suhrke 2001). However, the 
protests did not constitute a movement. 
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Thus, the initial research demonstrated that the type of activity considered to be social movement 
activity (as outlined in Chapter One) is limited within new protectorates, or is at least on a far smaller 
scale than one would expect to find in an established democracy. There are a number of likely reasons 
for this in conflict and post-conflict situations and it is to be expected that there may be limitations on 
social movement activity. Also, as explored in Chapter One, the type of civil society development 
promoted in new protectorates is generally of a ‘civil’ nature, which provides services or advocates 
for civic principles or pluralism (Bridaux and Kurki 2014; Chandler 2013; Belloni 2008), which has the 
potential to side-line and hinder social movement activity, a factor that is considered in the following 
chapters.  
 
Bearing the above discussion in mind, I have selected case studies which do not necessarily resemble 
social movements in the strictest sense but are the closest entities I could find in each territory, post-
international intervention. The first case study, Vetëvendosje, arguably began as a social movement, 
which became an SMO. Afghanistan 1400 is more representative of a CSO, but as I argue below, it is 
still provides a useful case study for the research questions. 
 
Both case studies self-define as movements and, prior the decisions to become political parties, 
actively wanted to avoid being considered as political parties or NGOs. This highlights some interesting 
questions relating to the definitions of social movements, CSOs, and NGOs. This is particularly 
pertinent in light of the type of civil society that is promoted in new protectorates and, as Esteves, 
Motta and Cox state, social movements and NGOs should not be considered as two distinct spheres, 
but as different modes of popular organisation. They argue that  
 
“their abilities to ally with one another, to play each other’s roles (as when things that look 
like movements act like NGOs or vice versa), to push each other out of the way or to play a 
good-cop, bad-cop routine can be analysed within a single frame of reference - and assessed 
in terms of their effectiveness and strategies and their ultimate outcomes” (2009: 18). 
 
Also, it has been acknowledged that within social movement studies generally, scholars tend to 
analyse movements as coherent entities (della Porta and Rucht 2002), which, as discussed above can 
be problematic due to the shifting nature of movements (Whittier 2002; Tarrow 1994). This is 
particularly problematic for this study because there are few distinct movements within new 
protectorates, although some organisations do consider themselves part of broader movements. In 
addition these definitional issues, and the efforts made by the case studies to position themselves as 
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movements highlight potential constraints and opportunities for movement activity, which I discuss 
in the case study chapters. 
 
Thus, I believe that both cases facilitate the investigation of the research questions and has led to a 
wider understanding of how international actors can influence political opportunities and how 
organisations similar to social movements have developed within the new protectorate context, as 
well as how social movement activity may be better placed to develop. There were also several 
pragmatic factors that were considered when choosing the case studies, which are common 
considerations when assessing case study viability (Yin 1994; Langrish 1993). Examples of such 
considerations were my own knowledge, linguistic and cultural limitations, access and the resources 
required to conduct the research. 
 
Vetëvendosje 
The first case study detailed in this thesis is Vetëvendosje (Movement for Self-Determination), which 
is active in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje gained particular prominence within Kosovo as one of the main 
bodies of opposition to the international presence and supportive of independence. I did not come 
across any other entities that could be considered a social movement or counter-movement within 
Kosovo. Arguably, Vetëvendosje began as a social movement in 2005, possessing the four common 
elements of a social movement outlined by Diani (1992) - collective identity, shared beliefs and 
solidarity, collective action, and networks of informal interaction. It can be considered as the modern 
day expression of the wider Albanian nationalist movement because Vetëvendosje had the main 
objective of gaining self-determination for Kosovo and advocated that Kosovo become part of Albania. 
All other movement claims stemmed from this main objective. It has opposed elements of the 
presence of international institutions, particularly the role of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), which the movement regarded as anti-democratic and an obstacle to self-determination. 
The movement has used a wide variety of tactics, including direct action and protests.  
 
Since Kosovo declared independence in 2008, Vetëvendosje has broadened its goals and put 
candidates forward for parliamentary elections. From this point there are arguments that support the 
ideas that Vetëvendosje then became a political party, an SMO, or continued as a movement. 
Members of Vetëvendosje argue that they remain a movement and continue their movement 
activities alongside their parliamentary participation. This is explored in more detail in the case study 
analysis of Vetëvendosje in Chapter Four.  
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Afghanistan 1400 
The second case study is Afghanistan 1400, an organisation that advocates youth engagement and 
peace in Afghanistan. Afghanistan 1400 formed in 2012 as an organisation that aimed to mobilise the 
‘new generation’ in Afghanistan and to provide a platform for youth participation in a range of areas 
considered challenges for Afghanistan. It has a diverse but selective membership and attempts to 
engage young Afghans and raise awareness of its goals via events, statements and lobbying. At the 
time of the completion of this thesis Afghanistan 1400 had a lull in its public activities and was in what 
they consider to be a transitional phase as it reassesses its internal structure and considers the 
prospect of forming a political party in addition to its existing activities.  
 
Afghanistan 1400 displays elements of a social movement such as collective action and a network of 
activists but its organisational element situates it more as a civil society organisation. The organisation 
considers itself a movement and is adamant that it will not take international funding or function as 
an NGO, something that is explored later in Chapter Six. The reasons for the choice of Afghanistan 
1400, as noted above, are partly due to the lack of entities which clearly fit within the definition of a 
social movement in Afghanistan. One notable other movement is the Islamic movement, the Taliban. 
However, the practical issues of researching the Taliban are obvious and Afghanistan 1400 provides 
an interesting case because it developed after the international intervention, while the Taliban have 
existed for much longer. Afghanistan 1400 does see the Taliban as a threat, although this is largely in 
relation to their aims rather than as a direct counter-movement. 
 
There are some well-known groups advocating women’s rights in Afghanistan, however Grau notes, 
“[w]hat seems to be missing is a broader women’s movement, rooted in society and enabling women 
to advocate jointly for change on local levels” (2016: 420). A similar claim can be made for Afghanistan 
1400. The organisation has aims that link it to youth and peace movements more broadly but, 
although there has been an increased interest in these areas since the intervention, there is little that 
represents a youth or peace movement that has strong foundations in Afghanistan (see Kazemi 2012). 
However, Afghanistan 1400 is still a particularly interesting case for the application of a political 
opportunity framework, which allows us to see what opportunities or constraints there might be to 
social movement development in Afghanistan and in new protectorates more broadly. 
 
Case comparison 
An initial assessment of Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 highlighted that the international 
presence has had different influences on both of the case studies, which provides for an interesting 
comparative analysis. Both case studies have also responded to the international presence and its 
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influences in quite different ways, which has highlighted the variety of ways in which the presence of 
international actors as well as political opportunities can affect the development of social movements. 
 
It was also beneficial to select case studies within new protectorates that were within different regions 
in order to contribute more to the comparative element of the study. Although all new protectorates 
have different histories I felt it beneficial to study only one new protectorate within Europe. Both 
Kosovo and Afghanistan have experienced a significant international presence, and are considered to 
be new protectorates by Mayall and Oliveira (2011), as explained in Chapter One. Their histories differ 
significantly as do the reasons for intervention in the first place. Therefore, the nature of the 
international presence differed in each territory as both experienced differing levels of influence from 
international actors at different times. For instance, the pre-independence period in Kosovo 
experienced a UN administration, while the UN mission in Afghanistan took a more assistive role. The 
contexts of both territories will be discussed in depth in Chapters Three and Five and a comparison is 
made in the discussion chapter. 
 
This selection of two case studies provided a robust way of testing some elements of the analysis in 
this study. It allowed for the intensive investigation necessary in order to generate the thick 
descriptions required to answer the research question. The use of two cases also allowed elements of 
comparison between several aspects of each case (Tarrow 2010; Stake 2005; de Vaus 2001) and 
highlighted potential points of interest for other cases. The comparative element, which involved 
within-case and cross-case comparisons, provided rich contextual descriptions that helped to identify 
similarities and differences between the cases and the territories and made it possible to develop a 
method of classification which produced data relevant to the research question.  
 
A study of a larger number of cases might have helped to draw broader conclusions (della Porta 2002: 
297), however, this was not possible within the time limits of this research and would have meant a 
less in-depth, and consequently less informed consideration of the smaller number of case studies 
selected. However, due to the small amount of literature that exists in this area and thus, the 
exploratory nature of my research, it can be argued that two case studies were sufficient. A study of 
more cases may be appropriate at a later stage in order to apply the political opportunity framework 
and the suggestions made in this thesis.  
 
The choice of one case in two different territories showed how the different claims and tactics of each 
movement have been enacted in relatively similar contexts, in the sense they both have high levels of 
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influence from the international presence, although no new protectorate project has followed exactly 
the same trajectory. Similar actors were at play in both territories, although some organisations and 
institutions were more prominent in each country. Their location in different regions meant that some 
different regional actors were involved. Analysing two different new protectorate contexts enabled 
an assessment of a wider variety of potential influences, rather than facilitating a direct comparison 
between the two. This enabled relationships between different movement elements and international 
actors to be examined in different contexts. Both territories demonstrated differences in the actions 
and level of influence of the international actors, as well as domestic circumstances, broadening the 
potential for comparison and analysis. While the study does not seek to generalise findings, or to argue 
that it is representative, it does provide data on understudied movements and CSOs and offers an 
analysis of an otherwise understudied context for social movements which can be subjected to further 
research. 
 
Data Collection 
This research focused on learning and understanding the values and perceptions of a variety of actors, 
and so qualitative methods were judged to be the most effective for the collection of data and analysis 
in this research. Fieldwork was carried out in Kosovo, where I spent most of a year, which provided 
useful insights into everyday life in Kosovo as well as my research questions. It was not practical to do 
the same in Afghanistan due to the timeframe of the research, the expense, and the safety concerns 
at the time. It was, however, still possible to gather significant amounts of information on the 
international presence and the case studies, including several valuable interviews. The period of data 
collection ended in December 2014, and so the case analysis considers the activities of international 
actors and both cases until around this point. 
 
Several different types of documentary sources have been collected throughout the research phase 
of the thesis, including resolutions, regulations and legislation, texts of speeches, press releases and 
official reports and publications produced by the case studies themselves. Documentary sources have 
been gathered in order to gain evidence on the activities and perspectives of both international actors 
and the case studies to verify and assess how strategies, claims and policy changed over time. Random 
sampling was not appropriate for this research, so a cyclical process was used, which involved starting 
with a small selection of relevant and similar samples. After some analysis further selections were 
made based on these findings (see Bauer and Aart 2000: 19). Other documents were also highlighted 
during interviews.  
 
The main purpose of gathering documentary sources on international actors was to establish who the 
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key actors were, and to establish state and institutional interests and goals. This provided the basis 
for exploring the activities of these actors and aspects that may influence social movement 
development and strategy. Locating documents relating to the case studies served a similar purpose 
and was vital in outlining the activities and claims of both case studies as well as their perspectives on 
the international actors present within the territory. 
 
Information relevant to the Afghan case study was gained largely from online sources and via the 
British Library. I collected data from the websites of international institutions and organisations, such 
as UNAMA and NATO. I gained some additional information directly from these sources after 
contacting them with questions or interview requests. I also collected data from embassy websites 
and reports from research organisations. Data on the Afghanistan 1400 itself was collected from the 
organisation’s website and Facebook page, which was used more frequently. Some of the Facebook 
posts were available in English, but the majority were written in Dari or Pashto. I was able to obtain 
some of the documents posted in English from a member and some posts were translated. 
 
For Kosovo, data on international actors also came largely from websites, particularly those of UNMIK, 
EULEX, USAID, UNDP, the EU External Action Service and various embassies. The released WikiLeaks 
cables proved insightful, particularly those sent by the US ambassador in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje have 
a large amount of information available in Albanian, but a weekly newsletter in English that has been 
published online since 2006 provided a huge amount of information on the movement’s actions, aims, 
responses to events. The newsletter also often cited articles that members had written elsewhere. 
During one of the interviews I was given a copy of the movement’s manifesto, first published in August 
2013 under the title the Governing Alternative, and containing information regarding the movement’s 
organisational structure. A number of articles were available on the website as well as news updates 
and photographs. It was possible to gain a more visual impression of some of the Vetëvendosje’s past 
activities by viewing their online gallery and other photographs of protests and direct action available 
online.  
 
I used secondary data from academic literature, think tanks and CSOs. There was a wealth of general 
information on both countries, particularly regarding the conflict and the activities of international 
institutions. However, I found little information regarding the two cases, the presence of social 
movements in general, or their interactions with the state or international actors. This lack of 
information highlights the contribution to empirical knowledge that this thesis makes, especially 
regarding empirical data on Afghanistan 1400, which formed relatively recently. Although more 
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information can be found on Vetëvendosje as it has been established for longer, my thesis also 
contributes additional empirical data.  
 
It also became clear to me that some of the literature referring to certain aspects of each territory was 
quite polarised, particularly in the case of Kosovo. On some issues there were often stark differences 
in the presentation of facts and figures within both journalistic and scholarly accounts, each of which 
can be viewed within a particular agenda, including those presented by Serbian, Albanian and 
international sources. This study engages with, but does not attempt to clarify, debates that are not a 
direct focus of the study, such as the issue of Kosovo’s statehood and the overall success or failures of 
the interventions. 
 
Interviews 
Over 30 interviews were conducted in Kosovo and London, or via Skype. The interviews were carried 
out with a wide range of actors to gain multiple accounts of events and processes relevant to both 
cases. Interviews were conducted with members of both case studies, including those within the 
leadership as well as with international and local employees of CSOs, institutions, NGOs, embassies 
and journalists. Semi-structured interviews were used to allow guided but flexible questioning 
(Bryman 2008; Mason 2002; Marshall and Rossman 1999). They allowed me to follow up on specific 
issues or new topics or themes that arose (as suggested by Yates 2009), and to clarify or expand on 
issues arising from their position or area of expertise. ‘Sensitising questions’, according to Strauss and 
Corbin (1998: 77) address the issues of concern to the interviewee, establish who is involved, and how 
the interviewee defines the situation and it’s meaning to them. These types of questions were used 
in order to understand the interviewees’ perspectives on a number of issues and assist the 
development of particular themes.  
 
As my research is concerned with the impact of the presence of international actors, it was important 
to recruit participants from both the case studies and various international actors. As a result, 
‘purposive sampling’ was used, and interviewees were selected due to their relevance to the research 
area rather than for their representativeness (Bryman 2008: 458). A representative sample would also, 
in practice, be very difficult to achieve; however, attempts were made to get interviews with a wide 
range of relevant participants. Sampling generally happened in stages as I gained more information 
on the case studies and other significant actors, highlighting other potential interviewees. In some 
instances, therefore, ‘snowball’ sampling occurred, with more interviews being made possible after 
interviewees introduced or suggested further participants. 
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Generally, potential interviewees within Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 were identified in their 
publications and via their websites. In the case of Afghanistan 1400 I had contact with a founding 
member prior to beginning the PhD. This member had made me aware of the development of the 
organisation in its early stages. After conducting an interview with her she put me in touch with other 
members. Similarly, in Kosovo, after initial interviews I was provided with further contacts. The wide 
variety of respondents within and outside of Vetëvendosje facilitated the collection of broad 
perspectives that covered events and activities over a substantial timeframe, both prior to and during 
its existence. I attempted to gain respondents from similar organisations and institutions in both states 
as well as those specific to each state such as UNMIK. Although I was able to gain a range of interviews, 
and there were no significant gaps, it would have been interesting to interview more employees of 
international actors, such as the US embassy, however some interview requests did not receive a 
response. 
 
After direct contact with interviewees was established, usually via email, a brief explanation of the 
research was given. This was followed up with an email explaining the objectives of the research and 
the interview procedure. Prior to the interview, a document was sent to the interviewee informing 
them about the research, what topics were likely to be discussed, the subsequent use of the data, and 
the option to remain anonymous or to withdraw from the interview. The document was intended to 
help resolve any potential ethical issues and required the signature and date from the participant to 
confirm they were aware of these issues and to consent to the interview. A further optional signature 
was required to confirm whether the participant agreed to be referred to by name in the thesis or 
preferred to remain anonymous.  
 
At the start of each interview issues of anonymity and the participant’s right to withdraw were re-
addressed, and interviewees were asked if they preferred the interview to be digitally recorded or 
hand-written notes to be taken. Data protection of interviewee details and interviews has been 
maintained. I ensured this by naming transcripts and recordings with a code, which did not directly 
identify them. This provided extra protection of data, and in the unlikely event of third party access it 
would not be possible to link files to individuals. Stored audio files and transcripts were password 
protected as an extra security measure. The majority of interviewees were fluent in English making it 
was possible to conduct all the interviews in English.  
 
Potential ethical issues that could have arisen during the research were submitted to, and approved 
by, the University of Lincoln Ethics Committee. The assessment of ethical issues was conducted in 
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accordance with the guidelines of the University of Lincoln and the Social Research Association. Most 
participants gave me permission to use their names and were keen to be interviewed and the majority 
of interviewees asked to be informed about the findings and outputs of the research. 
 
During the interviews, I made efforts to present myself as an impartial interviewer, not showing signs 
of agreement or disagreement with the interviewee’s responses or asking leading questions. In some 
cases it was necessary to steer interviewees to the specific requirements of the research, to ensure 
they were covered within the time available. This is a recognised issue when interviewing committed 
activists (for example, Taylor and Rupp 1991). The presence of factions within social movements is 
commonplace (Blee and Taylor 2005: 98) and, therefore, had the potential to raise interesting 
challenges regarding the sampling and conduct of interviews. Remaining neutral was important to 
help ensure that access to other elements of the case studies were not denied. As previously 
mentioned, the contacts for interviews with members of Afghanistan 1400 were provided through an 
initial contact though I was assured, and it seemed to be confirmed during the interviews, that I would 
speak to a variety of members with diverse opinions on Afghanistan 1400’s progress, future and 
organisation. It was not clear to me that there were any significant divisions within Vetëvendosje at 
the time of the interviews. Several interviewees did, however, acknowledge that during the period in 
which they were discussing participating in elections some members had strongly disagreed with such 
a move (see Chapter Four). 
 
The analysis of the interviews was an ongoing process that helped to develop research ideas and 
raised new questions for further interviews. All of the interviews which were carried out, usually 
lasting between 30 and 90 minutes, were transcribed. Interviewees were emailed again after the 
completion of the transcription, thanking them for their participation and allowing them to review the 
interview transcription if they chose to. Depending on the agreement made over confidentiality, in 
some cases this provided the opportunity for the respondents to point out any areas of the interview 
where they could be identified. Allowing the respondents the opportunity to review their transcript is 
not necessarily to encourage censorship but also has the potential for useful comments and additions 
which could benefit the research (Burnham et al. 2008: 293). The interview transcripts were re-read 
in order to establish any relevant themes.   
 
Overall, the interviews were an effective means of obtaining information and opinions from activists 
involved in the case studies. The interviews filled some gaps in information on their activities, 
particularly in the Afghanistan 1400 case due to less information in the public domain, and helped to 
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highlight where further research may be useful. The interviews also helped to gain an understanding 
of the motivations behind some actions, such as discussions about becoming a party, which would 
have been difficult to gain with other methods. Similarly, the other interviews were an extremely 
helpful source on the roles of international actors as well as opinions on the case studies, which would 
have been difficult to obtain otherwise. 
 
Interviews with international and local employees, for example, provided a useful insight into the 
workings of a variety of organisations, their aims and perceived roles, as well as their perceptions of 
other actors and the cases in question. The interviews were also useful in aiding understanding of how 
different audiences interpreted the ideas of both case studies, and how they were intended to be 
perceived by the cases themselves. This is important to this study as it helps to gauge the perspectives 
of both how the cases are received, and also how they perceive this reception and the effect this has 
on their decision-making. The interviews with members allowed greater understanding of the ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ (Warren 1988), through the participants’ experience, their opinions and attitudes (Arksey 
and Knight 1999: 2), which provided a range of meanings and perspectives (Gubrium and Holstein 
2001). 
 
Qualitative methods can be criticised for having a number of weaknesses (Theam Choy 2014; 
Hammersley 1989), while some argue that the data collected in interviews can be largely anecdotal, 
open to misinterpretation or inaccuracies, and the value can be exaggerated leaving the potential to 
over identify with the subjects or to overlook anomalies which appear as accepted norms (Alsaawi 
2014; Blee and Taylor 2002). Although it is impossible to overcome all of these issues, there are 
strategies that I have employed to reduce them. The use of several sources of data helped provide a 
fuller account of each case study and made it easier to assess comparisons between the cases. The 
use of primary and secondary sources allowed for triangulation that helped to corroborate and 
validate the data sources, highlighted gaps or potential inconsistencies, and increased the level of 
detail (Denzin 1989), whilst also going some way to addressing the potential issue of researcher bias. 
Semi-structured interviews have also been recommended as a means of reducing potential researcher 
bias, and allowing wider questioning which can be followed up later on in the interview (Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Blee and Taylor 2002). 
 
Political opportunity 
A political opportunity framework has been used to guide the analysis of the two case studies, 
informed by interviews and documentary evidence. Before discussing the framework created for the 
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case study analysis, the literature is on political opportunity is briefly outlined, including they ways in 
which political opportunities can affect movement strategy. This is followed by a discussion on the 
categories used within most applications of a political opportunity framework. Then, by bringing 
together the literature on new protectorates and political opportunities, I have outlined some of the 
key elements of new protectorates that are likely to impact upon political opportunities, and 
incorporated these into the framework. This framework is applied to the contexts of Kosovo and 
Afghanistan in Chapters Three to Five and reflected on in the case study chapters. The utility of the 
framework’s application to a new protectorate framework is reflected on in Chapter Eight. 
 
Political opportunities are considered to be the “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent 
– dimensions of the political environment that provides incentives for collective actions by affecting 
people’s expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow 1998: 76-77). Scholars have argued that political 
opportunities can affect a variety of movement aspects, including their emergence (Tarrow 1998; 
Oberschall 1996), strength (Rucht 1996), behaviour (della Porta 1996), as well as strategy (Kitschelt 
1986) as discussed below. Several proponents of the political opportunity framework suggest that 
social movements emerge or mobilisation increases when political opportunities expand (Jenkins and 
Perrow 1997; Tarrow 1998, 1996, 1994; della Porta 1996; Oberschall 1996; Voss 1993; McAdam 1982; 
Tilly 1978). A number of scholars also suggest that opportunities can arise from constraints or the 
closing of opportunities, or from threats external to the movement (Suh 2001; Brockett 1995). As 
Koopmans (1999: 96) states, “‘[o]pportunity’ is seldom defined, but generally refers to constraints, 
possibilities, and threats that originate outside the mobilizing group, but affect its chances of 
mobilizing and/or realizing its collective interests.”  
 
Several studies have questioned some of the specifics of political opportunity theory by testing it 
against alternatives (see Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2003; Van Dyke 2003; Snow et al. 2003; Van Dyke 
and Soule 2002; McCammon et al. 2001; Cress and Snow 2000; Soule et al. 1999; Amenta and Zylan 
1992; Lieske 1978). Despite questioning the concept, Meyer (2004: 134) argues that these studies still 
support the core idea that context is important in the analysis of social movement development, and 
concedes that “[g]iven the broad range of empirical concerns and settings, conceptual statements are 
necessarily broad” (Meyer 2004: 134). This study is not intended to test political opportunity itself, 
but uses it as a framework to help explain the cases and gain an understanding of the factors that can 
affect their strategy in contexts like those found in Kosovo and Afghanistan, contexts which have not 
been the considered in relation to political opportunities before. I am also expanding the use of a 
political opportunity framework by applying it to entities that are considered to be social movements, 
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SMOs and civil society organisations. In this study comparisons between the two cases and these 
political opportunities can be made, which Kitschelt (1986: 59) argues, “can show that political 
opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements 
on their environments.” 
 
Critics have suggested that existing definitions of political opportunity are very broad, and that the 
concept does not consider movements not in opposition to the state (Goodwin and Jasper 2003). 
Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) suggest that the concept is “in danger of becoming a sponge that 
soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment.” McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) have 
responded to some of this criticism in Dynamics of Contention, and Gamson and Meyer (1996) have 
suggested that a more analytical distinction between relatively stable aspects of political opportunity, 
such as traditions and institutions, and more volatile elements of opportunity, such as public policy, 
political discourse, and elite alignment, may help clarify the concept. They also suggest that political 
opportunity does not just consist of a fixed external environment that activists must confront, but that 
it is also something they can influence or change (see also Tarrow 1993). The analysis in this thesis has 
been conducted with consideration of this criticism, and the utility of the political opportunity 
framework in the context of state-building is revisited in Chapter Eight.  
 
Political opportunities in new protectorates 
Traditionally, political opportunity has focused on the relationship between social movements and the 
state (Marks and McAdam 2000) and it has been suggested that the changes in this relationship 
determine mobilisation (Kurzman 1998). However, some scholars have found that other factors can 
also influence political opportunities, often elements resulting from globalization (Lahusen 1999; 
Smith 1999; Passy 1999). There have been a number of applications of different political opportunity 
models and comparative studies to a range of states (see Snow et al. 2003; Van Dyke and Soule 2002; 
Banaszak 1996; Amenta et al. 1994; Joppke 1993; Amenta and Zylan 1992; Jutschelt 1986). There has 
also been a small amount of literature that considers how a political opportunity approach can apply 
to transnational actors (Parks 2015; della Porta et al. 2009). The use of a political opportunity 
framework has been criticised for being biased towards developed democracies (Banks 2007: 136), 
though some studies have applied a political opportunity framework in non-democratic contexts (see 
Schock 1999; Boudreau 1996; Brockett 1991).  
 
The context of new protectorates provides a novel use of the political opportunity framework, as 
international actors not only influence elements of the state and its governance, but also by less direct 
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means, such as the funding of civil society development. The rapid developments which occur in new 
protectorates, generally at a much faster rate than in an organically developed democracy, make this 
novel application of a political opportunity framework particularly relevant and interesting. Although 
scholars have previously acknowledged the impact of exogenous factors on a movement’s 
development and strategy (see Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1633), it has not been applied to 
contexts similar to new protectorates.12 Due to the nature of new protectorates and the extensive 
international influence the political opportunities available sit somewhere between the state and 
inter-state arena, something I discuss in further detail in Chapter Eight. 
 
There are a number of elements of the new protectorate context, that are less common to other 
contexts, which are likely to have some impact upon the political opportunities available to 
movements. As previously mentioned, the form and nature of new protectorates tends to differ in 
each territory. A number of states have experienced an extensive international presence, some have 
seen an international administration or trusteeship temporarily responsible for governing the state, 
such as UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) in Kosovo (1999-2008) and UNTAET (United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) in East Timor (1999-2002), while others have seen 
the extensive influence of international actors on security and political developments, such as the 
presence of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan (2001-2014).  
 
Strategy 
Before expanding on the categories within the political opportunity framework, it is useful to outline 
what strategy is and how it may be impacted by political opportunities. There are a number of ways 
in which a movement can be affected by political opportunities, including: the ability to mobilise; the 
use of particular political strategies and tactics; the advancement of particular claims over others; the 
cultivation of some alliances rather than others; and the potential to affect mainstream institutional 
politics and policy (Meyer 2004). This thesis is particularly concerned with how political opportunities 
may influence the strategy of a movement, SMO or a CSO. Just as the political opportunity framework 
is a useful tool to guide the analysis of social movements as well as other entities, the existing 
literature on social movement strategy can also be applied to elements of social movements, such as 
                                                          
12 A couple of studies were found to apply political opportunities to Vetëvendosje in Kosovo, both of these were 
undergraduate independent studies from study abroad programmes and their focus was on the movement’s mobilisation 
and its shift to becoming a party (see Bruce 2013 and Delafrouz 2009). Both studies include interviews with other movement 
activists and provided some new insights into Vetëvendosje. No such work has been found in relation to any movements in 
Afghanistan. 
46 
 
SMOs, or CSOs in order to establish how these elements are affected by the presence of international 
actors. 
 
Social movement strategy is regarded as the:  
 
overall plan for action, the blueprint of activities with regard to the mobilization of resources 
and the series of collective actions that movements designate as necessary for bringing about 
desired social changes (Jenkins 1981: 135).  
 
Strategy affects the ability to mobilise, attract participants and potential allies and the possibility to 
persuade, interact with and influence their targets (Meyer and Staggenborg 2007; Banks 2007). 
Strategy involves decisions regarding a variety of interrelated factors, including which tactics to use, 
the demands to make, and their targets and audiences (Meyer and Staggenborg 2007). It encapsulates 
a CSO’s inevitable attempts to react to changes in available political opportunities in order to maximise 
their impact.  
 
Meyer and Staggenborg (2007) outline three key aspects of a social movement’s strategy which can 
be affected by, and contribute to, the political opportunities available. These aspects are demands, 
arenas and dilemmas. Demands may be about the actions, identity, or those which a movement or 
SMO claim to represent. The importance attached to each of these may vary, and it may be viewed as 
strategically better to focus on certain goals at more or less favourable times (Tilly 2004b), which may 
be influenced by the political opportunities available. It may be the case that political allies are 
promoting similar demands as part of an electoral campaign, providing a favourable moment to 
pursue similar goals. 
 
The arenas, or venues, which movement elements choose to act within have the potential to reach 
different audiences and targets. Each arena may operate differently and could be institutional or non-
institutional, and tactics may range from participation in elections to protest in public squares. The 
tactics chosen will have a significant influence on the chances of claims being heard and attracting (or 
putting off) potential supporters (Snow et al. 1986: 464, 470). The choice of venue and tactics can 
depend on the opportunities for access, and the position of the movement or SMO in relation to their 
targets and audience (Meyer and Staggenborg 2007).  
 
Often, Jacobsson and Saxonberg (2013: 2) suggest, scholars have presented movements as having an 
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“either/or” attitude regarding engagement in contentious politics or other activities, such as advocacy 
or providing social provisions or services, when in reality they often do both, although perhaps at 
different times. For example, a movement may find it more effective to pursue economic and legal 
options if the state has favourable laws but weak implementation (Fröhlich 2012; Jacobsson 2012; 
Ivanou 2013), whereas open states may provide more options for lobbying or advocacy. Other 
scenarios may make protest or direct action appear to be the most effective or viable method. Several 
studies have considered the use of aggressive or violent tactics by social movements (see Sajjid and 
Härdig 2016; Seferiades and Johnston 2012; della Porta 1995; Gamson 1975). Scholars have suggested 
that the use of these types of tactics are the only option for those with few resources (Piven and 
Cloward 1977), however, the use of these tactics can bring the risk of a repressive response from 
authorities (Jasper et al. 2015: 405). 
 
Conflicting interests and pressures on movements and SMOs, which can stem from political 
opportunities, present a number of dilemmas for movements (Meyer 2007) that may influence their 
strategic decisions. These dilemmas could involve decisions to use of disruptive instead of orderly 
tactics, to focus on internal rather than external audiences, or to use a different method to manage 
tensions within movements (Jasper 2004: 10). Meyer and Staggenborg (2007: 7) consider this to be 
an iterative process, as the reactions to one set of tactics can impact upon future opportunities and 
constraints. The case studies selected include a movement/SMO which regularly uses mass 
mobilisations as part of a larger repertoire of direct action, and an CSO with contrasting tactics, 
focusing much less on mass mobilisation and more on lobbying and awareness raising through 
meetings, shorter term, reactive campaigns, and social media. Interestingly, both have chosen to field 
candidates in elections, a decision that appears to have been influenced by political opportunities and 
some international influence. The strategies and tactics of both are considered in depth in Chapters 
Four and Six. 
 
The influence on political opportunities by international actors has been assessed in Chapters Three 
and Five. This assessment made it possible to see, in Chapters Four and Six, how some of the shifts in 
strategy have been shaped by international actors. Strategy is of course influenced by a number of 
other aspects such as internal conflict and resources. However, the focus of this thesis is on the 
influence of international actors, and though these other aspects are acknowledged where relevant, 
they are not subject to extensive discussion in the case analysis. These issues are not considered to be 
hugely influenced by international actors or considered as part of the political opportunity framework.  
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The political opportunity framework 
Here, I incorporate the findings from the literature review in Chapter One into the political opportunity 
framework, introducing potential characteristics of new protectorates that might impact upon 
political opportunities. Some of these influences on political opportunities are heightened or even 
novel in the new protectorate context in comparison to other types of states (democracies, 
authoritarian states, for example) or in the contexts in which political opportunity has been applied 
thus far.  
 
McAdam and Tilly have both suggested categories into which political opportunity can be divided (see 
McAdam 1996; Tilly 1978). Tilly (1979) outlined five categories: openness, coherence of the elite, 
stability of political alignments, the availability of allies and, repression and facilitation. McAdam 
(1996: 26-29) attempted to improve the reliability of the concept by specifying four dimensions: 
relative openness of the institutionalised political system; instability of elite alignments; presence of 
elite allies; and the state's reduced capacity or propensity for repression. These categories have been 
used as a guide to outline some of the main factors affecting political opportunities found in the 
literature, which are explored within my own four categories below.  
 
Openness  
Political opportunities are often discussed in reference to how open or closed the political system of 
the state is (see Eisinger 1973). Several scholars have argued that the level of openness impacts upon 
the opportunities for social movements to put forward their demands (Tarrow 1998; Clemens 1997; 
Koopmans 1996; Esman 1994; Tilly 1978). This refers to the capacity for competition for elite status, 
the potential to change laws and to participate in political opposition. A closed system does not allow 
for these changes. It is not possible to categorise most states as open or closed, but they can be placed 
on a spectrum, and that position may shift over time (McAdam 1996: 41). Existing research has 
highlighted a relationship between state openness and movement mobilisation that demonstrates 
that closed regimes tend to repress social movements, open and responsive ones assimilate 
movements and more moderate regimes tend to allow for the broad presence of movements, 
although they do not readily agree to movement demands (Kitschelt 1986: 62). Meyer and 
Staggenborg (1996: 1634) suggest that is it not only political openness that increases mobilisation 
prospects, but that mobilisation may also be more likely when threats to movements increase. It is 
also possible that even in circumstances where the state wants to engage with citizens, it is difficult 
for it do so, especially if it lacks resources or there are security risks associated with sending staff to 
certain areas of the country. 
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In states that are not considered to be new protectorates, the analysis of the openness of the state 
and its effect on political opportunities is confined to domestic governance structures. In the case of 
a new protectorate, the presence of international actors and their influence on these governance 
structures ought to be assessed to determine whether this presence does have an effect on the 
openness of the state, and therefore the available opportunities. As outlined in Chapter One, 
democratisation is one of the key goals of international actors in new protectorates, including the 
creation of democratic institutions and elections. These processes, which tend to happen very quickly 
in relation to other states, have varying levels of success but it can be expected that with 
democratisation the political system is likely become more open than the previous system (at least 
during the time of the conflict, if not before). As explained above, increased openness is likely to lead 
to increasing opportunities for movements and SMOs to mobilise. The processes and outcomes of the 
democratisation process are also likely to have a degree of influence over the capacity for competition, 
the fragmentation within the party system, the type of government that emerges and the potential to 
influence laws or participate in political opposition, which are also likely to affect opportunities such 
as the opening up of channels of interaction and the potential for new political allies, which are 
discussed further in the categories below.   
 
Coherence of elites 
Many of the political opportunities available are dependent on the situation within the political 
system, often linked to how open the system is. For example, the number of political parties, groups 
and factions that are able to effectively engage and put forward their ideas in electoral politics can all 
impact upon political opportunities. Kitschelt (1986) argues that the higher the number of these 
groups, the more difficult it is to confine electoral interests to those of the established and 
bureaucratised parties. The degree of fragmentation within the party system can also present 
different opportunities. Several scholars have argued that a division among elites is a significant factor 
in the success of revolutionary movements (Selbin 2006; Goldfrank 1994; Goldstone 2001, 1994; 
Skocpol 1979; Trimberger 1978; Gurr 1970). Division among elites may create incentives for 
mobilisation, and may present the possibility for movements and SMOs to promote their causes to 
elites who may take them on, particularly if it is likely to increase their own political influence (Tarrow 
1998; Banks 2007). 
 
The positioning of a government on the left or right, and the ideological leanings of political parties 
may affect their general level of responsiveness towards movement activity (Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 
1995; Amenta and Zylan 1992). Electoral vulnerability or the immediacy of elections may also increase 
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the likelihood of government responsiveness (Burstein 1999). Another factor is the capacity of the 
legislature to develop policy independently of the executive, which is thought to increase 
opportunities due to the nature of an electorally accountable legislature that will be more sensitive to 
the demands of the public (Kitschelt 1986). 
 
The literature on post-conflict and fragile states highlights some interesting findings regarding the 
elites that may also be found in new protectorates. For instance, movements and SMOs may find that 
they are attempting to air their demands within a context of conservative elite control, a common 
feature of such states (Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009; Banks 2007). Tilly (1978: 135) argues that this 
encourages elites to “resist changes which would threaten the current realisation of their interests 
even more than they seek changes which would enhance their interests.” Further, they,  
 
fight tenaciously against loss of power […] They work against admission to the polity of groups 
whose interests conflict significantly with their own. Existing members tend to be more 
exacting in their demands of contenders whose very admission would challenge the system in 
some serious way (Tilly 1978: 135).  
 
Banks (2007: 132) argues that this applies to social movements with moderate goals just as much as 
those whose goals are contrary to the interests of the political elites.  
 
In the case of new protectorates, it is not only the domestic elite that need to be considered but also 
the international actors, which effectively form an international elite. As discussed in Chapter One, 
the international actors involved in new protectorates agree on broad goals, often seen as 
representative of the international community. However, each actor comes with its own ideas, 
interests, and responsibilities which are put forward with varying levels of coordination or partnership 
with other actors. In addition to the common issues of poor coordination and communication 
between international actors, highlighted in Chapter One, Mayall and Oliveira (2011: 18) argue that: 
 
In practice, external interveners have different institutional cultures and political agendas, 
and often opposing senses of what should be prioritized. More important, they stand in no 
particular relationships with each other and are under no obligation, except the broadest of 
terms, to advance common objectives.  
 
In fact, international actors have received heavy criticism for the lack of harmonisation and coherence 
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within state-building projects (Paris 2006; Rubin 2006; Ghani et al. 2005; Samuels and von Esiedel 
2004). Paris (2006) notes that several missions have been marred by the inability of international 
actors to work together effectively, putting this down to the underlying problem of a lack of 
harmonisation in their values and ideals, and the lack of an agreed ‘blueprint’ to work on. This lack of 
coherence may have the potential to open up opportunities in the same way it can in relation to 
domestic elites. 
 
Relationship between international actors and domestic elites 
State-building projects do not start with a blank canvas and must work, to varying extents, with 
aspects of the existing elite and political system. Peace deals, new constitutions or international 
agreements are often written by foreign experts, frequently on the basis of a number of deals made 
amongst domestic and international elites. Thus, the relationship between international and domestic 
actors has a significant impact on the transition of the state (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Tansey 2009; 
Holohan 2005) and on political opportunities. Given the unique situation found in new protectorates, 
which usually involves a close relationship between domestic and international elites, it is worth 
delving further into the literature to gain a better understanding of this relationship and how it might 
impact upon political opportunities. 
 
Domestic elites are not homogenous and the elites that international actors choose to work with, and 
how they do so, will have an impact on the post-conflict transition and the nature of the balance of 
power within the domestic elite (Tansey 2009; see Scott 2007: 6). International actors will prefer those 
elites who are most likely to represent their goals and desires (Tansey 2009). When local elites favour 
the introduction of a democratic regime, international and domestic elites are likely to interact along 
consensus lines and work together to establish the institutions of a democratic political system. 
However, when domestic elites would rather frustrate democratic development, the nature of the 
domestic and international interaction is likely to be significantly different. The resulting transition is 
more likely to be marked by confrontation rather than consensus, and new democratic institutions 
may be more likely to be imposed by international actors.  
 
In most cases it is difficult to assess how much the views of elites and local populations converge with 
those of the international actors present. Mayall and Oliveira (2011b) note that international actors 
often make an initial assumption, which is that the local population are equally enthusiastic to become 
liberal versions of themselves, and are thought to fulfill similar ambitions. However, this is not always 
the case, for instance in Iraq Bridaux and Kurki (2014) found that although some elements were in 
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place to allow for democratic decision making, this did not result in the widespread adoption of liberal 
values by Iraqis. They argue that the “US failed to win over the Iraqi civil society essentially because 
of its inability to get the Iraqi elite to adhere to the US project for Iraq” (Bridaux and Kurki 2014: 95). 
This was due, in part, to the model of electoral democracy and quick elections which entrenched 
rivalries between Iraqi factions and led to a battle for votes that resulted in political organisations 
trying to provide services in exchange for votes. 
 
Even on occasions when international actors and domestic elites agree it may not result in widely 
positive outcomes for the local population. For instance, Banks argues that the constitutions, usually 
written by foreign experts and based on deals with domestic elites  
 
tend to regulate the distribution of political, economic, and social power in ways that address 
the concerns and interests of the elite drafters. This has led to the adoption of constitutions 
that entrench the political power of elite drafters, limit the development of competitive 
political opposition, and fail to create institutional and procedural mechanisms for addressing 
existing and future political, economic, or social conflicts (Banks 2007:105). 
 
There are also a number of reasons that certain elites may not wish to support international actors 
(Scott 2007: 5). Existing domestic political actors and those returning from exile are likely to have their 
own agendas they wish to pursue. Some elites, in the knowledge that most of the international 
presence will be keen to leave as soon possible, may just bide their time until the international 
presence has left (Mayall and Oliveira 2011: 26). Several authors have suggested that neo-
patrimonalism may be an important, yet often overlooked, factor when assessing who the elites in a 
state are and where power really lies (see Scott 2007). Some scholars suggest that even in states that 
appear to be structurally weak, strong informal networks actually hold most of the power (see Reno 
2000; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Reno (2000) calls these ‘shadow states’, which often allow elites to 
increase their economic power and may serve as a disincentive to work with international actors.  
 
The state-building literature offers different opinions on the importance of engaging with strong 
elites. Some authors argue that strong elites provide local leadership for the rest of society (see 
Morales-Gamboa and Baranyi 2005; Chesterman 2005). Others (Barnett and Züercher 2009) argue 
that when international actors work with strong elites an oppressive form of social hierarchy can be 
recreated (Scott 2007: 6). The literature that addresses post-conflict states also provides some useful 
insights into the types of elites that could be expected in new protectorates. McAdam (1982) suggests 
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that it is particularly common in post-conflict states to find political power concentrated among a 
small elite. This elite is likely to have a conservative approach to maintaining the boundaries of the 
political system (Walter 2002) and it is likely that there are few incentives for this type of elite to be 
more inclusive, as discussed above (see Banks 2007 and (Tilly 1978).  
 
There are also occasions when international actors feel the need to work with some elites who do not 
wholly represent their goals. Mayall and Oliveira argue that some international actors have a 
“penchant for cutting corners” by accommodating certain actors, which may explicitly stand for 
political and social projects at odds with the purposes of the new protectorates” (Mayall and Oliveira 
2011: 29). It may also be the case that international actors ignore existing structures as well as some 
local elites, as observed by Holohan in Iraq and Kosovo (2005). Berdal and Keen (2011) argue that poor 
communication and collaboration with domestic actors can help to emphasis the distinction between 
“us” and “them”. 
 
Another issue that may affect the relationship between international and domestic elites is that of 
elites engaging in activities that international actors are trying to curb. For example, Boyle (2011: 197) 
highlights that in the new protectorate context it is possible that criminal networks may be active, and 
organised violence, such as reprisals or insurgencies, or looting, may occur. Often criminal networks 
develop as a result of conflict, and in some cases they constitute some of the elites or influential 
groups in the post-(or continuing) conflict period (Capussela 2015; Boyle 2014: 126; Briscoe and 
Rodríguez Pellecer 2010). The prevalence of corruption is another area that may put strain on the 
relationship between various actors. Corruption is often pervasive in new protectorate contexts and 
some have argued that it is even perpetuated by internationals that often maintain or work with the 
corruption rather than countering it (see Chayes 2016 on Afghanistan; Capussela 2015 on Kosovo). 
 
The working practices within international organisations may also have an impact on international and 
domestic relationships as well as on the overall effectiveness of the mission. For instance, the 
assumption of an overarching agreement and a shared culture amongst international actors can often 
lead to disagreement over policy or ideas amongst those working in, and between, these organisations 
being ignored or overlooked by the actors themselves (Autesserre 2007). Another consideration is the 
employment procedures within international actors such as NGOs, donor agencies and the UN, that 
are notably similar within each sector (Mayall and Oliveira 2011), often involving short term 
placements of up to a year, and so potentially impacting upon institutional memory. Transparency 
and accountability is often lacking, particularly in relation to international decision-making, and when 
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employees of international organisations engage in criminal behaviour or incompetence (see Syal 
2015; Le Billon 2008).  
 
Internationals, both military and civilian, have often been criticised for a lack of knowledge of the 
countries they are based in (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Panel on UN Peace Operations 2000). The 
potential to increase that knowledge as quickly as required can be limited by security concerns, and 
the fact that staff are usually deployed in urban areas and provincial cities. These elements, and the 
fact that international employees are often presented as living the high life in Green Zones (see 
Chandrasekaran 2008) or military camps, may also impact upon public perceptions of the international 
effort. The literature related to international actors in new protectorates suggests that the coherence 
of international actors, their internal effectiveness and their ability to work with other actors is likely 
to have an impact on political opportunities to movements and should be considered in addition to 
the coherence of domestic elites. 
 
Facilitation and repression 
The types of interactions between government and movement elements can influence the ease of 
access for new claims and interests to be aired within the decision-making process. In order for this 
to happen there must be mechanisms available for new demands to make it into this process (Kitschelt 
1986). Institutional rules that govern access to the public sphere and the political decision-making 
process can cover a host of elements that may impact on the decisions of movement elements, such 
as electoral laws or the relationship between government and civil society actors. These rules, 
Kitschelt (1986: 61-62) argues, 
 
allow for, register, respond to and even shape the demands of social movements that are not 
(yet) accepted political actors. They also facilitate or impede the institutionalisation of new 
groups and claims. 
 
Kriesi et al. (1995) suggest that facilitation can occur through the support of allies, including political 
parties or unions, which can facilitate a movement by participating in their protest events. Marx (1979) 
highlights a number of strategies that actors external to a movement can carry out should they want 
to facilitate or inhibit a movement. These strategies are set out in Table 1 below. In Marx’s analysis of 
efforts by the US government to facilitate or inhibit movement activity in the 1960s and 1970s, he 
found that the efforts intended to damage movements were more formalised and prevalent (Marx 
1979). Marx also found that the actions of some government agencies, legislators or the courts are 
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much “more likely to be of a general and overt nature, rather than being at the specific micro-level in 
response to a given movement. When micro-level facilitative actions do occur, they are often indirect, 
and reactive” (Marx 1979). 
 
Table 1: General Strategies for Facilitating or Inhibiting a Social Movement  
To facilitate the movement To inhibit the movement 
Facilitate capacity for corporate action Inhibit capacity for corporate action 
Make it possible for energies of movement to go 
toward pursuit of broader social change goals, as 
well as maintenance needs 
Direct energies of movement to defensive 
maintenance needs and away from pursuit of 
broader social goals 
Create favorable public image; develop and 
support ideology 
Create unfavorable public image and counter-
ideology 
Give information to movement Gather information on movement 
Facilitate supply of money and facilities Inhibit supply of money and facilities 
Facilitate freedom of movement, expression, and 
action; offer legal immunity 
Inhibit freedom of movement, expression, and 
action; create myth and fact of surveillance 
and repression; apply legal sanctions 
Build and sustain morale Damage morale 
Recruit supporters De-recruitment 
Build leaders Destroy or displace leaders 
Encourage internal solidarity Encourage internal conflict 
Encourage external coalitions with potential allies 
and neutral relations (or conflict only insofar as it 
is functional) with potential opponents 
Encourage external conflict with potential 
allies and opponents 
Facilitate particular actions Inhibit or sabotage particular actions 
 
(Marx 1979) 
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The inhibition of movement activity can, in some cases, be considered repressive or as a threat to a 
movement. Tilly states that repression is “any action by another group which raises the contender’s 
cost of collective action,” while facilitation is an action which lowers that cost (Tilly 1978: 100). It is 
more likely that acts of repression will be used towards movements that seek fundamental changes 
within a society and are viewed as a threat to elite power. Those demanding less fundamental changes 
are less likely to experience repressive actions, even in contexts that are considered authoritarian or 
generally repressive (Tarrow 1998: 80).  
 
There has been much debate over the significance of repression and its effects on mobilisation. 
Scholars have argued that state repression will damage the chances of social movements emerging or 
being sustained (Banks 2007: 149); it is also possible that people will withdraw from engagement and 
choose to self-censor (Earle 2011). Conversely, some scholars argue that repression may stimulate 
engagement or serve to facilitate a movement (Earle 2011; Brockett 1995; Marks 1989; Kimeldorf 
1988; Barkan 1984; Lipset 1983), and that expectations of repression generally do not correlate with 
protest participation (Opp 1994; Opp and Gern 1993; Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991; Opp and Ruehl 
1990; Muller and Opp 1986). 
 
In the new protectorate context it is possible that the government, or other domestic groups, may 
facilitate or repress movement activity. Given the unique scenario in new protectorates, it may be 
possible that international actors also have the potential to affect the facilitation or repression of 
movements, directly and indirectly. For instance, as Chapter One highlighted, international actors can 
play a role in rule of law issues, which could provide them, with either the responsibility for, or 
influence over, police and military reactions to protest and movement activity. Equally, there may be 
ways in which international actors facilitate movements, such as the setting or influencing institutional 
rules or via civil society development, which could affect the channels available to influence or interact 
with elites and the public. 
 
Presence of allies or opposition 
The presence of allies or opposition within the elite (those with some power valued by the movement 
or SMO) may influence strategic decisions. A movement’s or SMO’s allies, who could range from 
individuals to other movements or organisations, may provide financial assistance, or other resources 
such as expertise, office space or a means of publicity for its demands (Schock 2005: 33-34; Tarrow 
1998: 79). Political allies may put forward a movement’s issues into institutional arenas or incorporate 
them into their agendas (Giugni 2007: 55).  
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Banks (2007: 149) suggests that in non-democratic states, where movements may have fewer internal 
resources, having influential allies can be of even greater importance (Schock 2005: 34; Tarrow 1998; 
80). These allies, or opposition, could be in the form of a variety of international actors. Given the far-
reaching influence of some international actors in new protectorates, it may also be the case that 
potential allies or opponents are influenced by their relationship with international actors, either 
directly or by the nature of the positions they take. 
 
It is possible that in post-conflict states sources of funding and certain types of domestic organisations, 
such as trade unions, professional associations, or strong opposition parties, that are often found in 
more stable states, may be lacking, therefore decreasing the potential number of allies and impacting 
upon the state’s relationship with civil society actors more broadly. Schock (2005: 361) argues that in 
cases where these types of organisations do exist in post-conflict contexts, they are often under state 
control and, therefore, the potential for influential allies are limited.  
 
The appearance and disappearance of other movements, or counter-movements (see Meyer and 
Staggenborg 1996), as well as a historical precedent for mobilisation can also affect mobilisation 
opportunities and strategy (see Kurzman 1998; Kitschelt 1986). Movement activity may have a 
‘demonstration effect’ (Kitschelt 1986: 61), potentially encouraging other movement activity. Recent 
theories focusing on solidarity suggest that social movement activism grows from pre-existing 
organisation, which can provide the setting, the solidarity, and the resources for sustained protest 
activity (Tilly, et al. 1975: 4-8). Kitschelt (1986) suggests that when several movements are active at 
the same time, this is often the best moment to maintain the momentum of a movement and to 
influence policy. This is similar to other research findings that suggest more people are likely to protest 
if they think expected numbers will be higher (Opp 1988; Klandermans 1984; Blumer 1969).  
 
It is possible that social movements become a more common form used for the representation of 
interests in particular contexts due to previously successful social mobilisations (see Quadagno 1992). 
However, from the discussion in Chapter One it appears that the type of civil society development 
that occurs in new protectorates may affect the development of social movements more generally as 
well as the potential relationships between movements and other civil society actors. For example, 
Esteves, Motta and Cox (2009: 2) argue that, while some NGOs have successfully cooperated with 
movements, elements of civil society more frequently see their privileged access to funders and 
policy-makers under threat if they are associated with more critical groups. They go on to argue that 
aspects of civil society has “often colluded with the state and corporations in deligitimsing or 
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demonising them [critical groups], which can in turn easily mean cooperating in their criminalization 
and justifying the deployment of force” (Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009: 2).  
 
Conclusion 
The political opportunity framework outlined above is applied to the new protectorates of Kosovo and 
Afghanistan in Chapters Three and Five, which provide an assessment of how international actors may 
affect political opportunities in these states specifically. However, while it is possible to discover some 
of the political opportunities taken up by the case studies, it is not easy to discover all the alternative 
opportunities that may have been available (Amenta 2005; Valocchi 1993). Similarly, it may not be 
always be possible to speculate on missed opportunities (see Sawyers and Meyer 1999). There may 
also be cases where movements and SMOs may not be able, or want, to respond to certain 
opportunities (see Schock 2005; McAdam 1982). And even this already presumes that these 
opportunities are recognised in the first place. The perception of opportunities is, arguably, as 
important as the existence of the opportunities themselves (Suh 2001: 437; Kurzman 1996; Gamson 
and Meyer 1996). Thus, the political opportunity framework outlined above is not used as a set of 
variables in an effort to find a direct cause and effect relationship between opportunities and 
movement actions. Instead, the political opportunity framework is used to gain an insight into the 
influence of international actors on potential opportunities and provide an initial overview, on which 
more research can be carried out.   
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CHAPTER THREE: KOSOVO 
 
This chapter assesses how the presence of international actors in Kosovo has shaped the context in 
which social movements function. I analyse the impact international actors have had upon the political 
opportunities available to movements. The chapter has been split into two sections, the first focuses 
on the post-conflict, pre-independence period from 1999 to early 2008. The second focuses on the 
period after independence was declared in 2008 until the beginning of 2015. Throughout both 
sections I assess the key actors involved and the events that took place with a view to providing an 
insight into the impact of these factors on the potential political opportunities for movements.  
 
The first section provides an overview of how Kosovo became a new protectorate and the 
international actors involved. I take a closer look at the role of UNMIK as the largest feature of the 
international presence with the most extensive powers. Following this I consider the domestic elites 
that have emerged since the conflict and the role of the Provisional Institutions of Self Government 
(PISG). I discuss the coherence of international actors, domestic elites, and the relationship between 
the two. The influence of international actors on democratic development is then discussed, 
particularly the conduct and outcome of elections, the rule of law and civil society development. These 
elements have been significantly shaped by international actors and are those most likely to impact 
upon political opportunities for movements.   
 
In the second section of this chapter I consider the effects of independence on political opportunities. 
I provide an overview of the roles of the additional international actors present in Kosovo in the post-
independence period, such as the International Civilian Office (ICO) and EULEX. I also briefly revisit the 
areas discussed in the first section and consider the changes within these areas, up until the end of 
2014. This chapter draws on the extensive literature on Kosovo, as well as the new protectorate and 
political opportunity literature explored in Chapter One and Two, which has been applied to the 
specific context of Kosovo. The assessment of the influence of international actors and their impact 
on political opportunities provides the contextual overview for the analysis of Vetëvendosje in the 
following chapter.  
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Pre-independence period 
International actors 
A vast amount of literature has assessed the international presence in Kosovo, including those focused 
on the intervention (Phillips 2012; Gibbs 2009; Daadler and O’Hanlon 2000), UNMIK (Knudsen and 
Lausten 2006; Sörensen 2009; Hehir 2010; Zaum and Knaus 2012; Van Willigen 2013), the broader 
state-building effort and Kosovo’s path to independence (Capussela 2015; Ker-Lindsay 2009; Weller 
2009; Judah 2008), and the legitimacy of the international presence (see Yannis 2001, 2004; 
Chesterman 2005; Caplan 2005; Hehir 2006, 2007, 2009; King and Mason 2006; Narten 2008; Lemay-
Hébert 2009, 2013). This literature highlights the extensive influence wielded by a variety of 
international actors involved in the new protectorate. Here, I clarify Kosovo’s status as a new 
protectorate and provide an overview of the international actors involved and the coherence between 
them. This overview highlights the extensive powers international actors had in post-intervention 
Kosovo, as well as the range of areas in which they could impact upon political opportunities for 
movements.  
 
Kosovo as a new protectorate 
On March 24th 1999, a 78-day NATO intervention began, which intended to stop the persecution of 
the Albanian population within Kosovo by Yugoslav armed forces and Serbian police and Serb 
paramilitary forces. This intervention symbolised the shifts within Western policy-making, and it was 
the first time NATO used military force against a nation that did not pose a direct threat to a NATO 
member. After the intervention, UNSCR 1244 was adopted on 10 June 1999, with 14 votes in favour 
and one abstention from China. After the intervention, Kosovo was technically a UN protectorate (Trix 
2010). The resolution dictated that an international civil and security presence would be deployed in 
Kosovo under the auspices of the UN. UNSCR 1244 insisted on the withdrawal of Serbian forces and 
placed Kosovo under a transitional UN administration overseen by UNMIK (UNSC 1999), the first UN 
operation of its kind. UNMIK maintained authority over several executive functions until the 
declaration of independence in 2008. 
 
UNMIK and KFOR, the NATO led international peacekeeping force, represented the largest among a 
plethora of international actors present in Kosovo after the intervention. Several specialised 
institutions were also present, such as the European Commission, the OSCE, the IMF, World Bank and 
several UN agencies, as well as embassies and consulates, development agencies and international 
NGOs. The presence of the international administration and the extensive involvement of largely 
Western international actors over nearly a decade means that Kosovo can be considered a new 
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protectorate, as defined in Chapter One. Such extensive influence by international actors over military 
and civilian aspects of post-intervention Kosovo resulted in a substantial impact on political 
opportunities available for movements. 
 
International Community? 
As outlined in Chapter One, international interventions are often presented as though they are carried 
out by and for the international community. This was the case with the intervention in Kosovo. Prior 
to the intervention, a major conference was held at Rambouillet, France, to try to establish a 
consensus on how to deal with the conflict. At the conference, the possibility of an intervention was 
opposed by several states, including China, Russia and India. The Indian ambassador to the UN was 
particularly vocal against an intervention and argued that despite the intervention being claimed as 
an act of the international community, it was clearly not representative given the amount of 
opposition (Nambiar 2000). The intervention was often presented as the international community 
rescuing the suffering Kosovar Albanians (Lindberg 2014) by bringing an end to “the humanitarian 
catastrophe now unfolding in Kosovo” (NATO 1999). In a press statement the NATO secretary-general, 
Javier Solana, announced that NATO was taking action due to “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Government’s refusal of the International Community’s demands”, and that the action was “intended 
to support the political aims of the international community” (NATO 1999). 
 
The term ‘international community’ appeared regularly in documentary sources and interviews 
throughout the data collection process. The term seems to largely provide a convenient form of 
reference to the international actors more broadly, and the values and norms they are generally 
thought to promote. However, as Chapter One highlighted, the use of the term often refers to a 
narrow set of actors. This can be seen in Kosovo as the international actors found to have engaged in 
Kosovo were largely limited to those from the US, some Western European states and Turkey,13 with 
little political activity visible from other states.14 Actors from some states seem to be more active in 
certain sectors, either geographically or by policy area. For example, Norway is particularly interested 
                                                          
13 Turkey’s involvement in Kosovo stems from the strong historical and cultural links to the region. Turkey tends to engage 
less in the overtly political matters of the country, content with the approach of other influential states (Interview 18, 2014). 
Turkey co-operates with other states working in Kosovo, particularly with European states and the US, supporting the EU’s 
work on a dialogue with Serbia and therefore do not pose a point of contention with the more influential actors present in 
Kosovo (Ibid). 
14 When interviewed, one embassy official commented that countries outside of the EU and the US do not even make public 
statements in Kosovo (Interview Six, 2014). 
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in civil society projects (Royal Norwegian Embassy in Prishtina 2014), whereas Turkey focuses on the 
promotion and restoration of cultural sites (Interview 18, 2014).  
 
Due to Kosovo’s geopolitical position within Europe, Western powers had incentives to ensure 
Kosovo’s long-term stability. However, soon after the establishment of the new protectorate, several 
states, especially the US, were distracted by other crises developing elsewhere. The effects of 9/11, 
the threat of terrorism, and subsequent events in Iraq and Afghanistan, shifted international, and 
particularly Western attention away from Kosovo. Despite growing concerns elsewhere, the US and 
Western states continued to pour significant resources into Kosovo. This was, in part, because the 
credibility and legitimacy of the NATO intervention rested on the success of subsequent efforts to 
maintain security and ensure democratic development (Capussela 2015). 
 
The US were publicly very supportive of the Kosovar cause in the build up to the intervention and was 
one of the most influential actors during and after. The US has been one of the biggest donors to 
Kosovo, contributing almost $2 billion to Kosovo’s development since 1999 (Department of State n.d.). 
Support from the US takes a number of forms, including development projects led by USAID and 
advisers or consultants that are placed near ministers (Capussela 2011a: 57). As a result, the US and 
its ambassadors have maintained a significant level of influence over events in Kosovo (Lewis et al. 
2014; Capussela 2011b). 
 
Both UNMIK and KFOR were present as part of UNSCR 1244 but were guided by Western powers. This 
could be thought to assure some level of coherence between missions (see Capussela 2015; Knudsen 
and Lautsen 2006). However, the KFOR mission was NATO led and did not take orders from the UN. 
As noted in the political opportunity literature, levels of coherence or division among international 
actors may increase or constrain opportunities for movements, depending on the demands the 
movement makes. Chapter One highlighted that within new protectorates, the international actors 
involved generally agree on broadly defined goals, though each actor may have its own focus or 
methods of implementation. An interview with Robin Budd, Second Secretary at the British Embassy 
in Kosovo, highlights the extent to which he felt international actors collaborate in Kosovo: 
 
[The] international community shares common goals, when it comes to democracy and civil 
society development, but I would not go as far as to say [the] international community acts as 
one body (Interview Eight, 2014). 
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Despite the autonomy of some actors, the promotion of similar goals by a relatively small number of 
states involved in Kosovo suggests that it is possible to assume a broad consensus existed when 
considering political opportunities. Therefore additional opportunities were likely to arise for those 
organisations and movements with goals that align with those of international actors. However, those 
with opposing goals, or goals that were not of interest to international actors are likely to perceive 
fewer additional opportunities. 
 
UNMIK 
The main civilian responsibilities for state-building efforts lay with UNMIK. The mission’s mandate 
was: 
 
to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic, self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and 
normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo (Noutcheva 2012: 3). 
 
To achieve UNMIK’s mandate it helped to establish the PISG and to oversee its functions. Overall 
responsibility lay with the head of UNMIK, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), 
chosen by the UN Secretary-General. UNMIK was responsible for several key executive functions, 
including the UNMIK Police, the UNMIK Department of Justice and the UNMIK Civil Administration. In 
addition to this, UNMIK set out to support the reconstruction of infrastructure, to maintain civil law 
and order, promote human rights, assure the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and, 
coordinate humanitarian relief (UNSC 1999). 
 
UNMIK consisted of four pillars that included the involvement of other international actors: 
  
Pillar I:  Humanitarian Assistance, led by the UNHCR (United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees) 
 Pillar II:  Civil Administration, under the UN 
 Pillar III: Democratisation and Institution Building, led by the OSCE 
 Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, managed by the EU (UNSC 1999). 
 
The first pillar was phased out at the end of June 2000 as the emergency phase was over and the 
majority of refugees had returned. This pillar then became responsible for rule of law (including 
UNMIK Police and the Department of Judicial Affairs). As part of the third pillar, the OSCE’s mandate 
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involved building democracy, and promoting human rights and the rule of law. It was also responsible 
for institution building, including the Assembly, Radio Television of Kosovo (RTK), and the Kosovo 
Police force. The EU’s remit included responsibility for the UNMIK customs service, the Kosovo Trust 
Agency, the Fiscal Affairs Office and the Central Banking Authority of Kosovo (Papadimitriou et al. 
2007). 
 
From the available information, it seems that initially UNMIK was generally welcomed by the public 
and the Kosovar elite (Egleder 2012: 281; Lemay-Hébert 2009; UNDP 2004), and was viewed as an 
extension of the international force that intervened in Kosovo. A survey of Kosovars conducted by the 
UNDP (2004) showed that 63.8% were satisfied with UNMIK in November 2002. However, political 
opportunities were quite constrained during the first few years of UNMIK’s presence as UNMIK itself 
was fairly closed and so the channels available to influence UNMIK’s decision-making were limited. 
USAID reported that UNMIK was viewed as being particularly unaccountable and unresponsive to 
NGOs (USAID 2003, 2004, 2005). This is important in regard of political opportunities as UNMIK was 
viewed as the most powerful body at the time, while other actors were perceived to have low levels 
of influence (UNDP 2004). Only 25% perceived the PISG, political parties and civil society as having the 
power to effect the political situation (UNDP 2004). This suggests that political parties and civil society 
are unlikely to have been perceived (whether this is accurate or not, the perception is important) as 
effective channels for movements to utilise.  
 
Five years after the NATO intervention Kosovo continued to struggle with a number of problematic 
issues. Infrastructure was still poor in many parts of the country, economically it was still donor 
dependent and reliant on remittances, corruption was rife, trafficking was a concern, unemployment 
remained around 45%, and there were occasional attacks on Serbs (see Kostić et al. 2012). The lack of 
progress in Kosovo was largely attributed to UNMIK (Lemay-Hébert 2009; King and Mason 2006). 
Surveys showed that satisfaction with the functioning of UNMIK, the SRSG and the Assembly was 
decreasing, there was also dissatisfaction with the government, though to a lesser extent (Lemay-
Hébert 2009; Hyseni et al. 2007b; UNDP 2004). Satisfaction with UNMIK had plummeted by almost 
40% between November 2002 and March 2004, and UNMIK was now being referred to as 
‘UNMIKistan’ by some (Lemay-Hébert 2009: 69). In the 2004 survey, over half of the respondents 
(60%) across ethnicities, perceived UNMIK as responsible for the political situation.15  
                                                          
15 Several UNMIK policies were unpopular with parts of the Kosovar Albanian population. For example, the introduction of 
eight new municipalities within Kosovo were created, three of which contained an ethnic Serb majority (Gračanica, Klokot-
Vrbovac and Ranilug). 
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At the same time, the future status of Kosovo was a key concern for Kosovar elites and the public. 
‘Uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo’ was considered one of the top three problems in Kosovo, 
across ethnicities (UNDP 2004). UNMIK had yet to address the issue of Kosovo’s future status, despite 
UNSCR 1244 stating that the international civil presence will facilitate a political process to deal with 
Kosovo’s future status (UNSC 1999). UNMIK had set out eight standards that provided a vision for a 
democratic Kosovo that included a stable political system and market economy. These standards were 
introduced in 2002 and had to be met before the status issue would be tackled. Many Kosovar 
Albanians were unhappy that the plan lacked clear steps and a time frame for the resolution of 
Kosovo’s status, fearing that Kosovo’s independence was being postponed permanently (Freedom 
House 2004). Capussela (2015: 34) claims that while international actors attempted to separate their 
efforts to state-build from the issue of statehood, the Kosovar public and elite eventually perceived 
UNMIK’s mandate as an obstacle to gaining independence for Kosovo.  
 
There have been a number of assessments of UNMIK’s effectiveness and role in Kosovo (see Capussela 
2015; Tansey 2009; King and Mason 2006), many of which have suggested that UNMIK was not a 
transparent or accountable institution (Pugh 2006; Visoka 2012). The real and/or perceived failings of 
UNMIK raised questions regarding the legitimacy of UNMIK’s continued presence in Kosovo, an issue 
that often arises for international actors post-intervention (Lemay-Hébert 2009: 65). Lemay-Hébert 
(2009: 65) argues that in Kosovo, as occurs in other territories with international administrations, 
UNMIK attempted “to create the conditions for its own legitimacy, portraying the state-building 
process as exogenous to the local society.” Lemay-Hébert argues that this sets the scene for a “popular 
backlash against foreign rule” and creates a “legitimacy dilemma” for the international administrators 
(Lemay-Hébert 2009: 66). Several scholars have argued that international actors did fear a violent 
backlash and attacks by Albanians, who the international community had set out to help, would have 
been particularly damaging to the credibility and the legitimacy of the mission (Capussela 2015; 
Cunliffe 2011: 37, 51-70). 
 
The feared backlash came in the form of riots which broke out in March 2004, during which around 
4,500 people were displaced, nearly 900 were injured and 19 died (ICG 2004). Some rioters targeted 
the UN by throwing rocks at UN buildings, burning UN flags and damaging the UN’s 4x4s (King and 
Mason 2006). Serbian, Ashkali and Roma homes were attacked and public buildings and cultural sites 
were damaged. The recurring explanation from among analysts at the time was that the riots were 
the result of ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians, while problems with UNMIK were just a 
side-line issue (Lemay-Hébert 2009: 71). However, Lemay-Hébert (2009: 71) argues that this was a 
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simplistic explanation which ignored the dissatisfaction and distrust of UNMIK felt by both Serbs and 
Albanians. The riots signified the most prominent demonstration of dissatisfaction with the presence 
of international actors. This very public dissatisfaction was likely to open up opportunities for those 
movements and organisations that wanted to make demands in opposition to the current situation, 
including issues surrounding UNMIK, the international presence, poor economic development, and 
Kosovo’s unresolved status. 
 
The riots triggered a significant shift in events in Kosovo, and in the approach taken by international 
actors. The riots demonstrated that KFOR and UNMIK were not in complete control, and were unable 
to fully enforce law and order (Capussela 2015; Kostić et al. 2012). International actors began to 
reassess the current framework concerning Kosovo’s status. Norwegian diplomat and UN Special 
Envoy, Kai Eide, was sent to Kosovo to assess the situation and recommended that the process of 
determining Kosovo’s status should begin. The status process continued to dominate much of the 
political debate in Kosovo until independence was declared in 2008. 
 
Domestic elites 
As outlined in Chapter Two, domestic elites play an important role in new protectorates. The 
relationship they have with international actors is usually a significant factor in the transition to a 
democratic state (Tansey 2009). Here, I outline the domestic elites present in the pre-independence 
period and their relationship with international actors. This relationship was tense due to the desire 
of domestic elites to deal with the issue of Kosovo’s status. Kosovo was not a state when the 
international intervention took place but many of those in the Kosovo elite, as well as the wider 
population, had called for independence long before the intervention. Given the dominance of the 
status issue during the pre-independence period, I will first briefly outline the efforts to gain 
independence prior to the conflict. This provides a useful insight into Kosovo’s post-intervention 
political elite and allows for a more thorough consideration of the context and the political 
opportunities available post intervention.  
 
Independence struggle 
The last century of Kosovar Albanians’ political history has been dominated by efforts to gain 
independence from Serbia, either as an autonomous state or by becoming part of Albania.16 The area 
                                                          
16 Modern Albanian nationalism was conceived in a political organisation known as The League for the Defence of the Rights 
of the Albanian Nation (commonly known as the League of Prizren) founded in 1878. The organisation aimed to unify areas 
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that is now known as Kosovo was ceded by the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 
1913. Some of Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbia and the rest was part of the Kingdom of 
Montenegro. It was at this time that what could be considered a Kosovar consciousness began to 
develop. After the First World War, Kosovo was part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The 1920s saw the 
start of human rights violations against Albanians and some responded with a guerrilla war (Malcolm 
1998; Bennett 1995). From 1945, Kosovo was a province within the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY), along with the province of Vojvodina and six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia). This was the first time Kosovo formed any 
kind of separate administrative unit though Albanians were still resistant to being incorporated into 
this state and in 1945 the Yugoslav army put a stop to a mass armed Albanian uprising.17 
 
Demonstrations by Kosovar Albanians against the authorities were a common tactic, and were often 
met with repression. Protests demanding better living conditions and increased levels of autonomy 
took place throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (Bennett 1995: 71).18 The authorities’ response to 
the protests were often harsh, though some long-term improvements eventually materialised to try 
and win over Albanians.19 Tito made efforts to rebalance ethnicities within the administrative 
structures in Kosovo, but the small number of those with power lacked experience and the province 
continued to struggle economically (Bennett 1995). In 1974, a new federal constitution gave Kosovo 
more autonomy. By the time of Tito’s death in 1980, Kosovo was 80% Albanian (Vickers 1998). His 
death marked a further increase in separatist pressures from Albanians and tensions between Serbs 
and Albanians within Kosovo.  
 
As of the 1980s, Kosovo was a very poor province and had a high level of illiteracy and unemployed 
but highly educated graduates (Mertus 1999). Activities at the University of Pristina led to the creation 
                                                          
inhabited by Albanians into an autonomous area within the Ottoman Empire. The concept of a Greater Albania was 
developed during the Nazi and Italian Occupation of the Balkans in the Second World War. 
17 Initially, little effort was made by Tito (1953-1980) to integrate Albanians into a wider Yugoslav society, and the Serb-
dominated secret police and security services were allowed to maintain order in Kosovo (Bennett 1995: 71). Tito did attempt 
to encourage a kind of overarching Yugoslav patriotism, although this was not entirely successful at overriding existing local 
ethnic associations or pre-existing myths. At the time Montenegrins and Serbs dominated the security forces and 
administrative aspects of the SFRY. Up until 1965, most areas in Yugoslavia had gone through a period of repression, although 
it tended to be worse in Kosovo (Kaldor 2013). 
18 For more on the various protests see Kostovicova (2005), Mertus (1999), and Bennett (1995). 
19 The University of Pristina was established in 1969, the use of Albanian texts, language and literature were permitted, and 
Albanian became an official language along with Serbo-Croat, which resulted in a rediscovery of Albanian national identity. 
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of networks that initiated large student protests in 1981 (Kostovicova 2005; Mertus 1999).20 In 1988 
the Albanian leadership in Kosovo was replaced by Milosevic, who limited Kosovo’s autonomy (O’Neil 
2002). It also led to demonstrations, a general strike and a hunger strike by miners. Events 
commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo saw more than a million Serbs present 
in Kosovo to celebrate (Bennett 1995: 100), sparking further protests by Albanians. In 1989, a new 
political party was formed. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova, focused 
on opposing the loss of Kosovo’s autonomy. Within a few months of its formation, the LDK had 
700,000 members, which was most of the adult population of Kosovo.  
 
There were fatal protests and riots in Kosovo in January 1990. The federal army responded and a state 
of emergency was imposed for three days (Kola 2003). The following year, Albanian lecturers and 
teachers refused to accept Belgrade’s changes to the curriculum (Bennett 1995: 216). In response, 
Milosevic’s new leadership in Kosovo resigned, which was followed by huge rallies in Belgrade. A state 
of emergency was imposed again and the military moved into Kosovo. The Kosovo Assembly, 
surrounded by tanks and planes, was coerced into accepting a new constitution giving authority to 
Serbia. There were claims that the ballot in parliament was fraudulent (Bennett 1995), and Albanians 
rejected the constitution and boycotted parliament. Policies of repression and discrimination 
continued for several years and existing traditions of coexistence and acceptance had been ruined and 
contributed to the alienation of Albanians from Serbia.  
 
In September 1991 the Provincial Assembly in Kosovo held an independence referendum which saw 
99% of the 87% turnout voting in favour of independence, but it was boycotted by the Serbian 
population (DD 2010). The only UN member state to recognise the declaration was Albania. Ibrahim 
Rugova became the first President of the still unrecognised, Republic of Kosovo. Rugova continued to 
oppose the loss of Kosovo’s autonomy and set up parallel institutions, including healthcare and 
education systems for ethnic Albanians.21 Throughout the 1990s, Rugova rejected any negotiations 
with the Serb authorities which did not directly discuss outright independence. His non-violent 
approach had been very popular, particularly as Kosovars had seen the violence in Croatia and Bosnia 
and did not want to face a similar situation in Kosovo. However, tensions worsened in 1995 after the 
                                                          
20 These protests signified the first time the Yugoslav authorities had positioned themselves on a particular side of a dispute 
between authorities within the SFRY. Serbs were allowed to intervene in Kosovo with the support of the Communist League 
of Yugoslavia (LCY), giving them control over the province (Bennett 1995: 90). 
21 Serbs had denied Albanians access to school and university but the parallel educational system was set up with students 
using makeshift classrooms in shops, houses and cellars as a part of a defiant refusal to accept Belgrade’s control over 
Kosovar education (Kostovičová 2001). 
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announcement of the peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, known as the Dayton Accords. 
These were facilitated by the Contact Group, an informal group comprised of the US, UK, France, 
Germany, Italy and Russia, that was concerned with policy developments in the Balkans. Kosovar 
Albanians felt their voices were not heard at the Bosnian peace talks and they were shocked by an 
outcome that left them with no relief from Serbian oppression (Garton Ash 2000). Rugova’s nonviolent 
and peaceful approach was perceived to be making little progress and support for his approach began 
to diminish. Several alternative solutions to the crisis were put forward, and the more radical and 
violent approach of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was gaining ground. 
 
The KLA, are thought to have been formed in 1994 (Kostić et al. 2012) by former Enverists (Marxist-
Leninist supporters of the communist leader of Albania in the 1970s and 1980s, Enver Hoxha). The KLA 
became more prominent after it carried out violent attacks on Croatian Serb refugee camps and police 
forces in 1996 (Kaufman 2002; O’Neil 2002). In 1997, the Albanian government collapsed and 
armouries were abandoned, which led to a sudden, large influx of weapons into Kosovo, allowing the 
KLA to increase attacks on Serb targets. The conflict escalated in 1998, particularly between the 
Serbian police force and the KLA. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) launched military attacks 
against entire villages in Kosovo in response to KLA military operations which led to the displacement 
of tens of thousands (Weller 1999). The KLA were considered ‘terrorists’ by some22 but they eventually 
managed to gain Western support, particularly from the US (Fulton 2010).  
 
Increased mobilisation of the KLA, the deaths of key figures within the separatist movement, further 
acts of violence by Serbian police and the displacement of an increasing number of Kosovar Albanians 
set the context for the wider conflict between the Serbs and the KLA (Judah 2008). It was at this point 
that the conflict became more internationalised with input from organisations such as the UN, the 
OSCE and NATO. NGOs, such as USAID and International Crisis Group, also became involved and 
focused on human rights or improvements in education, health care, and the media (Troebst 1998). 
By this time, the KLA’s approach began to be eclipse Rugova’s. In 1999, the KLA’s political chief, Hashim 
Thaçi was chosen by the underground Kosovo Assembly, to head the Kosovo Albanian negotiating 
team in discussions over the aborted peace accords known as the Rambouillet Agreement. 
 
After the war Kosovar elites largely consisted of those who had continued to support the LDK and 
Rugova’s policies in the run up to war, and former KLA members, from both its military and political 
                                                          
22 Such as the US Special envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard (BBC News 1998). The KLA had also appeared on the US list of 
terrorist organisations (Fulton 2010). 
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wings. The elite was divided, not along left and right lines, but on their stance towards the conflict and 
independence. The history of the independence struggle, which included a long period of institutional 
boycotts and conflict with Serbia, highlights how Kosovo’s political elite emerged from a communist 
political system in a different way to its regional neighbours. Despite the major differences in the pre- 
and post-1989 elite, the most prominent theme was the struggle for independence. 
 
Independence was also a very important issue to the general public, as shown by the history of 
demonstrations in the face of repression. The long history of movements and political organisations 
working towards Albanian independence, such as the League of Prizren, the National Liberation 
Movement, and the Democratic Front of Albania, may have presented future movements with some 
opportunities, by serving as a delayed demonstration effect for other movements (see Kurzman 1998; 
Kitschelt 1986), particularly those addressing the issue of independence. 
 
Provisional institutions of self-government 
In 1998, Ibrahim Rugova began a second term as President but lived in exile in Rome in 1999. He 
returned to Kosovo in 2000 and agreed, with international actors, to work on the creation of the PISG, 
along with Hashim Thaçi, the former KLA commander who had been leading the provisional 
government. The PISG was designed to fulfil the requirements of a parliamentary republic and 
included a non-executive president, a government and an elected parliament. The PISG included the 
Assembly of Kosovo, the Government of Kosovo, and the Judicial System. Initially these institutions 
only had responsibility over social and economic issues. UNMIK maintained a veto over any decisions 
made by the PISG and kept the most significant responsibilities, including the judiciary and 
constitutional system, and extensive legislative authority. UNSCR 1244 mandated that UNMIK 
gradually transfer part of its legislative and executive powers to the PISG. The SRSG could stop 
attempts by the PISG to go beyond its remit as defined by the Constitutional framework, which still 
included the issue of Kosovo’s future status (ICG 2001). Interactions between international and 
domestic actors were inevitably complex, as responsibilities were shared between UNMIK and the 
PISG, creating, in effect, a dual system of governance (Capussela 2015: 34; Freedom House 2005, 
2004). Capussela (2015: 34) argues that this “confused political accountability and led to increasingly 
less responsive government by the PISG.” Others have suggested that communication between the 
PISG and UNMIK was often lacking and that the system created tension (Freedom House 2004). 
 
By 2004, many of the responsibilities and competencies were transferred from UNMIK to the PISG. 
Despite this transfer, when surveyed, 59% of Albanians and 45% of non-Serb minority communities 
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thought that less than half or none of the competencies had been transferred. In contrast, 56% of 
Serbs in Kosovo thought that more than half or all competencies had been transferred. This 
demonstrates that it may have been difficult to establish which body was responsible for certain 
issues, and that international actors were extremely influential during the pre-independence period. 
The confusion over where responsibilities lay and the unresponsive nature of the PISG is likely to have 
constrained opportunities for movements and CSOs by limiting the availability and effectiveness of 
domestic allies and potential channels through which to influence elites. 
 
For the majority of the pre-independence period, the PISG had quite restricted powers and therefore 
a low capacity to develop policy independently of the executive, which at this time was the SRSG. 
Capussela (2015: 43) argues that the PISG were largely ineffective due to the legislative and 
hierarchical powers of the SRSG. He also argues that the SRSG tried to avoid any conflict with domestic 
elites. The PISG did approve some laws but it has been suggested that it was not effective at 
implementing them (Freedom House 2006). An increased capacity for the legislature to develop policy 
independently of the executive is expected to increase opportunities because an electorally 
accountable legislature should be more sensitive to public demands (Kitschelt 1986). Despite an 
electorally accountable legislature, the limited powers held by the PISG throughout much of pre-
independence period suggests that the PISG would not have been more sensitive to public demands. 
International actors were also not particularly sensitive to public demands (with the exception of the 
post-riot response). Despite the increasing shift in powers from UNMIK to the PISG, there were still 
few political opportunities available. 
 
The relationship between international actors and domestic elites 
Former KLA members formed a significant part of the elite in the post-intervention period and 
international actors chose to work with those from both its military and political wings. After the 
intervention, one of KFOR’s main tasks was to disband and resettle around 10,000 KLA fighters. It was 
formally disbanded, and many former KLA members were employed in the police and civil protection 
corps. However, rather than disarming the KLA fully, a non-aggression pact (see Phillips 2012: 116-17, 
203-4) was agreed, which Capussela (2015: 34-36) argues was one of the major policy choices that 
negatively affected the international administration’s abilities to fulfil long-term state-building goals 
and demonstrates the prioritisation of short-term stability. He also argues that the lack of even a 
gradual disarmament led to the appeasement of the elite and that many largely autonomous groups 
that had been part of the KLA were mostly intact, “under the command of leaders who entered 
politics, business or organized crime” (Capussela 2015: 34). As a result, the international 
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administration was without a monopoly on the use of force23 and an elite emerged that possessed the 
threat of a violent reaction to reforms that may damage their own interests, fuelling the fear of a 
violent backlash (Capussela 2015; Freedom House 2008, 2007).24 
 
Broadly, it seems that the majority of the domestic political elite were keen to work with international 
actors and saw Western support for Kosovo as an essential step towards gaining independence. 
Capussela (2015: 34) argues that the goals of international actors were also broadly in line with what 
the public wanted, particularly given the situation in Kosovo prior to the intervention. The majority of 
Kosovars did welcome the NATO intervention, and a legacy of gratitude remained for years after the 
intervention and still exists to a certain extent. This gratitude was closely associated with those leaders 
who were most proactive in advocating the Kosovar Albanian cause. In the capital, Pristina, there is a 
statue of Bill Clinton and streets named after George Bush, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair.25 President 
Hashim Thaçi has stated that “Kosovo is one of the most pro-American nations on earth” (Thaçi 2014) 
and he called Tony Blair a “political giant,” that “all of us in Kosovo owe him and the British people a 
considerable debt” (Thaçi 2010).  
 
The complex sharing of responsibilities between domestic and international elites, and the public 
appearance of domestic support for international actors could both create and constrain 
opportunities, depending on a movement’s or CSO’s demands. It is difficult to establish the levels of 
coherence between international and domestic elites across all issues but it does seem that it would 
have been difficult for movements to establish where responsibilities lay within the complex system 
of dual governance. The nature of the system of governance and uncertainty of the status issue 
suggests that the political system was quite closed resulting in fewer opportunities to influence the 
                                                          
23 A monopoly on the use of force is considered a key tenant of a functioning state. Although Kosovo was not a internationally 
recognised independent state at this point, the international administration had a remit covering a set territory and held the 
responsibility of creating a functional system of self-governance.  
24 Capussela (2015) believes that international actors did have other options, as the social order and elite were not yet set in 
stone and could have been more malleable, given that there were other forces both inside and outside of the country that 
could have helped to contain negative reactions to widening economic and political competition. At this time NATO was still 
heavily present, and Kosovo was economically and politically (in terms of gaining independence) dependent on the 
international community acting favourably towards it.  
25 Tony Blair visited Pristina in July 2010 and was welcomed by a crowd of several thousand. A few parents decided to name 
their sons after Tony Blair, giving them the first name Tonibler. As Borger (2014b) states “[i]t is not exactly a mass 
phenomenon, but it is the embodiment of one.” 
73 
 
political process. However, elements of the elite were frustrated with Kosovo’s progress and divisions 
between international actors and domestic elites may have provided potential political allies. 
 
Status negotiations 
The negotiations over Kosovo’s future status were a key development in the pre-independence era, 
which saw strong collaboration between international and domestic actors, and had a significant 
impact on political opportunities. The long period of Kosovo’s undetermined status provoked 
uncertainty in Kosovo and exacerbated the difficulties of post-conflict reconstruction (Chesterman 
2002: 3). It was difficult for several international organisations to work as effectively as they might 
have done if Kosovo’s status had been clarified. For example, Kosovo could not have full membership 
of certain international organisations due to its lack of statehood, and so organisations like the IMF 
and the Council of Europe (COE) could only work with Kosovo in an advisory capacity (Interview 15, 
2014; Interview 17, 2014). Some organisations included member states who disagreed with the 
principle of independence for Kosovo which meant the organisation as a whole, could not comment 
on the status issue. Even the OSCE and the UN had to remain neutral on the issue (Interview Five, 
2014; Interview Seven, 2014).  
 
The UN Security Council endorsed the conclusions of Kai Eide’s report and negotiations on Kosovo’s 
status started in February 2006 in Vienna. These negotiations involved Serbia and Kosovo, and were 
facilitated by international actors, led by UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari. The negotiators on the 
Kosovo side, known as the Unity Team, consisted of five members, proposed by Rugova. Several 
sources suggest that the work of the Unity Team was not very open to the public and it received 
criticism in Parliament for its undemocratic structure, secrecy and concessions (Freedom House 2007).  
 
A range of technical issues were discussed alongside the status issue, such as economic issues, 
property rights, the protection of Serbian Orthodox churches, decentralisation, and institutional 
guarantees for the rights of minorities (see Foniqi-Kabashi 2006). Decentralisation was a particularly 
sensitive issue. Serbia demanded that Kosovo Serb communities should have close ties between each 
other and Serbia and that Serb communities should receive direct funding from Serbia rather than via 
the Kosovo government. The Kosovar Albanian negotiators believed that this scenario could be 
politicised and were fearful of a similar situation to post-conflict Bosnia (Freedom House 2007). 
 
After a year of negotiations, in March 2007, Ahtisaari’s draft status settlement proposed a ‘supervised 
independence’ (Ker-Lindsey 2009; Weller 2009, 1999). It is thought, by some, that most Kosovar 
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Albanian politicians thought the draft proposal, the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement (also known as the Ahtisaari Plan) was a reasonable deal (Garton Ash 2007). However, the 
Ahtisaari Proposal was rejected by the UN Security Council and Serbia, and new talks were proposed. 
 
During the negotiation period, the economy remained poor, many were unemployed, civil society was 
weak, and the status issue appears to have trumped all other developments. Berisha (2011: 40) argues 
that the Kosovar leadership were focused on gaining independence and that dissent against the 
government was stifled and it deflected responsibility in the run up to independence. Berisha states 
that “the prevailing sentiment was to keep silent on any discontent that would avoid jeopardising 
Kosovo’s awaited independence, which relied on international support” (Berisha 2011:40). This 
context constrained political opportunities, particularly for making demands on issues that were not 
directly related to the status issue. For those movements concerned with the issue of Kosovo’s future 
status, the potential for political opportunities appears mixed. These movements may have benefited 
from the general consensus on independence, although there were divisions over the approach to the 
negotiations and what to do after the negotiations failed. This limited division among the elite may 
have provided some opportunities in the form of allies and a platform on which to air their demands. 
The effects of the status issue on civil society more broadly are considered below. 
 
Democratic development 
The establishment of liberal democracy was one of the primary aims for the international actors 
involved, as found in other new protectorates (see Chapter One). The previous sections have discussed 
the establishment of democratic institutions and the governance of Kosovo by UNMIK and the PISG. 
Here, I will consider the conduct and outcome of elections, followed by a broad overview of the some 
of the aspects of international involvement that have the potential to facilitate or repress movement 
activity, including the rule of law, and civil society development. This provides a further insight into 
the international actors’ impact on political opportunities, particularly in the areas of facilitation and 
repression. 
 
Electoral politics 
One key aspect of democratic development that international actors were heavily involved in, was the 
establishment of elections. Electoral politics can affect the political opportunities available in a 
number of ways, as outlined in Chapter Two. The conduct and outcome of elections can be 
demonstrative of the capacity for competition for elite status and the ability to participate in political 
opposition. The greater these capacities, the more open and responsive regimes are expected to be 
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and are then more likely to assimilate or allow the broad presence of movements (Kitschelt 1986: 62). 
It is also possible that when these capacities are lower, movements may be galvanised into action 
(Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1634). Movements may also find potential allies as a result of the 
electoral process and find opportunities where there is division among candidates or representatives 
(Tarrow 1998; Banks 2007). The conduct and outcome of the elections in Kosovo during the pre-
independence period will be analysed here with a view to establishing the impact on political 
opportunities. 
 
The first municipal elections took place in October 2001, over two and a half years after the 
intervention. These were followed by the first national elections in November 2001. The ICG (2001) 
considered the elections to be a landmark for post-conflict Kosovo. They gave some legitimacy to the 
Albanian population and altered the political landscape and the relationship between international 
actors and domestic elites. There had been some violence at the first municipal elections, but the 
conduct during the 2001 national elections was seen as an improvement (ICG 2001). All the elections 
pre-independence were managed by the OSCE’s Department of Elections according to regulations set 
by the OSCE and UNMIK.  
 
Those putting candidates forward are referred to as ‘entities’ and include political parties, coalitions, 
independent candidates and citizen’s initiatives. A citizen’s initiative is “a group of persons who 
voluntarily associate on the basis of a common idea, interest or viewpoint with the objective of having 
their candidates elected, but who do not wish to form a political party” (OSCE 2001). The rules state 
that each application must have 1,000 signatures from eligible voters along with a fee of 2,000 
Deutsche Marks (the currency used until 2000 when the euro was introduced, equating to around 
£1,000), which is refunded if at least one seat is won. There are 120 seats in the Assembly and 
applicants must state if they intend to compete for any of the 20 seats reserved for minority 
communities, 10 for Serbs (designed to encourage participation from the Serb community after a 
boycott of the first municipal elections) and 10 for Roma, Ashkaeli, Egyptian, Bosniak, Turkish and 
Gorani.  
 
Twenty-six political entities met the requirements set by Central Election Commission (CEC) (a body 
comprising of Kosovars and led by the head of the OSCE’s mission) and were certified to take part in 
the election by the OSCE. There were a number of entities attempting to gain the reserved seats, such 
as the Civic Initiative of Gora, the Democratic Ashkali Party of Kosovo and the United Roma Party of 
Kosovo. It is argued that the higher the number of political parties, groups and factions that can 
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effectively engage and put forward ideas, will increase political opportunities (Tarrow 1998; Banks 
2007). Given that 26 entities stood in the elections and the representation of minorities was ensured 
by the allocation of 20 seats, an increase in opportunities for movements is likely. This is particularly 
likely given that Kosovo had not had its own institutions for very long at this point. 
 
Despite the large number of entities participating in the elections, it appears that there was little to 
distinguish the three main parties from each other. This will have resulted in potentially fewer 
opportunities for movements which would usually benefit from a fragmented political elite (Goldstone 
2001, 1994). The majority of Albanians voted for three parties, the LDK, PDK and AAK (Alliance for the 
Future of Kosovo). The LDK,26 founded by former President Ibrahim Rugova, has stuck with similar 
policies since it was founded and it is generally considered to be on the centre-right (Balkan Insight 
2010). The party’s electoral base is largely urban, and in the 2001 elections it received 46.3% of the 
vote, double that of its closest rival, the PDK. 
 
The PDK27 received 22.5% of the vote in 2001. The party was founded by several former commanders 
of the political wing of the KLA in May 1999. Support for the PDK is largely from rural areas, particular 
the Drenica area in central Kosovo (Balkan Insight 2010). In its early stages the PDK was said to have 
some socialist tendencies, but now, as with most other parties, it positions itself on the centre right 
(Balkan Insight 2010). The AAK party placed third in the 2001 election,28 receiving 7.8% of the vote, 
making it the smallest of the three parties. It was formed in 2000, and led by Ramush Haradinaj, 
another former KLA commander. The party’s electoral base has remained in the west of the country, 
where Haradinaj is from, and is also considered to be on the centre-right (Balkan Insight 2010). 
 
The electoral system in Kosovo makes it very unlikely that a single party would be able to govern and 
each election has resulted in a coalition of some kind. In 2001 a coalition was formed between the 
LDK and the PDK. Rugova was finally appointed President at the fourth attempt after lengthy political 
negotiations, and international pressure (Freedom House 2005). Rugova continued to campaign for 
Kosovo’s independence but he insisted that this was to be done peacefully and under the agreement 
of all parties. He also pursued a policy of close relations with the US and the EU. As the three main 
parties are all considered to be on the centre-right, the main difference between them is linked to 
                                                          
26 For more on the LDK see KIPRED (2012: 20-24); IKS (2011: 23-34, 70-71); Sörensen (2009: 139-46). 
27 The PDK changed its name from the Party for the Democratic Progress of Kosovo in May 2000. For more on the PDK see 
KIPRED (2012: 18-20); IKS (2011: 35-43, 73-74). 
28 For more on the AAK see KIPRED (2012: 27-29); IKS (2011: 44-46, 74-75). 
77 
 
how they approached the conflict with Serbia. The LDK had supported a non-violent approach in 
contrast to those parties emerging from the former KLA leadership. 
 
The main feature of the 2004 election was the emergence of five new political parties, a large number 
of independent candidates and the dissolution of some minority coalitions. The newest party, gaining 
the most votes, was the Civic List ORA, founded by civil society activists. It gained 6.2% of the vote and 
seven seats, but failed to pass the five percent threshold required to win seats at the following 
election. Of the 32 political parties and independent candidates that participated in the Assembly 
elections, 19 won seats, including ten parties occupying regular seats and nine minority parties 
contesting for the reserved seats (Freedom House 2005). The LDK won the most votes again (45.4%), 
the PDK placed second (28.9%) and the AAK third (8.3%). Rugova attempted to incorporate supporters 
of the former KLA into the government and in November 2004 he appointed the AAK leader Ramush 
Hardinaj as Prime Minister.29  
 
The organisation of the 2004 elections saw more involvement from Kosovar bodies and the OSCE took 
a more advisory role (Freedom House 2005). These elections experienced less interference from 
international actors when it came to establishing a government than in the 2001 election (Freedom 
House 2006). The most prominent issues during the election were wide-ranging and included 
employment, healthcare, agriculture, good governance and anticorruption (Freedom House 2005). 
After the election in 2005, the first real opposition was formed in Parliament, which seemed to revive 
parliament, “raising the level of dialogue in institutions and society in general” (Freedom House 2006). 
However, representatives within the opposition did frequently walk out (Freedom House 2006). The 
increased number of entities in parliament and the establishment of a clear opposition opens up 
opportunities due to the increased fragmentation and capacities for opposition to function. 
 
In 2005, Rugova escaped an assassination attempt when a bomb exploded in a waste container as his 
car drove by in 2005. However, he died soon after in January 2006 of lung cancer. Rugova’s death had 
major effects on the unity within the LDK (Freedom House 2006), which led to a “tumultuous and 
periodically violent” electoral process for new leadership (Freedom House 2007). Also during this 
period, the negotiations on status were taking place and the prospects of independence seemed more 
assured. The political discourse in Kosovo appears to have broadened with some new influences such 
                                                          
29 Hardinaj only stayed in the position for four months as he was indicted for war crimes by the ICTY (International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia). Agim Ceku took his place and Haradinaj was later acquitted in 2008, returning to a ‘hero’s 
welcome’. He faced a retrial in July 2000 which took two years and led to a second acquittal. 
78 
 
as that of Behgjet Pacolli. Pacolli, an ethnic Albanian millionaire who was founder and President of a 
Swiss based construction and civil engineering company, invested heavily in Kosovo and started a new 
party, the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR) in March 2006. The party took 12% of the votes in the November 
2007 elections, taking third place (though this early success was short lived and the AKR failed to make 
the 5% threshold at the following elections). The party was considered to be ideologically liberal and 
to occupy the centre.  
 
The 2007 elections saw another new party emerge - the SLS (Independent Liberal Party), formed in 
2006, and the largest party representing Serbs in Kosovo, winning five Assembly seats. These new 
entities were contributing to the gradually broadening political spectrum of entities that were gaining 
seats at elections. Ninety-seven entities took part in the 2007 elections and the PDK won the elections 
for the first time receiving 34.3% of the vote. The party leader, Hashim Thaçi, the former political 
leader of the KLA, formed a coalition with the LDK, which had won 22.6% of the vote. The SLS also 
became part of a coalition with the PDK and had two cabinet ministers. The SLS also held the mayoral 
positions in three Serb-majority areas (Balkan Insight 2010). A Freedom House (2007) report suggests 
that although there was a stable government in 2007, this was not due to stable structures but due to 
pressure from international actors, particularly the US and the EU. The consensus that seemed to have 
been reached between parties was mostly likely down to the ongoing status talks (Freedom House 
2007). 
 
Even without the somewhat enforced consensus among domestic elites and the ongoing status talks, 
the domestic political elite were ideologically very similar. The majority of political parties in Kosovo 
lacked strong ideological positions, and 90% of those in the Kosovo Albanian political elite claim to be 
on the centre right (Democracy for Development 2014; Anderson 2010: 3). This lack of fragmentation 
and the lack of parties from the rest of the political spectrum suggests that movements with 
alternative demands are likely to see their opportunities constrained. While those movements with a 
centre-right or similar stance to political parties and those in government may perceive an increase in 
opportunities.  
 
The influence of international actors in the political process, and the consensus politics for the sake of 
the negotiation process is likely to have constrained political opportunities for movements. These 
factors appear to virtually negate the outcome of the elections in relation to movement opportunities. 
International actors played a significant role in the conduct of elections but it is also evident that 
certain international actors had some influence over the resulting coalition formation between parties 
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in the aftermath of elections. Alongside the international influence, there were a number of domestic 
factors that also influenced the outcome of elections. It is widely acknowledged that patronage and 
the influence of local ties, regionally and by clan (known as fis) tend to dominate electoral politics in 
Kosovo (Freedom House 2011; Sörensen 2009). Most parties tend to focus on a small number of 
leaders, and Capussela (2015: 45) argues that most parties were lacking internal democracy and 
“resembled personal fiefdoms or aggregations of personal clienteles” (Capussela 2015: 46; see 
Sörensen 2009; Džihić and Kramer 2009; Montanaro 2009).  
 
It seems that the public became quickly dissatisfied with the PISG (Capussela 2015: 45) and 
participation in elections declined quite rapidly. Reports30 state that turnout was 80% in 2000, 54% in 
2004 and down to 37% by 2007 (IKS 2011; Freedom House 2005). Capussela (2015: 45) argues that 
this is “an eloquent sign of how ingrained the citizens’ distrust of those institutions had become.” 
Freedom House (2006) has suggested that voter turnout is lower because “[p]olitical parties have a 
limited ability to communicate distinct policies to voters, and the election system fails to produce 
choices based on individual or local interests.” These factors also serve to limit political opportunities. 
 
As late as 2006, Kosovo still did not have an electoral law and the issue of electoral reform was the 
subject of public debate. Civil society activists raised a number of concerns over the effects of 
proportional voting, such as poor accountability of assembly members to their constituents and the 
overrepresentation of minorities with 20 reserved seats. The system of closed lists was also criticised 
for narrowing voters’ choices to three or four significant parties (Freedom House 2007). Prior to the 
October 2004 elections, civil society activists formed an umbrella group called Reforma, advocating 
for open party lists that identify each party’s candidates. However, the campaign started long after 
Kosovo’s political parties had successfully pressured UNMIK to approve a proportional voting system 
with close lists. Later, international organisations, such as International Crisis Group, also joined the 
advocacy of open lists (Freedom House 2006). Some complained that the OSCE and UNMIK failed to 
engage aspects of civil society in discussions on the electoral system (Freedom House 2007). 
Eventually open lists were adopted as well as some other reforms in 2007 (Freedom House 2007). This 
campaign for electoral reform highlights the nature of the relationship between international actors 
and domestic elites, as well as the lack of responsiveness by both to civil society. 
 
                                                          
30 Capussela (2015: 45) advises caution when considering these reports and states that the voter register was inflated and 
that it continues to be. 
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Overall, the elections in Kosovo during the pre-independence period show the ability to participate in 
political opposition, demonstrated by the broad range of groups standing in the elections. However, 
the number of groups and factions that could effectively engage appears to have been fairly limited. 
As explained earlier, the majority of elites, including those who were elected, stood on conservative, 
centre-right platforms and the fragmentation amongst elites was fairly low. This is likely to limit 
opportunities, particularly for left-leaning movements or those putting forward alternative demands 
to those elected. Movements are likely to experience different outcomes regarding the potential for 
allies and opposition within the political elite depending on their demands. Though opposition politics 
improved in 2005 it was not long before the status talks dominated the political discourse for the two 
years preceding independence limiting opportunities to present other issues. 
 
Movement facilitation? 
Along with the conduct of elections, international actors had significant influence over a number of 
broad areas that could facilitate or inhibit and repress social movement activity. These broad areas 
are important to consider as there are no signs that international actors tried to facilitate movements 
directly. Generally, during the pre-independence period the institutional rules that could facilitate a 
movement’s access to the public sphere and the political decision-making process (Kitschelt 1986) 
were still being developed. Particularly in the early years of the new protectorate, there were few 
institutional rules that would facilitate movements. Although a large number of laws were passed that 
may have been favourable to social movement activity, many were not implemented or used 
effectively. For example the Law on Access to Information was approved by the assembly in 2003. In 
2005, the implementation of the law was still inconsistent and there was a lack of knowledge amongst 
civil servants as well as the public, so accessing public information from UNMIK and the PISG was still 
a challenge (Freedom House 2005).  
 
The OSCE, as part of the UNMIK administration, was also responsible for establishing the rule of law, 
to “help ensure the independence, impartiality and accountability of the justice system”, and the 
mission “reviews human-rights legislation, helps institutions implement it correctly, and assists the 
Office of the Prime Minister to ensure that legislation is developed and implemented in accordance 
with the rule of law standards” (OSCE 2016). In the period before independence, Capussela argues 
that the rule of law could largely be ignored by the PISG and that the public administration was “widely 
used by the elite as an instrument for patronage, and was plagued by political interference, corruption 
and nepotism” (Capussela 2015: 45; see Progress Report 2007: 10; Progress Report 2008: 12-13).  
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The effectiveness of the OSCE rule of law mission has received a mixed response, though the judiciary 
was weak, it has strengthened throughout pre-independence period (Freedom House 2008). UNMIK, 
included a police component and was tasked with creating a new police force and to maintain law and 
order until then. By 2005, the creation of the Kosovo Police Service was near completion with 6,000 
officers (Freedom House 2005), but was still under the authority of UNMIK until independence. The 
international authority over policing and the rule of law links the international actors with police 
reactions to political protest or repression of social movements. It appears that Vetëvendosje was the 
only civil society actors that experienced any repression from the authorities, which is explored in 
more detail in Chapter Four. 
 
Civil society development 
International actors have provided large amounts of funding and support into civil society 
development since the intervention, which has contributed to the significant changes seen in the 
nature of Kosovo’s civil society. As discussed in Chapter One, civil society development can provide 
social movements with channels of interactions between them and government. In order to assess 
the international influence on civil society, I first briefly consider Kosovo’s civil society prior to the 
involvement of international actors. This is followed by an assessment of how the presence of, and 
funding from, international actors had impacted on civil society and the resulting impacts on political 
opportunities. 
 
Civil society, before the NATO intervention, was a key part of the parallel systems and featured as part 
of the resistance to Serbian authority (KCSF n.d. a). There were several grassroots organisations 
concerned mainly with human rights and humanitarian and welfare issues that did not have financial 
incentives, such as the Council for the Defense of human Rights and Freedoms and the Mother Teresa 
Charitable Society. In addition, independent trade unions and think-tanks such as Riinvest and the 
Kosova Action for Civic Initiatives, were also active (Freedom House 2006). Bennett (1995: 216) argues 
that during this period, Kosovar Albanian society was homogenised as a result of Serbian oppression, 
and Kosovar Albanians were using resources, such as remittances, collectively. During this time there 
was a sense of solidarity and that the line between government, under the leadership of Rugova, and 
these civil society organisations was blurred (Interview 12, 2014). 
 
After the conflict, Kosovo’s civil society changed dramatically, particularly in terms of the number and 
type of organisations, and the issues civil society was concerned with also significantly shifted. Once 
the initial need for humanitarian relief began to fade, international NGOs and funders began to focus 
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on civil society. The legal framework influencing civil society in Kosovo, which is mainly found under 
the Law on Freedom of Association of NGOs and the main elements of Public Beneficiary Status, is one 
which most analysts seem content with (KCSF n.d. b). UNMIK had an Office for the Registration of 
Nongovernmental Organisations and it appears that the formal process for entering civil society was 
quite open and is relatively simple (KCSF n.d. b; Freedom House 2004). A vast number of NGOs that 
have been set up since the intervention, increasing from 400 registered NGOs in 2000 (USAID 2001) 
to 1,000 by 2004 (Freedom House 2004), 2,000 by 2005 (Freedom House 2005), and 3,000 by 2006 
(Freedom House 2006).  
 
The majority of civil society consists of NGOs (KSCF n.d. b) and a limited amount of other forms of civil 
society actors. Despite the vast numbers of NGOs registered, it is thought that less than half of 
registered NGOs are well established and active (Strazzari and Selenica 2013: Kelmendi 2012; 
Kelmendi 2012; USAID 2009; Pula 2005). As little as 150 of 2,000 registered NGOs were thought to be 
active in 2005 (Freedom House 2005). Many NGOs are believed to have registered just to gain public 
benefit status which has damaged the public image of NGOs (Freedom House 2006). The image of 
NGOs was considered to be poor amongst the public throughout the pre-independence period (UNDP 
2008: 142; Freedom House 2004) and it has been suggested that the public perceive NGOs with 
“apathy, disinterest, and even distrust” (Freedom House 2006). The government also began to provide 
funding to some civil society groups in 2005 (Freedom House 2005). However, the following year the 
government appeared to be less supportive, and suggested that NGOs were just small organisations 
that work for money. Freedom House (2006) states that the language used by the government 
“undermines or belittles NGOs’ democratic role” (Freedom House 2006).  
 
There are also claims that the type of civil society development that has occurred in Kosovo has 
resulted in the apparent separation of privileged employees from the rest of society, detaching 
organisations from local concerns, aspirations and identifications (Interview 12, 2014; Freedom House 
2006). However, NGOs are thought to have more influence at the local level than the central level due 
to the closeness of citizens associations and local governments (Freedom House 2005). A Freedom 
House report (2006) has stated that Kosovo’s civil society is characterised by “income opportunity 
rather than a mission for societal change” or “a civic responsibility.”  
 
These claims are part of a range of accounts on the state of Kosovo’s civil society, which has been 
considered energetic and diverse (Pula 2005), as well as “weak or incapable of mobilizing civic activism 
and holding government accountable” (Kelmendi 2012: 33; also see Fagan 2010; Pula 2005; Freedom 
83 
 
House 2004). There are a number factors which may account for weaknesses within Kosovo’s civil 
society during the pre-independence period, stemming from both domestic and international 
elements. Demjaha and Peci (2004: 140) state that “the traditional prerequisites for a strong civil 
society are virtually absent in Kosovo.” As discussed in Chapter One, this is somewhat expected by 
scholars of the region and post-conflict states, as some have highlighted that civil society is often weak 
in these contexts (Howard 2013; Fagan 2010; Demjaha and Peci 2004).  
 
Howard (2013) outlines three key reasons for weak civil society in post-Communist countries: the 
legacy of mistrust of communist organisations, the persistence of friendship networks, and 
disappointment with post-Communist orders. These reasons may go some way to account for a weak 
civil society in Kosovo, however, the Communist legacy was interrupted by civil resistance between 
1989 and 1998 (Pula 2005; Clark 2000) and the conflict which followed. Kelmendi (2012) argues that 
the period of resistance in Kosovo is a more influential factor on public attitudes towards civil society 
participation than the presence of a Communist legacy. Scholars have suggested that in many post-
communist countries, movements against communism tended to fade away within a year or two of 
the countries’ post-Communist existence (Kopecký and Mudde 2003: 9), whereas resistance was still 
prominent in Kosovar society for a much longer period. However, the legacy of mistrust, highlighted 
by Howard (2013), appears to be present in Kosovo as surveys show high levels of mistrust of leaders 
and institutions (Civicus 2011: 63; UNDP 2008).  
 
One of the key benefits of an effective civil society is the increased access for groups and individuals 
to the public sphere. Civil society can also provide a channel to influence political decision-making. 
However, this influence was still weak in Kosovo during the pre-independence period. Pula stated in 
2005 that “the direct impact of civil society on the policy process is still rather weak” due to the 
“unfavourable structure of Kosovo’s governing institutions” (Pula 2005: 2). Pula argued that the 
political potential of civil society would continue to be constrained “as long as the political monopoly 
in Kosovo is held by UNMIK and a handful of party leaders” (Ibid). Coelho also argues that international 
actors, “informed by a neoliberal understanding of the state and the politics of international state-
building” have created a “largely apolitical NGO sector that has legitimized the political status quo 
rather than serve as a vehicle for transforming state-society relations” (Coelho 2012: 1). 
 
UNMIK was reported to be particularly unaccountable and unresponsive to NGOs (USAID 2003, 2004, 
2005). UNMIK wrote the Interim Constitutional Framework of Kosovo signed in 2001, which had no 
input or consultation with the public or civil society organisations (USAID 2002: 104). A 2004 USAID 
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report stated that, “successful collaborations [between NGOs and UNMIK] at the national level were 
limited to issues […] where UNMIK’s authority and interests are not impeded” (USAID 2004: 140-50). 
Also, the dual governance system that existed in the pre-independence period meant that, during the 
period when powers were being slowly transferred from UNMIK to the Kosovar authorities, civil 
society actors had difficulty participating, advocating or debating some issues. It was not always clear 
who had responsibility for certain issues (USAID 2004). USAID suggested that structural issues made 
it easier for certain local and international authorities to avert and divert responsibility in certain areas 
(USAID 2003: 104). These issues suggest that the opportunities for influencing government by civil 
society, as well as more broadly, were quite limited during the pre-independence period and were in 
fact, hindered by UNMIK. 
 
There were positive developments within civil society during the pre-independence period. A 
Freedom House (2005) report suggests that civil society was maturing by 2005 with some NGOs active 
in advocacy, providing expert analysis at public hearings, forming coalitions, and receiving more media 
coverage due to public interest in their activities (Freedom House 2005). Some have suggested that 
international actors have helped to consolidate civil society (Interview 12, 2014). However, a number 
of organisations expressed concern that Kosovo’s civil society is unsustainable without international 
funds (Freedom House 2004). Several organisations have suggested that donor funding has not 
necessarily represented a better quality in the work of civil society actors (KCSF n.d. a; Freedom House 
2005). Analysts argue that most of these organisations are trying to function with poor organisational 
structures, unstable financial resources (USAID 2004), and that donor funding has led to a more 
bureaucratic and elitist ‘project culture’ (Sampson 2002a, 2002b).  
 
The main issues addressed by NGOs in Kosovo were those which were most likely to attract donor 
funding, particularly on minority and youth issues which were priorities of many of the international 
actors involved in Kosovo (KSCF n.d.b). The KCSF has suggested that this has led to an increasing 
number “of those that estimate that a large number of civil society initiatives are not driven by the 
interests of the community” (KSCF n.d.a). This is supported by Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 95) who 
argues that many of the NGOs in Kosovo were “responding to UN democratization policies and 
Western donor-driven priorities underpinned by universalist paradigms of civil society.” Coelho (2012: 
2) argues that “instead of harnessing the deep-seated pluralism that existed in Kosovo’s civil society 
during the pre-war era, the international community has largely cultivated a NGO sector that is donor-
dependent and apolitical.” As outlined in Chapter One, international funds and support can present 
civil society’s role as one which is a subsidiary to the state, encouraging interventions only on less 
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contentious issues. This appears to be how internationally funded civil society has developed in 
Kosovo. This type of civil society is likely to have an effect on movement activity and on those CSOs 
that do not receive international funding, particularly those which seek to address more political or 
contentious issues or those not supported by international donors. 
 
As discussed earlier, the most prominent issue in the pre-independence period was the status issue 
and the negotiations. The 2005 Freedom House report on Kosovo states that the activities of civil 
society “decreased owing to the negotiations process for the status of Kosovo, which has dampened 
civil society enthusiasm for criticism of the Kosovo administration” (Freedom House 2005). The report 
argued that civil society was stagnant and failed to “provide checks and balances to the emerging 
government structures and its reduced public willingness to engage in critical monitoring” (Freedom 
House 2005). NGOs made few demands for transparency in the negotiation process, which largely 
took place away from the view of the public (Freedom House 2006). It has been suggested that a ‘wait 
and see’ approach to the issue of status was prevalent, and that ‘hot activities’, like anticorruption, 
should not be pursued in case they negatively affected the outcome of the negotiations (Freedom 
House 2007). The key factors contributing to this approach were thought to be self-censorship and 
donor influence (Freedom House 2007). This further supports the suggestion that donor influence was 
stifling civil society from pursing certain issues, creating an unfavourable environment for positive 
interaction between citizens and government.  
 
Given the prominence of international actors’ influence on the type of civil society that developed in 
Kosovo, it appears that the environment may not have been particularly conducive for grassroots 
activity. Some independent activity was visible in addition to Vetëvendosje, including trade unions, 
though they functioned largely as observers (Freedom House 2006). Student organisations became 
increasingly active, particularly the Student Union and the group, For a Different University. Other 
groups such as the KLA War Invalids Association and the KLA War Veterans Association were 
considered to be politically engaged in opposition to the LDK-AAK coalition but thought to be “serving 
more as vigilante groups than as genuine interest groups” by Freedom House (2004).  
 
Given the state of civil society in the pre-independence period it seems that movement opportunities 
are actually constrained by aspects of internationally funded civil society development, rather than 
increased. The way civil society has developed appears to largely leave out smaller grassroots 
organisations. Despite the prominence of movements in the historical struggle for independence and 
the active civil society in the pre-war period, few grassroots organisations and movements emerged 
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in the pre-independence period. As discussed in Chapter One, there is a historical precedent for 
movement mobilisation may have a ‘demonstration effect’ and encourage movement mobilisation 
(see Kurzman 1998; Kitschelt 1986). However, the post-war scenario of little grassroots activity may 
limit this ‘demonstration effect’ and the potential for allies. 
 
Although towards the end of the pre-independence period, once status negotiations had progressed, 
civil society did become more active again (Freedom House 2007), and there were some signs that 
UNMIK was responsive to some involvement of NGOs, particularly on fiscal issues (Freedom House 
2007), it seems that through this period opportunities relating to civil society development were 
limited. It is clear that, although the funding from international actors has had some positive effects 
on civil society development more broadly, international actors also played a large role in limiting the 
opportunities that could be provided to movements through civil society development. The form of 
civil society promoted by international actors, the resulting poor image it had with the public, and the 
response from the government and UNMIK seems likely to have stifled non-donor activities and those 
concerned with more contentious issues. 
 
The issues with civil society development are not only a result of international donor development. 
Citizens’ ability to participate in the political system generally was relatively low, highlighted by World 
Bank indicators based on the ability of citizens to participate in choosing a government and freedom 
of expression, of association and the media (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: World Bank Voice and Accountability Indicator31 
 
World Bank (2015) 
                                                          
31 The Voice and Accountability indicator is defined by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators website as 
“capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” (World Bank 2015).  
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Capussela (2015: 46) sums up the difficulties facing the Kosovo population, and highlights the difficulty 
for citizens to hold the government or the international administrators to account in the pre-
independence period. He states that the government  
 
could plausibly deflect any public criticism towards UNMIK […] the international 
administrators were thus a shield behind which the political leaders could hide their own part 
of responsibility for the lamentable conditions of the country, from which the attention of the 
electorate was also distracted by the question of Kosovo’s status. Constrained by poverty and 
unemployment, enticed by the illusory benefits of patronage, inadequately informed, unaided 
by the intermediate social and political organisations, confused about the allocation of powers 
and responsibilities between UNMIK and the PISG, and apprehensively focussed on the all-
pervading question of Kosovo’s independence, the population was not capable of holding its 
own political institutions to account (Capussela 2015: 46). 
 
The low capacity of citizens to participate, also demonstrates the limited opportunities for 
movements. As outlined throughout the pre-independence period, the channels of interaction and 
influence are fairly closed and mobilising other citizens may be difficult for movements due to the 
numerous factors that make citizens less inclined to participate. At the same time, the limited 
possibilities for citizens to voice their concerns directly with the government, may in fact draw them 
to a movement. It is clear that, although domestic actors are involved in governance and civil society, 
international actors have a major and direct influence on the availability of political opportunities via 
their executive authority and funding. International actors have also played a role in directing the 
political discourse, which will also impact on political opportunities, depending on the goals of 
movements or CSOs, which is explored further in the following chapter. 
 
Post-independence period 
The proposal for a supervised independence, put forward by UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari in 
March 2007 was accepted by the Kosovo Unity Team and then accepted and approved by the Kosovo 
Assembly. The members of the Unity Team signed the Potantico Declaration, which included an 
agreement for political parties to remain united for the 120-day transition period which was outlined 
in the proposal. Once a further six months of negotiations had failed to make progress, the Assembly 
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of Kosovo unanimously declared its independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008.32 This section of 
the chapter considers the period after this declaration was made until the beginning of 2015. I firstly 
consider the changing nature of the international presence although I argue that Kosovo is still a new 
protectorate even after the independence declaration. I provide a summary of the changes in Kosovo 
since the independence declaration in relation to the issues discussed in the first chapter, including 
the role of international actors and domestic elites, and continued democratic development. I also 
consider how these changes have affected political opportunities during this period. A number of 
aspects that were assessed in the first section have experienced little change regarding the availability 
of political opportunities. These aspects are only touched on very briefly here to establish the changing 
influence of international actors and to provide a brief assessment of political opportunities in the 
post-independence period. 
 
International actors 
Aspects of the international presence were reconfigured in the wake of the independence declaration. 
Shortly after, the Ahtisaari Plan was incorporated into Kosovo’s new constitution, the Assembly 
‘invited’ the European Union Rule of Law mission (EULEX) and the International Civilian Office (ICO) to 
supervise the Plan’s implementation. Despite the independence declaration, the implementation of 
the Ahtisaari Plan meant that Kosovo would undergo a ‘supervised independence’ until it met the 
conditions set out in the Plan. This situation led several to argue that Kosovo’s protectorate status was 
continuing (Judah 2008; Vucheva 2008; Spiegel Online 2008). The ICO had executive powers over 
domestic decision making processes until December 2012. EULEX still has some executive 
responsibilities, and a plethora of other international actors, both military and civilian remain active 
in Kosovo. Due to this existing international presence, I argue that Kosovo remains a new protectorate. 
 
The declaration of independence divided international actors. The Serbian government claimed it still 
had sovereignty over Kosovo, in line with the UNSCR 1244, taking the issue to the International Court 
of Justice in 2010, where it lost. Serbia continues to give political and economic support to three Serb-
dominated municipalities in Northern Kosovo. These municipalities did not acknowledge Kosovo’s 
independence claim and Serbian law is applied in these areas. Shortly after the independence 
declaration, two border posts in the north of Kosovo were burnt by Serbs, and NATO forces were 
forced to intervene, stoking fears that violence might return to Kosovo. (Bilefsky 2008).  
                                                          
32 Two years after the declaration of independence a Serbian initiative for an advisory opinion from the ICJ was given UN 
General Assembly backing. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided that the declaration (not independence per se) 
did not break international law (BBC News 2010). 
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After the declaration, UNMIK and KFOR began to reduce their presence. EULEX, took over rule of law 
matters from UNMIK, and was deployed in December 2008 after much negotiation between the EU, 
UN, and Serbia. It took some time for UNMIK to transfer authority to the ICO and EULEX due to the 
UN Security Council’s failure to endorse the Ahtisaari Plan. UNMIK is still present in Kosovo but has a 
minor role focused on monitoring, reporting, and facilitating dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. 
 
The International Civilian Office (ICO) was set up in Pristina to prepare and supervise the transition to 
independence in accordance with the Ahtisaari Plan. The ICO had the power to overrule decisions 
made by the executive, legislative and judicial branches in Kosovo. It supported the International 
Civilian Representative (ICR), whose mandate was granted by the International Steering Group of 25, 
mainly EU, nations (Noutcheva 2012). The ICR’s mandate was to interpret the Ahtisaari Plan, and 
included the power to annul laws or sanction officials who did not enforce the Plan correctly. By 
September 2012 the ICO were satisfied that Kosovo had completed the implementation of the 
Ahtisaari Plan and ended its supervision, making Kosovo entirely responsible for its own governance. 
However, EULEX and other international actors maintain a significant presence, particularly the EU 
and the US, which I will discuss below. 
 
The European Union 
The EU had been involved in Kosovo since the intervention. The EU managed UNMIK’s fourth pillar 
that dealt with reconstruction and economic development. The EU has provided over two billion euros 
in assistance since 1999 (EEAS n.d. b). Kosovo’s stability and prosperity is clearly of interest to the EU, 
given its location. This is reflected by the fact that in 2011, 70% of the aid to Kosovo came from the 
EU, albeit in both direct and indirect ways (Capussela 2011a: 56). EU involvement and influence in 
Kosovo gained momentum when EULEX replaced UNMIK in 2008 and again when potential EU 
membership was on the cards for Kosovo and Serbia. The EU’s External Action Service states that the 
EU’s current focus in Kosovo is on “fostering Kosovo’s development of stable institutions and 
sustainable economic development and ensuring Kosovo’s European future” (EEAS n.d. b). 
 
The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process maps the steps towards association and eventual 
membership of the EU for both Kosovo and Serbia: currently Serbia is a candidate country and Kosovo 
has ‘potential candidate’ status. The EU has facilitated negotiations to help the normalisation of 
relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and has used potential membership (including, a priority for 
Kosovo, visa liberalisation) as both an incentive and threat, to encourage both sides to cooperate. In 
July 2014, a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was reached, which creates a framework 
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for Kosovo to comply with EU laws and should enhance dialogue and trade with the EU (Freedom 
House 2015b).  
 
Politically, Kosovo is keen to be an active part of European politics, which would include joining the 
EU as quickly as possible. This was stressed in Kosovo’s Public Diplomacy campaign, launched in 
October 2009 (Wählisch and Xharra 2010; Collaku 2010). Many of the interviews conducted in Kosovo 
revealed that most people thought that EU membership was a very long way off, although the 
possibility of membership was occasionally heavily used in political rhetoric by politicians within and 
outside of Kosovo. However, most interviewees suggested that they were not really seeing the 
practical effects (Interviews Three 2014; Interview Four 2014; Interview Nine 2014; Interview 14, 
2014). The involvement of the EU, as a large provider of funds and the process of potential 
membership, provides opportunities for those making demands in line with the EU and the 
requirements for EU membership. The increased presence by the EU has the potential to provide new 
or different allies and the broader discourse of EU membership may also provide opportunities for 
movements. 
 
Following the establishment of the ICO, UNMIK was replaced by the European Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo (EULEX). EULEX’s mandate was to monitor, mentor and advise Kosovo’s institutions in issues 
related to the rule of law. This mandate has been renewed several times since 2009 and costs the EU 
100 million euros a year. In May 2009 EULEX had 2,569 employees, consisting of 1,651 internationals 
and 918 Kosovars (Džihić and Kramer 2009), although there has been significant downsizing since 
then.  
 
Given that a new UN resolution has not been issued in relation to EULEX, the presence of EULEX was 
considered to be illegal by Serbia and Russia (Kostić et al. 2012). At this time, it was not known which 
law the north of Kosovo would be subject to - UNMIK, Kosovar or Serbian law. This led many within 
the Kosovar opposition and media to criticise the government and state that this ambiguity signified 
partition of the country (Freedom House 2009). 
 
Assessments of the effectiveness of EULEX have been mixed (Capussela 2015; Kostić et al. 2012; Džihić 
and Kramer 2009). When EULEX replaced UNMIK, albeit with a different mandate, it seems that the 
Kosovar public and other institutions working in Kosovo had very high expectations of the EULEX 
mission (Interview 12, 2014). This was partly due to the much-discussed fact that it was the EU’s 
largest mission with the resources to make real progress. Also, civil society activists were disappointed 
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with the lack of progress after ten years of UNMIK (Interview 11, 2014) and were optimistic about the 
new organisation. However, it seems that the EULEX mandate was not communicated to the public 
particularly well, and the media’s focus was on the more exciting aspects of the mandate such as 
prosecuting high profile criminals (Interview 12, 2014). The presence of such a large institution 
administered by international actors highlights the continued influential role played by international 
actors in the post-independence period.  
 
The United States 
Though the presence of EULEX puts the EU at the forefront of international involvement in post-
independence Kosovo, many sources and interviewees still feel that it is still the US who have the final 
or, at least, the most influential say over decision-making in Kosovo (Lewis et al. 2014; Interview Four 
2014; Interview Five 2014; Interview Nine 2014; Interview 13, 2014; Capussela 2011c). This may be 
due to the Kosovo government’s preference to deal with the US, and their belief that US assistance is 
the most beneficial to them. A leaked diplomatic cable from the US ambassador in 2009, sent to 
provide information for a visit to the US by the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo, suggested 
that the US still had a sense it had a major role in Kosovo’s development. The cable stated that the US 
presence in Kosovo was still important, particularly because, 
 
U.S. forces alone are trusted enough by Serbs and Albanians to maintain peace in one of the 
most volatile parts of Kosovo. Kosovo leaders will also express their belief that only the United 
States can provide the kind of lasting leadership in Kosovo and the region that is necessary for 
prolonged stability. Frankly, we agree (Kaidanow 2009b). 
 
The prominent sense of gratitude to the US, among the Kosovo population may have waned in recent 
years and there is more public criticism of the US and of international actors more broadly than was 
apparent in the pre-independence years (Interview One 2014; Interview Four 2014; Interview Nine 
2014; Interview 14, 2014). Some aspects of US involvement are perceived as being potentially 
exploitative. One stark example was the US’ push for US company Bechtel to be given the contract for 
the highway that was built from Pristina to Albania. The new road, known as the Patriotic Highway, 
was incredibly expensive, over-budget and well beyond Kosovo’s current needs (Lewis et al. 2014; 
Collaku et al. 2014). The highway is one of the best in Europe, and cost 20% of Kosovo’s GDP, seen as 
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unnecessary by many (Capussela 2015; Lewis et al. 2014; Brunwasser n.d.; Capussela 2011c).33 The 
shift in public attitudes to the presence and influence of international actors may increase 
opportunities for those who seek to challenge this influence, however, this shift is unlikely to be 
significant enough to constrain opportunities for those who seek to work with international actors. 
 
Relationship between international actors 
The post-independence period saw the scaling back of the UN and the EU taking a much more 
prominent role. Despite the appearance of overarching unity, different approaches to implementation 
and expectations between international actors within Kosovo remain, and have had an impact on the 
efficient functioning of the international presence. For instance, despite what appears to be a clear 
commitment to Kosovo, five EU member states still do not recognise Kosovo. This has inevitably 
created some difficulties in developing a consistent policy for the EU and the EULEX mission.34 
 
Differences in approach between the EU and the US were highlighted in leaked US diplomatic cables, 
which gave an insight into the relationship between international actors that is otherwise difficult to 
uncover. The cables suggest that the US had fairly low expectations of the capabilities of EULEX. One 
of the cables expressed reservations and showed the level to which the US were unimpressed by 
European efforts, highlighting the flaws of the European Institutions in Kosovo35 (Kaidanow 2009b). 
                                                          
33 Kosovo’s government budget in 2012 was 1.5 billion euros. The project budget doubled from the initial offer of £555 
million to it costing $1.13 billion in the end (Lewis et al. 2014). It was excessive for Kosovo and half the number of lanes 
would have been enough to cater for current needs (Capussela 2011a). The deal was signed in April 2010 and the US 
ambassador at the time, Christopher Dell, had significant influence, which is not considered unusual. However, his recent 
appointment as Bechtel’s country manager in Mozambique has been met with some scepticism despite his compliance with 
regulations on lobbying on behalf of the company (Lewis et al. 2014). There were concerns regarding the deal from the IMF, 
the World Bank, EU diplomats and the Kosovar government’s legal advisor. Pieter Feith, the ICR in Kosovo from 2008 to 2012, 
criticised the deal and called for an inquiry, accusing Dell of withholding information regarding the contract as well as 
lobbying Kosovo into “what he describes as an ill-advised deal with a US company, which placed enormous pressure on the 
fledgling country’s budget” (Lewis et al. 2014). Bechtel were awarded another contract to build a highway from Pristina to 
Skopje, Macedonia in early 2014 for $833 million (Lewis et al. 2014). 
34 Cables released by WikiLeaks highlighted that some of those who do not recognise Kosovo would make complaints in 
Brussels after the publication of reports that might suggest EULEX was surpassing its neutral status or the provisions made 
by UNSCR 1244. These grievances were then relayed back from Brussels to EULEX (Kaidanow 2009b). Capussela (2011b) has 
argued that the “EU should use its incentives on both Kosovo and Serbia and end its own discussion on the recognition of 
Kosovo, which still damages nascent European common foreign policy.” 
35 For example, one cable outlined that at the April/May 2009 ceremony marking the opening of the new EUELX HQ and the 
beginning of its Full Operating Capacity, “no Kosovo flag was displayed, though all EU member state flags – including that of 
the UK, which recently announced its withdrawal of most of its EULEX contingent – were prominently featured. No U.S. or 
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Another cable expressed American police officers’ dismay at the “hands-off approach” of EULEX’s 
officers (Kaidanow 2009b). The US were also concerned about a reversal in the gains and progress 
they felt they had made in Kosovo and emphasised that their presence was “necessary to bolster 
European resolve, bring Belgrade to a more realistic sense of its equities in peace and stability, and 
take a firm line with the UN on further reducing its presence in Kosovo” (Kaidanow 2009b). 
 
Though there is some evidence of disquiet among the international actors, when considering political 
opportunities the general consensus of the broad goals and future direction of Kosovo seems 
dominant. Movements may perceive opportunities in the divisions of the international actors, 
particularly if the movements are making demands in relation to issues of Kosovo’s status or Kosovo’s 
relations with Serbia. 
 
International actors in Kosovo were still heavily influential, even after the period of supervised 
independence. In the pre-independence period it was more likely that movements would perceive 
greater opportunities if they made demands in line with the goals of international actors, and vice 
versa. This is still the case in the post-independence period because, although they had fewer 
executive powers, international actors are still extremely influential. However, for the period of 
supervised independence (2008-2012), international actors were focused on the implementation of 
the Ahtisaari plan, and less so on other issues. A Freedom House report in 2010 stated that 
international actors present in Kosovo had not used their leverage to influence what it saw as 
“negative trends in governance” (such as rising corruption and restrictions on freedom of speech), 
instead focusing on implementing the Ahtisaari Plan (Freedom House 2010b). This suggests that, like 
the status issue in the pre-independence period, the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan took 
precedence over other issues. 
 
Domestic elites 
Several authors have argued that by 2008, the PISG were still underdeveloped (Džihić and Kramer 
2009; Bideleux and Jeffries 2007). After independence, the governance of Kosovo rested entirely with 
the new central government though it was still assisted heavily by the ICO and foreign embassies 
(Freedom House 2009). A number of problematic issues within these institutions continued in the 
                                                          
Turkish flag was flown, either.” This was followed by “[w]e expect that this confusion will continue to plague both justice 
and customs operations in the North, and it will become an ever more vocal bone of contention among Kosovo Albanian 
political forces and the local media. Right now EULEX is a stabilizing consensus on Kosovo’s status, but it could quickly become 
immobilized by its inherent political limitations” (Kaidanow 2009a). 
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post-independence era. Political interference with appointments of senior officials were still common, 
particularly with civil service posts. The lack of transparency regarding these posts led Freedom House 
(2010) to state that there was a “growing culture of clientelism.” There was also little coordination 
between the government and the Assembly (Freedom House 2009) and the government interfered 
with the Assembly’s agenda (Freedom House 2011). Capussela (2015: 157) argues that this led to a 
vicious circle in which “a lack of confidence in the legislature’s capacity to exercise effective oversight 
over the executive often led the international community to assist the government in by-passing it, 
for reasons of convenience, and further discredited it.” Therefore, international actors were still 
influencing political opportunities in relation to the capacity and effectiveness of domestic 
institutions. 
 
Some improvements were made, for instance, attempts to improve oversight were carried out with 
the creation of three oversight committees in 2009 (Freedom House 2010b). The opposition were 
increasingly critical of the government regarding corruption and a lack of vision (Freedom House 
2009). However, the opposition were particularly fragmented in the post-independence period and 
unable to unite effectively against the government (Freedom House 2012). There was some consensus 
among political elites over how to deal with northern Kosovo but the dialogue with Serbia, facilitated 
by the EU from March 2011, gained less support (Freedom House 2012). In July the Kosovo 
government attempted to enforce an embargo on Serbian products (Serbia had blocked imports from 
Kosovo since the independence declaration in 2008) and special forces were sent to two checkpoints 
on the northern border and some violent protests occurred. This move had initially been supported 
by the opposition and civil society but later they were critical of the government and international 
actors publicly opposed the action (Freedom House 2012). 
 
Local government was one area of governance that appeared to make significant improvements after 
independence. The European Commission (2011) reported that improvements were made in the 
decentralisation process regarding local governance, increasing opportunities for citizen 
representation. These improvements made local government more attractive for more well-known, 
and senior politicians to stand in local elections (Freedom House 2014b). However, despite these 
improvements, transparency, accountability and service provision is still considered poor at the local 
level (Freedom House 2013b). The improvements, albeit small, may provide slightly more 
opportunities for those seeking to influence government at the local level. 
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Political opportunities, in relation to domestic institutions, may have improved post-independence 
but are still limited. Independence meant that Kosovars had much greater control over their own 
governance, removing some of the effects of dual governance, such as ambiguities over 
responsibilities. The capacity for the legislature to develop policy independently has improved but is 
still fairly low due to interference from the executive and international actors. It appears that issues 
such as corruption and political interference limit a number of the channels of influence available to 
movements. Opportunities may be increased or constrained by the increasingly active, yet divided 
opposition. 
 
Democratic development 
The declaration of independence and the full transfer of governance responsibilities to domestic 
institutions was a huge step forward in Kosovo’s democratic governance. The declaration removed 
the issues of dual governance and confused responsibilities, potentially increasing opportunities. 
During the post-independence period the institutional rules that can facilitate movement’s access to 
the public sphere and the political decision-making process are more developed and the sheer amount 
of legislation that has been based since the end of the conflict is likely to have increased opportunities 
relative to the pre-independence period. However, there are still a number of key areas, in which 
international actors have been active, that are still limiting democratic development and therefore 
opportunities for movements. These include weak governance and corruption, which actually 
worsened after independence, as shown by World Bank indicators below in Figure 2 (World Bank 
2015; European Commission 2008; Freedom House 2009).  
 
A Transparency International report published in 2014 stated that most Kosovars perceived the 
judiciary and political parties to be the most corrupt institutions in Kosovo (Martini 2014). 
Unemployment and poverty both remained around 45% (World Bank 2010; World Bank 2008) and 
once independence was declared, UNMIK passed over control of an economy that was “still small, 
backward and uncompetitive” (Capussela 2015: 40-41; see European Commission 2008). International 
actors were less involved in economic development but organisations such as the IMF still advised the 
government. Some international actors became increasingly vocal on the issue of government 
corruption, particularly the US ambassador who requested that parties form a government that did 
not include anyone under investigation for corruption (Freedom House 2011). 
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Figure 2: World Bank Control of Corruption Indicator 36 
 
 
World Bank (2015) 
 
Electoral politics 
As explained in the discussion of pre-independence electoral politics, there are a number of ways 
electoral politics can facilitate political opportunities. Here, the elections that took place after 
independence are briefly considered to see if any significant changes occurred that would affect 
political opportunities.  
 
After the independence declaration, international actors had less direct involvement in electoral 
politics though their influence can still be seen. New electoral laws were adopted, ending the OSCE’s 
responsibilities in running of elections and Kosovar authorities took responsibility for the Central 
Election Commission (CEC). The CEC organised the 2009 local elections but it did rely on the OSCE and 
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) for assistance conducting the election 
(Freedom House 2010b). 
 
The coalition government, in place before the independence declaration, consisted of the PDK and 
the LDK. PDK leader Hashim Thaçi was Prime Minister and continued to govern in the initial stages 
after the independence declaration. The three dominant parties of the pre-independence period, the 
LDK, PDK and AAK, were still prominent, though the AAK’s popularity had decreased. Some new 
entities appeared but the three main parties with well-known leaders still dominated the political 
process, patronage still prevailed, and the decline in voter participation continued. The issue of 
                                                          
36 The Control of Corruption indicator is defined by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators website as “capturing 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests” (World Bank 2015). 
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independence and gaining recognition were the dominate features of political debate for the rest of 
2008. In second half of the year the opposition were critical of government over corruption and a lack 
of vision (Freedom House 2009). 
 
After local elections in 2009, the PDK said it wanted to reorganise its ruling coalition, this was an 
unwelcome step for most other parties. At the end of a period of political upheaval, the coalition 
remained but interestingly, during the incident the US ambassador and the head of the ICO said that 
they would not interfere with the process (of changing the coalition if that was the outcome) as long 
as the constitution was respected (Freedom House 2010b). This announcement of non-interference 
demonstrates that there was still an expectation of involvement by international actors and that 
clarifications from these actors were still important. The same year, as Freedom House (2010b) 
reported, several Western European embassies and the US embassy intervened to prevent incidents 
in Mitrovica, as well as the overall situation in the north, and a protocol on police cooperation between 
EULEX and Serbia, being discussed in Parliament. The debate did not go ahead due to the fear of raising 
tensions. However, the report stated that this move by international actors “added to the Assembly’s 
poor reputation as a body where issues of public concern are not discussed and political accountability 
is lacking” (Freedom House 2010b). 
 
In 2010 the Constitutional Court ruled that the standing President, Fatmir Sejdiu of the LDK, could not 
serve at the same time as being leader of his party, the LDK. Sejdiu resigned from his post and an 
institutional crisis followed, the LDK left the governing coalition and the PDK could not form a new 
one. A general election was called after a no confidence vote passed (Freedom House 2011). Twenty-
nine entities were certified to take part in the 2010 election, far fewer than in the previous election. 
The significant elements of the 2010 were the cases of fraud that were observed in six municipalities, 
causing a revote, and the entry of new parties. International observers criticised the election and 
recounts were conducted in some places. The LDK won the election again (32%), followed by the LDK 
(25%), Vetëvendosje (13%), the AAK (11%) and the AKR (7%). The AKR, led by Behgjet Pacolli, stood in 
coalition with the Justice Party and Social-Democratic Party. 
 
Two new parties had entered, Vetëvendosje and the New Spirit party (Fryma e Re), which were both 
critical of government corruption and the fact that Kosovo is still excluded from the EU’s visa free zone 
(Freedom House 2011). The New Spirit party was formed by three directors of well-known NGOs 
though they failed to pass the threshold of 5% in the election and later merged with Vetëvendosje. 
The tradition of leader based politics continued, making it difficult for new leaders and parties to 
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emerge (Freedom House 2011). The 2010 election demonstrates the representation of a wider 
political spectrum than previous elections, though new parties gained a small percentage of the vote. 
Pacolli was nominated as President but a Constitutional Court ruling stated the appointment was 
unconstitutional as many opposition MPs walked out of the vote (Constitutional Court 2011). Atifete 
Jahjaga, once a deputy of the Kosovo Police, was nominated and Freedom House (2012) state that it 
was widely reported that the US Ambassador encouraged leaders to elect her in a private talks. 
 
Parliamentary elections were also held in 2014, but a government was not formed for a further six 
months due to disagreements over who had the constitutional right to do so. The PDK won the 
elections again (30%) with a coalition including the Justice Party (PD, which has a pro-Islamic 
programme), the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (OSHDK), the Movement for 
Unification (LB, which wants unification with Albania), and the Conservative Party of Kosovo (PK). 
However, none of the coalition gained more than the 5% threshold required, preventing it from 
forming a government. The LDK won 25% of the vote, Vetëvendosje 14% and the AAK won almost 
10%. 
 
The increasing political opportunities that may have been found in the middle of the pre-
independence are probably reduced in the post-independence period. Depending on movement 
demands, the instability of coalitions and further periods of political upheaval may have increased and 
constrained the potential for allies and interaction with the Assembly or government. The repeated 
upheavals, low voter turnout, the high perception of corruption and fraudulent results are all factors 
that may put movements off attempting to influence in this way. However, the decreased levels of 
international involvement and increased presence of those representing positions on the political 
spectrum, other than the centre-right, may provide new sources of allies and channels of influence 
for movements. 
 
Civil society development 
Improvements in the effectiveness of civil society were seen in the period after independence. With 
the independence issue somewhat dealt with, civil society agendas began to become based around 
thematic issues. However, most organisations within civil society still struggle to develop their own 
strategic vision (Freedom House 2009). This is, in part, due to a decrease in international funding. 
Donors generally fund projects of specific interest to them and the decrease in funding meant many 
organisations needed new direction and were struggling to be self-sufficient (Interview 12, 2014). 
Also, many international donors are not necessarily keen to support local initiatives (Freedom House 
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2010b). A number of factors present in the pre-independence period continue to hinder civil society 
development. Low levels of trust are still prevalent, demonstrated by a 2011 survey that showed that 
9.1% of Kosovars believe that most people can be trusted (Civicus 2011: 23). Kelmendi (2012) argues 
that civil society in Kosovo seems to be lacking the capacities to support democratisation of the state. 
Trade unions are still weak (Freedom House 2014b) and the reputation of civil society continued to 
suffer due to the uptake of political jobs by activists, and what was considered poor election 
monitoring by civil society organisations in 2010 (Freedom House 2012). 
 
According to the Institute for Development Policy (INDEP), 7,000 NGOs registered between 1999 and 
2014, 2,224 are considered active, and 850 of those are based in Pristina (INDEP 2014), though the 
reach of NGOs outside the capital has increased (Freedom House 2010b). The influence of civil society 
increased in the post-independence period and is much more prominent when it comes to scrutinising 
public policy, monitoring government and influencing public debate on a number of issues (Freedom 
House 2010b, 2015b). For instance, the six-point negotiations caused concern that mobilised civil 
society into protesting, due to fears that Kosovo was being partitioned (Freedom House 2009). There 
was more cooperation between civil society and the Assembly (Freedom House 2010), though this 
was largely on an ad hoc basis (Freedom House 2011). Freedom House (2012) stated that civic groups 
faced pressure and harassment, and that there were occasions where members of the Assembly 
slandered some activists. The government and parliament were criticised in the European 
Commission’s 2011 report for not involving civil society in the policy and law making process 
(European Commission 2011). The European Commission then launched a 3.3 million euro project, 
the Civil Society Facility, in October 2012 to facilitate the involvement of civil society in policy dialogue 
(European Commission 2012). During the post-independence era, many activists chose to enter 
politics (Interview Five 2014; Freedom House 2012). 
 
As in the pre-independence period, tense political periods, such as the period immediately following 
independence and the aftermath of the 2014 elections, meant that civil society activities were, to 
some extent, put on hold (Freedom House 2015b). This has a similar effect on civil society’s ability to 
act as a channel for interaction as the status negotiations in the pre-independence period, which were 
likely to have resulted in fewer opportunities for movements. However, civil society was much more 
visible to both the media and the Assembly than in the pre-independence period. A number of 
protests by civil society actors took place in the post-independence period, including one of the 
largest, against the privatisation of Post and Telecom of Kosovo (PTK) that took place in 2011 (Freedom 
House 2012). 
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Conclusion 
The NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the subsequent state-building efforts have seen the 
extensive influence by international actors over Kosovo’s democratic development and its transition 
to independence. International actors have maintained a significant military presence and provided 
political assistance to domestic elites throughout the new protectorate period, which has in turn, had 
a significant impact upon political opportunities. The international administration in the form of 
UNMIK was particularly influential over political decision-making in Kosovo during the pre-
independence period. UNMIK was considered unaccountable and was unresponsive to NGOs and 
therefore many of the constraints to opportunities that are expected in a fairly closed state were 
present in Kosovo in the early years of the new protectorate.  
 
The interdependence between international actors and the domestic elite resulted in a somewhat 
enforced coherence, so opportunities as a result of divisions between the two elites are unlikely, 
though it is possible that movements could attain political allies within either of these sets of elites. 
However, the issue of Kosovo’s status dominated the political discourse of domestic elites, and 
eventually international actors, in Kosovo during the pre-independence period. The prominence of 
the independence issue provided opportunities for those movements that were engaged in this issue, 
yet constrained opportunities for those who were not. The dominance of the status issue actually 
served to stifle civil society that was concerned with issues other than independence.  
 
There has been little direct or indirect facilitation of movements by the government or international 
actors and there are few channels for movements to interact with, or to influence elites. The nature 
of internationally funded civil society in Kosovo, largely ignores movements, and has been weak, 
particularly in the pre-independence period. Movement opportunities are constrained in this area due 
to the ineffectiveness of civil society to act as a channel of interaction and the limited type of issues 
that donor-funded civil society focuses on. 
 
The influence of international actors upon political opportunities in the post-independence era is still 
significant due to civil society’s dependence on funding from international actors, the presence of the 
ICO and EULEX, and the influence of some international actors on the political system. The declaration 
of independence and the end of UNMIK’s executive authority did signify a greater role for domestic 
actors and institutions and removed the issues of dual governance. The declaration of independence 
largely resolved the status issue and opened up space for debate on other issues, potentially providing 
new opportunities for movements. It is clear that there are more opportunities since the early years 
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of the new protectorate in line with the development of democratic institutions and civil society. 
However, the conduct within these institutions and the type of civil society that has developed in 
Kosovo often serve to constrain, rather than increase opportunities.  
 
Post-independence Kosovo has still suffered from weak governance and a number of other factors 
hindering democratic development such as the prevalence of corruption. Freedom House reports, 
which score states across a variety of indicators each year, suggest that little has changed between 
2008 and 2014 in the areas of national democratic governance, the electoral process, independent 
media, the judicial framework and independence, and corruption. The reports do state that civil 
society development and local democratic governance were two areas which had shown positive signs 
and received increased scores (Freedom House 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2011, 2012, 2013b, 2014b). The 
strengthening of civil society in the post-independence period, along with the increasingly critical 
opposition in the Assembly contribute to the gradual opening up of political opportunities for 
movements in Kosovo.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: VETËVENDOSJE 
 
This chapter features a case analysis of the first case study, Vetëvendosje. Here, I seek to establish if 
Vetëvendosje’s strategy was influenced by the presence of international actors in Kosovo. The 
potential for this influence is assessed, both in terms of the influences on political opportunities and 
more broadly. In the contextual analysis in Chapter Three I established that the presence of 
international actors in Kosovo was extensive during the new protectorate period and contributed to 
an increase in political opportunities. However, these opportunities were largely still very limited in 
many areas. 
 
This chapter, like Chapter Three, is split into two sections. The first covers the period between the 
NATO intervention in 1999 and the declaration of independence in February 2008. I discuss 
Vetëvendosje’s formation and emergence from the Kosovo Action Network (KAN), its goals and 
targets, as well as the types of tactics it chose to employ and incidents of repression that Vetëvendosje 
experienced. I also consider Vetëvendosje’s response to the status talks, followed by an analysis of its 
allies and opposition. The second section covers the post-independence period until 2015. I revisit 
Vetëvendosje’s goals, targets and tactics and assess how these have changed post-independence. This 
is followed by an assessment of the decision to participate in elections and how their allies and 
opposition changed. 
 
Pre-independence period 
The Kosovo Action Network 
Vetëvendosje emerged from its predecessor, the Kosovo Action Network (KAN) so I will briefly discuss 
the KAN’s background, its aims, allies and tactics, to help establish Vetëvendosje’s origins. The KAN 
was formed by a group of international activists led by an American writer, Alice Mead (now Alice W. 
James) in 1997 (Vetëvendosje 2010d). The KAN carried out a range of activities in support of student 
protests and grassroots actions against what they considered to be the occupation of Kosovo by 
Serbia. They also called for the restoration of the Albanian language (CNN 1997), the release of war 
hostages, and pressured institutions to address the issue of missing persons (Vetëvendosje 2010d). 
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Two well-known former KLA members became involved in Vetëvendosje in 2001: Adem Demaçi37, the 
former head of the political wing of the KLA, and Albin Kurti, who worked for Demaci. Both had been 
imprisoned by the Yugoslav authorities for two and a half years, and as a result, were well known 
across Kosovo. Prior to their imprisonment both had resigned from the KLA after disagreements over 
the proposed Rambouillet Agreement. The proposed agreement intended to help resolve the conflict 
between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians, was the result of NATO facilitated negotiations, and led to 
internal conflict and a split within the KLA. The agreement did not guarantee independence for Kosovo 
and Demaci and Kurti resigned from the KLA in protest against those in the organisation who were 
willing to sign the agreement. A BBC report in March 1999 stated that Adem Demaci was “out of touch 
with the new, younger leadership of the KLA, which is demonstrating considerable pragmatism in its 
dealings with the international community” (BBC News 1999). This series of events and the reaction 
to them hints at the way in which the actions of international actors would influence Vetëvendosje 
throughout the course of its development and sets the scene for Vetëvendosje’s potential allies and 
opposition. Similarly, the involvement of Adem Demaçi highlights Vetëvendosje’s role in the 
continuation of resistance and pursuit of unification with Albania, due to his history as the founder of 
the Revolution Movement for Albanian Unity (RMAU), which was active in the 1960s. 
 
After 1999 the KAN became increasingly marginalised and turned its attention to opposing UNMIK 
(Lemay-Hébert 2013: 93). On the fifth anniversary of the UNSCR 1244, in June 2004, about one 
thousand people protested using whistles, red cards and music. They read a Citizen’s Declaration, 
promising a struggle against what they considered to be the anti-democratic UNMIK. The protest was 
followed by a tour throughout Kosovo during which slides with slogans were projected on the walls of 
public and government buildings. In another protest they placed a yellow ribbon saying ‘Crime 
Scene/Do not Cross’ around the UNMIK building. The KAN co-ordinated with other organisations 
across Kosovo that focused on issues stemming from the conflict with Serbia, such as the Gjakova 
based group, ‘The Cries of the Mothers’ (Thirrjet e Nënave) and the Krusha e Vogel based group, ’26 
March 1999’ (26 Marsi 1999). The June 2004 protest is considered to represent the conceptual genesis 
of Vetëvendosje (Vetëvendosje 2010d) and the gradual transformation of the KAN into Vetëvendosje. 
                                                          
37 Adem Demaçi was imprisoned for his opposition to the Tito government from 1964-1974 and again from 1975-1990. After 
his release he was the chair of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms of the People of Kosovo from 
1991-1995. In 1991 he won the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. In 1996 he became the 
president of the Parliamentary Part of Kosovo, during this time he proposed the idea of a confederation including Kosovo, 
Montenegro and Serbia that would be called Balkania. 
104 
 
Vetëvendosje’s formation 
Vetëvendosje officially formed on 10 June 2005 with the aim of creating a grassroots movement with 
purely political motives that would spread across Kosovo, and cooperate with other organisations in 
Albania and Macedonia (Interview Two 2014). Vetëvendosje displays a number of features commonly 
found in definitions of social movements, including a collective identity, shared beliefs, attempts to 
challenge the status quo through collective action and networks of informal interaction. Vetëvendosje 
define itself as a movement (Interview One 2014; Interview Four 2014), which has proved significant 
to its positioning relative to other groups such as political parties and NGOs, a factor that is explored 
further below. 
 
Albin Kurti led Vetëvendosje and soon after its formation it began producing a weekly paper, a 
biweekly radio programme, weekly columns in two Kosovar newspapers, and an English language 
newsletter, which started in July 2006 with the intention of explaining Vetëvendosje’s ideas and 
activities to non-Albanian speakers (Vetëvendosje 2010d). It began to expand its membership network 
and offices were established in most municipalities across Kosovo and several abroad, engaging the 
diaspora. 
 
Vetëvendosje formed just over a year after the March 2004 riots and just over two weeks after the 
UN Secretary General appointed Special Envoy Kai Eide to carry out a comprehensive review of 
Kosovo. The increasing levels of dissatisfaction with UNMIK among the public, the riots in March 2004, 
and the continued concern over Kosovo’s future status meant that this was an opportune time to form 
in opposition to UNMIK. The same factors also demonstrated a shift in the perceptions of the 
international administration, which struggled to legitimise its presence to the public (Lemay-Hébert 
2013), and began to be seen as an obstacle to Kosovo’s independence (Capussela 2015). The riots also 
highlighted the international administration’s weakness and lack of control (Capussela 2015). These 
signals of weakness in the authorities are considered an opportune time for movements to form 
(Tarrow 1998: 77). 
 
Goals and targets 
Vetëvendosje’s initial demands were for self-determination for Kosovo and all other demands stem 
from this. The movement opposed UNSCR 1244 and claimed that it maintained Serbia’s sovereignty 
over Kosovo. Vetëvendosje saw the newly imposed rule by international institutions as a mere 
replacement for Serbia. It viewed the international administration as a new colonial presence and a 
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hindrance to achieving self-determination. Anthropologist Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 98) outlines 
Vetëvendosje’s outlook as follows: 
 
Vetëvendosje’s world view is based on a clear distinction between on the one side, the 
community of natural citizens of Kosovo, in majority Albanians, whose will should be 
consulted through direct forms of democracy, namely referenda, and who have a right to full 
sovereignty, self-determination and unification with the motherland [Albania]; and on the 
other, those forces which represent and impose foreign rule and policies on the people of 
Kosovo and are, in consequence, labelled undemocratic, (neo)colonialist and oppressive 
(Schwandner-Sievers 2013: 98). 
 
As a result of Vetëvendosje’s main goal of self-determination, via unification with Albania, its attempts 
to “reclaim sovereignty over the statebuilding process” (Visoka 2016: 9), it has been described as a 
nationalist movement (Interview One 2014; Interview Five 2014; Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Strazzari 
and Selenica 2013; McKinna 2012b). Hechter (2000) states that nationalist movements can be 
distinguished by their claims for self-determination and legitimate rights to govern a specific territory. 
This feature of Vetëvendosje will be explored in more detail later in the chapter because it played a 
significant part in its relationship with international actors. 
 
One of the key targets for Vetëvendosje in the pre-independence period was the international 
administrator, UNMIK. Vetëvendosje believed the institution to be an oppressive regime that existed 
against the will of the Kosovar people, denying their freedom (Vetëvendosje 2010d; Vetëvendosje 
2006g). Vetëvendosje claimed that the international presence was inherently undemocratic in its 
nature and that it was unaccountable. Vetëvendosje based its claims on a number features of the 
international institutions such as employee immunity from prosecution, the lack of voting within the 
institutions, and the lack of consultation with the Kosovar public about how, and by whom, they are 
governed (Interview One 2014; Vetëvendosje 2006a). 
 
Vetëvendosje also opposed the PISG and the political parties functioning within it. This was due to the 
heavy influence of international actors on the institutions. Visar Ymeri, elected leader of Vetëvendosje 
in February 2015, stated that Kosovo’s institutions and the majority of political parties had been “very 
servile to all the institutions, towards UNMIK, particularly towards embassies and overseas missions 
of the IMF and the World Bank” (Interview Three 2014). 
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Vetëvendosje’s actions often attempted to highlight continued Serbian influence in Kosovo’s affairs, 
such as its call for a boycott of Serbian products in Kosovo. It felt that Serbia should apologise for 
crimes committed during the war, and take some responsibility for the damage caused. Vetëvendosje 
often carried out direct actions in response to statements made by Serbian politicians and each time 
a Serbian official visited Pristina, activists threw rotten eggs at them (Vetëvendosje 2010d). 
Vetëvendosje clearly had different priorities to international actors, who were focused on regional 
stability, improved relations between Kosovo and Serbia, the rights of Serbs, and the protection of 
cultural sites in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje did not agree with the approach of international actors to these 
issues, particularly the inclusion of Serbia in the status negotiations. 
 
Vetëvendosje often referred to the activities of the ‘international community’ in Kosovo in their 
newsletter and during interviews. Although the term is often used as a reference to the broad goals 
and ideas associated with the international community, it was also used as a convenient reference to 
the US, some Western European states as well as the general international presence. Some references 
were made to individual institutions but these were also seen as part of the international community’s 
presence in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje’s use of the term suggests that international actors were generally 
perceived as one target, albeit with an appreciation of the responsibilities that each institution and 
different organisations had within Kosovo. Principally Vetëvendosje claimed not to oppose the 
support of international actors, but disagreed with the nature of the international presence and a 
wide range of its policies (Interview One 2014). However, it appears that Vetëvendosje was perceived 
to be opposed to all aspects of the international presence and anything associated with it, which 
affected its ability to put forward its own demands, a factor that is explored below. 
 
Vetëvendosje’s goals and targets in the pre-independence period were heavily influenced by 
international actors. Its main target was the international presence itself, particularly the international 
administrator, UNMIK, but also the influence of several other international actors. This included the 
influence of international actors on the PISG, which was also seen as a target as a result. Increased 
dissatisfaction with the international presence was clearly demonstrated by some of the public, which 
presented an opportunity for Vetëvendosje’s formation and expansion. However, the prevailing 
sentiment among the public and the political elite was that Kosovo needed the international actors 
present in Kosovo in order to gain independence. Despite targeting different aspects of the 
international presence it seems that Vetëvendosje generally perceived this presence as coherent, 
resulting in little potential for allies to emerge from the fragmentation of international actors. 
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Tactics 
The types of tactics used by Vetëvendosje were a mix of novel and creative direct actions and more 
traditional demonstrations. Actions in the early stages of the movement included demonstrations, 
blockades, public meetings, exhibitions, graffiti, a boycott of Serbian products and direct actions. A 
number of the actions carried out by Vetëvendosje built on symbols of the historic Albanian resistance 
and Albanian culture. The targets of these tactics were mostly international actors, though other 
elements seen as expressions or representations of them, such as the PISG or the Unity Team, were 
also targeted. Although explicitly non-violence some of the tactics employed by Vetëvendosje resulted 
in clashes and repressive responses from the authorities, which led some to consider the movement 
to be violent. This will be explored further here, along with a consideration of the choice of tactics in 
relation to political opportunities. 
 
Types of tactics 
Vetëvendosje chose direct tactics to highlight its dissatisfaction with UNMIK, often in response to 
particular decisions or the release of reports by UNMIK. For example, in response to Serbia being 
allowed to hold a referendum on Serbia’s new constitution in Kosovo it placed a toilet wrapped in a 
pink ribbon at UNMIK’s gates and threw brown paint onto the building. In its newsletter, it said  
 
[t]his is just more of the excrement that UNMIK, itself no better than institutional excrement, 
has without any caution, spread all over Kosova38 since its arrival. We have delivered the toilet 
seat so that in the future they can relieve themselves in the proper place. The only way to 
keep Kosova clean is to kick UNMIK out (Vetëvendosje 2006g). 
 
Many demonstrations and direct actions were against symbolic elements of the international 
presence, and were conducted in the centre of Pristina, and outside UNMIK and other institutional 
buildings. The first action carried out by Vetëvendosje was on 12 June 2005, and involved activists 
writing ‘NO NEGOTIATIONS – SELF DETERMINATION!’ on the walls of UNMIK headquarters. This 
graffiti later appeared on walls and buildings elsewhere, and can still be see around Pristina. Another 
action targeted UNMIK jeeps that had become a common and symbolic sight in Kosovo, which 
Vetëvendosje argued, went some way to reinforcing the prejudices UNMIK has of Kosovo as an 
                                                          
38 Kosova is the Albanian spelling of Kosovo. 
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extreme environment39. Activists added an ‘F’ and ‘D’ either side of the ‘UN’ lettering on the vehicles, 
making the word ‘FUND’, which means ‘END’ in Albanian, signifying what they felt should be the end 
of the UNMIK regime (Vetëvendosje 2010d).  
 
Other actions included the distribution of an obituary written for UNMIK, the dumping of hay in front 
of the UNMIK building to highlight that the only thing villagers were able to do on their land was cut 
the grass, and a large demonstration which blocked the UNMIK building the day before the automatic 
extension of UN Resolution 1244 (Vetëvendosje 2010d). Vetëvendosje’s actions also attempted to 
raise questions about the moral and political legitimacy of UNMIK (Lemay-Hébert 2013). For instance, 
the creativity, novelty and unexpected nature of their actions were, in part, to ensure that the police 
would find their actions difficult to deal with (Delafrouz 2009). In turn, if the regime was unable to 
deal with Vetëvendosje’s actions effectively, the administration would look weak and undermine its 
authority and legitimacy (Interview One 2014). 
 
Vetëvendosje referred to the principles of self-determination put forward by the UN and used similar 
language to that used by international institutions. It repeatedly referred to UNSCR 1514, passed in 
1960, which grants independence to colonial countries and peoples. One action involved placing that 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as ‘parking tickets’ 
on UNMIK and Kosovo police vehicles (Vetëvendosje 2010d). Vetëvendosje argues that the ‘will of the 
people’ of Kosovo has been repeatedly ignored, and that even though Kosovar Albanians have 
experienced repression since 1912, the incidents in 1998-1999 are sufficient to justify the right to self-
determination.  
 
The tactics chosen by Vetëvendosje are likely to have been influenced by the limited political 
opportunities available in the pre-independence period. As discussed in Chapter Three, there were 
few signs of efforts to facilitate social movement activity by the government, institutional rules were 
still developing, the government was not open and responsive, and there was a lack of opportunity 
for citizens to voice dissent and hold the international institutions to account. Furthermore civil society 
was not serving as an effective channel to influence government and was not monitoring or voicing 
criticism of the government or international actors at the time. As a result Vetëvendosje perceived its 
chosen tactics to be the most viable, effective and visible. It believed that direct action, 
                                                          
39 This idea is supported by some of the peacebuilding literature which highlights that the use of 4x4s illustrate the 
securitised, privileged and possibly colonialist nature of international intervention (Duffield 2014; Autesserre 2014; Smirl 
2015). 
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demonstrations and its communication outlets were the best way to raise public awareness of the 
negative impacts of some the decisions being made on behalf of Kosovars and were the only way to 
be heard (Interview One 2014). 
 
During much of the pre-independence period, it appears that Vetëvendosje more effectively mobilised 
citizens than political parties did (Freedom House 2007). Vetëvendosje did not perceive domestic 
institutions as a viable channel for promoting its demands and was opposed to the way these 
institutions functioned under the supervision of international actors. As a result, the movement would 
not support or participate in these institutions. Leader, Visar Ymeri stated that “we thought that 
participating in elections was just another way of paying into the illusion that was being built by 
UNMIK - that Kosova functions democratically when in reality that could not happen” (Interview Three 
2014). Thus, the tactics and used by Vetëvendosje were directed at international actors and their 
allies, encouraged by the lack of political opportunities. 
 
Violence and repression 
Vetëvendosje’s publications and interviews position it as an advocate of non-violence, stating that it 
is the most effective method to achieve its aims in Kosovo. For example: 
 
Nonviolence should be understood as a confrontation with UNMIK for democracy, for justice, 
and equality. It means the tools of strike, boycott, civil disobedience and demonstration. There 
is nothing passive about non-violence. It is an active form of resistance (Vetëvendosje 2006d). 
 
Despite these claims, and regardless of the debate on what constitutes violence, the tactics used by 
Vetëvendosje, and events at certain demonstrations have led to some deeming it violent. Several 
Vetëvendosje demonstrations have involved clashes between some demonstrators and the police. 
Visoka argues that despite the claims of non-violence Vetëvendosje’s “protests intentionally incited 
violent reactions by local and international policy” (2017: 119). It is difficult to assess what provoked 
these clashes, whether it was the police, Vetëvendosje, a small element of either side, or whether it 
was carried out by those unaffiliated with Vetëvendosje or by those not adhering to the instructions 
given by the leadership on either side.  
 
Although, an extensive assessment of international media coverage of Vetëvendosje has not been 
carried out, a quick assessment suggests that much of the coverage of Vetëvendosje focuses on 
clashes at demonstrations. Publicity around violent images of confrontations with the police have 
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impacted on perceptions of Vetëvendosje. Kurti states that the coverage of the protests was a big 
problem for the public face of Vetëvendosje. He argues that without the protest actions they were 
not listened to, but the coverage of protests is limited to images of Vetëvendosje’s actions as 
confrontations with the police, rather than coverage of the reasons for the protest (Interview One 
2014). Anecdotal evidence from a couple of the interviews in Kosovo suggests that even those who 
agreed with large parts of Vetëvendosje’s agenda, or at least its contribution to the debate on certain 
issues, were put off by some of the methods used (Interview Nine 2014; Interview Ten 2014). 
 
The response to some of Vetëvendosje’s actions and protests was arguably repressive on the part of 
the authorities (see Tilly 1978). Several sources, including interviewees (Interview Nine 2014, 
Interview Ten 2014) and reports (Freedom House 2007) have suggested that some of Vetëvendosje’s 
actions had been met with over-the-top and violent reactions from the police. Vetëvendosje was the 
only civil society actor to experience these types of responses in the pre-independence period 
(Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Freedom House 2007). Many Vetëvendosje activists were arrested and 
often ill-treated by the police (Freedom House 2006). From its formation until the end of 2006, 198 
Vetëvendosje activists were arrested and many were given fines, which they refused to pay, while 
some received jail sentences. Vetëvendosje claims it did not disturb citizens or receive complaints, 
stating that in the case of arrests for graffiti, citizens had offered Vetëvendosje the walls of their 
houses and shops (Vetëvendosje 2010c). In 2006, 322 activists were arrested, and 110 were 
sentenced. Vetëvendosje claimed that the “psychological pressure against the families of the activists 
ha[d] also increased”, particularly as a result of house searches for activists (Vetëvendosje 2010d). In 
2007, 84 activists arrested, 84 activists and citizens injured, and 9 activists beaten (Schwandner-
Sievers 2013; Vetëvendosje 2010d). 
 
UNMIK was responsible for the rule of law, and had authority over the police. Vetëvendosje perceived 
the two to be linked: “we are disturbing the peace and order of the UNMIK government, which is 
effectively being supported by the police” (Vetëvendosje 2010c). It is difficult to assess how much 
influence international actors had over the reaction of the police at demonstrations but Vetëvendosje 
claimed that the reaction from authorities got worse, stating that the “police have become ever more 
violent, more brutal. The system is no longer acting only through KPS [Kosovo Police Service], but also 
through special units and UNMIK officials. In Prizren, even KFOR soldiers were present” (Vetëvendosje 
2010c). As discussed in Chapter One, international actors were concerned about outbreaks of 
violence, particularly after the March 2004 riots, and the impact this would have on their own 
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legitimacy. This may provide some explanation to the responses to Vetëvendosje’s actions, though it 
is also possible that they felt that these responses were justified in their own right. 
 
A demonstration in February 2007 was one of the largest and most controversial protests carried out 
by Vetëvendosje. The figures vary, but the protest is thought to have been attended by between 1,300 
and 3,000 (Lemay-Hébert 2013; Kaidanow 2007a). The protest was against the Ahtisaari Plan, the 
Unity Team, UNMIK, and the upcoming deployment of the International Civil Office. This protest and 
the aftermath have been well documented, including information garnered from leaked US diplomatic 
cables. There was a heavy police presence at the protest and the city centre was sealed off to prevent 
protestors from getting to the UNMIK or PISG buildings. Protestors breached two lines of barricades 
and the police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets. Fifteen activists were arrested 
(Vetëvendosje 2010d), and the US ambassador stated, in a leaked diplomatic cable, that around 75 
people were treated for tear gas inhalation. Six of them were hospitalised (Kaidanow 2007a). Two 
protestors died due to injuries from rubber bullets.  
 
After the protest there was criticism that the response by the KPS and UNMIK Police has been an 
overreaction (Kaidanow 2007a) and raised further questions over UNMIK’s accountability (Human 
Rights Watch 2007). In what was considered to be a “rare move of accountability” the Interior Minister 
and UNMIK police commissioner both resigned (Freedom House 2007). Albin Kurti was arrested and 
the KPS searched Vetëvendosje’s offices in Pristina and elsewhere. The US ambassador, in a document 
since leaked, stated that: “our effort – together with UNMIK and KFOR – is to keep the public focused 
on the real locus of responsibility for the violence: the Self-Determination movement and its extremist 
leader, Albin Kurti” (Kaidanow 2007a). Contrary to this view, a poll conducted as part of the Early 
Warning Reports, put together by USAID, UNDP and Riinvest (a local think tank) showed around 45% 
of those questioned felt that the UNMIK police was responsible for the violence at the protest, 
compared to just under 20% of those who felt Vetëvendosje was to blame (Hyseni et al. 2007a). This 
serves as an important indicator of perceptions, regardless of where responsibilities lay. 
 
Several months after the protest, an international prosecutor filed an indictment against Kurti for 
crimes relating to the violence at the demonstrations in February and he was placed under house 
arrest. A number of international and Kosovo-based NGOs and the Ombudsperson’s Institution in 
Kosovo were reported to have expressed concern over the legality of Kurti’s detention (Amnesty 
International 2007). Some suggested that the arrest of Kurti was politically motivated, including the 
Kosovo NGO, the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) (Freedom House 
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2008), Amnesty International (2007) and Howard Clark (2008) of War Resisters International. There 
was also the suggestion that most people in Kosovo believed that Kurti was being held to prevent 
further actions being carried out while the issue of Kosovo’s status was being resolved, even among 
those who did not agree with Kurti’s actions (Gashi 2007). Vetëvendosje collected almost 150,000 
signatures demanding Kurti’s release (Schwandner-Sievers 2013). In the end Kurti’s trial was recessed 
indefinitely, much to the dismay of the US embassy, which stated that Kurti’s “past actions have 
proven not only dangerous, but deadly, and he promises to continue to be a destabilizing force in 
Kosovo. Why the international judge who ordered his release failed to take this into account remains 
a mystery” (Kaidanow 2007b). In 2010, Kurti was found guilty of obstructing official persons but all 
remaining charges were dropped.  
 
The 2007 protest and its aftermath highlights a number of the most overt ways in which the 
government and international actors inhibited Vetëvendosje’s activities, using techniques described 
by Marx (1979) and discussed in Chapter Two. For example, the arrest of Albin Kurti served to direct 
the energies of Vetëvendosje to, what Marx (1979) calls, ‘defensive maintenance’, and away from its 
goals. It also served to displace and discredit Kurti as Vetëvendosje’s leader and potentially 
contributed to an unfavourable image in the eyes of some.  
 
It is difficult to assess the level of influence of international actors regarding repression or the result 
of this repression on Vetëvendosje’s image and ability to mobilise. There is a debate over whether 
repression could open up opportunities for movements by increasing mobilisation (see Earle 2006; 
Brockett 1995; Marks 1989; Kimeldorf 1988; Barkan 1984; Lipset 1983). In the case of Vetëvendosje, 
it seems that the police reaction to the protests actually served to boost the Vetëvendosje’s 
legitimacy, and encouraged other supporters (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Interview Nine 2014, 
Interview Ten 2014). Some sources suggest that Kurti’s arrest in 2007 actually strengthened 
Vetëvendosje’s popularity (Collaku 2010). What is clear is that some international actors did consider 
Vetëvendosje to be violent and a threat to security, which shaped the way international actors chose 
to respond to it, inevitably impacting on potential political opportunities. 
 
The Status Process  
By the time the negotiations process had begun in 2006 Vetëvendosje had established itself as a 
prominent opposition feature and expanded its activities to other urban and rural areas around 
Kosovo (Vetëvendosje 2010d). The negotiations became an additional target for Vetëvendosje and it 
was highly critical of the principle of negotiations with Serbia, the conduct of the Unity Team and the 
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international actors facilitating the process. Albin Kurti, argued that Kosovo never lacked ‘status’, as 
every territory has some kind of status (disputed or otherwise). He argued that the framing of Kosovo’s 
undecided status as resolvable via negotiations with Serbia and other international actors was wrong 
and that the solution should come from a decision by the Kosovar people (Interview One 2014).  
 
Rhetoric highlighting the lack of consultation with Kosovars was used in direct actions, such as the 
placement of wanted posters with the faces of the Unity Team and text saying that the team were 
trading away the future of two million people without consulting them (Vetëvendosje 2007). To 
highlight how ‘unfair’ the readiness to negotiate with Serbia was, Vetëvendosje activists poured red 
paint in front of the entrances to the Kosovo Assembly to symbolise the blood that had been sacrificed 
in liberating Kosovo (Vetëvendosje 2010d), providing another example of references to earlier 
Albanian resistance movements. Vetëvendosje also sought to raise awareness of the details of the 
Plan and organised discussions across the country, including at the university, with members of other 
political parties and a variety of experts. 
 
The negotiations, which became the focus of Vetëvendosje’s strategy, were initiated and facilitated 
by international actors, highlighting another area in which international actors influenced 
Vetëvendosje’s strategy. Vetëvendosje was particularly concerned about the proposed plans for 
decentralisation, perceiving it to be an ethnic solution, not a multi-ethnic one, and that it was most 
likely to result in the “Bosniaisation of Kosovo” (i.e. partitioning) (Vetëvendosje 2006b, 2006g), 
increasing the likelihood of future conflict (Vetëvendosje 2006a). This comparison represented 
Vetëvendosje’s perception of a threat to Kosovo’s territorial integrity that was feared would create a 
territorial, religious and institutional partition of Kosovo, resulting in Kosovo remaining part of Serbia 
(Vetëvendosje 2006f). Vetëvendosje hung maps showing the effects of decentralisation in city centres 
(Vetëvendosje 2006c) and hosted a number of public meetings, particularly in towns and villages, that 
were seen to be most threatened by the decentralisation plans, to gather and highlight information 
on the issue. This was a response to the feeling that the public, particularly those who lived in the 
affected municipalities, was not sufficiently consulted on the changes to municipal boundaries. 
Vetëvendosje believed that special protection zones, also part of the negotiations, would create areas 
controlled by Serbia, perpetuating the claim that the heritage of the Orthodox Church is exclusively 
Serbian and not part of Kosovar heritage (Vetëvendosje 2006a). It organised protests, including one 
in Deçan, around the monastery, which had been given special protection, blocking the UNMIK 
building (Vetëvendosje 2010d). 
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Vetëvendosje used the issue of decentralisation as an opportunity to highlight specific and local issues 
and to incorporate them into its wider claims for self-determination and opposition to the conduct of 
international actors. It also served as an opportunity to highlight how it felt international actors were 
defying their own aims, and to demonstrate how Vetëvendosje was actually acting in line with the 
standards supposedly set by international actors. For instance, the movement stated that:  
 
The people of Kosova are not allowed to participate in decisions about their local level of 
government, let alone their future as a state. And this is how the international community 
thinks democracy is built? (Vetëvendosje 2006a). 
 
There were others who criticised the Unity Team for not being democratic or transparent, including 
some politicians, elements of the Kosovo media, international organisations (Freedom House 2007), 
and associations concerned with the effects of the war, such as the KLA veterans’ association 
(Freedom House 2007). Some of these critics also cited the comparison to a potentially similar 
situation to Bosnia (Freedom House 2007), highlighting potential allies for Vetëvendosje, at least on 
this issue. Vetëvendosje highlighted this criticism of the negotiations by others, such as that of PDK 
Assembly member Hydajet Hyseni, referring to his comments in its newsletter (Vetëvendosje 2006e). 
Vetëvendosje participated in demonstrations with political parties and other organisations, 
particularly at the local level. For instance, demonstrations in Vitia and Gjilan in September 2006, were 
joined by all branches of political parties present in these municipalities, which would have been the 
most affected by the decentralisation plan (Vetëvendosje 2010d). This highlights how Vetëvendosje 
used opportunities that developed from disagreements and some fragmentation amongst elites, over 
the UN facilitated negotiations. However, as stated in Chapter Three there was a sense among the 
domestic elite that it was essential to keep international actors on side during the negotiation process 
if independence was to be granted for Kosovo. Therefore, overall domestic and international actors 
represented a somewhat coherent approach to independence. Most of the domestic political elite 
was keen to work with, or at least be seen to be working with, international actors in order to gain 
independence. Association or acknowledgement of the views of Vetëvendosje would not be useful to 
many domestic elites at that time. Thus, there was little potential for alliances with international 
actors or many domestic actors on this issue, aside from those mentioned at the local level. 
 
The status negotiations dominated public and political debate and provided an opportunity for 
Vetëvendosje to air its demands relating to Kosovo’s self-determination. Vetëvendosje presented 
similar criticisms of the Ahtisaari Plan. Though opposition to the Ahtisaari Plan may have provided 
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similar opportunities to the negotiations, in the sense that the Plan provided another target relating 
to the presence of international actors and another platform on which to make claims regarding self-
determination. Garton Ash (2007) argues that the majority of Albanian politicians felt that the Plan 
was a reasonable deal. This lack of fragmentation amongst both the international and domestic elite 
again constrained opportunities for Vetëvendosje.  
 
As the negotiations progressed, self-determination for Kosovo seemed more likely in the form of some 
kind of independence, with the technicalities regarding Kosovo Serbs still being negotiated. This 
perhaps confirmed the shift in the independence discourse from the call for unification with Albanian 
that had dominated earlier Albanian efforts, towards independence for Kosovo itself. This shift was 
started by Rugova and the LDK before the NATO intervention, arguing that Albanians needed to fight 
for their own causes within each state. This approach was continued by domestic elites in the post-
intervention period and some have suggested that the Kosovar elite was attempting to suppress an 
emphasis on unification with Albania and concentrate on gaining outright independence (Delafrouz 
2009). Part of the impetus for this shift in the post-independence period comes from the fact that 
international support was perceived to be more likely to support the independence of Kosovo, rather 
than supporting Kosovo’s unification with Albania. Again, international influence may have indirectly 
constrained opportunities for Vetëvendosje by contributing to political situation that resulted in the 
declining saliency of Vetëvendosje’s key demands. 
 
Rather than increasing opportunities for Vetëvendosje, the status negotiations appears to have 
constrained them. As discussed in Chapter Three, the status negotiations stifled dissent and criticism 
from civil society more broadly, which was largely silent on the issue, potentially reducing the scope 
of the debate and potential allies for those critical of the process, such as Vetëvendosje. Though the 
lack of input from civil society may have been partly self-censorship or outside the remit of many 
organisations, it was, in part, due to the fact that most civil society actors were funded by international 
donors. Despite the lack of input and discussion from civil society more broadly, Vetëvendosje, and 
other grassroots groups, were probably in a better position to publicly criticise and contribute to the 
debate on the status issue. Vetëvendosje’s strategy was largely focused on raising public awareness 
of the potential repercussions of the status talks and the Ahtisaari Plan.  
 
Allies and opposition 
Vetëvendosje collaborated with other small grassroots organisations, such as ‘The Cries of Mothers’ 
and the ’26 March 1999’ and, occasionally, individuals or the local sections of political parties. 
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However it seems that there were generally few other opportunities for allies during the pre-
independence period. This was affected, in part, by the perceptions of Vetëvendosje and the 
incompatibility of Vetëvendosje’s goals with those of other influential actors. Vetëvendosje claims 
that it was keen to maintain its independence and did not seek support from any international actors 
(Interview One 2014), which seems logical given its aims. Vetëvendosje claims that most of the office 
spaces it uses have been donated by supporters and that running costs are paid for from membership 
fees (Interview One 2014; Interview 13, 2015). 
 
It is very difficult to gauge how much support or opposition Vetëvendosje had throughout the pre-
independence period. It is thought that the 2007 demonstration had the highest attendance of 
demonstrators (between 1,300 and 3,000), while other protests saw lower figures (Lemay-Hébert 
2013; Kaidanow 2007a). The number of supporters is not possible to establish reliably, and it is difficult 
to find concrete indicators of support for or opposition to Vetëvendosje, or to distinguish support for 
it from general support for its aims, or how active support or opposition was. Vetëvendosje has 
claimed to have up to 10,000 supporters across 16 branches (Karpat 2006).  
 
Early Warning Reports have given some indication of support for Vetëvendosje through polling in four 
editions of the report in 2006 and 2007. A poll in a 2006 report shows levels of support across seven 
regions of Kosovo, giving figures of between 36.9% and 62.6% for those who have a supportive 
attitude towards Vetëvendosje and between 21.5% and 54.3% for those who oppose it (Hyseni et al. 
2006). These figures were fairly similar in the following editions of the reports. Interestingly, as Lemay-
Hébert (2013) notes, the first appearance of questions on the movement in a 2006 report, were placed 
in the annex. In later versions it was moved to the section on ‘public and personal security’, and 
support was only assessed on the basis of region or education. One report (Hyseni et al. 2007a) poses 
questions on feelings of security and levels of support for Vetëvendosje, implying that these two 
elements are linked. There is no explanation in the reports for featuring Vetëvendosje in the ‘public 
and personal security’ section. This is even more striking because no other groups are mentioned. 
Vetëvendosje was mentioned in the conclusions of a 2006 report stating that the “[d]issatisfaction 
among members of “Vetëvendosje” with Kosovo’s political developments and the occurrence of 
protests with a tendency to turn violent” was a security concern (Hyseni et al. 2006: 35). 
 
Vetëvendosje appears to have had a fairly broad appeal to a varied cross-section of Kosovar society, 
as well as within the diaspora. It is possible to identify some key groups from which Vetëvendosje 
drew support, particularly due to its earlier links with the KAN, war veterans, and Albin Kurti’s time as 
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a political prisoner. This meant that Vetëvendosje often appealed to older, rural populations, KLA 
veterans, and former political prisoners (Schwandner-Sievers 2013: 96). Several interviewees also 
suggested that Vetëvendosje was a voice of young people (Interview Five 2014; Interview 13, 2015), 
an idea also supported by its popularity among students, who often participated in Vetëvendosje’s 
activities. Vetëvendosje often organised events with university students, such as discussions on the 
Ahtisaari Plan (Vetëvendosje 2010d). 
 
When asked how he felt Vetëvendosje was perceived or represented by the media and international 
actors, Albin Kurti said Vetëvendosje was viewed as ‘a troublemaker’, ‘a destabiliser,’ and ‘crazy,’ and 
has been labeled rebels, anarchists, communists, fascists and nationalist. All to convinced people not 
to listen to them (Interview One 2014). The current head of Vetëvendosje’s parliamentary group, 
Glauk Konjufca said that one image of Vetëvendosje in the pre-independence period suggests they 
were a “kind of very aggressive, sectarian, very radical, revolutionary organisation” (Interview Two 
2014). Konjufca states that the movement were labelled by some, as communists, fascists, and 
anarchists and that “we were everything over the years” (Interview Two 2014). These claims made by 
members are supported to some extent by the negative framing of the movement in media sources 
and reports, such as the Early Warning Reports. Vetëvendosje has been referred to as a ‘terrorist’ or 
a ‘criminal organisation’ in the regional and international media (see examples Abdiu 2007, 2010; 
Oschliess 2006).  
 
International actors also expressed negative claims about Vetëvendosje and appear to have viewed 
the movement as a spoiler of the international state-building project. A UN report issued in 2007 
stated that Vetëvendosje was exploiting the political uncertainty present in Kosovo, endangering 
peaceful political processes and stated that it was radical and dangerous (UNSC 2007). It seems that 
the perceptions of Vetëvendosje among most international actors was negative. Several international 
interviewees described their negative perceptions during the pre-independence period (Interview 
Five 2014; Interview Six 2014; Interview 11 2014). One believed that Vetëvendosje’s only aim was to 
get rid of UN interference, and that its very definition as a movement for self-determination would 
inevitably create conflict with the international community (Interview Six 2014). Anthropologist, 
Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 6) argues that the “[i]nternational attitudes and reactions towards 
Vetëvendosje! have been ambiguous and contradictory, if not outright helpless or even defamatory.” 
The public statements and responses to Vetëvendosje by international actors helped create an 
unfavourable public image and demonstrate efforts to inhibit it.  
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The negative perceptions appear to have contributed to the difficulties Vetëvendosje experienced in 
trying to get its messages across to the Kosovar public and the detail of its arguments was often lost. 
It is possible to see the influence of international actors, both directly and indirectly, on these 
perceptions. For example, Vetëvendosje were regarded by some as being anti-American (Interview 
Two 2014, Interview 13 2015). As discussed in Chapter Three, the majority of the Kosovar public and 
elite are strongly pro-American and pro-European and there was little criticism of the international 
actors’ involvement in Kosovo, particularly in the early years of the new protectorate. Kurti argues 
that members of Vetëvendosje also value the help of the US but not in the way the US wants. He 
argues that the US wants Kosovars to have “a ‘Borat kind of love’ for the United States” and that the 
US “treat us as idiots”. He states that if you are not in line with this then you are feared by the Us - 
hence why Vetëvendosje is excluded (Interview One 2014). 
 
Vetëvendosje has also argued that this perception has been used against them, in the sense that 
arguments may be discredited on the basis of its supposed anti-Americanism. Glauk Konjufca stated 
that propaganda directed against them by the government was always mediated. He argues that 
public perceptions of the international community as saviours is manipulated by the government, so 
it has become a terrible accusation to say that someone is not liked by the US (Interview Two 2014). 
 
These negative perceptions of Vetëvendosje constrain opportunities to get more nuanced arguments 
across that deal with the detail of the international presence. It is of course possible that this also has 
the potential to attract supporters. However, for the majority of the population, it was likely that being 
anti-American or against the international presence was seen as being against the public interest. 
 
Given Vetëvendosje’s demands and targets, it is clear that it was unlikely to become, or even seek to 
become, allies with international actors. Several of the interviewees (both Albanian and international) 
who work within civil society and international institutions, as well as members of Vetëvendosje, 
suggested that a discourse had been created by the media and international actors which intentionally 
presented Vetëvendosje in a negative light (Interview Three 2014; Interview Four 2014; Interview Ten 
2014; Interview 13, 2015; Interview 15, 2014). Puhie Demarku, Vetëvendosje’s Head of External 
Relations and a deputy in the Assembly, believes that the international community helped to shape 
the radical appearance of Vetëvendosje, as well as a more positive view of other politicians who later 
turned out to be corrupt. Demarku also suggested that there was a lack of real analysis concerning 
what Vetëvendosje stood for in order to create clear opinions, and that “[f]or the sake of short term 
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stability the international community were willing to support the corrupt criminals and blame 
Vetëvendosje” (Interview Four 2014).  
 
Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 96) argues that the attitude of international actors is also likely to have 
had a damaging effect on their own legitimacy amongst sections of the population.  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, external state-builders and administrators have responded in a 
contradictory and rather helpless manner to this form of grass-roots resistance. It can be 
argued that by ignoring Vetëvendosje!’s historical and  cultural basis of self-authentication 
they contributed to undermining their own legitimacy in the eyes of significant local 
constituencies and affirmed the claims and expectations of the ideological leaders of this civil 
protest movement in a self-fulfilling prophecy (Schwandner-Sievers 2013: 96).  
 
It would be very difficult to trace the development of the discourse on Vetëvendosje, or to provide an 
assessment of whether this discourse and the resulting perceptions were accurate. However, what is 
important for this analysis is whether this discourse had an impact on Vetëvendosje’s strategy. This 
can be determined from an analysis of Vetëvendosje’s own thoughts feelings about how it was 
portrayed. Whether the negative perceptions of Vetëvendosje were orchestrated or not, members 
certainly felt the influence of the negative attitudes of some international actors, and the poor 
relationship between the two led to constraints on some political opportunities. Members have also 
acknowledged themselves that there was often a big gap between the perceptions of Vetëvendosje 
and what they stood for, which they did not necessarily manage very well, especially in its early stages 
(Interview Two 2014). One member expressed some regret about the management of perceptions 
and the portrayal of Vetëvendosje by the media. He noted the perception gaps which were particularly 
prominent in 2005, 2006 and February 2007 (Interview Two 2014). Though he did believe that it was 
very difficult for them to clarify or reassure doubters due to the interpretation that had been made 
by most of the media, analysts, the government and international actors.  
 
Vetëvendosje’s relationship with international actors clearly contributed to the shaping of its strategy 
during the pre-independence period. Although the independence issue dominated the political 
discourse, Vetëvendosje resorted to direct actions and mass protests to voice its demands. The lack 
of political opportunities in Kosovo during this period contributed to this use of these tactics. The 
perception of Vetëvendosje by international actors also limited potential allies. Many of these factors 
continued into the post-independence period, as discussed below. 
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Nationalism 
As mentioned, Vetëvendosje has been referred to as a nationalist movement and its goals and displays 
of ethnonationalism40 appear to have been a further point of contention for its relationship with 
international actors. I discussed the roots of the ethnic conflict that led to the NATO intervention in 
Chapter Three but here it is worth briefly considering the role of nationalism and ethnicity within the 
new protectorate and how it relates to Vetëvendosje. 
 
There were high levels of nationalism before the Kosovo war, which continued at a similar level 
afterwards (Dyrstad 2012). Dyrstad (2012: 828) argues that this was most likely due to people being 
mobilised along ethnic lines well before the war and that the levels of distrust and segregation were 
already so high that the conflict itself hardly changed this. Some claim that there is a particularly strong 
primordial sentiment among Kosovo-Albanians (Berisha 2005) and that “large parts of contemporary 
society in Kosovo continue to identify proudly with the victorious militant resistance of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA)” (Schwandner-Sievers 2013: 96). Vetëvendosje’s rhetoric, which some scholars 
have suggested is populist (Yabanci 2015; Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Visoka 2011), clearly resonates 
with some of the Kosovar public and appeals to this identification. One of the common features of 
social movements, as outlined in Chapter One, is collective identities (Diani 1992), which are readily 
available for nationalist movements (Vladisavljević 2002). As discussed earlier, many of 
Vetëvendosje’s actions have referenced Albanian history and culture, which serves to assert 
resistance as well as its internal identity (Schwandner-Sievers 2013). Visoka (2017: 115) argues that 
“[o]nly by combing nationalism with social concerns did LVV manage to mobilise large crowds of 
people, who are largely unemployed and unhappy with their socio-economic conditions.” In addition 
to this Strazzari and Selenica (2013) state that nationalism was not an unusual feature of Kosovar civil 
society in post-intervention Kosovo. 
 
The ethnonationalist elements of Vetëvendosje did not sit well with the objectives of the international 
actors in Kosovo. Given the state-building agenda, which includes minority protection and pluralism, 
it is likely that any nationalist element would have been viewed as detrimental to that agenda. 
Vetëvendosje vocally oppose the approach international actors have taken to ethnicity in Kosovo. 
Kurti argues that the “international rule in Kosova promotes diversity at the cost of solidarity and 
                                                          
40 Ethno-nationalism can be defined as “a desire to keep the (ethnic) nation homogenous and separated from other groups, 
where loyalty to the group is stronger than loyalty to the state” (Dyrstad 2012: 818). Muro (2015) suggests that research on 
ethno-nationalist conflict and social movements has remained largely separate (Stroschein 2012; Yashar 2005; Beissinger 
2002), though there are some exceptions (see Vladisavljević 2002, Beissinger 1996). 
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difference at the cost of universality” (Kurti 2011). One of the key aims was to build “a free, pluralist 
and multi-ethnic” Kosovo (UNSC 1999, 16). Actors, including the UN, UNMIK, EULEX and NGOs such 
as the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) have all placed a great emphasis on the protection, 
inclusion and empowerment of minorities, which have an allocation of seats in the Kosovo Assembly 
(UNSC 1999, EULEX 2009, ECMI 2015). However, there has been significant criticism of UNMIK’s failure 
to build an inclusive peace in Kosovo (see Popolo 2011; Hehir 2007, 2006; Franks and Richmond 2008, 
Fawn and Richmond 2009, Devic 2006). Seifert argues that “[i]nternational policies and discourses, by 
evoking ethnonationalist categories, tend to silence and obscure realities on the ground whose 
complexities cannot be captured with such simple categories. International powers create identifiable 
ethnic units, which serve the purpose of regional administration, thus producing the 
(ethnonationalist) effects that they name” (Seifert 2014: 238). 
 
Critics argue that the policies carried out by UNMIK have been contradictory and actually “reinforced 
the separation between communities” along ethnic lines and “undermin[ed] communal proposals for 
peace” (Bargués-Pedreny 2016: 223) and that is has “institutionalized ethnicity as the only valid 
political category, strengthening the existing ethnic confrontation and undermining communal or 
hybrid forms of peace” (Bargués-Pedreny 2016: 227; also see Blumi 2003). Blumi (2003: 17) argues 
that international actors have demonstrated ambivalence in relation to the ethnonationalist 
dimensions of Kosovar society. While Seifert has suggested that these developments in Kosovo were 
not inevitable but actually “a complex interplay of local and - presumably more powerful - external 
influences is shaping identity” (2014: 239). Similarly Lemay-Hébert (2009:31) argues that the 
international actors’ efforts to promote reconciliation between the Albanians and the Serbs via 
positive discrimination were misguided and increased hostility rather the desired effect of improving 
relations. 
 
The decentralisation process was widely criticised by scholars for its focus on ethnicity as well as 
territory (Bargués-Pedreny 2016, see McKinna 2012b; Economides, Ker-Lindsey and Papadimitriou 
2010; Kallaba 2010). Several scholars have suggested that this focus actually “fuels the nationalist 
imaginary” (Bargués-Pedreny 2016: 227, see (Vaughan-Williams 2006; Campbell 1998, 80) and that 
some have used this approach to their own strategic advantage (Bargués-Pedreny 2016; Franks and 
Richmond 2008, 90). Jenne (2009: 285) has stated that “de facto partition has ensured the electoral 
success of national parties and policies…, creating a climate of extreme insecurity for ethnic minorities 
residing in the “wrong” territory.” 
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Bargués-Pedreny argues that there has been a shift in international actors’ understanding of state-
building “from a process of statebuilding that monitors and manages ethnic differences to a process 
that seeks to minimize the salience of ethnicity” (2016: 224). However, he goes on to argue that both 
approaches by international actors result in the same problematisation of the situation in post-conflict 
Kosovo. This, he argues, is based on Kosovars not being seen “as people who disagree over status, 
rights and needs, but as ethnic beings with psychosocial disorders – i.e. because of the war and 
traumatic post-war period – that have hidden ethnic aspirations” (Bargués-Pedreny 2016: 234). 
 
Vetëvendosje often refers to its constituency as ‘Kosovars’ and has stated in publications that the right 
of return should be respected and that it is not anti-Serb (Vetëvendosje 2006f).  Kurti states that the 
nationalism of Vetëvendosje is a “reaction to oppression by Milosevic and the war with the 
Serbs…Milosevic said there were no good Albanians, so our Albanian identity became our identity, it 
was a sign of defiance (Bilefski 2007). Kurti argues that if he is to be deemed a nationalist then there 
is a nuance: “if somebody sees some nationalist traits in me then it is more Franz Fanon than Charles 
de Gaulle, its more Algerian anti-colonial struggle rather than France is great” (Interview One 2014). 
However, Vetëvendosje’s rejection of decentralisation and the negotiations with the Serbia, as well 
as the use of some language and imagery by the movement, such as the prevalence of Albanian flags 
at demonstrations, may create a different impression to some. Thus, it may also have been difficult to 
reconcile Vetëvendosje’s desire to preserve Kosovo as it is, whilst also emphasising that the Albanian 
majority had been victims to Serbian oppression. Some scholars have argued that Vetëvendosje’s 
populist politics has led to exclusionary attitudes (Visoka 2011), and “inconsistencies and double-
standards” (Yabanci 2015: 29) towards minorities. Visoka (2017: 116) argues that “[b]y promoting 
mono-ethnic emancipation, while also ignoring the distinct identities, rights, and needs of other 
minority groups, LVV risked further segregating Kosovo society, delaying ethnic reconciliation, and 
suppressing progressive and moderate politics in the country.” Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 98) states 
that  
 
even though Vetëvendosje claims to promote citizenship over ethnicity, its ideological 
certainty and internal construction of moral superiority in the name of nationalism generate 
internal homogenisation pressures. In theory, these are likely to exclude those who are not 
able to identify, in unambiguous terms, with the national liberation fight of the Albanians in 
Kosovo, for those identities and allegiances might be more heterogenous, multiple, 
ambiguous or divided. 
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This, Schwandner-Sievers (2013: 98) notes is a known risk when attempting to “generate solidarity 
and consent for resistance” (also, see Martin 1989). 
 
The use of the term ‘nationalist’ in reference to Vetëvendosje comes with negative connotations for 
those of Western European or North American backgrounds, particularly due to the nature of the 
conflict in Kosovo. The idea that the nationalism of Eastern Europe is somehow different to that of the 
West appears to have stuck in the psyche of Western publics, journalists and academics, with some 
exceptions (see Muller 2008; Kymlicka 2001; Schopflin, cited in Kuzio 2001). In 1958, Hans Kohn (1958) 
stated that Western European nationalism is liberal and civic and linked to ideas of freedom and 
democracy. Eastern European nationalism is illiberal and ethnic and linked to history and blood-ties. 
This, Del Rosso (2013) argues, has been a feature of the subsequent literature on the subject and 
applied to the Balkans (see Kaplan 1993; Ignatieff; Pfaff 1993). 
 
An employee of an international development agency, who had been in Kosovo since shortly after the 
NATO intervention, believed that Vetëvendosje’s aim was to form a union with Albania and to make 
the Serbs leave. The interviewee went on to suggest that this was a generally held belief, and one 
which international actors could not be seen to tolerate (Interview Five 2014). Thus, there is a conflict 
between Vetëvendosje and the international regime, which is seen by Vetëvendosje as a new 
coloniser replacing Serbia. Thus, the claims to sovereignty made by Vetëvendosje provokes some 
tensions with the international regime, which is often the case with for nationalist movements (Olzak 
2006). 
 
Muro (2015) argues that the structural configuration of power defines the likely resonance of 
nationalist and ethnic claims. Actions brought in by international actors, such as decentralisation, the 
allocation of a significant number of seats for minorities in the Assembly have received criticism from 
various politicians, scholars and civil society groups. Thus, providing an opportunity for Vetëvendosje 
to criticise and mobilise supporters. Thus, the approach taken by international actors have perhaps 
encouraged the resonance of Vetëvendosje’s claims. 
 
Post-independence period 
There were a number of shifts in Vetëvendosje’s strategy after independence. Most notably it 
expanded its demands, directed its actions to new targets and participated in the 2010 elections, 
which have been assessed here, as well its allies and opposition in the post-independence period. 
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Expansion of demands 
After a quieter period in the immediate aftermath of the independence declaration, Vetëvendosje 
began to expand its range of demands and shifted its strategy significantly. It took independence as 
an opportunity to make demands on a variety of other social and economic issues. Vetëvendosje’s 
main aim of self-determination was somewhat resolved, though not entirely in the form it would have 
liked. Vetëvendosje still seeks unification with Albania via a referendum, though opportunities for this 
idea to be realised were further constrained by the declaration of independence. Some still suggest 
that unification would be popular among some sections of the population (Interview Five 2014; 
Interview 12, 2014). A 2010 poll conducted by Gallup, in cooperation with the European Fund for the 
Balkans, showed that 81% Albanian respondents in Kosovo were very supportive of a Greater 
Albanian. This was up from 54% in a 2008 poll (Gallup 2010: 13). Thus, the declaration of 
independence did not mean the issue of self-determination had been completely dealt with for 
Vetëvendosje. However, it is likely that this expansion of demands was due to a general acceptance 
of the independence declaration by the public and the Kosovar elite. This acceptance provided 
Vetëvendosje with opportunities for greater influence in new areas and allies, particularly as several 
of its demands were in areas that were also of interest to aspects of civil society and political elites. 
 
International actors did not advocate the independence declaration at the time it was made. However, 
their role in independence was significant and has impacted significantly on Vetëvendosje’s strategy. 
It felt that even though Kosovo now had full control over its institutions, it was still a protectorate, 
albeit in a slightly different form (Interview Three 2014). 
 
Vetëvendosje members suggested that there was increased criticism of international actors from 
other sources (Interview One 2014; Interview Four 2014) and evidence suggests EULEX was widely 
criticised (see Chapter Three). Vetëvendosje perceived EULEX as one bureaucracy replacing another, 
and that a one-sided relationship between the international institutions and Kosovars, would 
continue. “[T]he international community seeks to impose its own political or economic projects in 
Kosova for its own interests and contrary to the will of Kosov[o]’s people and without their consent” 
(Vetëvendosje 2010c).  
 
EULEX served as a new target for Vetëvendosje and it continued to use similar tactics to demonstrate 
its opposition to the presence of EULEX and the ICO. The EU-facilitated dialogue process between 
Kosovo and Serbia was seen by Vetëvendosje as a continuation of attempts by international actors to 
partition Kosovo that could still result in a similar situation to that found in Bosnia. Vetëvendosje’s 
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opposition to the international presence may have had a slightly different effect on the opportunities 
available to it in the post-independence period. International actors had less overarching control, 
EULEX in particular had a much narrower remit than before and the ICO appeared to be more 
temporary than UNMIK had been. A protest in September 2009, against the signing of a protocol 
between Serbia and EULEX, had a smaller turnout (of a few hundred) in comparison to other protests 
organised by Vetëvendosje. However, the smaller turnout may have been a side-effect of a 
Vetëvendosje protest a month earlier at which a small number of activists turned over EULEX vehicles 
in Pristina (Freedom House 2010b). It also appears that Vetëvendosje are still viewed as anti-
American, as well as against EU membership, something which it actually favours (Interview Four 
2014).  
 
A number of the issues Vetëvendosje had begun to pursue, particularly privatisation and corruption, 
had been protested about by other groups in the pre-independence period. These were salient issues 
amongst opposition political parties and civil society, increasing the potential for allies for 
Vetëvendosje. Vetëvendosje has taken a strong position against neoliberal economic policies, stating 
that certain policies, especially the privatisation of public services, have caused problems in other 
states and that Vetëvendosje would like Kosovo to take a different path (Interview Three 2014). 
Demands relating to the economy are largely directed towards the government, which Vetëvendosje 
states lacks economic vision and focus on costly infrastructure projects (Ibid). Although most of these 
demands are directed at the government, Vetëvendosje does state that many of these policies were 
initiated by UNMIK. Vetëvendosje is also very critical of the exploitative nature of the international 
presence, and highlighted the construction of the Super Highway as an example (Ibid), a project that 
was widely criticised (see Chapter Three). 
 
Corruption become a key concern for Vetëvendosje. The issue of government corruption has been 
criticised by opposition parties and is also a key concern for a number of NGOs as well as international 
actors. Addressing the corruption issue, presented the potential for a range of allies on this issue, 
particularly given that it is quite distinct from the main issues Vetëvendosje was associated with in the 
pre-independence period. In 2008, anti-corruption NGO Cohu! and Vetëvendosje both criticised the 
government as well as the opposition, which a Freedom House (2009) report suggested may have 
been to avoid being seen as being an extension of the opposition. International actors have not been 
that successful in fighting corruption so far and have suffered their own corruption scandals (Borger 
2014c). However, their attempts have perhaps increased opportunities for the issue to be debated 
and pressure placed on government. This has occurred via a number of factors, including the funding 
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of civil society actors to focus on corruption and by the sheer presence of the EULEX mission and the 
cases it has dealt with, bringing the issue of corruption to the forefront of public debate (for example 
EULEX 2012). 
 
The expansion of demands highlighted potentially overlapping goals with international actors and 
perhaps a more favourable context in which to air them. Vetëvendosje felt that it often spoke the 
language of the ‘international community’ - as perceived at a global level, but not necessarily in 
relation to its actions in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje feels that some of its views have been misinterpreted, 
which has served to increase its desire to be listened to by those who criticise it. Vetëvendosje strongly 
believes that its ideas do not diverge greatly from the principles that the international actors have 
tried to promote (Interview Two 2014). Kurti argues that they wanted to “speak in their language” so 
the West would understand, because “intellectually, philosophically, we are children of the west” 
(Interview One 2014).  
 
Vetëvendosje advocated democracy in the Western European sense, or rather, as Kurti stated, they 
were “fully compliant with Western thinking, with a history of Western ideas, but not in compliance 
with Western foreign policies” so this is a gap Vetëvendosje intended to exploit (Interview One 2014). 
Kurti argues that the international community did not allow for the ‘demos’ within democracy and 
consistently considered Kosovars to be residents and not citizens. Vetëvendosje stated that it is keen 
to see a ‘complete democratic process’ in which the active engagement of citizens is enabled by direct 
and participatory democracy, rather than a purely representative one. It believes that this will bridge 
the widening gap between the political institutions in Kosovo and the will and interests of the people 
(Interview Three 2014; Interview Four 2014). 
 
Elections 
After extensive debates lasting six months (Interview Three 2014), Vetëvendosje decided to put 
forward candidates for the elections in 2010, which signifies the biggest shift in Vetëvendosje’s 
strategy throughout its history. The long discussions that took place before the decision was made to 
enter electoral politics raised a number of concerns about the potential constraints this would have 
on its identity and ability to mobilise. Concerns included its future identity, its capacities in terms of 
expertise and analysis, and that energy spent on entering electoral politics would be diverted from 
other activities (Interview Three 2014).  
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Vetëvendosje participated in the 2010 elections as a ‘citizen’s initiative’ (see Chapter Three), notably 
not as a political party or independent candidate. It did not want to be considered solely as a political 
party and it planned to keep its existing activities at the forefront, seeing the involvement in electoral 
politics as an additional means of pushing forward its agenda: an “expansion of our strategy” 
(Interview One 2014; also see Vetëvendosje 2010a). Vetëvendosje continue to self-identify as a 
movement and continue their movement activities but are now, at least in part, an SMO due to the 
more organized nature of it parliamentary group.  
 
The decision to continue to call itself a movement has raised questions from political parties and 
journalists over what type of organisation Vetëvendosje is. Vetëvendosje has, at times, felt under 
pressure to define itself, though Kurti argues that this should not be necessary (Interview One 2014). 
Kurti states that: 
 
we don’t think of ourselves as a political party but neither as an NGO or CSO. We are none of 
these. We are a political movement which has a political concept, starting with a manifesto 
which we started nine years ago and developed into a political programme (Interview One 
2014). 
 
This represents Vetëvendosje’s broader efforts to separate itself as a different entity to others 
operating in Kosovo, such as NGOs and the other political parties. Similarly, another member stated 
how important the word movement was in reflecting the concept of Vetëvendosje’s organisation as 
energetic and vivid (Interview Four 2014). The emphasis on the definition as a movement also serves 
to confirm the continuation of existing strategies and tactics, to demonstrate that it continues to be a 
grassroots movement. One member stressed that, “we initially call ourselves activists so we refuse to 
be limited to a role that is purely institutional” (Interview Four 2014). Vetëvendosje clearly has several 
elements that are typical of other parties, such as its functions, rules and organisational aspects. 
However, the movement does not want to reduce itself to those elements alone, refusing to be 
“reduced to the classical functions of the Western parties in typical parliamentary life” (Interview Two 
2014). No other party in Kosovo has formed in this way or considered itself a movement at the same 
time and the concept is perhaps viewed as unusual.  
 
Despite the entry into electoral politics, Kurti speaks of an “unavoidable alienation with institutions” 
and that Vetëvendosje seeks to remain a movement (Interview One 2014). As a result Kurti visits his 
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parliamentary office once a week to allow “some fresh air in”41 (Interview One 2014). Vetëvendosje 
has high expectations of its MPs, the standards they should work to and their continuation of 
participation in demonstrations. A structure has been set up that is intended to ensure that the 
movement organisation is in control of the parliamentary group and not the other way around. 
 
Vetëvendosje had stated that it did not see Kosovo’s domestic institutions as a useful arena for its 
activities in the pre-independence period. Also, the evidence outlined in Chapter Three suggested that 
issues of fraudulent results, low voter turnout, and corrupt politicians may put off movements using 
domestic institutions. However, Vetëvendosje decided to participate in elections, in large part, 
because the international involvement in domestic institutions had decreased substantially. It was still 
not satisfied with the conduct of the institutions but viewed the Assembly as an “arena where we are 
going to fight” (Interview One 2014). Vetëvendosje had decided that this new arena would make it 
more visible and gave it the opportunity to confront political elites, which Kurti states would not have 
happened before (Interview One 2014).  
 
There are a few other opportunities that were outlined in Chapter Three that would explain the move 
into electoral politics, such as the signs that the opposition (whichever party or parties that was) was 
becoming occasionally more effective, and that other new entities from a different position on the 
political spectrum (though there were few of these) had also chosen to stand in elections. The moves 
by a number of those employed in civil society to politics, most notably the three directors of well-
known NGOs that formed the New Spirit party, suggests that others also started to see domestic 
institutions as a viable arena to make demands and effect change. According to Freedom House, the 
move by Vetëvendosje and several civil society activists prompted scepticism from a number of other 
organisations who saw them as “a sign of the growing politicization of civil society and a cynical use 
of civic activism as a path into mainstream politics” (Freedom House 2012). However, it seems that 
the independence declaration had a major effect on Vetëvendosje’s direction. Its expanding demands 
and goals, the lack of opportunities available to influence in other ways, and the decrease in 
international influence over political institutions appear to have been the primary factors for 
Vetëvendosje’s decision.  
 
                                                          
41 Although Kurti is an MP he spends the majority of his time on what he considers to be movement activity. He attends 
weekly plenary sessions and meetings on the committee on foreign affairs (two per month), resulting in about six meetings 
per month. He believes that these meetings, plus preparation time, allows him to spend three out of four weeks working 
solely on movement activities. 
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Vetëvendosje first put candidates forward in the 2010 elections and placed third, winning 13% of the 
vote, gaining 14 of 120 seats. After concerns over incidents of fraud in the election, Vetëvendosje 
appealed some of the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel’s (ECAP) decisions in the Supreme Court, 
which ruled in favour of Vetëvendosje and another election was held in the Mitrovica municipality. 
The move into electoral politics did open up a number of other opportunities, including other allies. 
The move also attracted new activists and some from other political parties (Interview Two 2014; 
Interview Four 2014; Interview Five 2014). Vetëvendosje also continued to organise protests, 
including one in 2012 on the day an agreement was signed involving the government selling its energy 
grid and distribution to the Turkish consortium Calik-Limak. Vetëvendosje’s MPs were prevented from 
attending the ceremony by the police. This led to the speaker of parliament accusing the Interior 
Minister of leading a siege of parliament due to his interference in the autonomy of the police 
(Freedom House 2013b). 
 
Vetëvendosje put forward its expanded programme in the ‘Governing Alternative’ in August 2013, 
which demonstrated it different perspective to other parties in parliament. Vetëvendosje was the only 
party to oppose the Brussels Agreement that sought to normalise relations between Kosovo and 
Serbia. A few members of other parties also voted against but the agreement was ratified with the 
votes of two-thirds of the MPs (Freedom House 2014b). 
 
In the June 2014 elections, Vetëvendosje gained slightly more votes with almost 14%, resulting in third 
place and 16 seats. The PDK had won the most votes in the election but the party could not get other 
parties to form a coalition. The LDK, AAK, and new party, Initiative for Kosovo (NISMA), formed a 
coalition which Vetëvendosje later joined. Significantly, this coalition wanted to put Vetëvendosje in 
charge of the process of dialogue with Serbia. However, the Constitutional Court ruled that it was not 
possible for this coalition to stand as it had not formed prior to the election. 
 
Also in 2014, Shpend Ahmeti, a Vetëvendosje member, formerly of the New Spirit party, was elected 
as mayor of Pristina, replacing the incumbent LDK mayor in the first success of its kind for 
Vetëvendosje. The position had become highly sought after by all the main parties as local government 
had become more appealing to more well-known and senior politicians (see Chapter Three). The 
improvements to local governance, much of which had occurred with the support of international 
actors, and the increasing appeal and importance associated with mayoral positions, particularly in 
Pristina, was an important opportunity for Vetëvendosje. One Vetëvendosje member suggested that 
there had been a prevailing assumption that if you were not liked by the international community you 
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had no chance of winning anything. Now it felt that the election of Ahmeti as mayor of Pristina 
demonstrated that it is possible to become critical of the international community and still win 
elections (Interview Four 2014). Though it is not possible to assess the reasons the public voted for 
Ahmeti, it can be argued that he is one of the few elected officials in Kosovo that has been openly 
critical of international actors. 
 
Allies and opposition 
Vetëvendosje has continued to engage with a variety of groups, particularly labour unions and 
students, as well as a range of interest groups including groups of professionals, farmers and small 
businesses, and other organisations such as those working with the families of missing persons and 
those working to help people get together within their neighbourhoods to deal with problems and 
improvements in their shared space (Interview One 2014). Vetëvendosje has also maintained its 
relationships with other grassroots organisations. These groups have, for the most part, had little 
interaction or direct contact with international actors, which makes them more suitable allies than 
many other civil society actors. 
 
Some of the perceptions of Vetëvendosje may have begun to slowly shift in the post-independence 
era, particularly after Vetëvendosje’s entry into electoral politics and winning the Pristina mayoral 
election. Participation in elections seems to have given some confirmation that Vetëvendosje is a 
serious entity and demonstrates a level of support that was hard to quantify in its earlier stages. When 
interviewed, Robin Budd, Second Secretary at the British Embassy in Pristina said that “[t]he election 
of the mayor demonstrates VV [Vetëvendosje] is more than just a protest movement and a serious 
player in the political scene of Kosovo” (Interview Eight 2014). The involvement of Vetëvendosje in 
electoral politics provided an opportunity for the public and politicians to demonstrate their support 
or opposition to Vetëvendosje in a way they may not have done before.  
 
In the run up to the 2010 election, Vetëvendosje’s focus on corruption gained some high profile 
support from US diplomat and former head of the Kosovo Verification Mission, William Walker, who 
endorsed Albin Kurti’s bid to become an MP. Walker believed that the international community was 
“complicit” in the current corruption found in Kosovo (Lewis 2010). Walker, admitted that support of 
Kurti was “a little unusual”, and that this support for Kurti would be regarded as “going rogue” by the 
State Department. He stated that he was not in agreement with all of Kurti’s policies, but that the 
international community was “looking the other way” while the current government benefitted from 
corruption (Lewis 2010). 
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Though it is difficult to gauge and verify how Vetëvendosje is perceived by the public and international 
actors, anecdotal evidence from 2014 suggests that perceptions have shifted somewhat, even if this 
has not been publicly acknowledged. Interviews with several international employees suggested that 
Vetëvendosje’s emphasis on anticorruption has led to them becoming seen as an anticorruption 
movement (Interview Seven 2014; Interview Six 2014). Several interviewees (both international and 
Kosovar) were positive about this shift, and suggested that Vetëvendosje is “providing an alternative 
that was missing” (Interview Seven 2014), that it is a healthy political development (Interview Five 
2014), and “the only counterweight to corrupt politicians” (Interview Six 2014). It also seems that the 
new focus of Vetëvendosje, and its agenda more broadly, has given those internationals that had only 
worked in the country in recent years a more positive impression of Vetëvendosje (Interview Six 2014).  
 
The newly elected major, Shpend Ahmeti was referred to by one international interviewee as the 
“cuddly face” of Vetëvendosje (Interview Five 2014), while others considered him to be on the 
‘conservative wing’ of the party (Interview Five 2014; Interview Six 2014), “more mainstream” or “less 
radical” (Interview Six 2014). There is little to suggest that a ‘conservative wing’ of the party exists, 
but perhaps this view is due to his former leadership of the New Spirit Party,42 his Harvard education 
and his former position as a World Bank economist. It could also be part of an effort to separate him 
from the rest of Vetëvendosje by suggesting that he is not wholly representative of the party. Another 
interviewee suggested that Vetëvendosje was unhappy with him, as he is not doing what 
Vetëvendosje wants him to (Interview Six 2014). It does not appear that he is demonstrating great 
differences to the rest of the party, although one member did suggest he may be less vocal on 
unification with Albania (Interview Three 2014). Ahmeti has expressed his disappointment over the 
limited support from the West. He has said that EULEX is “constrained by timidity in European capitals 
when it comes to following the corruption trail to the doors of top politicians” and suggested that EU 
politicians pressure EULEX to delay pursuing individuals, particularly if they are key players in the 
dialogue with Serbia (Borger 2014a). 
 
The actions of Ahmeti as mayor of Pristina seem to have been fairly well received by international 
actors, though this also seems to be expressed solely in private. Ahmeti was quick to make efforts to 
rid Pristina of corruption, tackling the construction sector (the sector most linked to organised crime) 
                                                          
42 The FeR or ‘New Spirit Party’, consisted of prominent local NGOs and public policy think-tanks. The creation of FeR had 
“the intention of bridging the gap between official politics and citizenship, FeR was considered to be EU-friendly, and is 
mostly composed of young, liberal, technically competent intellectuals and professionals educated in the West” (Strazzari 
and Selenica 2013: 128). However, they failed to gain the 5% of votes required for parliamentary representation. 
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by stopping illegal building43 and issues with waste and water management,44 leading some to suggest 
he is “arguably the bravest mayor on the continent” (Borger 2014a). At the time of data collection, 
many of the international employees interviewed seemed impressed with Ahmeti’s efforts in Pristina 
(Interview Five 2014; Interview Six 2014; Interview Twelve 2014). However, any approval voiced was 
often followed by the caveat that they did not support the party or Vetëvendosje more widely, not 
wishing to give them credibility or potentially encouraging voters outside of Pristina. This attitude was 
something that Vetëvendosje members and other Albanian interviewees seemed to be aware of 
(Interview Three 2014; Interview Four 2014). This leaves some international actors in a position where 
they might want to work with and support Ahmeti’s activities while not wanting to be seen to endorse 
him. Thus the lasting perceptions of Vetëvendosje and its lack of allies among international actors is 
still potentially constraining political opportunities, particularly as it seeks to engage with international 
actors.  
 
As the above discussion on Ahmeti demonstrates, the underlying positivity towards aspects of 
Vetëvendosje from those within international institutions does not signify a complete shift in attitude. 
Vetëvendosje felt that the perception of it has not changed among the most influential sectors of 
international community and that it was still not accepted by international actors, even after winning 
seats. Though it did feel that some recognised that Vetëvendosje had modified its aims (Interview Five 
2014) and that international actors were likely to feel that they had to be more accepting publicly now 
that it had gained seats in the election, as it showed a significant level of public support. Kurti stated 
that participation in elections has forced some degree of engagement, including meetings but no 
official ones, and that this has not come willingly from international actors (Interview One 2014). Kurti 
said that Vetëvendosje is not invited to monthly meetings with the US ambassador (Interview One 
2014). Despite missing these meetings, Vetëvendosje has changed its strategy and now tries to meet 
with those representing international actors, not just ambassadors but across the wide range of actors 
(Interview Four 2014). This is part of an effort to communicate its message more directly (Interview 
Four 2014), which is something Vetëvendosje has also tried to do with the public more broadly. 
Members stated that they felt that the gap in perceptions and what they really stand for is much closer 
than it was before (Interview Two 2014, Interview Three 2014). These efforts to engage with 
                                                          
43 The issue of violations of building regulations had been neglected over the last 15 years. Well-known architect and the city 
planning director who was working for the UN, Rexhep Luci, attempted to tackle the issue and was shot in the back six times 
in 2000. There has already been at least one assassination plot against Ahmeti (Borger 2014a; Luci 2013).  
44 At the time, the city was experiencing daytime cuts in the water supply despite the fact there had been a large amount of 
rain. 
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international actors represents a significant shift in strategy and stands in stark contrast to 
Vetëvendosje’s earlier methods of ‘communicating’ with international actors. This approach by 
Vetëvendosje and its choice to participate in elections may open up new opportunities, particularly 
for new allies, but for now the relationship with international actors seems to be less oppositional, 
though it still has a long way to go. 
 
The potential of a changing relationship between international actors and Vetëvendosje is significant, 
given the history between the two and its effect on Vetëvendosje’s strategy. It is clear that 
Vetëvendosje’s early demands and tactics did not fit with the agenda of the international presence. It 
is also possible that Vetëvendosje’s outright opposition to Kosovo’s negotiations with Serbia 
overshadowed other aims and, to some extent, the perceptions of Vetëvendosje in the pre-
independence have stuck. However this changed with independence, which was again an aspect of 
Kosovo’s political context that was largely influenced by international actors. The presence of the 
international actors gave Vetëvendosje the feeling that there were few alternatives for expressing its 
demands. Political opportunities, as outlined in Chapter Three, were also generally low, particularly in 
the pre-independence period. Entry into institutions occurred at a time where there may have 
appeared to be more potential to influence within the institutions rather than opposing them. This, 
along with Vetëvendosje’s other strategic choices shows how it has adjusted to the constraints it 
found within the context of a new protectorate. The new priorities and wider set of goals and demands 
has broadened Vetëvendosje’s appeal with the public and may also be altering the perceptions of the 
elite. 
 
Conclusion 
Vetëvendosje’s relationship with international actors clearly contributed to the shaping of its strategy 
throughout the new protectorate period. Vetëvendosje’s emergence was a direct result of the 
prolonged international presence in Kosovo, which it opposed. Vetëvendosje perceived the 
international presence, particularly in the form of UNMIK, to be an obstacle to its main goal of self-
determination for Kosovo and it opposed the decision to involve Serbia in Kosovo’s status talks. The 
lack of opportunities available for Vetëvendosje to influence the discourse on the status issue 
contribute to the type of tactics used, particularly the use of direct actions and mass protests. There 
are signs that international actors attempted to inhibit Vetëvendosje’s activity and the perception of 
it by international actors, also limited potential allies. Vetëvendosje’s opposition to the international 
presence made allies within the international actors highly unlikely. The potential for allies within civil 
society was also limited due to the vast amounts of funding from international actors for projects and 
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organisations that would work on the issues of concern to international actors. As a result, 
Vetëvendosje’s closest allies were other grassroots movements or groups. 
 
Vetëvendosje was keen to position itself as a different entity to political parties and NGOs which had 
formed in huge numbers since the intervention due to international funding. During the pre-
independence period Vetëvendosje also opposed the PISG due to its control by international actors, 
and so, enter institutions was not viable tactic. However, after the independence declaration, 
Vetëvendosje expanded its goals and its tactical repertoire by putting candidates forward for election 
in 2010. Vetëvendosje argue that this provides it with an additional arena in which to influence, but 
that its continuing movement activities are still a priority. Vetëvendosje’s success in elections has 
proved its position as a serious political player and it appears that some of the perceptions of 
Vetëvendosje have altered slightly. Its anti-corruption stance has been well-received by many, 
including some international actors. Vetëvendosje now meet with some international actors and are 
keen to discuss its policy ideas. However, Vetëvendosje still feel that the most powerful international 
actors are still unwilling to listen to them.  
  
Tilly (1979) and Tarrow (1998) have both stated that political opportunities are not just something 
that social movements have to confront, but can also be influenced by movements themselves. The 
discussion above suggests that Vetëvendosje also had an impact on the political opportunities 
available to them as well as those available to others. Several activists from Vetëvendosje have gone 
on to organise other groups and campaigns, and Vetëvendosje activists have been asked to advise 
students and unions, and have been asked to be present at their protests (Delafrouz 2009). Several 
social movement scholars (Tarrow 1998; Kitschelt 1986) have stated that the presence of other 
movements is likely to encourage further movement activity, causing a ‘demonstration effect’. The 
presence of Vetëvendosje may have had such an effect. It is possible that Vetëvendosje’s tactics have 
influenced others and had some impact on the small increase in acts of civil disobedience and protest, 
as noted by a USAID (2010) report. This may be due to the fact that many of the constraints in political 
opportunities perceived by Vetëvendosje are also present for other grassroots movements. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: AFGHANISTAN 
 
This chapter assesses how the presence of international actors in Afghanistan has shaped the context 
in which social movements might function. Here I provide an overview of how Afghanistan became a 
new protectorate and the international actors involved. I take a closer look at the role of the UN 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and also consider the coherence of the international 
presence in Afghanistan. Following this I consider the domestic elites that have emerged since the 
conflict, the coherence of these elites, and their relationship with international actors. I then discuss 
the influence of international actors on democratic development, particularly the conduct and 
outcome of elections and civil society development. Throughout the chapter I assess the key actors 
involved and the events that took place with a view to providing an insight into the impact of these 
factors on the potential political opportunities in post-intervention Afghanistan. This chapter draws 
on the extensive literature on Afghanistan, as well as the new protectorate and political opportunity 
literature explored in Chapter One and Two, which has been applied to the specific context of 
Afghanistan. The assessment of the international actors influence, and their impact on political 
opportunities provides the context for the analysis of Afghanistan 1400 in the following chapter. 
 
International actors 
A vast amount of literature has assessed Afghanistan’s complex history (Dupree 2014; Rubin 2013; 
Barfield 2010; Rubin 1995; Anderson and Dupree 1990) and conflicts (Fergusson 2011; Rashid 2010; 
Tanner 2009; Maley 2002), as well as the US led intervention in 2001 and the subsequent state-
building efforts (Morgan Edwards 2010; Cramer and Goodhand 2002; Suhrke 2001). State-building 
attempts in Afghanistan have been the focus of a growing critique within the academic and policy-
orientated literature, as has the nature of the state itself and how it has developed historically 
(Barfield 2010; Rubin 2002; Edwards 1996). This literature highlights the extensive influence from a 
variety of international actors involved in the new protectorate. Here, I clarify Afghanistan’s status as 
a new protectorate and provide an overview of the international actors involved, particularly the role 
of UNAMA. This overview provides a broad insight into the levels of influence international actors 
have had in Afghanistan and their resulting influence on political opportunities for movements. 
 
Afghanistan as a new protectorate 
Afghanistan has experienced interference from foreign forces for centuries and, particularly over the 
last 40 years, has become synonymous with violence and destruction, due to the nine-year Soviet 
invasion followed by civil war and Taliban rule. The extremely restrictive Taliban rule that had been in 
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place since 1996 was ended by Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The operation took place in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks, led by the US with the support of the UK. The US believed that al-Qaeda, 
and its leader Osama bin Laden, thought to be behind the 9/11 attacks, were being sheltered in 
Afghanistan by the Taliban. Initial military objectives included the capture of al-Qaeda leaders and the 
prevention of terrorist activities in Afghanistan through the destruction of training camps and 
infrastructure on Afghan territory (Bush 2001). US and UK forces used aerial bombing on Taliban and 
al-Qaeda targets and supported the Northern Alliance (NA), which was a military front formed in 1996. 
When the NA formed it was largely a Tajik organisation. However, by 2000, several other leaders of 
ethnic groups, including Uzbeks and Hazaras, joined the NA and participated in the civil war with the 
largely Pashtun Taliban. Once OEF had begun, the NA quickly took control of most of Northern 
Afghanistan and Kabul. 
 
A few months into the intervention, NATO committed troops from 43 states45 outside its own borders 
for the first time after invoking Article 5 of the NATO treaty. The mission was authorised by the UN 
Security Council in December 2001 by Resolution 1386, which involved NATO leading the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. The NATO alliance set out to bring reconciliation across the 
country, and then planned to withdraw, leaving a widely accepted government, supported by a strong 
Afghan Army and police (Khan 2013: 104). As well as fighting the Taliban insurgency, the ISAF mission 
also aimed to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and to assist Afghanistan in rebuilding 
key government institutions. This expanded the original aims of the intervention to include the 
removal of the Taliban and the creation of a new legitimate government based on democratic 
principles and human rights.  
 
A month after NATO involvement began, a political settlement was negotiated by international actors 
and some Afghan groups at a UN sponsored Conference in Bonn in November 2001. One of the key 
outcomes of the Bonn Conference, the first of over ten international conferences on Afghanistan, was 
the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions. This agreement was signed by Afghan representatives from 
various exile groups, but significantly not by any of the Taliban or many Pashtun tribal leaders (Morgan 
Edwards 2010). It was the first of a series of agreements intended to establish a process for political 
reconstruction and the adoption of a new constitution. The conference made provisions for an 
                                                          
45 Troops were contributed from states including Norway, Canada, Germany, Australia and New Zealand, which were 
engaged in fighting the Taliban insurgency while US and UK Special Forces continued to target al Qaeda activists (Johnson 
2013). 
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emergency Loya Jirga (a grand assembly) to take place in 2002, a Supreme Court, banking and currency 
arrangements, UN assistance, a human rights commission and agreements on the return of refugees 
(Johnson 2013). Discussions began over the establishment of democratic elections involving six 
neighbouring countries, plus the US and Russia (known as the 6+2), who agreed that a multi-ethnic, 
freely elected government should be chosen in 2004. Prior to this, a Transitional Administration (TA) 
was established until the elections took place. Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, was selected as Chair of the 
TA and later elected president in the 2004 elections. A few months after the conference, the UN 
assistance mission (UNAMA) was established. 
 
The Bonn Conference signified the commencement of the state-building project in earnest, and the 
significant presence of international actors in Afghanistan. It is from this time that Afghanistan can be 
considered a new protectorate, in accordance with the definition of new protectorates given in 
Chapter One. Despite a significant reduction of the international military presence and the Afghan 
government taking full control of its security in 2014, the country arguably remains a new 
protectorate. While the NATO-led ISAF ended its mandate at the end of 2014, a new NATO-led 
mission, Resolute Support, was launched in January 2015 to “train, advise and assist the Afghan 
security forces and institutions” (NATO 2016).  
 
NATO continues to finance the Afghan security forces, and the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring 
Partnership, signed in 2010, which “provides a framework for long term political consultations and 
practical cooperation,” was strengthened at the NATO summit in 2014 (NATO 2015). In addition to 
this, NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative remains in Afghanistan, and further financial assistance 
has been promised (Reuters 2016b). Although US President Obama announced the withdrawal of US 
troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, troops remain, albeit far fewer and with a narrower 
mandate similar to that of NATO’s post 2014 operation. In fact, Obama recently announced that a 
total of 8,400 troops would remain, nearly 3,000 more than originally planned, due to the continued 
insecurity in the country (Landler 2016). On top of this, the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA), details of which are explained below, has had its mandate renewed until March 
2017 (UNAMA n.d.). Given this extended political and military presence in Afghanistan, I argue that 
the new protectorate status of Afghanistan continues, and is likely to remain until 2017 at the earliest. 
 
UNAMA 
The presence of international actors in Afghanistan did not take the form of an international 
administration run by the UN, like those found in Kosovo or East Timor, established two years earlier. 
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Instead, the UN launched the civilian UNAMA, established by UN Security Council Resolution 1401 in 
March 2002 (UNSC 2002). The UNAMA’s mandate is for a political mission that provides  
 
“political good offices in Afghanistan; works and supports the government’s process of peace 
and reconciliation; monitors and promotes human rights and the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict; promotes good governance; and encourages regional cooperation” (UNAMA 
n.d.).  
 
The UN’s role could be considered as a facilitator, applying a ‘light footprint approach’ (Chesterman 
2007: 3). Thus, the political role of the UN was not as extensive as in Kosovo or East Timor, because 
the UN was not in a position of government, and Afghanistan’s sovereignty was maintained 
throughout the period of international involvement (Chesterman 2007: 9).  
 
The role of the UNAMA was to assist the political structures that had been put in place by the 2001 
Bonn conference when requested by the Afghan government. This lighter international presence was 
intended to assist Afghan institutions gain legitimacy and capabilities quickly (Lockhart 2011). The 
UNAMA is headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the office of the 
SRSG is charged with overall policy guidance, high-level political decision-making, and liaising with 
coalitions forces, ISAF and the Afghan Government. The mission has two divisions of activity, political 
and development and humanitarian issues. It includes several units responsible for coordinating 
international support for institution-building: Election Support, Military Advisory, Governance, Police 
Advisory, and Rule of Law. 
 
International Community? 
The term ‘international community’ appeared regularly in documentary sources and interviews 
throughout the data collection process. As in the case of Kosovo, the term seems to provide a 
convenient form of reference to the broad presence of international actors and the values and norms 
they are generally considered to promote. However, as Chapter One highlighted, the use of the term 
often refers to a narrow but shifting set of actors. The actors being referred to were usually the US, 
NATO, the UN and affiliated bodies. In addition to the NATO alliance, ISAF forces, and UNAMA, several 
other international actors have featured in the state-building process in the form of embassies, NGOs, 
and government development bodies. UN bodies, such as the United Nations Office for Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the UNAMA, the UNDP and the International Migration 
Organisation (IOM), as well as a wide variety of NGOs, and state development organisations such as 
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USAID and DFID were at the forefront of dealing with the many development and economic 
challenges. 
 
There are several other influential external actors in Afghanistan, which are not considered part of 
this international effort, either by Afghans or the actors mentioned, particularly Iran, China, and 
Pakistan. Shia political groups in Iran helped to build and arm the Northern Alliance and now 
Afghanistan receives aid, and maintains good relations with Iran (see Khan 2013; Rubin 2013). China 
seemed to have some understanding of the motivations for the initial intervention but was concerned 
about an enduring international presence, which it perceived as an attempt to prevent Chinese 
strategic interests in the region. China’s interest is largely linked to Afghanistan’s strategic 
transportation and infrastructure routes. In September 2012 China’s security leader stated, during a 
visit that China would “respect the rights of the Afghan people to choose their own path of 
development and [that it] w[ould] actively participate in Afghanistan’s reconstruction after the 
withdrawal of US and NATO forces” (Bodansky 2013: 190). China has signed several security and 
economic agreements to help train, equip and fund the Afghan police and develop Afghanistan’s 
natural resources (Bodansky 2013: 190). Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan have a long and mixed 
history. The early 1970s saw the beginning of interference by Pakistan in Afghanistan’s internal affairs 
(Khan 2013). During the Soviet intervention, over three million Pashtuns fled to Pakistan. The Taliban’s 
capture of Kabul has been attributed by many to support from Pakistan (Khan 2013: 97) and many 
Taliban members come from neighbouring Pakistan. This has been particularly problematic for 
security and Afghanistan and in 2008, US president Obama stated that the problems for Afghanistan 
also lay in Pakistan’s tribal areas and the term ‘AfPak’ was coined (Khan 2013: 103). 
 
All these states are arguably considered to have goals that differ from the goals of the international 
community (i.e. Western human rights and democracy), nor were they part of the initial intervention 
in Afghanistan. These states are not considered in further depth here as they were not involved in the 
initial intervention and do not promote the same developmental and democratising goals as other 
actors in new protectorates. 
 
The US has been particularly influential, despite showing little interest in Afghanistan during the 
Clinton administration. It preferred to support UN efforts at peace building and Pakistan (who helped 
equipping the Taliban), and even suggesting that the NA surrender to the Taliban. This policy began 
to shift after the US embassy bombings in 1998 in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi after which the US and 
UN sanctioned the Taliban (UNSCR 1267). After the attacks the US focused on Afghanistan as a 
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terrorist base that was a threat to the US (Rubin 2013). In August 2001 (prior to the attack on the twin 
towers), the US administration began supporting Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the NA. The US 
then instigated the initial intervention and put the most resources into reconstruction efforts, which 
the US has led as a result. The US and Afghanistan signed a joint declaration, which demonstrated 
their strategic partnership, giving US forces access to Afghan military facilities. The declaration states 
that the US will help to sustain Afghan security forces and continue to build Afghanistan’s economy 
and democracy (US State Department 2005).  
 
Other states, particularly the UK, Italy, Germany and Japan, have also shown a substantial 
commitment to Afghanistan in terms of resources. The EU has had a significant political and economic 
role in Afghanistan given its financial contributions and the influence of the EU Special Representative 
(EUSR) (Gross 2008). EU member states and institutions gave eight billion euros in aid between 2002 
and 2010 (Buckley 2010: 2), making them collectively the second largest donor (Gross 2008). However, 
some have suggested that the EU’s impact does not match its contributions (Buckley 2010) or that 
despite increased aid, the influence of the EU has actually decreased (Burke, E. 2014).  
 
Among the actors studied here, there was a general alignment on the fairly broad goals to provide 
security and establish democracy, which have dominated the concerns of those involved in ‘high 
politics’. This is represented in several agreements made with Afghanistan, including the Bonn 
Agreement, the EU-Afghanistan Joint Political Declaration (EU 2005) and the Afghanistan Compact 
(NATO 2006), although as Buckley argues these agreements tend to provide general guidance, 
outlining broad and ambitious goals, rather than much specific detail (Buckley 2010: 3). Different 
actors have provided different levels of resources and commitment, and have often taken 
responsibility for different aspects of state-building, such as military, judicial or police reform. For 
example, at a G8 meeting in Geneva in Spring 2002, responsibilities for Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
were distributed. The SSR consisted of different pillars, each led by a different state: Germany led on 
police reform, the US led military reform, Italy led judicial reform, and the UK led on counter-narcotics 
and Japan on DDR (Hodes and Sedra 2007). According to Burke, the responsibilities over certain state-
building aspects did not necessarily reflect the actors’ experience or competence in that area (Burke, 
E. 2014).  
 
There have been indications of tensions over the delivery of assistance, development efforts involving 
the military (Dowdy and Erdmann 2013: 279), and among different military actors (Johnson 2013: 
145). Paddy Ashdown, who was close to becoming the UN envoy to Afghanistan (BBC News 2008), 
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presented a damning statement on the coordination of international actors, stating that the failure of 
international actors in Afghanistan was not due to the Afghan President, but due to “our complete 
inability in the international community to get our act together and to speak with a single voice; to 
have a clear plan […] and a clear set of priorities” (Bhadrakumar 2009). This lack of coordination 
extended to the US and NATO allies, and the approach to military and civilian assistance in Afghanistan 
since the intervention. Thus, the approach can be considered incoherent, and although recognised by 
many of these actors, a comprehensive approach has not appeared (Stapleton and Keating 2015). 
 
Tensions and a lack of coherence among international actors has occurred various stages in the state-
building process. Rubin (2013: 15) argues that “[o]nce involved, the “international community” 
seemed to have no way to define achievable goals in Afghanistan, instead piling on objectives, though 
not the resources to achieve them.” Despite this it does not appear that the lack of clear goals or the 
presence of tension between international represent the type of divisions that would provide 
opportunities for movements. Despite the vagueness international actors generally present a 
consensus and assumptions are made about their broad goals, which are clearly distinct from those 
of a number of domestic actors, such as the Taliban. Therefore, movements or CSOs may pursue 
specific international actors, but this is most likely to be due to a mutual interest in the issues the 
movement is concerned with and the potential access it can gain, rather than due to the perception 
of divisions amongst the international actors. 
 
Despite differences, international actors have been extremely influential in Afghanistan, from the 
intervention until the present day, resulting in the significant potential to impact upon political 
opportunities. Despite the ‘light footprint approach’, international actors have influenced the 
development of new political institutions and a wide range of development and policy areas. The 
approach taken by international actors does make it a little more difficult to gauge how much 
influence international actors had over certain issues. This is due to the considerable amount of 
influence that is exercised by diplomatic means that are not always publicly discussed or measurable. 
Despite this, it is still possible to see the influence of international actors on political opportunities in 
a number of areas, which are discussed further throughout the chapter. 
 
Domestic elites 
As discussed in Chapter Two, domestic elites play an important role in new protectorates and their 
relationship with international actors is significant in the outcome of the transition to a democratic 
state (Mayall and Oliveira 2011; Tansey 2009; Holohan 2005). Here I will outline the domestic elites 
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present in Afghanistan after the intervention as well as their relationship with international actors. 
This provides a useful insight into Afghanistan’s political elite and allows for a more thorough 
consideration of related political opportunities. 
 
The current political elite in Afghanistan is representative of power struggles in the country over at 
least half a century. Once the initial intervention and the ousting of the Taliban from large parts of 
Afghanistan had occurred, many of the earlier Afghan elite re-emerged, including some returning from 
exile. These included former regional commanders and warlords, many of whom had been involved 
in the civil war in the 1990s. On their return, some competed for power and resources (ICG 2002) in 
the areas they had controlled prior to Taliban rule, continuing as they had during the civil war, creating 
militias and exploiting those who were not in their patronage network (Farrell and Giustozzi 2013). 
These warlords, some argue, were effectively rewarded and supported by the West after the 
intervention, causing further insecurity (Burke, E. 2014: 3-4; Rubin 2006: 5-6). 
 
At the Bonn negotiations in 2001, four delegations of ethnic factions positioned against the Taliban 
were present, including the Northern Alliance, the Cypress group (exiles with links to Iran), the Rome 
group (elites loyal to former King Mohammad Zaher Shah), and the Peshawar group (mostly Pashtun 
exiles based in Pakistan). The Taliban were not invited, and the signatories of the agreement did not 
include many significant Pashtun leaders, which Morgan Edwards (2010: 11) argues, led to a feeling 
of alienation from central government among Pashtuns.  
 
Power was distributed at the 2002 Loya Jirga, which consisted of 1450 candidates, 1051 of which were 
chosen by indirect elections. District representatives were chosen, and 100 seats were reserved for 
refugees, 25 for nomads, 53 for the interim administration and the commission organising the Jirga, 
and 160 seats for women. At the last minute, fifty unelected governors participated in Loya Jirga, 
which Morgan Edwards (2010: 11), who was present, states were in fact ‘warlord strongmen.’ Morgan 
Edwards argues that these warlords shaped much of the outcome of the Loya Jirga, causing long-term 
damage to state-building efforts by enabling them to “claim the political legitimisation of the 
international community” (Ibid). Morgan Edwards (2010: 12) goes on to argue that the outcome of 
the Loya Jirga enabled warlords to influence future key government appointments (also see Lister 
2007) as well as the Constitution. 
 
The ratification of the constitution in 2003 was a key event in the state-building process after the Bonn 
Conference and the 2002 Loya Jirga. The Constitutional Commission responsible for preparing the 
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constitution was supported by the UN, and restructured the Afghan government, creating an Islamic 
republic with executive, legislative and judicial branches. Daud (2014) argues that the constitution 
process was dominated by a few members of the elite, particularly Karzai and the Transitional 
Government. According to the International Crisis Group (2003), there was little public involvement 
and apparent confusion about the process of producing the new constitution, which the ICG argue 
was the “product of obfuscation by the TA [transitional administration] and the UN” (ICG 2003). The 
ICG (2003) also stated that “[m]ost Afghans know what they want from government and from a 
constitution”, and that the efforts by some, particularly the UN, “to paint them as an undifferentiated 
peasantry lacking meaningful opinions are demeaning” (ICG 2003). This demonstrates the closed 
nature of the state-building process and the limited opportunities for the public, including CSOs and 
social movements, to participate in the process. The other result of these early institutional 
developments was an extremely centralised government (Morgan Edwards 2010: 12; Nijat 2014; Daud 
2014). A government that Morgan Edwards (2010: 12) argues “protects the interests of an elite group 
of strongmen with whom Karzai maintains allegiances.” This situation of conservative control by elites 
is perhaps unsurprising in a post-conflict context (Banks 2007), and results in few opportunities for 
movements.  
 
There appears to be significant division among the political elite in post-intervention Afghanistan, 
which would usually be considered to increase political opportunities. However, as Daud (2014) 
argues, one of the major flaws in Afghanistan’s democracy lies in the only ‘partial belief’ that these 
diverse elites have in democracy. “Afghan elites fear that, once out of power, they will not only be 
unable to make a comeback but may also face persecution at the hands of rivals, as is evidenced by 
Afghanistan’s history” (Daud 2014). This absence of a consensus that supports democracy, 
conservative control over the government and the prevalence of patronage do not tend to allow for 
the kind of politics in which political opportunities are abundant and social movements flourish. 
 
An additional limitation is the fact that whilst the Taliban is not part of the political elite in post 
intervention Afghanistan, it has remained an important actor and instigates much of the instability 
and insecurity experienced in Afghanistan. A Taliban insurgency remained after the intervention, 
operating from remote parts of Afghanistan and safe havens in Pakistan. Rashid (2013: 214) argues 
that after the 2001 intervention the Taliban has transformed and became organised like a franchise 
with more nationalist intent, fighting against foreign occupation. It has had some level of control in 
most parts of Afghanistan since 2001 and there are fears that it will continue to pose a major threat 
to stability when US and NATO forces withdraw (Rashid 2013: 214). The continued presence of the 
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Taliban remains a threat to Afghan stability and the potential for state-building efforts to succeed. The 
poor security situation also constrains a number of political opportunities, which are considered 
further below. 
 
The relationship between international actors and domestic elites 
The relationship between international and domestic actors in Afghanistan has been complex, and has 
had a major impact on the state’s development, and therefore impacted on the available political 
opportunities. The influences of international actors on the decisions of the domestic elite is varied. 
Often international actors use behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts to influence domestic elites, 
making them difficult to track. Also, agreements between these actors often consist of broad goals, 
and pressure is exerted with the threat of decreased financial assistance if promises are not kept.  
 
Initially the relationship between international actors and the Government were positive, and the US 
in particular were pleased with Karzai’s appointment as leader and his success in the 2004 presidential 
elections (Engel Rasmussen 2016; Burke, J. 2014). Karzai, as head of the large Polpazi, Pashtun tribe, 
had lobbied for Western aid in an attempt to overthrow the Taliban while it was in power (Burke, J. 
2014). However, the relationship between President Karzai and the US became increasingly strained. 
Karzai was said to be frustrated with having to deal with constant changes in senior Western officials 
and policies (Ibid). As discussed below, by the time of the 2009 presidential elections, the US was keen 
to see a new president. 
 
However, Karzai remained president until 2014, although there have been a number of tense incidents 
between international actors and his government. In 2013, Karzai refused to sign the Bilateral Security 
Agreement (BSA), which would allow foreign troops to remain in Afghanistan. This was despite the 
deal being approved by the Loya Jirga, and came as a surprise to the US and many of Karzai’s own 
security officials (Graham-Harrison 2013). In August 2014, a New York Times reporter was expelled, 
after he was accused of endangering Afghan national interests for reporting on government officials’ 
alternative attempts to resolve the electoral crisis (Nordland and Gladstone 2014; Rosenberg 2014). 
The decision was criticised by the UN and the US embassy in Kabul and was later reversed by the newly 
elected President Ashraf Ghani. 
 
There were differences of opinion between international actors and domestic elites over how to deal 
with the Taliban, including both military and political solutions (Khan 2013: 103). Early British attempts 
to enter negotiations or truces with the Taliban or local insurgents were banned by the Afghan 
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government (Johnson 2013: 146). Later, in 2007, the Deputy Head of the EU delegation, Michael 
Semple, and a political officer with the UNAMA, Mervyn Patterson, were expelled by President Karzai, 
both accused of threatening national security after reportedly talking to the Taliban (Gall 2007). 
President Karzai, who has stated that he is not “anti-Western” often opposed the tactics used by the 
US and its military allies, particularly US airstrikes and night raids on Afghan villages (Engel Rasmussen 
2016). Karzai stated that these tactics to defeat the Taliban and foreign interference in Afghan politics 
were undermining Afghanistan’s sovereignty (Ibid). Karzai said “[t]his denial of self-determination 
causes a lot of frustration and anger for the Afghan people, and that helps fuel the conflict” (Ibid). 
Karzai blamed the West and Pakistan for the resurgence of the Taliban but shifted his position in the 
last few years of his presidency, and with the support of international actors, made efforts to reconcile 
with the Taliban.  
 
The current government, led by Ashraf Ghani, disagree with Karzai’s view on the efforts by US troops 
and relations between the US and Ghani appear to be better. Ghani signed the BSA as soon as he 
entered office. Ghani initially reached out to Pakistan, requesting that the Taliban be brought to the 
negotiating table, despite stating several times that Pakistan is hostile to Afghanistan and uses the 
Taliban to put pressure on Afghanistan (Ibid). However, after bombing attacks by the Taliban Ghani 
announced that the times of giving amnesty to the Taliban and a soft approach is over, but that those 
who wish to end militancy will be welcomed (Arif 2016). 
 
The differing perspectives and disagreements between Karzai and international actors, occasionally 
extended to the rest of the Afghan government and the parliament. For instance, in 2007, the Afghan 
parliament approved an amnesty for warlords, which the UN, some Afghan MPs and human rights 
groups criticised (Walsh 2007). In 2010, Morgan Edwards (2010: 1-2) went as far as suggesting that 
Afghanistan is run by a political elite “whose objectives seem diametrically opposed to those of the 
international community.” This division between international actors and Karzai, and often the wider 
political elite, appears to have the potential to provide more significant political opportunities than 
the divisions within either the international actors or domestic elite. This is not to suggest that both 
sets of elites are homogenous, but from the perspective of political opportunities, there appears to 
be a distinction between the goals and approach of international actors and those of the majority of 
the domestic elite. This presents movements and CSOs with potential allies and opposition on either 
side, depending on their goals. A factor that may constrain these opportunities is the effort made to 
promote the image of a successful relationship. Also there is a great amount of interdependence that 
exists between some of the international and domestic elites. However, a movement or CSO that 
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utilises allies within the international or domestic elites may also be able to capitalise on that 
interdependence by using allies to pressure those within another set of elites. 
 
The approach and actions of international actors have received a mixed reaction from the Afghan 
public. Many Afghans have been critical of the activities of international actors and have felt that their 
expectations were not being fulfilled (Johnson 2013; Rashid 2013: 247). Some suggest that the various 
ethnicities, religions and regions feel differently towards international actors, depending on the 
benefits they have gained as a result of the intervention (Interview 22, 2015; Interview 23. 2014). The 
loss of lives and damage caused by, and since the intervention reportedly created a lot of resentment, 
particularly among Pashtuns (Khan 2013: 101). Those Afghans with ties to the West are often viewed 
with some scepticism, such as presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani, as discussed below. In light of a 
number of elites returning from exile after the intervention, the public consultation process on the 
constitution led to calls for a ban on any minister maintaining dual citizenship (Rubin 2013: 157).  
 
The criticism of the international presence in Afghanistan reflects critiques that are common in new 
protectorates, as outlined in Chapter One. For instance, some have suggested that international and 
military staff spent short lengths of time in Afghanistan, UN and military officials often lacked 
development experience, contract workers were unchecked, and a practice of sub-contracting and 
extortionate costs reached epidemic proportions (Chandrasekaran 2011). The international presence 
had very highly paid employees and large accommodation was “already overwhelming the new 
administration and distorting the economy” in 2002 (Rubin 2013: 107). The public ambivalence about 
international actors may help or hinder political opportunities. This is likely to depend on whether the 
movement’s or CSO’s goals align or counteract the goals of international actors. 
 
Despite the problems with the international presence, the Afghan public see international actors as 
responsible for a number of aspects of Afghanistan’s development, particularly regarding security. It 
was reported in 2007 that Afghans tend to view the US as “overwhelmingly powerful” and “see the 
security situation on the ground as a direct reflection of U.S. choices and priorities” (Ray Steele and 
Thier 2007). Several English language sources have highlighted that many Afghans were concerned 
about the future of Afghanistan without the presence of the international actors, particularly 
regarding the security situation and the potential reversal of progress made (Freedom House 2015a; 
Wilson Center 2013; Dowdy and Erdmann 2013: 279). This highlights the extensive responsibilities 
that international actors are perceived to have. 
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Democratic development 
The beginnings of the state-building process have been discussed above, along with the broad 
influences international actors have had on the process. Many of the outcomes of the state-building 
process have, at first glance, obviously improved in Afghanistan and, as a result, the political 
opportunities available should have increased. However many of these process in Afghanistan are 
somewhat flawed or underdeveloped, and in turn limit political opportunities. These processes 
including electoral politics, and civil society development, are discussed further here. 
 
The state-building efforts in Afghanistan have suffered a number of setbacks, due to a wide range of 
factors, such as insecurity, resources, and corruption. At the time that the constitutional process was 
underway, some of the most influential international actors, most notably the US and the UK, shifted 
their attention and resources to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 (Khan 2013: 98; Rashid 2013: 
246).46 International actors refocused on Afghanistan in 2006, significantly shifting their strategy to 
security and development. It had become apparent to international actors by 2006 that Afghanistan 
was unlikely to develop into a fully functioning democracy solely though military means (Interview 21, 
2014). 
 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were introduced in 2006 by the US to coordinate military and 
development operations by creating areas free of insurgents, allowing development to take place 
(Johnson 2013: 163).47 Insecurity remained a problem however, and casualties increased from 4,000 
in 2006 to over 6,000 in 2007 (Washington Post 2008). A surge of US troops was deployed in 2008 and 
2010. In 2009 the new ISAF commander, General Stanley McChrystal, called for a more coordinated 
effort with Afghans. Numbers of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were to increase and 
McChrystal stated that ISAF intended to protect Afghans from the Taliban and corrupt elements in the 
Afghan government. He also urged the prioritisation of resources to Afghanistan to demonstrate the 
West’s long-term commitment (Johnson 2013a: 143). 
 
Concerns over the lack of progress and increasing vulnerability to extremism provoked more attention 
on democratic development. As a result the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) was 
                                                          
46 To demonstrate the differences in resource distribution - in March 2004, several Afghan delegates lobbied for aid in Berlin. 
They raised $27.6 billion. This amounts to $164 per Afghan, which as Johnson (2013a: 153) points out was lower than the 
$336 per Iraqi estimated in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war. 
47 The teams, made up of military officers, diplomats, and experts on reconstruction, were also meant to empower local 
governments to govern their constituents more effectively, though the success of these has been mixed (see Perito 2005). 
148 
 
adopted at the Paris Conference in June 2008 (see Washington Post 2008). At the conference, the US 
pledged more than $21 billion in assistance to Afghanistan, along with other donors such as the Asian 
Development Bank ($1.3 billion), the World Bank ($1.1 billion), the UK ($1.2 billion) and the EU ($770 
million). These contributions were in addition to the $25 billion that had been pledged to Afghanistan 
since 2000, though international aid groups have since stated that only about $15 billion had been 
delivered, partly due to concerns over corruption, inefficiency and the lack of accountability 
(Washington Post 2008). These large conferences continued to take place, and financial and 
developmental assistance was often conditional and linked to the progress made by the Afghan 
government. This allowed international actors to exert pressure on the government to deliver on 
promises made to international actors in order for financial assistance to be delivered in its entirety. 
 
Despite the increased attention to Afghanistan and its overall development it has been widely 
suggested that development took a back seat, or was ‘second-tier’ to military efforts and security 
issues during this period (Cookman and Wadhams 2010: 1; Morgan Edwards 2010: 2). A short-term 
approach, often seen in new protectorates, was taken, and, again, state-building efforts suffered as a 
result (see Dowdy and Erdmann 2013: 279; Johnson 2013: 163; ICG 2002). Debiel and Lambach (2010: 
6) argue that a top-down approach to state-building was taken, “promising quick results but 
downplaying the role of informal actors and grossly underestimating the political dimensions of 
seemingly apolitical reform.” 
 
There are a wide range of factors that impede democratic development in Afghanistan, particularly 
the security situation, but also weak and ineffective institutions (Daud 2014), poor rule of law, a poor 
economy and widespread corruption. Afghanistan’s economy functions as a war economy and is 
subject to many structural problems (Goodhand 2004). For decades, Afghanistan has been reliant 
upon huge amounts of aid from donors. Some have suggested that up to 90% of the Afghan economy 
is dependent on the international presence, and that it requires up to $8 billion a year to sustain it 
(Khan 2013: 104). On top of this, Afghanistan repeatedly features in the last few rankings in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, and is currently ranked 168 out of 168 
states (Martini 2015). The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators show Control of Corruption 
only just made it over the 5% mark in 2014 for the first time since its indicators began in 1996 (World 
Bank 2014). Afghanistan produces over 90% of the world’s non-pharmaceutical opium, the profits of 
which often fund warlords and the Taliban (Washington Post 2008), and is also linked to corruption. 
The trafficking of drugs and the issue of corruption has been linked to some of the highest levels of 
the Afghan government. International actors have been involved with programmes to eradicate the 
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production of the poppy crop and its corrupting influence, however these have had limited success 
(Goodhand 2008) and were also “inherently alienating” due to the lack of alternative work (Johnson 
2013: 153). Corruption is also reported to be undermining Afghanistan’s security forces and 
encouraging public support for the Taliban (Engel Rasmussen 2016). Despite efforts to curb 
corruption, some have suggested that the policy of international actors has actually aided or 
exacerbated corruption in Afghanistan (Chayes 2016; Johnson 2013: 164), particularly as much of the 
corruption has been “bankrolled largely by the inflow of foreign funds” (Engel Rasmussen 2016).  
 
Afghanistan also suffers poor rule of law, and World Bank Indicators show the maintenance of the rule 
of law remained at less than 5% from 1996 until 2014 (World Bank 2014). The judicial system operates 
in a haphazard way, there are high levels of corruption within the police force, which is heavily 
militarised, and its main focus is the protection of administrative centres (Freedom House 2016). 
Freedom House (2015a) reports that “police and other security personnel have occasionally used 
excessive force when confronting demonstrations,” demonstrating the potential for repression of 
movements. The effects of repression may limit or open up opportunities for movements, a debate 
which is discussed in Chapter One. Although areas such as control of corruption, rule of law and 
accountability score very low according to World Bank’s Indicators, they do show a small degree of 
improvement compared with the pre-intervention period. 
 
Poor democratic development also affects the presence of institutional rules that may facilitate access 
to the public sphere and the political decision-making process (Kitschelt 1986). There are few such 
rules in Afghanistan, as might perhaps be expected, at least in the early stages of a new protectorate, 
limiting opportunities in this area. Although no research has been conducted in this area regarding 
political opportunities in Afghanistan, indications can be taken from the levels of participation from 
the public generally. The World Bank’s (2014) Worldwide Governance Indicators for voice and 
accountability in Afghanistan, in Figure 3, show the perceptions of how able citizens are to participate 
in choosing their government, as well as freedom of expression, association and the media. The figures 
began to improve after the intervention, dropped in 2009, and began to improve again by 2014, but 
are very low and have not even reached 20%. Several authors have suggested that major political 
changes have occurred without the support of the population, with obvious examples being the Bonn 
Conference and the constitution writing process, which involved no public consultation (Daud 2014; 
Morgan Edwards 2011). 
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Figure 3: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator on Voice and Accountability in Afghanistan 
 
World Bank (2015) 
 
Afghanistan has a very ethnically and linguistically diverse population of just over 33 million. Pashtuns 
make up the largest ethnic group at 42% of the population, followed by Tajiks (27%), Hazaras (9%), 
Uzbeks (9%) and smaller percentages of Aimaq, Turkmen, Baloch and others. Most of the country is 
Muslim, around 80% are Sunni and 20% are Shi’a. The constitution itself does state that ethnic and 
linguistic minorities are officially recognised for the first time, and it guarantees equal status to 
minorities, most of which have seen improvements in political representation and participation 
(Freedom House 2016). However, minorities remain subject to discrimination and harassment 
(Freedom House 2016). The constitution guarantees rights to assembly and association with some 
restrictions, which are maintained to varying degrees across different regions of Afghanistan 
(Freedom House 2015a). Rubin (2013: 8) argues that  
 
“[w]hatever sense of unity and national identity Afghans express does not negate the reality 
of a conflict largely structured on ethnic lines and characterized by some ugly inter-ethnic 
violence. Nonetheless, the sense of national identity, and the belief that Afghan national 
identity is inherently both Islamic and multi-ethnic, seems sincere, widespread, and deeply 
rooted.” 
 
Another element that limits potential participation is the lack of responsiveness by elites, since as 
Daud (2014) argues, elites have “failed to generate some measure of responsiveness to public 
opinion.” On top of this, Freedom House (2016) reports that in areas under full government control, 
private discussion is, for the most part, “free and unrestrained”, but political discussion in areas 
controlled by the Taliban is much more dangerous. Participation is hampered across the population 
due to strong patronage networks, the lack of security, and the problems of fraud and security during 
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elections (Freedom House 2016). When combined, these factors highlight the limited opportunities 
for public participation and give a good indication that the opportunities for movements to influence 
or gain allies among the elite are small. 
 
Electoral politics 
The establishment of elections is a key aspect of democratic development and international actors 
have been heavily involved in them in Afghanistan. Political opportunities can be affected by electoral 
politics in a number of ways, as outlined in Chapter One and Three. Here, I analyse the conduct and 
outcome of the elections in Afghanistan since the first elections held in 2004, to the most recent in 
2014. This analysis is carried out with a view to establishing the impact on political opportunities.  
 
After the intervention, international actors were keen to see presidential and parliamentary elections 
take place as quickly as possible. This was part of the ‘light footprint approach’. International actors 
believed that early elections would demonstrate that Afghanistan had, despite the intervention, 
maintained its sovereignty. Elections are often the focus of international actors in new protectorates, 
which tend to focus on the technical aspects of democratisation. Elections also demonstrate some 
signs of success and progress, particularly to domestic audiences of the international actors involved 
(Morgan Edwards 2010: 12). Electoral politics can demonstrate the capacity for competition of elite 
status, the ability to participate in political opposition, the capacity of the legislature, and the 
openness of a regime.  
 
The first parliamentary elections were held in 2005, in which a National Assembly was directly elected, 
comprised of a lower assembly with 249 seats and an upper house with 102 seats. No municipal 
elections have taken place in Afghanistan, to date. In the 2005 and 2010 parliamentary elections, 
former warlords gained the majority of seats in the lower and upper houses. Further parliamentary 
elections have been delayed due to disagreements over how to ensure fair elections, concerns about 
the legitimacy of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), proposals for electoral reforms (van 
Bijlert 2016), as well as security concerns, but are due to take place in October 2016 (Reuters 2016a). 
 
Afghanistan uses the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system, and over 70 political parties, have 
been registered since 2005. Although the number of registered parties is high, Freedom House (2010a) 
has reported criticism of the 2003 Political Parties Law. It has been suggested that the law’s vague 
language “could be exploited to deny registration on flimsy grounds”. Freedom House (2010a) also 
reports that it is potentially more difficult for new political parties to participate, particularly given the 
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SNTV system. However, despite there being so many political parties, nearly all candidates in 
Afghanistan’s elections stand as independents. They may have an affiliation with a political party, but 
apply for candidacy at the Electoral Commission as independents. This is due to the fact that being 
associated with a party does not do much to boost a candidate’s chances. Freedom House state that 
political parties “lack a formal role in the legislature, weakening their ability to contribute to stable 
policymaking and legislative processes” (Freedom House 2016). National Democratic Institute (NDI) 
research on political parties in Afghanistan in 2011 highlighted that specific ideology, messages and 
policy proposals were still being developed, lacking specific detail and are very similar among groups 
of parties (NDI 2011). Rubin (2013: 299) argues that “[c]ollective political actors in Afghanistan are not 
clearly defined. Politics is highly personalized, tending to crystallize around powerful men and their 
patronage networks.” The political opportunity framework suggests that the higher the numbers of 
political parties, groups and factions that can effectively engage, increases opportunities. However, 
given that parties do not engage effectively, the difference between parties is negligible, capacity of 
the legislature is low, oversight is poor and fragmentation is low, political opportunities to influence 
and interact with parliament appear to be extremely low. 
 
Presidential elections took place in 2004, 2009 and 2014. The president is elected for up to two five 
year terms, and appoints ministers, with parliamentary approval. All other executive positions are 
appointed by the president. In the build-up to the 2004 elections, a joint Afghan - UNAMA election 
body was established, security was provided by ISAF and the Afghan National Army (ANA), and the 
election was observed by the OSCE and other groups. International donors provided over $90 million 
for the elections (Katzman 2006: 3). In December 2004 Hamid Karzai, who stood as an independent 
candidate, became the first elected president, winning 55.4% of the vote.  
 
The 2009 elections, although organised by Afghans, were still a key concern for international actors. 
International actors still assisted with the conduct of the elections, particularly security, which was a 
major concern throughout the election period. As discussed above, the relationship between the US 
and Karzai had become strained, and the US’ expectations of Karzai delivering on his promises to 
international actors were low (MacAskill 2009). Instead, the US were keen to see their favoured 
candidate, Ashraf Ghani, a former finance minister and World Bank analyst win. The former US 
defence secretary, Robert Gates, stated that the US had tried to manipulate the 2009 elections, but 
called it a ‘clumsy and failed putsch’ (Gates 2015). However, the fact that Ghani had spent much of 
his life outside of Afghanistan appeared to have the potential to reduce his attractiveness to the 
electorate, leading to his loyalty being questioned (Stern 2009). As discussed above, many Afghans 
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were suspicious of international and especially Western actors. At the time of the elections, it was 
reported that many Afghans would prefer a lessening of ties to the US (Sarhaddi Nelson 2009). Stern 
even reported that, although Ghani’s “reputation as an academic, technocrat, and reformer is close 
to sterling […] his international appeal plays to a narrative Afghans are programmed to reject.” It has 
been said that Ghani was referred to as Zana-e Bush, meaning ‘Bush’s wives’ (Stern 2009). Despite US 
support, Ghani only received 3% of the vote in the preliminary round of the elections. Although 
international support for Karzai had decreased, he remained president, winning 49.7% of the votes in 
the final round, beating Abdullah Abdullah of the United National Front, who received 30.6% of the 
vote. Significantly, voter turnout had dramatically reduced from 83.66% in 2004 to 38.8% (IDEA 2011). 
 
Both the 2004 and 2009 elections were marred by accusations of fraud, which was again a major 
feature of the 2014 election. Despite continued UN supervision, the elections were controversial and 
prolonged due to the many accusations of fraud. After the second round of voting, the Independent 
Election Commission (IEC) published preliminary results showing that Ashraf Ghani was leading but 
Abdullah Abdullah alleged that there had been fraud and declared himself the winner. The US 
intervened by threatening to cut off aid if the crisis was not resolved in a constitutional manner 
(Freedom House 2014a). The US brokered an agreement that called for a national unity government 
(NUG) and an internationally supervised audit (Freedom House 2016). Despite this involvement from 
the US, both the US and the Afghan government felt the need to clarify that the Afghan government 
has “full sovereignty and control over political decisions” (Freedom House 2016). In the end, both 
candidates agreed to a power sharing arrangement with Ghani as president and Abdullah in the new 
position of chief executive, a position the US had been lobbying for since before the 2009 elections 
(MacAskill 2009). Since the formation of the NUG, disagreements have led to many government 
positions remaining unfilled over a year after the elections (Freedom House 2016). 
 
The Taliban have opposed every election, although their calls for a boycott in 2014 were, for the most 
part, ignored (Freedom House 2016). However, participation is still made difficult by the presence of 
armed groups from all sides, particularly outside of urban areas (Freedom House 2016). Government 
officials at all levels are frequently the targets of violence or assassination attempts, with 155 attacks 
on officials occurring in the first six months of 2012 (Freedom House 2013a). The long periods of 
political uncertainty surrounding elections, high levels of fraud, low voter turnout and highly 
centralised nature of the political system do not bode well for political opportunities. Freedom House 
(2010a) actually state that “Afghanistan is not an electoral democracy” because, although elections 
have taken place, “significant problems remain with regard to the political framework, effective 
154 
 
governance, and transparency.” Poor government effectiveness is shown in World Bank Governance 
Indicators in Figure 4. All of these factors, combined with the ineffective legislature and political 
parties, demonstrate the flawed nature of Afghanistan’s democracy and the consequent constraints 
on political opportunities. 
 
Figure 4: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator on Government Effectiveness in Afghanistan 
 
World Bank (2015) 
 
Civil society development 
International actors have provided large amounts of funding and support for civil society 
development, which only really began in earnest in 2006, once development aims gained greater 
focus. This has contributed to the significant changes seen in the nature of Afghanistan’s civil society. 
As discussed in Chapter One, civil society development can provide social movements with channels 
of interactions between them and government. In order to assess the international influence on civil 
society, I briefly consider the effectiveness and results of international funding and development of 
civil society. I also consider civil society development in relation to Afghanistan’s youth, as well as the 
increasing attempts by civil society actors to function independently from international funds. This 
provides an insight into the political opportunities that arise as a result of internationally funded civil 
society development. 
 
Before international actors became involved in civil society development in Afghanistan there were a 
variety of forms of civil society activity, including shuras (community councils), religious networks, 
NGOs and voluntary groups (see Berg Harpviken et al. 2002). However, Rubin (2013: 59) argues that 
the “years of war had destroyed much of Afghanistan’s social capital as communities and institutions 
were dispersed or destroyed.” The type of internationally donor funded civil society that has 
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developed since the intervention had not really existed before (Interview 22, 2014), and global civil 
society actors are now extremely prominent within Afghanistan’s civil society (Van den Boogaard 
2011: 29). It appears that the type of civil society promoted by international actors was very different 
to the type of Afghan civil society that had existed before, which has largely been ignored. Van den 
Boogaard (2011: 29) suggests that  
 
opportunities for modern Afghan NGOs and traditional civil society organizations to 
contribute positively to peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts were largely squandered as 
a result of the international community’s focus on a Western neoliberal definition of civil 
society that did not necessarily fit the Afghan context, resulting in a circumscribed application 
that limited the breadth of local actors involved. 
 
There is some debate within Afghanistan about what the term ‘civil society’ really means, and about 
how traditional and religious components should be included (Winter 2010: 7), but generally the 
image of civil society in Afghanistan is poor, and was viewed particularly negatively in the early stages 
(Interview 22, 2014). One interviewee, working for German institute FES and based in Afghanistan, 
suggested that international donors “define a lot” regarding civil society, and that Afghans had little 
power to do things differently (Interview 21, 2014). Cramer (2009) argues that Afghanistan’s 
bureaucracy was further eroded by the high salaries provided by NGOs, which in some cases 
encouraged people to take lower skilled jobs in foreign organisations. Winter (2010: 7) conducted an 
extensive study of civil society in Afghanistan, and found that Afghan civil society actors have received 
“little consistent, substantial or helpful support,” and that donors were “at a loss” over how to support 
them. These factors highlight the lack of attention by international donors to more grassroots civil 
society actors, such as social movements. 
 
It seems that political opportunities may arise for those wishing to utilise potential allies within civil 
society or to use civil society as a channel to raise public awareness. However, it seems that civil 
society provides very limited opportunities for interacting with government. For example, the 
interviewee from FES suggested that there was very little dialogue between civil society and the 
government, and that where dialogue had occurred “it was probably always a bit forced by the 
internationals”, who told members of the government that there were civil society representatives 
that they had to listen to (Interview 21, 2014). It is difficult to assess whether the lack of engagement 
is due to a lack of will or capability, but another interviewee, former Director of the Foundation for 
Culture and Civil Society (FCCS), Timur Hakimyar, summed up what may be the simplest explanation 
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for the lack of engagement by the Afghan government: “they can’t even help themselves so can’t help 
us” (Interview 31, 2014). 
 
Civil society development has featured in a number of the international conferences on Afghanistan, 
particularly the London conference in December 2014 (Interview 32, 2015). Huge budgets were drawn 
up and one interviewee suggested that it marked a shift in Afghan civil society, which realised it had 
an audience and was increasingly active and professional. However, at the same time, the conference 
may also have led to smaller organisations being pushed out (Interview 21, 2014). Generally, 
international funding for civil society is expected to decrease with the military drawdown. Donors, 
particularly the EU, are, furthermore, changing their approach to funding, and are becoming 
increasingly interested in supporting Afghan civil society. This shift has been one of the key outcomes 
of the Tokyo conference on Afghanistan in 2012. Donors are becoming more likely to support projects 
with organisations which partner with Afghan NGOs (Interview 31, 2014). This is partly due to the 
increasing feeling amongst donors that little progress had been made so far, despite large amounts of 
money being put into civil society development (Interview 31, 2014). At the same time, the imminent 
funding decrease is prompting some organisations to seek alternative sources of funding in order to 
be sustainable without international funds. Some suggest that this independence will help these 
organisations, not only in terms of funding, but also in appearing to be ‘home grown’. As a result, it 
has been suggested that their influence and effectiveness may increase (Interview 23, 2014).  
 
New small-scale organisations, run by Afghans are also being created, keen to remain independent, 
and many include founders with experience in international organisations (Interview 31, 2014). This 
could begin to bring opportunities for movements by making independent organisations and 
grassroots groups more common, and could increase the credibility and of attention to other forms 
of civil society actors.  
 
There is already a very small but growing number of other organisations beginning to emerge 
independently, such as A3 (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014) and the ‘I See You’ campaign’, an anti-
corruption campaign organised by Peace Street Group volunteers (The Afghanistan Express 2014). The 
‘I See You’ campaign was funded by its activists in, as one explained, an attempt to demonstrate that 
“the initiative is anchored in society, and not only supported by individuals or the international 
community […] to be legitimate” (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014). However, it may be difficult for many 
organisations and groups to sustain themselves (Interview 21, 2014; Interview 30, 2014). Kazemi 
(2012), questions the potential for groups to be independent and inclusive, stating that it is very 
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difficult to achieve, and that most have either been politically instrumentalised or repeatedly 
subjected to political manipulation on ethnic, religious, ideological and other grounds, mainly due to 
their fundamental need for funding. 
 
The effectiveness of internationally supported civil society development has had mixed reports (see 
Winters 2010), and it remains to be seen whether any achievements that have been made will be 
sustained once funding decreases. Pessimistic outlooks on civil society commonly cite the lack of 
participation of women and young people, the urban-rural divide, which skews decision-making, and 
political, religious and ethnic divisions, which make collaboration difficult (Brookland 2013). Alongside 
these problems, the idea of volunteerism is weak (Interview 30 2014), as is social responsibility 
(Brookland 2013), which is in part, down to the economic and security situation, issues of trust after 
decades of conflict (Interview 21 2014), and a reliance upon international actors (Interview 30 2014).  
 
Despite this, there are signs that internationally developed civil society is having an impact and is 
increasingly influencing policy (Brookland 2013; Freedom House 2015a). Freedom House (2016) 
reports that approximately 274 international NGOs and almost 1,800 local NGOs were active in 2015, 
but also that threats, harassment and violence made it difficult for some NGOs to work and hindered 
the recruitment of foreign staff. The increased presence of civil society and the donor support provides 
potential opportunities regarding the allies and a potential, if only a limited channel of interaction 
with government. The general development of civil society has the potential to increase some 
opportunities for movements depending on their goals. Despite this, the possibility for some 
movements to gain allies, mobilise and take advantage of discursive opportunities on certain issues 
that international donors have given prominence too, particularly human rights and gender equality, 
have probably increased with the international funding of civil society. The way in which civil society 
has been developed in Afghanistan has ignored grassroots and movement activities, as found in the 
wider literature on civil society development and discussed in Chapter One. The small number of 
movements that exist suggests that a ‘demonstration effect’, encouraging further movement activity 
is unlikely (see Kitschelt 1986).  
 
Afghanistan’s new generation 
Internationally funded civil society may still provide opportunities for allies or opposition, as well as 
discursive opportunities on issues that movements and CSOs may also be concerned with, particularly 
in the areas of gender equality, human rights and youth issues, which have been the focus of many 
international donors (Nikolic 2014; Winters 2010). This is of particular interest here because 
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Afghanistan 1400, the case study in the following chapter, present themselves as a youth movement, 
and one which wants to promote youth participation. Afghanistan has a very young population, with 
70% of the population being under 25 years (Wilson Centre 2013), while unemployment in this age 
group is around 40% (Pegasus 2016). However, when people talk about Afghan youth, the ‘youth’ can 
be anything up to their mid-thirties (Hewad and Garret Johnson 2014: 2) and is often used to refer to 
people with what is seen as a progressive mindset, regardless of their age. For decades, young Afghans 
have left Afghanistan for better education and work elsewhere (Etehad 2016), but it seems that, 
increasingly, Afghan’s youth wants to stay and improve Afghanistan. This ‘new generation’, as it is 
often referred to, is demanding a greater influence on Afghanistan’s future, and wants to see the end 
of the old structures of governance (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014). The generational divide is becoming 
increasingly apparent as Johnson (2013: 168) argues, young Afghans have little time for the older 
generation, which insists on practices they are not familiar with.  
 
To date, there has been a lack of engagement by the Afghan authorities with Afghanistan’s youth. 
Lockhart (2012) claims that repeated surveys show that Afghanistan’s youth have demands similar to 
those made during the Arab uprisings in 2011 that is, for inclusivity and increased opportunities for 
young people. There have been some efforts by the government to engage, such as an Afghan National 
Youth Policy, presented in May 2013 that outlined legislative strategies to address youth issues after 
consultation with over 500 young people across the country (Wilson Center 2013). The government 
also made some moves to demonstrate a greater interest in youth activism and held a National Youth 
Policy Conference in June 2013 in order to create a framework to support youth initiatives.  
 
Most of the major political parties in the country have some kind of youth section and there are some 
other youth organisations orientated groups, such as the policy Afghanistan Analysis and Awareness 
(A3). The Jombesh-e Jawanan, the youth section of Abdul Rashid Dostum’s National Islamic Movement 
of Afghanistan party (Jombesh-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan) is a particularly visible example. Other 
youth groups include the Afghanistan Youth Parliament, which used to be supported by the UN and 
social organisations such as the National Coordination Centre of the Youth of Afghanistan (Markaz-e 
Hamahangi-ye Melli-ye Jawanan-e Afghanistan), its affiliate, the Network of Young Activists for 
Reform and Change (Shabaka-ye Fa’alan-e Jawan bara-ye Eslah wa Taqir) and the Union of the Youth 
of Afghanistan (Ettehadia-ye Jawanan-e Afghanistan), formerly a governmental institution, the Jirga-
ye Melli-ye Solh-e Jawanan-e Afghanistan (Afghanistan National Youth Peace Jirga) and the Islamist 
group the Institution of Young Muslims (Nahad-e Jawanan-e Mosalman) (inspired by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and provide education and social services). 
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Generally the Karzai government did little to encourage youth engagement in politics, proactively 
urging university students to keep out of politics. University students have historically been politically 
active in Afghanistan, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s (Hewad and Garett Johnson 2014). Student 
groups have been less active in recent years, and have struggled to maintain momentum and expand 
their reach across the country (Kazemi 2012). Despite this, there have been some signs of activity 
more recently, such as a hunger strike over university reform by 80 students in May 2013 (Brookland 
2013). An attack on the popular Lebanese restaurant ‘Taverna du Libnan’, in January 2014, prompted 
several youth action groups into action, organising actions against terrorism (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 
2014).  
 
The build-up to the 2014 elections also saw increased activity amongst young Afghans, particularly in 
Kabul. While many were very critical of the presidential candidates, the dominant message seemed 
to be calling people to vote. Rayhab, of Counterpart International, bluntly states, “[l]et’s not be naïve 
about the current reality”, “Afghan society is conservative and hierarchical,” making it difficult for 
young people to contribute meaningfully to policymaking and government reform (Wilson Centre 
2013). Hewad and Garret Johnson (2014: 1) argue that “the growth of subnational youth political 
organizations since 2001 is in many cases synonymous with the emergence of a civil society in 
Afghanistan,” and that Afghan youth see civil society organisations as “one route to political power.” 
This suggests that the increased activity by young people within civil society, and the attention from 
international actors, provides opportunities for those movements and CSOs working with and for 
young people, in terms of allies, mobilising activists and discursive opportunities.  
 
Conclusion 
The NATO intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and the subsequent state-building efforts have been 
conducted by international actors from a narrow set of states, most prominently the US, and some 
international organisations such as UNAMA. These actors have maintained a significant military 
presence and provided political assistance to domestic elites in an effort to democratise Afghanistan 
throughout the period of the new protectorate. These international actors have significantly 
influenced Afghanistan’s political system, and as a result have impacted upon the political 
opportunities.  
 
Although the international actors involved in Afghanistan have had an incoherent approach to civilian 
and military assistance, and some tensions in the approach exist, they do not represent the type of 
divisions that would provide political opportunities. International actors generally present a consensus 
160 
 
in relation to their overall goals, which are quite distinct from those of a number of domestic actors, 
such as the Taliban. The relationship between international actors and the Afghan government under 
Karzai, although positive initially, was strained. The differences in approach and goals between 
international and domestic actors demonstrated a lack of coherence between the two. This division is 
likely to provide more significant political opportunities than the divisions within either the 
international actors or domestic elite. 
 
The domestic elite in Afghanistan is divided, which would normally present political opportunities, 
however the absence of a consensus supporting democracy, conservative control among elites and 
the prevalence of patronage do not allow the kind of politics in which social movements flourish. Also, 
parties do not engage effectively, the differences between parties is negligible, and the capacity of 
the legislature is low, which are all factors that result in few opportunities to influence and interact 
with the government and parliament. 
 
Political opportunities were extremely limited in the period prior to 2006 due to high levels of 
insecurity, and the lack of focus by international actors on development. Opportunities have increased 
since that period due to the conduct of elections, an increasingly active civil society and the general 
increase in the openness of the state. International actors have been the driving force behind state-
building efforts, but these have been hampered by a number of factors such as insecurity, an often 
poor relationship with domestic actors, a weak civil society and corruption. These failings have 
contributed to constrained opportunities in some areas. For instance, the poor security situation 
makes it difficult for a variety of actors, including social movements and CSOs, to work outside of the 
capital, Kabul. 
 
There is little direct or indirect facilitation of movements by the government or international actors 
and there are few channels for movements to interact with, or influence elites. Despite the nature of 
the internationally funded civil society that has developed in Afghanistan, which largely ignores 
movements, the development of civil society may present the most fruitful channel for opportunities 
regarding allies and as a channel of influence. The increasing prominence of civil society generally, as 
well as the increasing political activism in recent years, particularly among Afghan youth, suggests that 
opportunities are increasing. There is no sign that the government are intentionally inhibiting 
movements but the broader repressive environment serves to limit political opportunities in 
Afghanistan. 
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CHAPTER SIX: AFGHANISTAN 1400 
 
This chapter features a case analysis of the second case study, Afghanistan 1400. Here, I seek to 
establish how Afghanistan 1400’s strategy was influenced by the presence of international actors in 
Afghanistan. This is assessed both in terms of the wider influences of international actors and in the 
ways political opportunities were influenced by international actors, which was considered in depth 
in Chapter Five. In the contextual analysis in Chapter Five I established that the presence of 
international actors in Afghanistan was extremely influential over domestic decision-making, which 
contributed to an increase in opportunities. However, these opportunities were still extremely limited 
in many areas. 
 
This chapter considers Afghanistan 1400’s formation in December 2012, its membership and growth, 
allies and tactics, covering the period from its formation until the beginning of 2015 when the data 
collection period ended. Therefore it is too early to judge the effects of recent developments within 
the National Unity Government, and the transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghan 
government. Given the lack of literature on Afghanistan 1400’s the majority of the information and 
perspectives on the movement come from the interviews conducted with members of Afghanistan 
1400, diplomats, and Afghan and international employees of civil society organisations. 
 
Formation 
Afghanistan 1400 officially launched on 6 December 2012, soon after NATO leaders had declared that 
full responsibility for security would be handed over to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. Initial talks 
about the possibility of forming a new and distinct movement had begun much earlier in 2011 and 
continued over several months. In the initial stages, the seventeen young Afghans, who became 
known as the founders, held talks about their vision, structure and what role the organisation should 
play. As word of these discussions spread, the group engaged with other interested young Afghans 
with common ideas and a similar, but in many cases, previously undiscovered desire to make a political 
or civic contribution (Interview 26, 2015). Others joined the discussions and so began the build-up to 
the launch of a potential platform for youth participation in a wide range of aspects of Afghanistan’s 
development. Founding member, and head of the Gawharshad Institute of Higher Education, Elham 
Gharji, said, “[w]e realised that a new generation of Afghans with leadership potential had come into 
being, scattered in various places, but which could be connected” (Kazemi 2012). A charter, which is 
still being worked on and improved, was produced as a result of these discussions and provides the 
basis of the agreement which new members sign when they join. Afghanistan 1400 sought to be as 
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democratic and inclusive as possible from the start. For this reason, during the months before the 
official launch, committees prepared drafts on future goals and the structure of the organisation, 
which were then discussed and voted on at general assembly meetings. This process was considered 
to be very participatory by many members (Interview 26, 2015; Interview 24, 2015). 
 
Afghanistan 1400 describes itself as a civil-political movement, “aimed at mobilizing and creating a 
political platform for the new generation of Afghanistan” (Afghanistan 1400 2012). It believes that this 
definition enables them to flexibly use a combination of both civil and political methods to change 
Afghanistan. At the time Afghanistan 1400 formed, many members had a background of experience 
in the civil society sector, whilst others had been, or wanted to become, politically active. Combining 
the two elements, Afghanistan 1400 feels that it represents a type of organisation that is rarely seen 
in Afghanistan (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 25, 2015). It also serves as a means of unifying the 
diverse membership. Afghanistan 1400 defines itself as a movement, and displays a number of 
features commonly found in movement definitions, as outlined in Chapter One. These include a 
collective identity, shared beliefs, and networks of informal interaction. However, as discussed in 
Chapter Two due to the organisational element and selective membership, Afghanistan 1400 
represents a civil society organisation. Later in the chapter I argue that this is, in part, due to the lack 
of opportunities for movements and therefore, the difficulties in operating as movement during this 
period in Afghanistan. 
 
The self-identifying as a movement is still an important feature of the organisation because it serves 
as a strategic effort to highlight to others that Afghanistan 1400 is a new and different type of entity 
relative to others active in Afghanistan, particularly political parties or NGOs. As outlined in Chapter 
Five, youth groups in Afghanistan tend to shy away from political parties as a form of organisation, 
largely due to the poor reputation of parties (Hewad and Garret Johnson 2014: 3). Hewad and Garret 
Johnson (2014: 7) studied Afghan youth politics and identified four types of organisations among the 
Afghan youth. Afghanistan 1400, of which Hewad is a member, was considered to be “established by 
the nation’s young political elite post-2001, which remains limited in size and reach and are chiefly 
concerned with driving policy at the national level” (ibid.: 7). Afghanistan 1400 was careful not to 
position itself as an opposition to the government or as a political party. When an article was posted 
on the Huffington Post website, which stated that Afghanistan 1400 was a party, those involved were 
keen to get it corrected as soon as possible in order to prevent members or an external audience 
getting the wrong idea about the its position (Interview 20, 2014; see Huffington Post 2014). 
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Since 2001, a great deal has changed for most young Afghans. Afghanistan 1400 member, Assad 
Nissar, feels that a generation was lost during the civil war (1978-2001), as many people were forced 
to leave the country, and, as a result of war, few opportunities existed for those who stayed (Interview 
28, 2015). Nissar argues that this has led to low expectations from and of this generation, and little 
capacity in regard to political and civil developments (Ibid). Now, Afghanistan has a very young 
population within a traditionally hierarchical society that has historically failed to engage with 
Afghanistan’s youth, as discussed in Chapter Five. Although there are still huge steps to be taken in 
Afghanistan’s development, the emerging new generation of Afghans in the post-intervention period 
have increasing opportunities, such as better access to education, and exposure to a wide range of 
influences from outside Afghanistan (Interview 24, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). 
 
Afghanistan 1400 has emerged from this context of huge change that has taken place in post-
intervention Afghanistan, taking advantage of some of the broad opportunities present since the 
intervention. The international presence has played a significant role in shaping the post-intervention 
context, particularly for Afghan youth, from ending Taliban rule to funding civil society projects 
focused on Afghanistan’s young people. Members of Afghanistan 1400 have personally benefitted 
from the gradually increasing opportunities available in areas such as education and employment. The 
organisation’s formation can be viewed as a reaction to these circumstances, coupled with members 
feeling a sense of duty in terms of paying something back to the country (Interview 20, 2014), 
recognising the potential to affect change, and their capacity to rectify the lack of opportunities for 
young people by giving them a voice (Interview 24, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). 
 
The existing, older, political generation consists of many former Mujahideen, warlords and members 
of the former communist regime. Afghanistan 1400 members argue that this older political generation 
possesses a certain mind-set and approach that is not beneficial to a younger generation of Afghans, 
who have a different outlook that is not reflected in the country’s current leadership (Interview 28, 
2015). These views of the political ‘old guard’ are salient features of the few analyses of the 
perspectives of Afghan youth, which argue that the attitudes of the older political generation are a 
limiting factor on youth participation and mobilisation, as outlined in Chapter Five (Hewad and Garret 
Johnson 2014; Larson and Coburn 2014). As a founding member, Haseeb Humayoon, argues, young 
people in Afghanistan are better connected than ever, with “new aspirations, new sets of values and 
a whole different frame about what they want in the country for themselves, [and] for their 
generation” (NPR 2013). Afghanistan 1400 has set out its own values as a “[b]elief in Islamic values, 
respect for the Constitution of Afghanistan, democracy, freedom of speech, gender equality, 
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pluralism, equality and meritocracy” (Afghanistan 1400 2012). It stresses its long-term outlook, which 
is intended to outlast the presence of international actors, and is reflected in the name, Afghanistan 
1400. The ‘1400’ relates to the next century in the Persian calendar, which is the year 2020 according 
to the Western calendar, and is intended to symbolise a focus on the upcoming century and to express 
hope for change. 
 
Goals 
Afghanistan 1400 has a wide variety of goals that apply to several areas of Afghanistan’s political 
development, but sees the involvement of the new generation as a key factor in the building of a more 
prosperous Afghanistan. Its vision represents its desire to encourage Afghan youth to be at the 
forefront of change in Afghanistan, believing that it is the responsibility of Afghanistan’s youth to take 
on the challenges facing Afghanistan, especially in the wake of the international military drawdown. 
Thus, its vision for the future of Afghanistan is as follows: 
 
A prosperous and democratic Afghanistan based on the rule of law, with responsible 
leadership, banking on her diversity, and buttressed by the energy, commitment and creativity 
of the new generation within political, social, cultural and economic spheres (Afghanistan 
1400 2012). 
 
Afghanistan 1400’s goals, designed consistently with this vision, are outlined below and reflect its aim 
to signify a break with the way Afghanistan has developed to date, and to ensure that things do not 
return to the situation of the 1990s (Interview 28, 2015).  
 
Afghanistan 1400’s goals (Afghanistan 1400 2012) are: 
- To create a national platform to mobilise and bring together the new generation; 
- To create opportunities for young citizens to have an influential and determining voice; 
- To depolarise politics in Afghanistan through encouraging understanding, moderation, and 
tolerance, and through institutionalising politics based on moderation and tolerance; 
- To depoliticise the civil service in Afghanistan; 
- To present a responsible and realistic perspective on Afghanistan in domestic and 
international debates; 
- To instil a culture of appreciation for the sacrifices and services of Afghanistan’s security 
forces. 
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Building on these stated values and goals, Afghanistan 1400 also seeks a modern government, 
constitution and Parliament in Afghanistan (Interview 26, 2015), and the themes of democracy, 
economic stability, the new generation, diversity and responsibility, recur throughout its goals and 
actions. The idea of Afghanistan’s youth taking responsibility for the future of the country is important 
to the organisation and is represented in its slogan, ‘our country, our responsibility’. Additionally, this 
makes the point that the younger generation should take responsibility for the future of the country 
in a way that older generations have failed to.  
 
The slogan also reinforces the message that lasting and sustainable change cannot be produced until 
the Afghan population acknowledges that it plays a primary role in addressing the challenges present 
in Afghanistan. During an interview, one member argued that the older generation often places blame 
for problems in Afghanistan upon others, usually other countries, foreigners within the country, or 
those who are considered part of the international community. They went on to say that the constant 
use of an external scapegoat allows Afghans to shirk responsibility, an outlook that they argue is less 
prevalent among the new generation (Interview 24, 2015).  
 
Several other members interviewed stated that the slogan represented an acceptance of the declining 
international presence. They argue that given this, Afghans must take on the responsibility of 
maintaining the advancements that have been made in the country, in order to achieve a prosperous 
future for Afghanistan (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 26, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). This highlights the 
mix of self-determination and responsibility that appears to resonate with a number of the goals put 
forward by Afghanistan 1400. It seeks to unify those who stand for the national interest and follow 
the constitution, opposing those who do not, an aspect of the movement that is discussed further 
below. This stance makes the organization less of an oppositional force and is another factor that 
contributes to the group’s status as a CSO. Their stance of supporting the government appears to align 
with some political leaders. As Rubin (2013: 305) explains, 
 
Afghans who have lived through the past decades are united in their anxiety over the fragility 
of the current trends of stabilization. Several leaders of political trends have stated in private 
that they are reluctant to form an opposition movement, because the government is simply 
too weak to tolerate it. Afghans have seen what unbridled division can inflict on their society, 
and one of their most important resources is the determination to resist the forces that may 
drive them back to violence. 
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Afghanistan 1400 is keen to see unity among those who support the Afghan constitution in opposition 
to those who do not. These groups and individuals, such as the Taliban, are perceived as threats to its 
vision of the future of Afghanistan. Afghanistan 1400 have carried out several activities to encourage 
resistance against extremism, and produced a statement on the opening of the Doha office of the 
Taliban. Another call for unity against these threats can be seen in a press statement released in 
response to the Afghan National Security Council, which had recently commented on a fatwa issued 
against the Afghan people by a religious scholar in Pakistan. The statement supported the Council and 
urged the government to make a statement that unifies “political forces against Pakistan’s 
interference” in Afghan affairs. It also suggested that the government should summon the Pakistan 
ambassador for an explanation, and it should invite representatives from the Afghan forces, political 
parties and, political and civil movements to discuss how to co-operate and proceed on the issue 
(Afghanistan 1400, 2013a). 
 
Initial talks about the formation of Afghanistan 1400 did not focus on the international presence, as, 
at that time, the military drawdown seemed a fairly distant prospect. However, as discussions 
progressed, the issue became more important, particularly as the drawdown drew closer and the 2014 
presidential elections were approaching, both of which signified a significant transition of power in 
Afghanistan (Interview 27, 2014). Members suggested in interviews that Afghanistan 1400 is a 
reaction to the ‘understandably unsustainable’ international military presence and extensive support 
from international actors (Interview 27, 2014). Others claimed that the international drawdown 
played a minor role in Afghanistan 1400’s formation, precisely because of the membership’s low 
expectations for international assistance in the long-term. Overall it can be argued that the impending 
diminution of an international presence indirectly contributed to the formation and outlook of 
Afghanistan 1400. The future withdrawal of international actors did present Afghanistan 1400 with an 
opportunity to make a break with the past. Afghanistan 1400 also saw the prospective withdrawal as 
a catalyst for Afghans taking responsibility and maintaining the progress made during the international 
presence. This underlying influence of the international presence, and its potential absence, on its 
strategy, gives one indication of how elements of Afghanistan 1400 has been shaped by international 
actors. 
 
‘Western’ goals? 
Some of the Afghanistan 1400’s goals and demands can be, and have been, viewed as overlapping 
with those of international actors in Afghanistan or being influenced by ‘Western’ ideas (Interview 22, 
2015; Interview 23. 2015). Afghanistan 1400 and international actors both support gender equality, 
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electoral reform and the peaceful transfer of power to the Afghan population (Interview 26, 2015). 
However, when Afghanistan 1400 put together its goals in writing, it purposely avoided the extensive 
use of language associated with the broad, Western-sounding goals of international actors in 
Afghanistan. For example, a conscious effort was made to avoid the rhetoric of democracy and human 
rights that is often used by those actors (Interview 20, 2014), so that while democracy is mentioned, 
Afghanistan 1400’s written agenda illustrates that it is keen to demonstrate that it proposes solutions 
that are both novel and that stem from Afghan influences. These efforts are largely down to members 
wanting to present Afghan solutions, but also because they feel that if they are too closely associated 
with international actors they will be seen as being influenced by them, something they are keen to 
avoid.  
 
Afghanistan 1400’s association with Western ideas in the eyes of the public seems to arise largely from 
the overlap in goals, and the fact that many members have studied or worked in Western states. Eqbal 
states that “[i]n the beginning, they [other Afghans] said that many of us were in the US so we must 
be CIA or brainwashed by the UK […] We will talk to internationals but we don’t want to give them the 
sense that they can influence us” (Interview 20, 2014). In most of the interviews, members of 
Afghanistan 1400 were adamant there was a distinction between their ideas and those of the 
‘international community’ (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 24, 2015; Interview 25, 2015; Interview 26, 
2015; Interview 28, 2015). One member said that Afghanistan 1400 definitely, and intentionally, has 
a different message to most other groups in Afghanistan, but members argue, that it should 
automatically be associated with “Western” ideas and values that are promoted by international 
actors in Afghanistan. Members are keen to stress that they are all Afghans and grew up with Afghan 
values. 
 
Another factor which may give the impression that Afghanistan 1400 is influenced or in line with the 
thinking of the ‘international community’ is its vocal critique of the Afghan government (Heinrich Böll 
Stiftung 2014; Interview 26, 2015). This type of criticism usually comes from international actors, 
particularly over corruption and often gains significant attention in the international and Afghan 
media (see Neumann 2015: 6; Gall 2006). Member, Gran Hewad, argues that publicly criticising the 
government, “to some extent put the reformist approach of Afghanistan 1400 and the ‘international 
community’ in line” (Interview 26, 2015). However, there are also some areas in which the movement 
are less ‘in line’ with international actors goals. For example, it is sceptical of peace talks with the 
Taliban, something that international actors have pushed: “[w]e are not willing to bring you [the 
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Taliban] in at the cost of compromising our constitution, our women’s rights, our democratic 
procedures and institutions”, said the first Chair of the organisation, Shaharzad Akbar (Druzin 2013). 
 
Many members stated that they were in favour of a continued international presence in Afghanistan, 
even though they believe that an international presence is not sustainable in the long term and is by 
no means the perfect solution. Shaharzad Akbar explained that:  
 
[W]e understand and we realise that security commitments will decrease. It means a smaller 
number of troops, and a possible decrease in aid. We understand that we Afghans need to 
take responsibility for ourselves and realise that international attention cannot be sustained 
indefinitely. What we think, however, is that we need a few more years of support to allow 
the shifts to happen in our political system (Anon 2013: 231). 
 
In Chapter Five, I outlined that there were a number of issues that became more prominent as a result 
of the presence of international actors, which had the potential to provide political opportunities for 
those concerned with those issues. Afghanistan 1400 has benefitted from these discursive 
opportunities that have arisen from the international presence, particularly in areas where it has 
promoted demands similar to those of international actors. One example of this is Afghanistan 1400’s 
attempts to address gender equality, a subject widely associated with international actors due to their 
efforts to promote the issue, and which had received little attention in Afghanistan prior to the 
intervention (see EEAS n.d. a; Morgan 2008; IRN 2002).  
 
Concerns have been expressed that progress made in the area of gender equality could be lost once 
the presence of international actors diminishes (Calfas 2015: 4; Bernard 2013; Peled 2010). 
Afghanistan 1400 also acknowledged the fragility of the achievements made in the areas of women’s 
rights and gender quality. It held an event on gender equality and discussed how the debate on gender 
issues could become an issue at the national and local level (Afghanistan 1400, 2013c). However, 
although addressing the same issue, members argue that Afghanistan 1400 is approaching it in a 
different way to that of international actors. Firstly, in terms of its organisational approach, 
Afghanistan 1400 stresses that it does not function as an NGO, it is not conducting projects for money, 
but instead trying to focus on the ideas (Interview 20, 2014). Secondly, it is attempting to address the 
issue in a way appropriate to Afghanistan, rather than the Western approach promoted by 
international actors.  
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Thus, despite working towards a common goal, Afghanistan 1400 attempts to find Afghan approaches 
to dealing with the issue of gender equality (Interview 24, 2015). It has held seminars and meetings 
on women’s rights and gender equality, and attempted to take a fresh look at the issue in the Afghan 
context in order to find a new and more appropriate approach. In early meetings members attempted 
to identify a common perspective and language for the way society and Afghanistan 1400 view the 
issue. For example, there are certain cultural commonalities across Afghanistan which Afghanistan 
1400 feel need to be acknowledged before establishing the best way to tackle the issue (Interview 20, 
2014). In this case, it is taking advantage of the increased attention to the issue as a result of the 
international presence, but at the same time wants to address the issue in an alternative way. 
 
Despite the efforts to distance itself from what are perceived as Western ideas, it appears that many 
see Afghanistan 1400 as having some association with ideas and goals promoted by international 
actors. Interviewees both outside (Interview 22, 2015; Interview 23, 2014) and inside the organisation 
(Interview 20, 2014; Interview 27, 2015) suggested that this perception seemed fairly widespread. The 
association with Western values, is probably fair to some degree; in fact one member stated that many 
of Afghanistan 1400’s ideas were clearly linked with what could be considered Western, and should 
not be seen as a negative (Interview 27, 2015). The perception may also be a side-effect of being a 
youth movement with progressive ideas in the emerging post-intervention period. A United States 
Institute for Peace (USIP) report, co-authored by a member of Afghanistan 1400, stated that 
progressive politics are often associated with young Afghans (regardless of age) by internationals and 
Afghans (Hewad and Garret Johnson 2014). Progressive politics in turn, appear to be viewed as being 
influenced by Western ideas. Therefore, Afghanistan 1400’s ideas are seen as more similar to those 
of international actors in comparison to other groups active in Afghanistan. One member argues that 
this puts the group in a distinct position that has both advantages and disadvantages, which it is still 
trying to assess (Interview 24, 2015).  
 
The issue of Afghanistan 1400’s perceived association with international actors does impact on the 
thinking behind its future strategy. This is in addition to the existing considerations over the language 
it uses, as well as its independence, which is discussed below. An association with international actors 
and the promotion of Western ideas is seen as a potential constraint on political opportunities to 
mobilise and succeed and has caused Afghanistan 1400 to consider its goals and demands, as well as 
how they are presented. On the other hand, it is clear that Afghanistan 1400 sees benefits to this 
association, and is taking advantage of the opportunities that this presents. 
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Membership and growth 
Afghanistan 1400’s membership is ethnically and religiously diverse, and members have varied 
professional backgrounds, a mixture that is rare for organised groups in Afghanistan. Members state 
that the different influences and backgrounds would not normally come together in Afghan society 
(Interview 20, 2014; Interview 24, 2015). This is a factor that members and those outside Afghanistan 
1400 feel distinguishes Afghanistan 1400 from previous youth initiatives and other organisations, 
which are often associated with a specific religion or ethnic group (Interview 24, 2015; Interview 28, 
2015; Kazemi 2012). Members have a mix of professional backgrounds too, and includes civil servants, 
former and current government officials such as President Karzai’s former spokesman,48 and the 
former chief electoral officer at the IEC, civil society activists, and people from the private sector. This 
list highlights some of the influential positions held by members, many of whom also possess extensive 
networks within and outside of these professions. The experience that some members already have 
of working within the system which they want to influence is viewed by members, and those outside 
Afghanistan 1400, as a useful asset to its potential to influence and promote its demands (Heinrich 
Böll Stiftung 2014).  
 
Although it is in some respects diverse, it does appear that most members have emerged from a 
similar class, and perhaps many could be considered to be part of a young elite with networks that 
give them an advantage in terms of accessing other elites and institutions. This influence via the 
members’ professions and networks has arguably provided Afghanistan 1400 with more opportunities 
to interact with a variety actors in Afghanistan than other available channels of interaction provided 
by political opportunities, which are otherwise quite limited. 
 
The majority of Afghanistan 1400’s members are well-educated, and many hold post-graduate 
qualifications. Interestingly, many outside the organisation perceive that a significant proportion of 
Afghanistan 1400’s membership has been educated abroad in Western institutions, a feature that 
some felt was a fairly widespread perception (Interview 22, 2015; Interview 23, 2014; Interview 27, 
2014). In reality, members estimated that between 10%-20% of the members have been educated 
abroad, while the rest had studied within Afghanistan, including the majority of founding members 
(Interview 28, 2015; Interview 20, 2014). A small number of members were part of a young leaders 
programme run by the German Institute, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Interview 21, 2014), within 
Afghanistan, which seems to be the only one of this type in the country (Interview 20, 2014). It was 
                                                          
48 The former spokesman’s involvement created a lot of attention initially but has since left the group as he was very involved 
in one of the presidential candidates’ election campaigns. 
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suggested that some of the more prominent members, with the most exposure to the media and 
international organisations, may have studied abroad, and this may have contributed to the 
generalisation (Interview 28, 2015). Also, these members often presented themselves as 
representatives of Afghanistan 1400, whereas those who were influential at the local level, often 
those educated in Afghanistan, are said to have taken less ownership (Interview 20, 2014). Despite 
the reality of relatively low numbers of Western educated members, the perception has both helped 
and hindered Afghanistan 1400, particularly with regards to mobilisation and potential allies, and 
feeds into the wider perception, discussed above, that it has Western associations. 
 
New members were recruited once some of the key aims and structure had been established by the 
founding members. Existing members were proud of its diversity, but at the same time wanted to 
ensure that the membership had common values and objectives, particularly during the early stages 
(Interview 20, 2014; Interview 24, 2014; Interview 27, 2014). Another reason for the deliberately slow 
membership expansion was a fear of becoming well-known for the ‘wrong reasons’, and of becoming 
‘tainted’ by one member's background. Members felt that other groups had failed due to their focus 
and dependence on particular individuals: “We want people to associate us with a mentality rather 
than a particular individual” (Interview 20, 2014). These concerns accounted for the selective 
membership process and structure of Afghanistan 1400, which sought to be as democratic as possible. 
These processes are intended to help keep focus on the organisation’s message, rather than on 
individuals, although it is not clear how effective this has been.  
 
It is also the case that the movement has benefitted from the prominence of some members such as 
President Karzai’s former spokesman, as it helped attract greater attention (Interview 21, 2014; 
Interview 25, 2015). A set of stringent selection criteria for members was established, and makes clear 
that members cannot have active membership of a political party, a criminal record, or be accused of 
any corrupt activity or other controversial associations. New members are briefed on the objectives 
of the organisation, and are asked to sign an agreement in accordance with its charter before officially 
becoming a member. The membership has continued to increase and by June 2014 there were around 
300 members. However, since then recruitment slowed, due to what could be considered a latent 
period during and after the elections in 2014, which is discussed further below. 
 
Allies 
As outlined in Chapter One, political opportunities may present different allies or opposition. In the 
case of Afghanistan 1400, there have not been cases of other groups or individuals actively opposing 
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it. The organisation has taken part in the activities and campaigns of other Afghan based groups. It is 
difficult to assess how Afghanistan 1400 was received more broadly, as there have only been a very 
limited number of sources in English that have discussed it; the assessment of its reception and 
potential allies is therefore drawn largely from the interviews conducted for this research, which 
provided anecdotal evidence and a useful insight into how it was received by the public and other civil 
society organisations. 
 
According to interviewees, Afghanistan 1400 has gained verbal support from a number of people and 
organisations, including both Afghans and internationals working in Afghanistan. Members felt that 
they received a positive reaction from Afghans and those employed by international actors, and 
gained significant media coverage, particularly at the time the organisation was launched. A 
declaration made by Afghanistan 1400 made recommendations on reforms of the electoral system 
and electoral bodies, which received particular attention from the local Afghan media (Interview 26, 
2015). Campaigns after the landslide in Badakshan and the incident at Kargha Lake also received media 
attention, and are discussed further below (Interview 27, 2014). Members felt that within Afghanistan 
the response to the organisation was good, and there was a lot of interest in several of their activities, 
particularly the meetings on gender equality (Interview 25, 2015). One international interviewee 
working in civil society felt that Afghanistan 1400 was “pretty well known in Kabul, not amongst the 
politicians because they don’t care very much about what the youth is doing but they are known 
amongst youth networks” (Interview 21, 2014). 
 
Many internationals, working for various international actors, had expressed their optimism about the 
formation of Afghanistan 1400 to members (Interview 21, 2014; Interview 25, 2015; Interview 28, 
2015). Many of the members have friends or colleagues working within international organisations, 
and felt that there was interest, support and trust in what they were trying to achieve, and members 
were often asked how things were progressing (Interview 25, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). Internationals 
who were not known to the group also expressed their support, particularly at various events. Those 
expressing support were not only those working within civil society, but also those in the private sector 
or those engaged in research in the country (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 28, 2015). Some embassy 
and international officials had contacted Afghanistan 1400 and asked how they could help, although 
at this point in time, members were concerned about the impact of such help on their reputation 
(Interview 20, 2014). According to Hewad and Garret Johnson (2014), this attention from international 
actors may have been somewhat predictable considering the features of Afghanistan 1400. Hewad 
and Garret Johnson’s (2014: 7) research into Afghan youth politics highlighted that Afghanistan 1400 
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featured in a subset of organisations that gained the most international attention due to the high level 
of education of members, its Kabul location, and the presence of members in the diplomatic 
community, government posts and international organisations and media. 
 
During interviews with members it became very clear that the reputation of Afghanistan 1400 was a 
key concern, which led to a cautious approach regarding who it is seen to ally with. The framing and 
perception by others is seen as key to the potential success of Afghanistan 1400. Members want to 
maintain a strong unified message representative of the group’s aspirations and is very keen to 
present itself as independent, distancing themselves from other influences, both domestic and 
international. Afghanistan 1400’s members firmly believe that the maintenance of independence is of 
major importance and a signifier of likely success. Afghanistan 1400 also feels that independence is 
another factor separating it from other organisations in Afghanistan (Interview 22, 2015; Interview 
24, 2015; Interview 28, 2015; Kazemi 2012).  
 
As explained in Chapter Five, many civil society actors and campaigns have emerged with international 
support, and while only a very small number have emerged independently, there is an increasing focus 
on independence and sustainability by various groups (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014). There is a small 
but growing number of independent civil society actors in Afghanistan, a trend that might increase 
with the declining presence of international funds. In line with this trend, Afghanistan 1400’s emphasis 
on independence is motivated by sustainability and the desire to avoid any kind of dependency, which 
it has seen causing problems for other organisations. Independence is also important to members, 
who feel that once they are associated with another organisation, it would be hard to lose that stamp. 
They also fear that this would hamper its ability to function as it likes. There is a strong feeling amongst 
members that any public or private money would force them to listen to certain voices. As Assad 
Nissar argues: “[t]his is our future, we don’t want to gamble it over receiving money from anyone. We 
can afford financing it and we have been doing it till now so we can do it in the future” (Interview 28, 
2015).  
 
Afghanistan 1400 is fortunate enough that its membership fees and members’ donations have been 
enough to resource its activities so far. Members pay a small, monthly membership fee of 50 Afghanis 
(around $1), and make contributions to specific events or campaigns if they can. At this point, there 
are no plans to take government or foreign funding, but funding may be sought from the Afghan public 
and businesses in the future. The desire for independence has led Afghanistan 1400 to turn down 
opportunities that arose from offers of support from international actors. It is thus strategically trying 
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to limit the any associations with international actors. This is done in order to protect its reputation 
and to prevent fuelling perceptions that it is somehow associated with Western actors and ideas, 
which could potentially constrain future opportunities. 
 
Tactics 
The tactics used by Afghanistan 1400 are varied and focus on raising awareness of issues stemming 
from its goals. It organises events, lobbies international and domestic actors, visits sites of Taliban 
attacks, and releases statements and declarations on a range of issues. Some of its activities to date 
have been conducted with other organisations, or have been part of a wider cause responding to an 
incident. Before the official launch, some members were involved in another campaign under the title 
Az Su-ye Jawanan-e Afghanistan (By Afghanistan’s Youth). This campaign included the distribution of 
posters and banners and online publicity showing support for the Afghan police and commandos who 
prevented attacks by insurgents on the parliament, embassies and the NATO headquarters in Kabul in 
April 2012 (Interview 25, 2015). Another event involved tree-planting and a memorial at Kargha Lake 
near Kabul, to show condemnation of a Taliban attack on a hotel in the area that resulted in the death 
of several civilians (Interview 25, 2015). One of Afghanistan 1400’s Facebook posts titled Where does 
Afghanistan stand? stated that this response was part of Afghanistan 1400’s aim “[t]o undo fear 
Afghanistan’s enemies seek to instil and shatter our people’s confidence” (Afghanistan 1400, 2015a). 
This was one of several trips and responses encouraging resistance to extremism. 
 
In April 2013, members of Afghanistan 1400 went to the western province of Farah after a Taliban 
attack on a court killed 50 people. They provided support to families and gave blood at the local 
hospital. In August 2013 it organised an event with other youth-run organisations to celebrate the 
victory of the Afghan national football team at the Asian Cup (Heinrich Böll Stiftung 2014). In 2014, 
members visited Badakshan, the site of a landslide; they gathered funds and aid to provide shelter, 
and asked people about their concerns and put these to the government (Interview 25, 2015). 
Afghanistan 1400 also had a campaign to encourage people to make blood donations for the 
Afghanistan national forces (Interview 25, 2015). It wanted to highlight the recent good performances 
of Afghan forces, as it felt they had not received enough support. These forces had also recently 
experienced their first major test without the support of international forces (Interview 27, 2014). This 
again highlights Afghanistan 1400’s use of the declining presence of international actors as a means 
of instigating action. 
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Afghanistan 1400 has a website in English, Dari and Pashtu, though this has not been updated recently, 
and it produces press releases which are distributed to the print media and TV. It also uses billboards 
and produces flyers. Facebook is used to provide updates of the movement’s activities and speaking 
events in Dari. Posts include announcements on internal election results, meetings on gender equality, 
press releases, and actions such as blood drives. Facebook is the most frequently used media, as it is 
viewed as the best method for the audience that the organisation wants to communicate with 
(Interview 20, 2014). Afghanistan 1400 also provides statements on relevant news issues, such as the 
opening of the al-Qaeda office in Qatar, Taliban assaults/victims of terrorism, the landslide in 
Badakshan, as well as the sporting success of the national football and cricket teams. While some 
members have attended protests, the organisation as a whole has not yet engaged in such activities 
largely due to its size and ability to mobilise. So far the other tactics used have been perceived to be 
a more effective way to achieve the organisation’s goals.  
 
International actors feature as one of the minor targets of Afghanistan 1400 as it is much more focused 
on the new generation of young Afghans and the Afghan government. Afghanistan 1400 has referred 
to the international community on several occasions, such as in statements on the elections, which 
made recommendations on how the international community could or should act (Interview 20, 
2014). Members have also meet with representatives of international actors such as embassy staff, 
NGOs and visiting delegations (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 26, 2015). These meetings are often 
organised at the request of the international actors who contact Afghanistan 1400 as part of efforts 
to gain a wider spectrum of views on a range of issues. During these meetings Afghanistan 1400 have 
advocated the continued international support of Afghanistan’s national security forces, for continued 
engagement in Afghanistan and support in strengthening Afghanistan’s institutions (Interview 20, 
2014). Members also attend seminars, conferences and meetings organised by international 
organisations with either a permanent or visiting presence in Afghanistan (Interview 26, 2015). 
Members have also travelled to Western countries, including the US and Denmark, to discuss issues 
with think tanks, policymakers and media outlets, those actors who may be influencing policy 
decisions on or for Afghanistan. On many of these occasions the group was approached by 
international actors to discuss its ideas. On a trip to the US in 2013 some members went to Congress 
and met with those in the State Department to discuss the opening of the Taliban’s office in Doha. 
 
Limited Opportunities 
Like other actors in Afghanistan, it is often difficult for Afghanistan 1400 to conduct some activities, 
and at times the security situation makes it impossible to arrange meetings. In Chapter Five, several 
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limiting factors for civil society and other political developments were outlined. Many of these factors 
are also limiting development, tactics and activities. For example, due to the insecurity in many part 
of Afghanistan it is much more difficult for civil society organisations and election organisers to work 
in areas outside of Kabul, as it is for Afghanistan 1400. The organisation has made attempts to reach 
out to provinces and rural areas outside of Kabul, engaging in nationwide campaigns across the 
country. However, the majority of the campaigns have been Kabul-centric. A few members of 
Afghanistan 1400 live outside Kabul and travel to meetings, but most are based in the capital 
(Interview 20, 2014).  
 
Afghanistan 1400 has also struggled to engage with Afghan youth outside of Kabul, who are less likely 
to be aware of it and its activities (Interview 25, 2015). It is noteworthy, however, that, despite this 
problem, there have been requests from other youth groups in the provinces for Afghanistan 1400 to 
visit (Interview 28, 2015). Members have also suggested that many of its ideas may be socially liberal, 
and therefore less likely to be accepted or appealing in more conservative, rural areas (Interview 25, 
2015). Member, Gran Hewad, also highlighted that extra resources are needed in order to fully engage 
in the provinces as it requires much more time and committed facilitators, both of which were in short 
supply. Hewad also stressed the lack of political or legal opportunities that support this type of activity 
in the provinces and that effective work in these areas requires a major investment in time and 
resources (Interview 26, 2015). 
 
Internationally funded civil society does not appear to have provided many opportunities as a channel 
for interaction for Afghanistan 1400, although a small number of members have benefitted from 
programmes run by international actors (Interview 21, 2014), and many members work or have 
experience working in internationally funded civil society organisations. These experiences are likely 
to have provided useful insights, experience and contacts that have been brought into Afghanistan 
1400. Also, Hewad and Garret Johnson (2014) have suggested that the increase in political activity 
among Afghan youth has occurred generally in line with the development of internationally funded 
civil society. Some members have been positive about some of the developments made in civil society 
and have expressed concern about reductions in funding for civil society organisations (Interview 20, 
2014; Interview 25, 2015). They also highlighted the need for civil society to be heard and, specifically, 
that civil should be allowed to participate in the forming of legislation relating to elections 
(Afghanistan 1400, 2013b).  
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However, there is scepticism surrounding the way civil society has developed. The prevailing feeling 
that came across in interviews with members is that, in general, civil society is project driven, and 
functions more like an industry in which there is money to be made. The type of civil society developed 
in Afghanistan fits with that described in Chapter One, i.e. a civil society that does not facilitate social 
movement activity. Despite the scepticism of many members regarding civil society development, one 
highlighted that without the international presence, Afghanistan 1400 would not have been able to 
conduct some of the activities it had, particularly on gender equality (Interview 25, 2015). In this 
instance, it can be argued that Afghanistan 1400 has benefitted from the international presence as a 
whole, as well as from the discursive opportunities that have been provided by the international actors 
pushing some topics that had been difficult to discuss. However, as a channel of interaction civil 
society provides little opportunities aside from the contacts members have established within civil 
society. 
 
The limited opportunities resulting from poor democratic development outlined in Chapter Five, and 
the type of civil society developed by international actors, do seem to be factors in Afghanistan 1400’s 
strategic choices and go some way to account for the reasons why it is not a social movement in its 
current form. Hewad (Interview 26, 2015) states that the lack of a proper parliamentary system, rights 
for political parties, or attention to the development of political parties, have all contributed to 
Afghanistan 1400 developing the way it has, with both civil and political aims, and with the intention 
of influencing electoral and institutional reforms. As institutional rules that could facilitate movements 
and channels of interaction with elites are lacking, it appears that most of Afghanistan 1400’s access 
to elites stems from the contacts of its members. 
 
There is also a lack of similar entities or movements in Afghanistan. Thus the ‘demonstration effect’ 
that the presence of movement can have on opening up opportunities, as discussed in Chapter One 
does not exist. Despite the desire to present a new and different entity in the form of Afghanistan 
1400, the lack of other similar entities has constrained its opportunities. Several members felt that 
there are very few reference points in terms of similar movements or groups in Afghanistan, past or 
present, and that members are, to some extent, working things out as they go along (Interview 24, 
2015). Membership of Afghanistan 1400 has been a new experience for most members (Interview 26, 
2015). This fits with the assessment of civil society provided in Chapter Five. Social movements do not 
really feature among Afghanistan’s traditional civil society and has not been a part of the civil society 
development that has occurred since the intervention. Reflecting on Afghanistan 1400’s the latent 
period after the elections, a statement by Afghanistan 1400 said that it was “not an exception to, but 
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rather at the forefront of overcoming the deficit of a culture of collective action in Afghanistan” 
(Afghanistan 1400, 2015a). 
 
The tactics that are used by Afghanistan 1400 also reflect the limited opportunities available via other 
channels, the lack of similar entities in Afghanistan, and the desire to influence domestic institutions 
using supportive rather than adversarial means. As outlined in Chapter Five, there are very few 
institutional rules that actually facilitate movement activity, and channels of interaction with elites are 
limited. However, as touched upon earlier, Afghanistan 1400 does take advantage of the influence 
and networks of its members, and while it is difficult to assess accurately how much access 
Afghanistan 1400 has to those it wishes to influence, it appears that the contacts that individual 
members provide have helped them overcome some of the limited opportunities. 
 
Elections 2014 
The presidential elections in 2014 were the focus of much of Afghanistan 1400’s activities following 
its launch in 2012. The focus on these elections both demonstrates the types of tactics used, and 
signified a set-back in Afghanistan 1400’s development, which appears to be largely down to the 
uncertainty that the prolonged election produced, as well as internal differences on the direction of 
the organisation. 
 
Afghanistan 1400 released statements (Afghanistan 1400, 2013b) and organised events highlighting 
the importance of the elections as the first election to take place after the international military 
withdrawal. The first chair of the movement, Shahrzad Akbar stated that,  
 
[w]e see the democratic transfer of power – the political transition – as the most important 
thing on the national agenda at this point. We have constantly been raising attention, 
encouraging participation, calling on our political leaders to encourage participation and 
mobilize voters, and also going out there saying that we are looking at agendas rather than 
personalities (Anon 2013: 227).  
 
Afghanistan 1400 also discussed the significance of the elections and lessons from previous elections 
(Interview 20, 2014), producing a document recommending changes that should be made to the 
electoral system, and strongly arguing that the elections were the only way of helping to ensure that 
this transfer was a success (Interview 20, 2014). In 2013, leaders of the group visited the US and tried 
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to encourage American officials to focus on helping to ensure that the April 5th elections were free 
and fair rather than concentrating on talks with the Taliban (Gienger 2013). 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Afghanistan 1400’s activities following its formation created certain 
expectations among both Afghans and those working in embassies and international NGOs. These 
observers believed that Afghanistan 1400 would be vocal in the run up to the elections, and many 
were keen to see who the organisation would support (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 21, 2014; 
Interview 28, 2015; Interview 30, 2014). Some interviewees outside Afghanistan 1400 said that they 
were a bit disappointed that it was not as outspoken as they had hoped (Interview 21, 2014; Interview 
30, 2014). However, after much debate Afghanistan 1400 had decided not to endorse any of the 
presidential candidates officially, and instead focused on encouraging people to vote and on the 
elections being fair and transparent. This was due, in part, to the inability to reach a consensus over 
which candidate to support (Interview 20, 2014). In addition, some aspects of the campaigning had 
become associated with a tribal approach, which was something that members felt was not good for 
the country (Interview 26, 2015). Members also believed that fraud was taking place, tarnishing the 
elections, and wanted to maintain their values and principles (Ibid).  
 
This decision not to support a particular candidate did create something of a division or polarisation 
within the organisation (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 26, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). Some members 
were disappointed at what they viewed as a missed opportunity (Interview 28, 2015). Afghanistan 
1400 nevertheless maintained its independence throughout the elections, although some members 
did go on to work on the campaigns of various candidates. Those who chose to support or campaign 
for a particular candidate had to sign a set of guidelines, and also meant they must resign from 
leadership positions (Interview 20, 2014; Interview 28, 2015). Some wanted to bring forward the 
political elements of the organisation and build the rest of the structure around that progress, not 
wanting to miss opportunities. Other members seemed happy and confident with the decision to 
remain neutral, particularly given the outcome of the elections (Interview 26, 2015). In addition, there 
was some feeling that members may have infused ideas and principles from the organisation into the 
election campaigns they worked with, using the same language as Afghanistan 1400(Interview 20, 
2014), and therefore effectively spread its ideas in that way. Afghanistan 1400 did continue its 
outreach activities, produce press releases and organised meetings with members of the Afghan 
government and electoral institutions (Interview 26, 2015). 
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Despite not supporting any particular candidate in the election, two members recently became 
ministers - Assad Zamir as Minister of Agriculture and Humayoun al Rasa as Minister of Commerce. 
Both are active within Afghanistan 1400, but had to stand as independent candidates as Afghanistan 
1400 is not a registered party. Although they were both members of Afghanistan 1400, they were not 
solely associated with it, and had other supporters and people lobbying for them. Both were already 
respected within the political community, and had previous government experience, so it is not 
possible to determine whether they benefitted from their links with Afghanistan 1400 (Interview 20, 
2014; Interview 26, 2015). It is also difficult to say whether or not the majority of the Afghan public 
will be aware of the relationship, but some members certainly see their selection as a demonstration 
of the qualities and advantages the organisation has (Interview 24, 2015; Interview 26, 2015). 
 
Since June 2014 Afghanistan 1400 has focused on internal restructuring and internal changes which 
have resulted in a period or dormancy regarding public activities and member recruitment, although 
discussions and meeting have been ongoing. Hewad and Garret Johnson (2014: 3) note that a focus 
on internal discussions is common among youth organisations, “[g]iven the conflict between inherited 
values and status quo power dynamics on one hand and contemporary events, education and 
exposure on the other.” The decision not to support an electoral candidate, and disagreements over 
the direction of the organisation played a significant part in the onset of a latent period, but there 
were also other events making it difficult for Afghanistan 1400 to operate.  
 
The political uncertainty surrounding the elections went on for six months, narrowing opportunities 
even further, as outlined in Chapter Five. A statement posted by Afghanistan 1400 on Facebook stated 
that “[w]hile our launch and aftermath were impactful and grandiose, we have also suffered 
unwanted pauses and were unaffected by the general political environment in the country” 
(Afghanistan 1400, 2015). The statement also said that the elections posed questioned for the 
organisation that were “bigger than its then two year-long presence on the scene could address” 
(ibid). It felt that many of its actions would risk being hijacked by the fact that the elections were 
ongoing, and could end up being associated with a particular candidate, which it had already tried to 
avoid (Interview 25, 2015). And finally, the poor security situation meant that it was difficult to 
organise events, and Afghanistan 1400 did not want to encourage people to attend events at which it 
could not guarantee the safety of attendees (Interview 25, 2015). 
 
Discussions, particularly since the elections, have involved the possibility of becoming a political party 
as well as a movement, and most of its upcoming activities are likely to focus on this. Many of the 
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members felt that the self-definition as a civil-political movement had hindered its ability to be more 
active during the elections (Interview 20, 2014: Nisser 2015): “On the one hand we were a civil and 
political movement so we couldn’t be involved […] We were also left disengaged […] [and we] should 
have allied with a candidate” (Interview 20, 2014). Another member felt that by attempting to act as 
a civil society organisation as well as a political one, Afghanistan 1400 ended up being considered a 
civil society group and therefore neutral. He, and others, felt that this left Afghanistan 1400 less likely 
to be listened to and that the its potential had been damaged due to the lack of a more political stance 
(Interview 26, 2015; Interview 28, 2015). Realistically the process of becoming a political party would 
take another two or three years, and perhaps longer. The decision to become a political party seems 
to have emerged largely from the perception of limited opportunities to influence in its current form, 
despite the reputation of political parties in Afghanistan. 
 
Conclusion 
Chapter Five outlined the extensive influence of international actors and limited availability of political 
opportunities. The way in which Afghanistan 1400 has developed clearly demonstrated both the 
influence of international actors and the limited opportunities for movement activity. Factors 
constraining Afghanistan 1400’s activities and ability to function as a movement largely stem from 
limited opportunities relating to the insecurity still present in the country, the difficulties in engaging 
outside of Kabul, the conservative control of elites, and the lack of similar entities. Afghanistan 1400 
has not been subject to intentional efforts by other to inhibit its activities, or repression, but there are 
few clear examples of Afghanistan 1400 benefitting from facilitation by international or domestic 
actors. With the exception of some international actors seeking out the opinions of those within 
Afghanistan 1400, most of the other opportunities it has taken up, such as the general development 
of civil society or the opportunity to lobby the government over elections, have been advantageous 
but in no way have these developments sought to facilitate this type of activity specifically. The lack 
of opportunities to influence government has influenced Afghanistan 1400’s tactics on a number of 
issues. The contacts and networks that the members of Afghanistan 1400 have, appears to be the key 
factor in countering the limited political opportunities. 
 
Although political opportunities are in many respects severely restricted in Afghanistan, the presence 
of international actors has nevertheless had a major impact on the context in which Afghanistan 1400 
operates, and it can be said that it effectively emerged from the broad opportunities that individual 
members had gained from the international presence, as well having taken advantage of the opening 
up of opportunities. However, the skeptical and often negative public perception of the West and the 
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international presence has also had some influence on Afghanistan 1400’s strategic choices, and 
contributed to its stance on maintaining independence, as well as the language it uses and the 
approaches it takes to dealing with certain issues. Despite the attempts to distance itself from Western 
ideas, Afghanistan 1400 has taken advantage of opportunities that arose as a result of the 
international presence, such as the opportunity to lobby international actors. However, overall poor 
levels of democratic development and high levels of insecurity have clearly affected the political 
opportunities available. These are both key areas that international actors set out to improve after 
the intervention and thus it could be argued that their state-building failures and insufficient levels of 
improvement in Afghanistan has substantially impacted on Afghanistan 1400’s strategy. The decision 
to become a political party, though in part down to the ambitions of members, also suggests that the 
post-intervention environment has not presented sufficient political opportunities for it to carry out 
the activities it set out to conduct as a movement. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have analysed the extent to which international actors influence political 
opportunity and social movement development more broadly within a new protectorate context. In 
this chapter, I draw together and discuss the broader findings that have emerged from that analysis. I 
do this by focusing on the influence of international actors on two levels. The first level involves the 
impact of the international presence on the availability of political opportunities. For this, I revisit the 
categories of the political opportunity framework, which were outlined in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
I then explore the findings of the contextual analyses of Kosovo and Afghanistan and reflect on the 
political opportunities found in each state. The second level is concerned with how political 
opportunities and international actors have influenced the two case studies more specifically. This 
involves a consideration and comparison of the formation and outlook, tactics and allies of 
Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 and the influence of international actors on their strategies. This 
two-layered analysis allows me to draw broader conclusions about how international actors can shape 
social movement development. 
 
International actors’ influence on political opportunities 
By focusing on the influence of international actors I do not intend to suggest that they are a unique 
shaper of political opportunities, or indeed of the case studies themselves. There are a number of 
other factors and actors that can, and do, affect the outcome of political opportunities and strategic 
decisions. These can emerge from different regional, historical and cultural settings, as well as the 
wide-ranging effects of the conflict and the intervention itself. The new protectorate context does, 
nevertheless, provide a new setting in which to analyse the influence of external factors on social 
movement development, and thus also provides new ground on which to apply a political opportunity 
framework. 
 
Applying the political opportunity framework to the two case studies has demonstrated that the 
influence of international actors was significant and contributed to the increase and constraint of 
opportunities in different areas. The extent and type of influence exerted by international actors 
fluctuated throughout the existence of both new protectorates. It also differed in each territory, 
largely due to the nature of the international presence being more extensive before independence in 
Kosovo and generally more assistive in Afghanistan.  
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One of the key findings from the analysis of the political opportunities available in Afghanistan and 
Kosovo was the existence of a very limited level of opportunities. Many of the factors limiting 
opportunities were a result of the new protectorate context, and as a result are highly likely to be 
found in other new protectorates. The level of opportunities was particularly low in the years following 
the intervention, and while both territories have seen opportunities opening up, the speed at which 
they have done so appears to be higher in Kosovo. The ongoing insecurity and poor democratic 
development in Afghanistan seem to be the most significant factors constraining opportunities. 
Political opportunities increased alongside the improved potential for the population to participate 
and voice its demands in the public sphere and political system. Opportunities have increased in both 
states, though more so in Kosovo, due to the gradual strengthening of civil society, and the 
implementation of elections. These factors are considered below within the sections considering each 
category of the political opportunity framework: openness, coherence of elites, facilitation and 
repression, and allies and opposition. Within these sections, I compare and contrast the political 
opportunities available in Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as the influence of international actors on 
them. Finally, I reflect on the political opportunity literature, outlined in Chapter Two, and analyse 
how my findings relate to those in the existing literature. 
 
Openness 
The political opportunity literature sets out a number of elements that contribute to the openness of 
the state, such as the capacity to compete for elite status, the potential to change laws and to 
participate in political opposition (Tarrow 1998; Kitschelt 1986; Tilly 1978). The literature also suggests 
that the more open a state’s political system is, the more opportunities exist (see Tarrow 1998; 
Clemens 1997; Koopmans 1996; Esman 1994; Tilly 1978; Eisinger 1973). The analysis of the 
opportunities available in Kosovo and Afghanistan supports this literature to some extent. Both 
territories had fairly closed political systems in the early years of the new protectorate, particularly in 
the period before the first elections took place, and both had very limited political opportunities as a 
result. Both states gradually opened up due to elections being held, and saw an increase in avenues 
for public participation as well as an increase in competition for elite status. However, despite the 
existence of these features, political opportunities in both Kosovo and Afghanistan remained low. 
 
My research has highlighted that although many of the features considered to contribute to an open 
state exist, many are not developed enough in order to serve as an effective means of facilitating 
movements. For example, the existence of elected officials that represent a different party to the 
government, does not necessarily constitute an effective opposition, which means that the 
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opportunities that could arise from the fragmentation of elites are less useful. The ineffectiveness of 
the opposition effectively constrains those opportunities to provide an ally that is likely to effectively 
influence the government. It was not until 2005 that something like an effective political opposition 
was formed in Kosovo (Freedom House 2006), and an effective opposition has yet to be seen in 
Afghanistan. There were also a number of cases of fraud during several elections in both Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, which also poses questions over the effectiveness of the electoral politics in both 
territories. There were a number of issues that hindered democratic development in both territories 
that are also commonly found in other new protectorates, such as the prevalence of corruption, 
patronage and insecurity. These findings highlight that although the features of a more open state 
may be visible, the effectiveness of those features must also be taken into account.  
 
The political opportunity literature suggests that the more closed a state is, the less responsive it is 
likely to be. This appears to have been the case in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The Afghan government 
was not responsive to the activities of Afghanistan 1400. Although the organisation was known among 
civil society actors, both international and Afghan, it was largely overlooked by the government 
(Interview 21, 2014). This lack of responsiveness from the Afghan government also applies to civil 
society actors more widely (Interview 21, 2014; Interview 22, 2015), and the channels of interaction 
between government and civil society as a whole are lacking. This appears to be more obviously the 
case for those organisations that are not put forward by international actors to interact with the 
government (Interview 21, 2014). Some representatives of international actors, did privately welcome 
the formation of Afghanistan 1400 and some offered to support it. However, the Afghanistan 1400 
did not accept support from international actors due to its desire to remain independent, 
demonstrating that the opportunity for potentially powerful allies is not always taken up (see Caruso 
2015).  
 
In Kosovo, neither international, nor domestic actors were responsive to movements. It did in fact 
take some time before either set of actors became responsive to civil society. In the case of 
Vetëvendosje, it experienced incidents of repression from domestic actors, such as the Kosovo Police 
(KPS), over which international actors had some authority. There were also occasions when 
international actors actually inhibited Vetëvendosje’s activities, as discussed below. Once 
Vetëvendosje had representatives elected to the Assembly, domestic and international actors did 
respond slightly differently to it. This was largely in relation to the elected representatives rather than 
Vetëvendosje as a whole. After the election success, Vetëvendosje did occasionally meet with 
international actors, though these have not been official meetings and the members of Vetëvendosje 
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felt that the attitude of the major international actors was the same as it had been prior to the 
elections. The success in elections did give Vetëvendosje a different status, in the sense that it had 
demonstrated that it had gained significant public support through democratic means, and that it 
could now engage in the political system as a serious player.  
 
New protectorates have proved to be an interesting context in which to assess the openness of the 
political system. In the political opportunity literature outlined in Chapter Two, openness is generally 
considered in reference to domestic state actors and focuses on the impact of the openness of the 
domestic state apparatus on political opportunities (see Tarrow 1998; Clemens 1997; Koopmans 1996; 
Esman 1994; Tilly 1978; Eisinger 1973). However, further analysis of the new protectorate context 
highlighted that international actors had an impact on the openness of the state. This was particularly 
clear in the case of UNMIK, which had extensive authority in Kosovo, and took on the role of a state 
authority. From an early stage in the new protectorate, UNMIK was gradually transferring powers to 
the PISG and democratic elections took place. This meant that the actions of both international and 
domestic actors were contributing to the level of openness of the state. When focusing on the 
influence of international actors on the level of openness, it was clear that UNMIK contributed to the 
closed nature of the political system. As discussed in Chapter Three, this was largely due to its 
executive powers and unaccountable nature (Pugh 2006; Visoka 2012). 
 
As my research progressed, it became clear that the broader influences of international actors should 
also be considered to impact on the degree of state openness, and not just that of an international 
administration. However, I found some aspects of the international actors’ influence difficult to assess, 
partly because influence is generally difficult to measure (see Lowery 2013; Tsui and Lucas 2013; Dür 
2008), and partly due to the lack of public information on how the influence of international actors is 
exerted. However, I argue that the elements of the international presence that affect political 
decision-making also play a role in the level of openness of the state and therefore on the political 
opportunities available. As a result, it can be argued that the extent of the influence of international 
actors on the political system requires further analysis in addition to that of the domestic state 
apparatus. This analysis needs to be incorporated into political opportunity frameworks that analyse 
territories with a heavy international influence, in order to fully gauge the openness of the state and 
the availability of political opportunities. 
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Coherence of elites 
The coherence of elites can have an impact on political opportunities in a number of ways. The existing 
literature on political opportunity highlights that fragmentation within the party system or division 
amongst elites is seen as a potential incentive for movements (Banks 2007; Tarrow 1998; Kitschelt 
1986). The somewhat amended political opportunity framework I developed and set out in Chapter 
Two suggested that there were three aspects of elite coherence that should be considered in relation 
to their impact on political opportunities: the coherence of domestic elites, the coherence of 
international actors, which effectively form another distinct set of elites, and thirdly, the coherence 
of international actors and domestic elites. I will revisit all three aspects here. 
 
Domestic elites 
In both Afghanistan and Kosovo much of the domestic elite attempted to maintain conservative 
control. This meant that elites attempted to keep power by maintaining the status quo, rather than 
encouraging change, which could have been beneficial to them, as found by Tilly (1978). This is similar 
to findings in the literature on post-conflict or fragile states (Banks 2007), in which power is likely to 
be concentrated among a small elite (McAdam 1982). The latter is likely to have a conservative 
approach to maintaining the boundaries of the political system (Walter 2002). This situation appears 
to be similar in new protectorate contexts due to the international influence and the recent, or in 
cases such as Afghanistan, the ongoing conflict.  
 
International actors have a significant influence on the domestic elites that they work with on 
developing a new administration and institutions. In a new protectorate, international actors generally 
prioritise stability and seek to work with the elite that will be the most stable option. This can influence 
the relationship between international actors and domestic elites, as we saw in the case of Kosovo. 
When it came to the issue of Kosovo’s status, in order to make progress an effort was made to 
promote some degree of consensus among domestic elites, as well as with international actors. In 
Kosovo and Afghanistan patronage is still pervasive and has an impact on the power held by elites. 
These local ties in Afghanistan make it possible for elites to exert their power in ways outside of the 
democratic system. These factors tend to override the political opportunities that are thought to 
emerge from fragmentation and division among domestic elites. As highlighted in reference to 
opportunities and openness, the analysis of the new protectorate context highlights that despite the 
appearance of division and fragmentation among the elite, a deeper investigation of elite interaction 
and interests should be conducted in order to establish whether these political opportunities really 
exist. 
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Much of the literature on political opportunities in relation to domestic elites discusses the potential 
impacts of election outcomes and the party system, i.e. the organisation and establishment of the 
most powerful elites in a democratic context. For instance, the literature suggests that the ideological 
leaning of a government is likely to result in a government being more responsive to movements with 
a similar ideological outlook (Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1995; Amenta and Zylan 1992). However, it is 
often difficult to categorise movements as being on the left or right of the political spectrum (Caruso 
2015). The two case studies had broad goals linked to the pursuit of self-determination. These goals 
do not fit neatly into a left-right spectrum. They are in fact quite different to the goals of those that 
may be pursuing policy change in a specific area, such as education or the health care.  
 
In Kosovo, both Vetëvendosje and the government were pursuing self-determination for Kosovo. 
However, they were doing so in different ways. While the government chose to work with 
international actors, Vetëvendosje saw international actors as an opposition, and a barrier to self-
determination. As a result, the attempts to present a somewhat coherent approach by international 
and domestic actors constrained opportunities for Vetëvendosje. This is expected in the political 
opportunity literature, which states that a division of elites is more likely to create opportunities than 
solidarity (see Banks 2007; Selbin 2006; Goldstone 2001, 1994; Tarrow 1998; Goldfrank 1994; Kitschelt 
1986; Skocpol 1979; Trimberger 1978; Gurr 1970). The case of Afghanistan 1400 however, presents a 
somewhat different scenario. Afghanistan 1400 have focused on engaging Afghan youth in politics 
and coming up with its own solutions and methods of presenting its ideas to the government. This 
stems from the lack of other channels and allies that could influence the government, either directly 
by Afghanistan 1400, or on its behalf. Therefore, the perceptions of political opportunities stemming 
from divisions within the elite have been less relevant to date. In fact, Afghanistan 1400 has 
occasionally advocated that elites, along with other groups, should unify together behind a particular 
cause or against a commonly perceived threat, such as the Taliban. This approach appears to override 
the issue of fragmentation and division within elites as the opportunities that may otherwise come 
from these factors are lacking. 
 
The contextual analysis of Kosovo and Afghanistan highlighted the relatively narrow spectrum of 
ideological stances among political parties, with research on political parties in Kosovo showing little 
difference in ideological stances, and that most parties can be considered to be on the centre-right 
(Democracy for Development 2014; Anderson 2010: 3). Given Vetëvendosje’s goals and the 
dominance of the centre-right stance of parties, the ideological leanings of government were unlikely 
to provide Vetëvendosje with many opportunities. After independence, Vetëvendosje’s goals 
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expanded and can be considered largely left-wing, which did not change the potential for 
opportunities in relation to the government. However, the lack of a left-wing option for voters and 
candidates in itself provided Vetëvendosje with an opportunity to participate in elections by providing 
candidates that represented a different position to the majority of the other candidates. The entry of 
Vetëvendosje into electoral politics was the most significant change in the dominance of centre-right 
parties in Kosovo. 
 
In Afghanistan, research also shows that there is little difference in the ideological and policy platforms 
of most political parties, which remain largely underdeveloped and indistinguishable (Freedom House 
2016; NDI 2011). Most candidates stand as independent candidates in elections and do not bring party 
associations into their campaigns. The lack of developed political parties, the narrow political 
spectrum represented in elections, and the broadly conservative control of elites in both Kosovo and 
Afghanistan all limit political opportunities. This is a situation is that is highly likely to be found in other 
new protectorates. 
 
The analysis of both territories also highlighted the potential that elections have to create political 
uncertainty and to lead to periods of instability that can hinder movement activity. In Kosovo and 
Afghanistan some elections were marred by incidents of fraud or the formation of a government was 
heavily delayed, events which appear to have constrained opportunities. For instance, Afghanistan 
1400 felt that the long period of uncertainty after the 2014 elections made it increasingly difficult for 
it to engage. This was due to the fear that a lot of potential activities would be viewed as a sign of 
support for one of the remaining two candidates. It was also difficult for Afghanistan 1400 to target 
and attempt to influence a government that was still not fully formed after six months, as was the 
case after the 2014 elections in Afghanistan. 
 
International actors 
In order to assess the degree of coherence of international actors, it was first necessary to assess who 
the key actors were, and then to determine the type and extent of influence these actors wielded. As 
explored in Chapter One, the international presence together with the activities of international 
actors, are often referred to as the ‘international community,’ by members of Vetëvendosje and 
Afghanistan 1400, the public, and a range of media and analysts. The analysis of Afghanistan and 
Kosovo highlighted how few states are actually involved in new protectorates. In both cases, the US 
took a leading role in the intervention and state-building efforts, particularly in the initial stages.  
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The analysis also highlighted several examples of disagreements among the international actors 
involved. As a result I thought it possible that fragmentation between international actors could be 
perceived as an opportunity. However, in the case study analysis, the lack of coherence among 
international actors did not appear to lead to either case study perceiving additional opportunities in 
this area. This may be because the disagreements were often related to the commitment of resources 
or a particular approach to the deployment of civilian or military assets, rather than about the goals 
and broad policies that were being promoted. All the international actors wanted to see security, a 
reduction in violence, and the conduct of free and fair elections. When it comes to more specific 
infrastructure projects or development policy areas, certain states or agencies tend to take up projects 
that are of particular interest to them, and which they approach within the broader promotion of 
human rights and democracy. This does however leave little potential for divisions that could generate 
political opportunities. The broad overarching goals and approach of the international actors and their 
association with the ideals of the ‘international community’ were a more prominent feature than the 
disagreements among international actors. This is demonstrated by the fact that both case studies 
tended to target the ‘international community’ as a whole. For instance, Afghanistan 1400 would 
address the ‘international community’ in statements that made recommendations to a variety of 
bodies. Vetëvendosje also targeted the international presence as a whole whilst carrying out direct 
actions and making statements directed at specific institutions or actors when relevant. 
 
International actors and domestic elites 
Despite the lack of perceived opportunities in relation to the coherence of international actors, the 
findings of my research demonstrate that the relationship between international actors is extremely 
important when analysing the availability of opportunities. In fact, the coherence between the two 
often created, constrained, or increased opportunities to a greater extent than the coherence of one 
set of elites did. The new protectorate context contains two quite distinct sets of elites. Although 
either set is unlikely to be homogenous, the relationship that international actors have with domestic 
elites, particularly those they seek to work with, can have an effect on a number of political 
opportunities, particularly in the areas of facilitation, repression and allies.  
 
In Kosovo, most of the public and the political elites were grateful for the NATO intervention into the 
conflict between Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians. The international actors’ broad goals of 
democracy and human rights were also generally welcomed. Most domestic elites were keen to work 
with international actors, viewing their support as the best way to gain independence. This meant that 
Vetëvendosje’s opposition to the international presence was likely to impact upon the potential for 
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allies among domestic elites, as well as the potential for its demands to be heard by domestic actors. 
Therefore, the coherence of domestic and international actors resulted in limited opportunities for 
Vetëvendosje.  
 
In Afghanistan, the response to the intervention, the presence of international actors and the 
promotion of democracy and human rights was much more mixed than it was in Kosovo. Given 
Afghanistan’s geopolitical position and its cultural history, the goals of the international actors 
represented a much starker change for Afghanistan than it did for Kosovo, which as a result has led to 
a greater distinction between international actors and the domestic elite. The relationship between 
international actors and domestic elites has been much rockier in Afghanistan than in Kosovo. These 
factors also help to explain why some perceive elements of Afghanistan 1400 to be ‘Western’. For 
example, when Afghanistan 1400 is critical of the Afghan government it is put in the same camp as 
international actors because it is known for criticising the government. This association has both 
increased and constrained opportunities for Afghanistan 1400. It increased its appeal to those who 
also support claims that may be similar to those made by international actors, but it constrained its 
efforts to present Afghan solutions, or to assert its independence from other influences. 
 
Facilitation and repression 
The types of interactions between movements, civil society more broadly, and government can 
influence the ease of access for new claims and interests to be aired within the decision-making 
process. In Chapter Two, I highlighted a number of ways in which government or international actors 
in a new protectorate may facilitate movement activity. This includes the development of civil society, 
the presence of institutional rules (Kitschelt 1986), the facilitation of particular actions and the 
freedom of action, the creation of a favourable image, and, the supply of finance or facilities (Marx 
1979). In Kosovo and Afghanistan, it was difficult to find any examples of the facilitation of movements 
generally, or in relation to the case studies.  
 
Although there was not a direct focus, the presence of institutional rules and civil society development 
did have the potential to facilitate movement activity. However, during the analysis of Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, it became clear that the institutional rules that might benefit movements were virtually 
non-existent in the first few years of the new protectorates but did increase to some extent 
throughout the new protectorate period. However, even when potentially relevant legislation was 
passed, the implementation and enforcement was often slow and the public and officials may not 
have been aware of the new rules for some time. This is another example of the apparent presence 
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of opportunities, which does not correspond to the opportunities that are actually available. 
Legislation that could help movements may have been put in place but the poor implementation or 
awareness of it still constrains political opportunities. 
 
While much of the literature on political opportunities concludes that movements benefit from the 
expansion of political opportunities (see Jenkins and Perrow 1997; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Voss 
1993; Tarrow 1994, 1996; della Porta 1996; Oberschall 1996), some scholars have argued that 
movements can also benefit from constrained opportunities (Suh 2001), repression (Lipset 1983; 
Barkan 1984; Kimeldorf 1988; Marks 1989; Brockett 1995) and threats, which can actually galvanise 
movements (Caruso 2015; Gamson and Meyer 1996). Several authors have concluded that activists 
are most likely to succeed when government policy appears to be particularly hostile and institutional 
mechanisms appear to be closed (Meyer 1993b; Schlzman and Tierney 1986; Smith 1996; Staggenborg 
1991).  
 
The two case studies responded differently to constrained opportunities and Vetëvendosje did 
experience some repression and attempts by international actors to inhibit its activities. Some 
international actors made derogatory public statements that damaged the image of Vetëvendosje to 
some. It also experienced a degree of repression from domestic actors and, arguably, international 
actors that had authority over the Kosovo Police and UNMIK police. Vetëvendosje claims to have 
experienced repression at protests, and in the form of harassment and arrest of its activists 
(Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Vetëvendosje 2010d). Sources external to the movement, including 
international organisations and interviewees, suggested that, on some occasions, the response to 
Vetëvendosje’s activities was repressive and, in some cases, over the top (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; 
Freedom House 2007). These responses to Vetëvendosje’s tactics have also served to inhibit its 
activities. For example, the house arrest of Albin Kurti that some thought to be politically motivated 
(see Clark 2008; Freedom House 2008; Gashi 2007; Amnesty International 2007) served to discredit 
Vetëvendosje’s leaders and divert its attention and resources towards defending itself and its image, 
rather than using its energies to focus on its goals. 
 
The political opportunity framework outlined in Chapter Two suggested that a repressive response by 
state authorities would be somewhat expected due to Vetëvendosje’s goals and tactics, which sought 
fundamental change and were therefore seen as a potential threat to stability by international actors 
(see Kaidanow 2009a). Even after Vetëvendosje participated in elections, protests continued to result 
in clashes with the authorities and Assembly members have been arrested. The response to 
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Vetëvendosje’s tactics and the repression it experienced, have had varying effects on its appeal. For 
instance, in February 2007 when two protestors were killed by rubber bullets shot by UNMIK officers, 
many thought that sympathy and support for Vetëvendosje increased (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; 
Interview Nine 2014, Interview Ten 2014). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the images of 
clashes with the police at other protests put many people off Vetëvendosje’s activities, even if they 
might have had some sympathy with its goals (Interview Nine 2014; Interview Ten 2014). Many 
interviewees did for example perceive the turning over of EULEX cars by Vetëvendosje activists as a 
step too far (Interview Six, 2014; Interview Nine, 2014).  
 
Afghanistan 1400 did not experience attempts by others to inhibit its activity, nor did it experience 
the same type of repression as Vetëvendosje. This is not least due to its organisational nature but also 
because its goals and tactics were unlikely to cause such a response. However, it can be argued that 
some of the goals and tactics used by Afghanistan 1400 emerged from a repressive environment more 
broadly and explain its development as a CSO and not a social movement. The insecurity and the 
threat caused by the Taliban made aspects of Afghanistan 1400’s tactics difficult to conduct at various 
times, particularly outside of Kabul. The organisation favoured a collaborative approach in its efforts 
to influence government and often encouraged different entities and the government, to unite in 
order to resolve a particular problem. This aspect of Afghanistan 1400’s outlook resulted in goals and 
tactics that would not threaten the government, and so, state repression was unlikely. This represents 
a key difference between the case studies, which both acted within a context of extremely limited 
political opportunities. Vetëvendosje’s response to the lack of opportunities was to use tactics of mass 
protest and direct action, while Afghanistan 1400’s tactics encouraged collaboration. However, the 
main similarity in both responses to the lack of opportunities was the decision to participate in 
elections.  
 
Elements of the repressive environment found in Kosovo, and more so in Afghanistan, were due to 
threats perceived by the case studies, and in some cases also by the state and other domestic actors. 
For Afghanistan 1400, these threats came from the Taliban and the external influence of other states, 
particularly Pakistan. For Vetëvendosje, threats were considered to come from international actors 
and Serbia, which were seen as obstacles to its goals for itself and Kosovo as a whole. Thus, both case 
studies were galvanised to some extent by threats, as expected in the existing political opportunity 
literature (Caruso 2015; Gamson and Meyer 1996). However, the origins of these threats have come 
from sources other than the state, which is the usual actor of consideration for political opportunity 
frameworks (see Kriesi et al. 1995). 
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Suh (2001) states that social movements can actually be positively affected if fewer opportunities are 
perceived. In a sense, both case studies have responded to the lack of opportunities available and 
have managed varying degrees of success as a result. Afghanistan 1400 seems to have attempted to 
make the best of the few political opportunities available, which has led it to develop and strategise 
in the way it has and resulted in its limited outreach. The latent period that Afghanistan 1400 has 
entered and its decision to participate in elections are also, in part, due to the perception of 
constrained opportunities. Vetëvendosje also adjusted its tactics in response to the limited 
opportunities available. The constrained opportunities contributed to the use of protest to express 
the lack of influence on the decision-making process, as found by Caruso (2015). But ultimately 
Vetëvendosje did choose to participate in elections in order to exert greater influence. The two case 
studies do not provide a uniform finding on repression or the perception of threat. It is however clear 
that the repressive context in Afghanistan and the repression and inhibiting actions against 
Vetëvendosje shaped the opportunities and therefore the strategies of both cases, albeit in different 
ways. 
 
Civil society development 
The discussion in Chapter Two suggested that civil society development could result in civil society 
providing a channel for social movements to interact with government, and the potential for allies. 
International actors spent significant resources on funding and developing civil society in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan and there are a lot of similarities in the way in which the internationally funded civil 
society developed, as well as in the effects on social movement activity. The increasingly active nature 
of civil society and the opening up of debate broadly benefited both case studies. However, in both 
territories the form which civil society took and its weakness did not provide an effective means for 
the case studies to interact with or influence government. It also appears to have contributed to the 
side-lining of social movement and independent grassroots activity more broadly. 
 
Donor-funded civil society often focuses on issues of importance to the international actors providing 
the funding, which does not always result in the funding of issues that are of most importance to, or 
most needed by, the local population. In some instances these issues may not be issues that are that 
prominent in domestic discourse or within domestic civil society. Some obvious examples of this arose 
in both case study analyses. In both cases there was some focus by donor-funded civil society on youth 
issues. International actors heavily promoted the issue of gender equality and women’s rights in 
Afghanistan (Nikolic 2014; Winters 2010). Women’s rights had not been a prominent issue prior to the 
intervention and there are concerns that a decrease in funding and attention from international actors 
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would result in the loss of any gains made in this area (Calfas 2015: 4; Bernard 2013; Peled 2010). In 
Kosovo, donor-funded civil society focused heavily on the issue of minority rights. This had been a 
prominent issue prior to the intervention in relation to the Albanian minority in Serbia. However, 
minority rights within Kosovo had not been a salient issue prior to the intervention (KSCF n.d. b). The 
analysis of both states finds that the space for these issues to be discussed was opened up by the 
international presence, providing opportunities for those concerned with these issues. These 
opportunities also raise the potential for allies within the international actors that could be lobbied or 
collaborated with. 
 
The introduction or renewed focus on certain issues also occurred outside the realm of civil society 
development. Some issues were mentioned in the rhetoric of international politicians or development 
bodies. In this sense, the presence of international actors can be said to introduce a new cultural 
component to the political opportunities that may be available. The cultural component of political 
opportunities has been acknowledged by a number of scholars after criticism that cultural influences 
had been overlooked by early political opportunity literature (see Koopmans et al. 2005; Ferree et al. 
2002, Gamson and Meyer 1996, McAdam 1996). In both Kosovo and Afghanistan, international actors 
play a role in shaping the cultural setting, not only in political terms by implementing democratic 
institutions, but also by influencing issue areas relating to democratisation more widely. It is 
questionable how successful international actors are in engraining these cultural aspects in new 
protectorates. Several scholars have already highlighted that democratisation is often somewhat 
limited to technical aspects such as elections and voting rather than cultural factors (Scott 2007). The 
impact of this cultural component of the international presence on political opportunities and social 
movements warrants further research. 
 
The analysis of civil society development in Kosovo and Afghanistan has confirmed the findings of 
Coelho (2012) who argues that international practices are “informed by neoliberal understanding of 
the state and the politics of international statebuilding” which created a “largely apolitical NGO sector 
that has legitimized the political status quo rather than serve as a vehicle for transforming state-
society relations” (Coelho 2012: 1). My case study analyses also support the wider discussion on civil 
society development in Chapter One. The framing of civil society by international actors in new 
protectorates is different to the way it is discussed within traditional discourse of liberal modernity 
(see Chandler 2013). In both Kosovo and Afghanistan the organisations funded by international actors 
are largely focused on non-contentious issues of concern to international actors, such as those which 
educate or advocate inclusive principles or for a pluralism of political identities such as youth and 
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women (see Chandler 2013 and Belloni 2008). Less attention is paid to holding the government to 
account and there are few projects likely to cause contention between civil society and the 
government or international actors.  
 
Civil society has developed in a way that many scholars have noted elsewhere, which has resulted in 
a professional and bureaucratised civil society, with donor dependent NGOs being the dominant entity 
(see Smith 2015; Lynch 2013; Choudry and Kapoor 2013; Paffenholz 2009; Aksartova 2009; Alvarez 
2009; Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009; Rajagopol 2003). This confirms the development of a more 
depoliticized civil society (see Bridaux and Kurki 2014; Chandler 2013; Esteves, Motta and Cox 2009) 
and has resulted in other actors being side-lined (see Vogel 2016; della Porta 2014; Pouligny 2006; 
Veltmeyer 2004; Kasfir 1998). Both case studies have actively tried to position themselves as 
something different to this form of civil society and do not want to be associated with the 
development of NGOs and internationally funded organisations. The case of Vetëvendosje also 
demonstrates that social movements are side-lined and demonized by international actors if they are 
deemed as spoilers or ‘uncivil’ and do not adhere to the type of civil society those actors wish to 
develop. Afghanistan 1400 appears to be a ‘civil’ element of civil society and has been seen in a 
positive light by several representatives of international actors. However, the case study analysis of 
Afghanistan 1400 highlights the difficulties in maintaining independence from international actors in 
terms of funding and the ability to distinguish itself from the discourse of international actors. 
 
Allies and opposition 
The presence of potential allies or opposition within the elite is another important factor that can 
influence political opportunities (Giugni 2007: 55; Schock 2005: 33-34; Tarrow 1998: 79). The presence 
of international actors itself provides an additional set of elites to consider in terms of allies and 
opposition. This proved to be an important consideration in the cases of Vetëvendosje and 
Afghanistan 1400. It was clear that international actors did provide both allies and opposition directly, 
and also influenced other potential allies and opposition for both case studies. The allies and 
opposition specific to the case studies are discussed in the following section. Here, I focus on the allies 
and opposition available more generally in both states. 
 
Existing research has considered social movements and their relations with international actors, in the 
form of institutions (Parks 2015; Sikkink 2003), but much of this considers the ability of transnational 
movements to influence policy at the international level (Wylie 1999). The majority of studies tend to 
focus on the issue of globalisation and the discussion on global civil society (Tarrow n.d.; James and 
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van Seters 2014; Karides, Smith and Beckers 2008; della Porta et al. 2006; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; 
Tarrow 2005). There is, however, no existing literature that covers the relationship between social 
movements and international actors working within the same state. The findings of this research 
highlight that the closed nature of the international actors working within new protectorates limit the 
potential for allies within international actors. The international funding of much of civil society within 
both new protectorates meant that international actors also had some influence over the potential 
allies or opposition that may be found in civil society. As discussed above, the issues that donor-funded 
civil society focused on can provide allies for those concerned with the same issues. However, the 
non-contentious nature of this part of civil society largely ignored social movement and grassroots 
activity and limits the potential for allies, particularly those focusing on different issues to those of 
donor-funded organisations. 
 
The presence of other movements and counter-movements was also cited as having the potential to 
affect the mobilisation opportunities and strategy of a movement (see Meyer and Staggenborg 2007; 
Kurzman 1998; Kitschelt 1986). There were no direct counter-movements to Vetëvendosje and the 
presence of other movements, or similar entities, was low in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In the case of 
Vetëvendosje it was clear that it was building on a history of movement activity, particularly in relation 
to the independence issue. It can be said that there was a historic ‘demonstration effect’ that could 
have encouraged Vetëvendosje (see Kitschelt 1986) though there was little other social movement 
activity in the post-intervention period. As explained above, the way in which donor-funded civil 
society developed led to grassroots movements and activism being overlooked. It appears that this 
type of activity seems to have declined in the post-intervention period, for a variety of reasons, such 
as the post-conflict context and the introduction of a donor-funded civil society. 
 
Influence of international actors on movement strategy 
The strategies chosen by Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 are quite different. Some of these 
aspects are down to the differing nature and structure of the two entities but still highlight the ways 
in which the international presence might influence social movement development. Differences can 
be observed in the structures of each case, in the tactics employed, in the allies utilised and in the 
relationship with domestic and international actors. However, similarities can be seen in the way 
international actors have influenced both case studies, yet their strategic decisions often took 
different paths. Here, I briefly outline the key features of Vetëvendosje’s and Afghanistan 1400’s 
strategy, including their formation and outlook, tactics and allies. These features were established as 
prominent aspects of strategy in Chapter Two, and formed the basis of analysis of Afghanistan 1400 
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and Vetëvendosje in the case study chapters. Following a brief overview of both case studies, I 
compare and contrast these features and then consider the findings regarding the influence of 
international actors in order to determine the extent of the influence and to draw conclusions from 
both case studies. 
 
Vetëvendosje 
Vetëvendosje emerged from its predecessor, the Kosovo Action Network (KAN). The KAN had been 
active since before the conflict with Serbia and had carried out a range of actions against what it 
considered to be the occupation of Kosovo by Serbia. After the conflict the KAN became more 
marginalised and began opposing UNMIK (Lemay-Hébert 2013: 93) by using direct action, 
demonstrations and through collaboration with grassroots organisations across Kosovo. The KAN 
gradually transformed into Vetëvendosje, which officially launched in June 2005. Vetëvendosje was 
led by the well-known political prisoner Albin Kurti, who had worked for the former head of the 
political wing of the KLA. Vetëvendosje continued to oppose UNMIK using similar tactics and allies to 
those utilised during the KAN’s existence. 
 
During the pre-independence period, Vetëvendosje’s main goal was self-determination for Kosovo, 
and all of its demands could be related to this. Vetëvendosje opposed the international administration 
and other aspects of the presence of international actors as it considered it an obstacle to gaining self-
determination. Vetëvendosje vocally opposed the status process, facilitated by the UN and 
negotiations with Serbia. As well as its opposition to UNMIK, Vetëvendosje opposed other aspects of 
the international presence as well as the PISG, due to the heavy influence of international actors on 
these institutions. 
 
After the declaration of independence, Vetëvendosje’s goals expanded to cover a wider range of 
political issues at the national level, and in recent years it has become well known for its anti-
corruption stance. Two years after independence, Vetëvendosje participated in elections whist 
continuing its existing activities against government decisions and the continued international 
presence in the form of EULEX. Vetëvendosje saw participation in elections as an opportunity to 
broaden its repertoire given that Kosovo’s domestic political institutions were now fully under Kosovar 
authority. Vetëvendosje won around 13% of the vote in 2010 and 2014.  
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Afghanistan 1400 
Afghanistan 1400 officially launched on 6 December 2012, soon after NATO leaders had declared that 
full responsibility for security would be handed over to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. It intended 
to serve as a platform for youth participation across a number of aspects of Afghanistan’s 
development. It claimed that the new generation of Afghan youth should be at the forefront of 
tackling the challenges facing Afghanistan and that Afghans needed to take responsibility for the 
future of their country. Afghanistan 1400 employed a variety of tactics and largely focused on 
awareness raising through the organisation of events, the release of statements and through lobbying 
international and domestic actors. 
 
Afghanistan 1400 has grown gradually and its membership includes a variety of religious, ethnic and 
professional backgrounds. This distinguishes it from the majority of other groups in Afghanistan, which 
are often associated with one of these features. Afghanistan 1400 has been critical of the Afghan 
government but seeks a more collaborative approach to achieving its goals. It has often advocated 
that various stakeholders in Afghanistan should unite in order to achieve success and oppose those 
who do not work in Afghanistan’s national interest.  
 
The Afghan presidential elections in 2014 became a focus for Afghanistan 1400 soon after its launch. 
The organisation tried to highlight the importance of the elections and encouraged young Afghans to 
vote. Despite the focus on the elections, its activities slowed over the election period due to its 
decision not to support a particular candidate. The length of the elections and the long period of 
political uncertainty as a government was being formed, led to an extended latent period. During this 
time Afghanistan 1400 continued to discuss how best to approach a variety of issues and took the 
decision to form a political party, which, will function alongside its existing activities. 
 
Formation and outlook  
Afghanistan 1400 and Vetëvendosje formed for quite different reasons but the influence of 
international actors can be seen in the formations of both. Broadly both emerged within the post-
intervention context, which presented new opportunities and constraints. More specifically both 
formations were galvanised by either the threat of a prolonged international presence or by the threat 
of an expected decline in the international presence. Thus, the influence of international actors played 
a role in the formation of both case studies, though in quite different ways. Both were, perhaps 
inevitably, affected by the sheer presence of international actors and the political change that resulted 
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from that presence. Vetëvendosje’s formation came as a direct response to the international presence 
while Afghanistan 1400’s formation came as this influence was declining. 
 
In the case of Vetëvendosje, the threat of a prolonged international presence galvanised members of 
its predecessor, the Kosovo Action Network (KAN) to form a new movement in order to better tackle 
its goals. Vetëvendosje saw the aspects of the international presence as an obstacle to its demands 
for self-determination. International actors formed one of Vetëvendosje’s key targets for actions and 
a clear oppositional stance was taken from the beginning of Vetëvendosje’s existence. In contrast, it 
was the declining presence of international actors that encouraged some to form Afghanistan 1400. 
The military drawdown shaped aspects of the organisations outlook, in the sense that its founders 
believed the time had come for young Afghans to take responsibility for Afghanistan and that efforts 
should be made to uphold the achievements that had been made during the period since the 
international intervention. 
 
The above findings on the formation of both case studies demonstrate the more direct influence of 
international actors. However, it is also possible to say that, more broadly, both Vetëvendosje and 
Afghanistan 1400 emerged in post-intervention environments, which had been shaped by 
international actors. The fact that it was several years after an intervention had taken place when 
Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 formed suggests that opportunities may have increased enough 
for members to perceive that a movement was a viable means of enabling political change.  This does 
appear to be more the case in Afghanistan, than in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje was able to build on the 
activities of the KAN that had formed several years earlier. Vetëvendosje was fighting for an issue, 
which had been prominent among Kosovar Albanians for decades. Afghanistan 1400, on the other 
hand, emerged from the changing nature of post-intervention Afghan society, which saw the opening 
up of opportunities for, particularly young, Afghans. However, in this case, it appears that Afghanistan 
1400 developed into a CSO rather than a movement, as a result of some of the limited opportunities 
both political and cultural.  
 
It is also possible to say that the formations of both case studies occurred at a time when a threat was 
perceived. In the case of Vetëvendosje, the threat of a prolonged and extensive presence of 
international actors in Kosovo and the failure to deal with the status issue in a satisfactory way 
prompted its formation. In the case of Afghanistan 1400, the threat was perceived from the declining 
international presence and the potential for the achievements made since the intervention to be lost. 
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This further suggests that the international presence itself contributed to the Afghanistan 1400’s 
formation. 
 
Interestingly, both case studies have sought to position themselves as distinct entities to political 
parties and internationally donor-funded NGOs. A significant finding in this context is that both felt it 
necessary to define the type of entity they want to be perceived as, in order to be distinguished from 
others. This self-identification as a movement and an alternative to other entities has been successful 
for Vetëvendosje. The tactics it employed, particularly demonstrations and direct action, are widely 
associated with movement activity. Vetëvendosje’s name actually includes the word movement, 
which helps to distinguish it from other entities. Vetëvendosje also benefits from a history of 
movement activity commonly associated with the Kosovo Albanian struggle for independence. On the 
other hand, Afghanistan 1400 presents a more unusual entity in Afghanistan. In fact, only few similar 
organisations have existed since the intervention.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Six, though Afghanistan 1400 self-defines as a movement, it also demonstrates 
a number of characteristics that are less common to social movements. This includes the small and 
somewhat selective membership process and the lack of protest as a tactic. The interesting aspect of 
this self-identification as a movement is the need to position itself as an alternative to other entities, 
which in this case, is perhaps more important to the organisation than adhering to the characteristics 
traditionally associated with a movement. This is, in part, due to the very low level of political and 
cultural opportunities for movement activity and the repressive context found in Afghanistan. This is 
demonstrated by the members concern about maintaining a reputation of independence and the 
feeling that the types of tactics employed are the most effective at the moment.  
 
Both case studies have clear goals that focus on political change at the national level. Vetëvendosje’s 
early demands stemmed from its goal of self-determination. Within months of Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence Vetëvendosje expanded its goals to cover a wide range of salient political issues at 
the national level. Afghanistan 1400’s goals were broad and over-arching from its formation, aimed at 
engaging the new generation of Afghans and tackling the political challenges facing Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan 1400’s goals also contain an element of self-determination, due to its demands for 
Afghanistan’s youth to take responsibility for the country’s future and to unite with others in order to 
promote the national interest against those that do not (i.e. those who do not abide by the 
constitution). It also wants to ensure that any progress that has been made since the fall of the Taliban 
is maintained.  
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The way in which Afghanistan 1400 approaches the issue of self-determination and national identity 
clearly contrasts with Vetëvendosje’s approach. The existing literature on nationalism and state-
building states that efforts to state-build often encourage “mobile[s]ation processes in ideology, 
politics and sentiment” (Seifert 2014: 239). Both cases studies have mobilised identity in different 
ways, though Afghanistan 1400’s appears to differ with the existing literature on nationalism in state-
building contexts. The case of Vetëvendosje demonstrates its mobilisation of identity via its use of 
ethnic and nationalist claims, which it also links to the presence of international actors. Vetëvendosje 
can be considered part of the backlash against external actors, which is expected to occur in relation 
to the policies of international actors on identity (Schwandner-Sievers 2013; Stroehle 2011). This can 
be seen as a part of a wider backlash that results from the legitimacy dilemma that international 
administrations often suffer from (Lemay-Hébert 2009).  
 
Interestingly, the goals of both case studies affected their position in relation to international actors, 
which influenced their strategies. For Vetëvendosje, its approach to self-determination in the pre-
independence period was very different to the approach taken up by international actors. However, 
it attempted to use the language of the ‘international community’, often referring to democracy and 
self-determination in the same way international actors have done. Vetëvendosje wanted to 
demonstrate that it was speaking the language of international actors and that its demands were in 
line with the goals that the international actors should (in theory) be aiming for. In doing so, 
Vetëvendosje also sought to highlight the mismatch between the type of policies and values 
associated with the international community and the reality that was being implemented in Kosovo. 
 
In Afghanistan 1400’s case, a number of its demands focused on similar areas as the goals of 
international actors, the reason why some have perceived the organisation as ‘Western’. Even in its 
very early days, it was conscious that it wanted to represent Afghan solutions to Afghan problems and 
did not want to be associated too strongly with international actors. When Afghanistan 1400 set out 
its vision and goals, it was careful to use language that demonstrated this, and not fall in with the 
discourse of human rights and democracy that is associated with the international community. These 
strategic decisions by both case studies highlight the types of responses to the indirect influences of 
international actors and their goals of democratisation. 
 
Allies 
The allies each case study has utilised also demonstrate stark differences in strategy. The presence of 
international actors clearly provided a new set of potential allies and also impacted upon the potential 
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for other allies and opposition as a result of their own allegiances and influences. It is difficult to assess 
the extent of this influence though some assumptions can be made. For instance, the opposition to 
the international presence by Vetëvendosje is highly likely to have had some influence on other 
potential domestic allies who were keen to work with international actors. The perceptions and 
positions, which both case studies took towards international actors also influenced other aspects of 
their strategies. The stance taken towards international actors also had repercussions in terms of 
public perceptions of both Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 and the potential allies that might be 
available to them. 
 
Neither of the case studies has received financial assistance from international or domestic actors and 
both feel that maintaining the independence is a key feature for success. Both feel that external 
support would jeopardise their status. However, they did collaborate with a few small grassroots 
groups and campaigns and had some allies within official institutions. Many of the other organisations 
that Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 collaborated with were also independent grassroots 
organisations that have emerged from domestic civil society. Both case studies appear to have 
collaborated with internationally donor-funded civil society to a far lesser extent.  
 
The choices of allies appears to stem from some scepticism from members towards donor-funded civil 
society. Also, as explained above, many of the goals of the case studies are not addressed by donor-
funded CSOs or at least not in the same ways. This in turn limits the potential for suitable allies. Each 
of the case studies had some political allies with the potential to carry their demands into institutional 
arenas (Giugni 2007: 55), though these have been limited. Members of Afghanistan 1400 felt that 
some of their ideas were incorporated by some of the campaigns run by candidates in the lead up to 
the 2014 elections. This was often the result of members working on these campaigns. The lack of 
powerful allies within the institutional arena is also likely to have encouraged both case studies to 
enter electoral politics. 
 
The positioning by both case studies and their desire to maintain independence has also had an effect 
on potential allies. The stance taken by each of the case studies towards international actors also had 
the potential to affect their relationships with other entities and on public perceptions. Afghanistan 
1400’s attempts to distinguish it from Western ideas, which are associated with international actors, 
were at least partially a result of the negative perception held by some of the population, that Western 
ideas are foreign, alien or unwanted. Although it is difficult to gain evidence of widespread public 
perceptions, anecdotal evidence suggests that many Afghans perceive the international actors to have 
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disappointed and not met their expectations and failed to deliver on promises made. As a result, 
Afghanistan 1400 tried to place emphasis on the Afghan roots of its vision, goals and methods, rather 
than the similarities between its goals and those of international actors. 
 
In contrast, Vetëvendosje’s oppositional stance towards international actors was not a salient feature 
of widespread public opinion. There had been riots and protests against UNMIK and a lack of 
discussion over Kosovo’s future status in the early years of UNMIK’s presence. However, the 
population was generally supportive of international actors due to the intervention itself and the 
general desire among Kosovars to become a stable state with a European and Western outlook, and 
hopes for future EU membership. Domestic elites also took a view that the support of international 
actors was necessary if Kosovo wanted to gain independence, a view which much of the public 
accepted. According to Vetëvendosje, this led to some perceiving Vetëvendosje to be anti-Western, 
anti-American and even pro-Russian in some cases. The Kosovar population was also largely content 
with the broad goals put forward by the international actors, with the exception of the status issue, 
which took a long time to be resolved. Broadly, the public and elites were in favour of democracy and 
a political future that looked similar to that established in Western Europe. In contrast, there was no 
such consensus among the population or the elites concerning the implementation of democratic 
governance in Afghanistan. 
 
The oppositional stance towards international actors taken by Vetëvendosje did lead to tensions with 
international actors, which also had an impact on Vetëvendosje’s strategy. It appears that, before 
Vetëvendosje participated in elections, there was little by way of direct contact between it and 
international actors. In fact, it felt that the repression it experienced was linked to the international 
presence. It also felt that its views were largely ignored by international actors. Vetëvendosje was 
negatively perceived and portrayed by international actors, which also appears to have influenced the 
opinion of others. For instance, the majority of the domestic elite was keen to work with international 
actors and was unlikely to want to associate with Vetëvendosje due to its stance towards international 
actors, even if it had agreed with some of Vetëvendosje’s demands. This limited the opportunities for 
it to gain allies and influence in the domestic realm. The lack of powerful allies may have impacted 
upon the choice of Vetëvendosje’s more radical tactics. The situation for Vetëvendosje has altered 
slightly since its election participation, and it now has meetings with representatives from 
international actors, albeit usually in unofficial settings. Members of Vetëvendosje feel that this stems 
from the acceptance of some international actors, that Vetëvendosje does have public support and 
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must therefore be taken more seriously, especially since it now has democratically elected 
representatives in the Assembly. 
 
In contrast, Afghanistan 1400 presents a supportive, if critical, approach to international actors. 
Representatives from international actors who are aware of its activities view Afghanistan 1400 in a 
positive light. Members often meet with representatives from international actors in formal and 
informal settings and seek to maintain a good relationship. It received offers of more direct support 
but declined this, as members did not want to be seen to be influenced by international actors. This 
indicates the limited potential of international actors as allies in some cases (see Caruso 2015). 
Although some international actors appear to be a logical choice of ally for Afghanistan 1400, some 
members suggested that the wider impact of the Western presence, and the perception of 
international actors within the population could have a counteracting effect on its strategy. The 
findings in relation to the influence of international actors on potential allies and opposition highlights 
that the influence is not only direct in the sense that international actors may choose to support or 
oppose particular movements or CSOs, but also indirectly. This indirect influence can occur as a result 
of the domestic elites that international actors work with, as well as via the promotion of particular 
agendas. 
 
Tactics 
From an early stage, Afghanistan 1400 developed a detailed and democratic structure with a very 
selective membership process. Vetëvendosje had a much more fluid structure and a bigger, more 
inclusive membership. Afghanistan 1400’s tactics have been dominated by less contentious lobbying 
efforts, statements, visits to the sites of Taliban attacks, and meetings, all attempting to raise 
awareness of issues of concern to the organisation. While also attempting to raise awareness through 
the use of its communication outlets, Vetëvendosje has organised demonstrations and carried out 
direct actions. These factors also highlight the different ways in which social movements, SMOs and 
CSOs function. However, both case studies do have similar broad targets for their demands in the form 
of domestic institutions, international actors, and the general population. Vetëvendosje has expanded 
its presence in the form of offices and activities outside of the capital Pristina, while Afghanistan 1400 
has found it more difficult to engage outside of Kabul, largely due to resources and security concerns. 
Generally, both have been most active in Kabul and Pristina. 
 
The analyses of both case studies suggested that the tactics used emanated, in part, from the political 
opportunities that were available to each of them, as touched on already. Both suggested that the 
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tactics they chose were justified by the lack of opportunities, although they emerged in quite different 
ways. While Vetëvendosje felt that it would not be heard without the use of mass demonstrations, 
direct action and a more adversarial approach, Afghanistan 1400 preferred to use less contentious 
tactics, taking advantage of its members’ contacts and networks. 
 
A key finding from the case study analyses is the decision by both case studies to enter electoral 
politics. The decision to expand their repertoire and participate in elections has demonstrated a 
significant shift in strategy. This raises interesting questions about when and why movements and 
independent CSOs, form parties in new protectorate contexts. While Vetëvendosje became a party in 
2010, members of Afghanistan 1400 are still discussing how and when it will become a party. As 
mentioned above Vetëvendosje was keen to present itself as a different entity to others operating in 
Kosovo, particularly the internationally funded NGOs. This was in part due to a perception among 
members that these organisations were largely ineffective and associated with a particular way of 
working. Interestingly, when Vetëvendosje decided to enter institutions it remained insistent that it 
would also remain a movement. This move arguably makes it an SMO, perhaps as part of a wider 
movement. Members feel that even the term ‘movement’ signifies dynamism and represents an effort 
to demonstrate that Vetëvendosje would continue its activities as before. However, political parties 
claimed to be confused by their status and often asked Vetëvendosje in an accusatory way what type 
of entity it was (Interview One 2014). 
 
Afghanistan 1400 was quite conscious of positioning itself as a different entity to those already active 
in Afghanistan. Some its members took a similar view of internationally funded civil society as 
Vetëvendosje, despite many members having worked for internationally funded organisations and 
advocating the ‘civil’ elements of the organisation. Some members perceived civil society 
organisations to be project based and questioned the implementation of projects in some areas. 
Afghanistan 1400 attempted to sit between a political and civil society entity and felt that defining 
itself as a ‘movement’ was the best strategy to carry out its goals. Before the decision was made to 
form a political party, which only happened after a lot of deliberation, Afghanistan 1400 did not want 
to appear as an opposition to the government or to be seen as a political party. This stands in contrast 
with Vetëvendosje, which, due to its tactics and opposition to the institutions in Kosovo, was unlikely 
to be thought of as a political party. This has similarities to Goldstone’s (2003: 3) findings that many 
protest movements self-identify as ‘outside of’ and ‘opposing’ established parties and the political 
system “to avoid the taint of cooperation or excessive compromise”. This does appear to be the case 
for Vetëvendosje as it wanted to appear outside of the new political system due to the control by 
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international actors. After six months of deliberations over becoming a party, Vetëvendosje registered 
as a citizen’s initiative. By registering as a citizen’s initiative, rather than a political party of coalition, 
Vetëvendosje is not formally a political party but a group of citizens. It went on to win 13 and 14 seats 
in the 2010 and 2014 elections respectively, as well as winning the mayoral election in Pristina in 2014. 
 
Although not a party yet, Afghanistan 1400 has had at least two members who stood and gained seats 
as independent candidates in the 2014 election. However, the two candidates are not considered 
direct representatives of the organisation as at the time of the elections, Afghanistan 1400 was not 
yet registered as a party, and both candidates had other affiliations. However, Afghanistan 1400 now 
regards these elections as demonstrative of the potential for success it could have in fielding its 
candidates in elections. As discussed in Chapter Five, the majority of election candidates in 
Afghanistan stand as independents as the party affiliation is not seen as a great advantage to 
candidates. However this could be an important factor in the future for organisations like Afghanistan 
1400. The majority of parties in Afghanistan are underdeveloped and present a fairly conservative 
approach. If Afghanistan 1400 forms a party, it will be presenting a very different platform in 
comparison to the majority of the over 70 other parties registered in the country.  
 
Interviews with members from both case studies demonstrated that they felt that they would have a 
greater impact by participating in elections. The findings of both case study analyses suggest that part 
of this perception stems from the limited political opportunities available in both states. Election 
success is seen as a means to gain further channels of interaction and influence, which are otherwise 
limited. For Afghanistan 1400 it does not seem that international actors played a direct role in this 
decision, which largely stemmed from frustration with the limited influence the organisation has had 
in its current form. 
 
For Vetëvendosje, the decreasing presence and influence of international actors over domestic 
institutions was seen as a new opportunity. Thus, along with Vetëvendosje’s desire to increase its 
tactical repertoire, the decreasing presence of international actors and Kosovar sovereignty over its 
own governance played a role in this decision. In theory, Vetëvendosje could have registered to take 
part in elections before the international actors had less authority over domestic institutions. 
However, it had not perceived this as an opportunity before, due to its opposition to the international 
actors’ authority over the institutions. New opportunities arose once Vetëvendosje had participated 
in elections. It felt that other actors, including international actors, had to take it more seriously given 
that it had some electoral support. Winning seats in the Assembly has provided Vetëvendosje with a 
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new arena for it to air its demands. A number of other smaller parties, which include some prominent 
civil society activists, have now become part of Vetëvendosje. 
 
There is a long history of social movements becoming political parties (Caruso 2015; Johnstone 2012; 
Goldstone 2004; Tilly 2004a, 1986; Glenn 2003). Goldstone (2003: 4) argues that in the US and 
Western Europe political parties and social movements have become “overlapping, mutually 
dependent actors in shaping politics, to the point where even long-established political parties 
welcome social movement support and often rely specifically on their association with social 
movements in order to win elections.” This has been seen in the case of the Republican Party in the 
US and the religious right (Green et al. 1998). In Afghanistan and Kosovo, movements are not 
established forces in this sense and there are few, if any, movements that collaborate with parties in 
this way. The existing nature of political parties and the prevalence of patronage appear to play a large 
role in this. The potential for overlap between movements and parties seemed small, hence the 
development of Vetëvendosje and to some extent Afghanistan 1400, regarding electoral politics. 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of both case studies has demonstrated the different types of influence that international 
actors can have on the strategic decisions of social movements and independent CSOs in new 
protectorates. Applying the altered political opportunity framework has demonstrated that the 
influence of international actors was significant in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and contributed to the 
opening up and constraint of political opportunities in a range of areas. The extent and type of 
influence exerted by international actors fluctuated throughout the existence of both new 
protectorates. The key difference found in the extent of the international influence in each territory 
was due to the presence of an international administration in pre-independence Kosovo and a more 
assistive international presence in Afghanistan. The key similarity in both new protectorates was the 
limited level of opportunities despite an increase in comparison to the pre-intervention period. 
 
Both Kosovo and Afghanistan had fairly closed political systems in the early years of the new 
protectorates, but both began to open up as democratic institutions strengthened and elections took 
place. UNMIK operated in a closed way during the pre-independence period in Kosovo, demonstrating 
the need for international actors to be analysed in relation to the openness of the state, and resulting 
political opportunities. The relationship between international actors and domestic elites was found 
to have a greater effect on opportunities for both case studies, than the coherence within either 
domestic elites or international actors. There was no direct facilitation of movement activity by 
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government or international actors in either Kosovo or Afghanistan. In both territories, institutional 
rules are weak and internationally donor-funded civil society has developed in a similar way, which 
ultimately ignores movement activity. The development of civil society has provided some broad 
possibilities for facilitation but overall it does not serve as a very effective channel for interacting with, 
or influencing, government. Vetëvendosje has experienced some attempts by the government and 
international actors to inhibit and repress its activities, while there were no signs of such efforts in the 
case of Afghanistan 1400.  
 
The case analysis of both case studies demonstrates the very different strategic decisions in response 
to the influence of international actors and the lack of available political opportunities. These 
differences can be seen even in the formation of the two entities. Although both emerged as a result 
of the international presence, Vetëvendosje formed in opposition to the prolonged presence of 
international actors, while Afghanistan 1400’s formation was influenced by the expected diminution 
in the international presence. Both cases had political goals aimed at the national level and initially 
sought to distinguish themselves as different entities to political parties and internationally funded 
CSOs. Vetëvendosje sought to use more radical tactics in the form of mass protests and direct actions, 
while Afghanistan 1400 sought to influence by releasing statements, lobbying and engaging with 
Afghan youth. Neither received financial support from international actors, though Afghanistan 1400 
did maintain a good relationship with some elements of the international presence. Due to 
Vetëvendosje’s opposition to the international presence, it had a tense relationship with international 
actors. Both tend to have stronger relationships with other grassroots organisations and political allies 
were limited.  
 
Interestingly, both cases studies have taken the decision to participate in elections alongside their 
existing activities. Vetëvendosje first participated in the 2010 elections in Kosovo, as a ‘citizen’s 
initiative’ and won 13% of the vote. It won a similar portion of the vote in 2014 and the mayoral 
election in Pristina. It saw institutional politics as a possible extension to its tactical repertoire once 
international actors no longer had authority over Kosovo’s domestic institutions. Afghanistan 1400 
made the decision to form a political party alongside its existing activities during the latent period that 
it experienced after the presidential elections in 2014. I argue that the decision to participate in 
elections, by both case studies, stems from the lack of opportunities available for case studies to 
influence the political system.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this final chapter I outline the key findings of the thesis and discuss their wider contribution to the 
literature. I reflect on the methods used and present suggestions for future research. First, I consider 
the key findings in relation to the two case studies, Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400. Second, I 
discuss the influence of international actors on political opportunities in both territories and outcomes 
for the two case studies. I then reflect on the methods used to conduct this thesis and consider how 
the political opportunity framework can be developed for future applications to new protectorates. 
Following this I discuss the wider contributions of the findings of this thesis, particularly in reference 
to the literature on new protectorates and social movements. Finally, I consider the possibilities for 
future research that have come to light while conducting this research. 
 
Key findings 
This research has found that international actors have played a significant role in shaping the 
strategies of Vetëvendosje, a social movement and SMO, and Afghanistan 1400, a CSO. The two case 
studies have developed in different ways and represented different entities, but both strategies, 
including the choice of allies and tactics were shaped, to varying extents, by the international 
presence. My case study analyses demonstrate that, although there are many similarities in the 
influences of international actors in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the case studies have responded 
differently.  
 
The influence of international actors can be seen in the formation of both, and although they emerged 
as a result of the international presence. Vetëvendosje formed in opposition to the prolonged 
presence of international actors, while Afghanistan 1400’s formation was influenced by the expected 
diminution in the international presence. Both have sought broad political change at the national 
level, but while Vetëvendosje possesses a relatively large membership, and predominantly uses tactics 
involving direct action and protest, Afghanistan 1400 has a selective membership and uses lobbying 
and public engagement to put forward its demands. This reflects the different types of entities of both 
case studies.   
 
The relationship that both case studies have with international actors has, to a large extent, been 
determined by their stance towards them. Vetëvendosje opposed aspects of the international 
presence and international organisations were the target of their direct actions and protests. This led 
to a tense relationship between Vetëvendosje and international actors, which also impacted upon its 
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allies and opposition. Vetëvendosje’s main allies were other small grassroots organisations as well as 
local politicians who joined protests and meetings on issues relevant to them. In contrast, Afghanistan 
1400 were in favour of international actors extending their presence in Afghanistan. The majority of 
Afghanistan 1400’s allies are other small grassroots organisations. However, the organisation also 
maintained good relations with a number of representatives of international actors. Despite its 
attitude towards international actors, Afghanistan 1400 is keen not to be too strongly associated with 
international actors, in order to maintain its independence and its claims to represent Afghan 
interests. 
 
Both case studies have been keen to distinguish themselves from other types of organisations found 
within each territory, particularly political parties and internationally funded NGOs. This is partly due 
to the poor reputation of political parties and the image of donor-funded civil society. Some of the 
aims of both cases have been similar to those of international actors, such as calls against corruption 
and the conduct of free and fair elections. Interestingly, although Vetëvendosje has opposed aspects 
of the international presence in Kosovo, it purposely used the language of the ‘international 
community’ to demonstrate that its goals were not dissimilar to those the international community 
promotes. In contrast, although Afghanistan 1400 had several goals that aligned with those of 
international actors, it sought to use language that demonstrates that its goals were to bring Afghan 
solutions to Afghan problems, and purposely avoided the language of democracy and human rights 
that is usually associated with the international community.  
 
One of the most significant findings and similarities between the two cases was the decision to 
participate in elections alongside their existing activities. I argue that the decision to put candidates 
forward in elections stemmed from the perception of limited opportunities for influence and the 
desire by both cases to extend their tactical repertoires. 
 
Political opportunities 
The analysis of the influence of international actors included an assessment of their impact on the 
political opportunities available. Applying the political opportunity framework outlined in Chapter 
Two highlighted that international actors had an impact upon a wide range of opportunities in both 
territories. This influence was at its most extensive during the UNMIK administration of pre-
independence Kosovo. The findings demonstrate that the level of opportunities gradually increased 
in both territories after the intervention by international actors, however, opportunities remain 
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limited across a number of areas. Poor security and low levels of development have played a 
significant role in constraining political opportunities.  
 
While some studies have found that the presence of political opportunities does not play a key role in 
the emergence or effectiveness of social movements (for example, Caruso 2015), this study finds that 
both entities emerged within a context of limited but increasing opportunities. New protectorates are 
territories in a state of transition, in which huge changes can occur at speed, often including the 
introduction of an entirely new political system put in place in the space of a few years. The speed and 
direction of change in new protectorates is quite different to the trajectory of change in other states, 
which are considered to be “cumulative and important, but not typically dramatic or influential in the 
short run” (Amenta and Young 1999: 154). Thus it is to be expected that a relationship between the 
emergence of social movements and the opening up of opportunities is starker. 
 
I have analysed the opportunities and constraints on movements in Kosovo and Afghanistan at a broad 
level, while also considering the specific opportunities available to the case studies where possible. 
This included the application of a political opportunity framework to a CSO rather than a social 
movement. This proved extremely useful in the analysis of potential social movement development 
broadly and the potential challenges that those wishing to form a movement face in new protectorate 
contexts. The use of the framework in relation to Afghanistan 1400 highlights the potential for its use 
in analysing other organisations that do not fit within the definition of social movements. Political 
opportunities were affected in Kosovo and Afghanistan across each of the categories outlined in the 
political opportunity framework in Chapter Two. Here, I will briefly explain the key findings relating to 
each category.  
 
Openness 
The international presence contributed to the gradual opening up of the political system in Kosovo 
and Afghanistan, most notably by contributing to the introduction and implementation of democratic 
institutions and elections. However, the findings highlight that the implementation and effectiveness 
of a number of factors that are considered to contribute to a more open political system, such as free 
and fair elections, an effective opposition, and the implementation of legislation are still relatively 
poor and must be taken into account when assessing openness. At the same time, the findings 
highlight that the very nature of the influence of international actors can also play a role in closing 
aspects of the political system, as demonstrated by the lack of accountability of the UNMIK 
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administration. This tends to occur in tandem with international actors promoting liberal democratic 
policies, which theoretically include an open political system. 
 
Coherence of elites 
Three aspects were considered when analysing the coherence of the elites in Kosovo and Afghanistan: 
the domestic elite, the international elite, and the relationship between these two broad sets of elites. 
Although divided on a number of issues, by attempting to maintain conservative control and exerting 
their power via non-democratic means, domestic elites were effectively coherent from the 
perspective of political opportunities, resulting in few political opportunities. Similarly, despite some 
divisions, the overriding perception of international actors as representative of an ‘international 
community’ with similar goals, resulted in few political opportunities being perceived. However, the 
coherence between international actors and domestic elites did impact upon political opportunities. 
The coherence and interdependence of these actors in Kosovo constrained opportunities for 
Vetëvendosje due to its opposition to the international presence. For Afghanistan 1400 the divisions 
between the government and the international actors did not provide opportunities as it often 
advocated a range of entities uniting behind particular issues, including international actors and 
domestic elites. The party system and the outcome of elections, considered to be important elements 
in the creation of opportunities, appear to have constrained some political opportunities. The 
ideological and policy platforms of political parties in both states remains largely underdeveloped and 
indistinguishable, and patronage prevails. 
 
Allies and opposition 
The international presence created additional potential for allies and opposition for movements and 
CSOs, and influenced the possibility of other allies and opposition. This occurred in a number of ways, 
including directly, via public approval or disapproval or, more indirectly, via the substantial amounts 
of funding to civil society. Neither case study had particularly powerful political allies, which may have 
contributed to their decision to participate in electoral politics. The most prominent allies of both 
cases were a few small grassroots organisations that were not funded by international donors. 
Vetëvendosje’s opposition to the international presence reduced the likelihood of international allies, 
though former US diplomat William Walker did support leader, Albin Kurti’s bid to become an MP, in 
a particularly unusual show of support (Lewis 2010). Although Afghanistan 1400 was approached by 
international actors which offered support, it declined in an effort to maintain its independence. 
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Facilitation and repression 
In terms of facilitation, international actors paid little attention to social movements and did not 
formulate policy that specifically concerned social movements in either Kosovo or Afghanistan. The 
implementation and effectiveness of institutional rules that may have benefited social movement 
activity was often slow. There were some benefits to movements from the development of civil society 
although the type of civil society that developed, and its weakness, was not conducive to movement 
or grassroots activity and it did not provide an effective channel for interaction with the government 
or international actors in either territory. The type of civil society promoted by international actors 
has led to a professionalised and depoliticised civil society, largely made up of donor-funded NGOs, 
which has resulted in the side-lining of alternatives such as social movements and grassroots 
organisations. 
 
There were occasions when international actors inhibited Vetëvendosje’s activities by, for instance, 
damaging its public image by making derogatory public statements. Vetëvendosje also experienced a 
degree of repression at protests in the form of over the top responses by Kosovo and UNMIK police, 
as well as the arrest of activists. This also served to inhibit Vetëvendosje’s activities, particularly the 
prolonged house arrest of Albin Kurti, which caused it to direct its energies away from its core goals. 
Although Afghanistan 1400 did not experience repression in the way Vetëvendosje did, the general 
environment in which it functions is repressive, due to the levels of insecurity and aspects of poor 
democratic development, such as flawed elections. Another notable finding was the perception of 
threat by both cases that did not emerge from the state, but from external sources, such as the Taliban 
in Afghanistan or Serbian influence in Kosovo. 
 
The analysis of political opportunities in new protectorate contexts demonstrates that despite the 
existence of democratic institutions, elections, and a funded civil society, the corresponding 
opportunities expected in the literature are still not present or are very limited. Much of this literature 
has considered political opportunities within established democratic states in Western Europe and 
the US. In the case of new protectorates, elements of poor democratic development may be explained 
by their very nature, in which there is usually a huge range of issues to be dealt with, including 
humanitarian aid, conflict resolution, the return of refugees, and the re-building of infrastructure. It is 
to be expected that democratisation processes take considerable time, particularly in these 
circumstances.  
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However, the findings regarding political opportunities and openness in particular highlight some of 
the uneasiness in the type of state, democracy, and civil society that are typically promoted by 
international actors. As discussed in Chapter One, the prevailing concept among international ‘state-
builders’ is that the state should be a liberal market democracy, which is little debated (Samuels and 
von Esiedel 2004). Development programmes intend to mould the state into one that emulates a 
European liberal Weberian state. However, the appropriateness of the type of democracy that is 
widely promoted by international actors, a liberal one, has been hotly debated (see Bridoux and Kurki 
2014). The version of liberal democracy seen in new protectorates has shaped political opportunities 
broadly by the development of institutions and the conduct of elections, however, the poor 
functioning of these has limited opportunities. This is particularly obvious in Afghanistan where a 
consensus on the implementation of liberal democracy is lacking and appears to limit the 
development of democratic institutions and therefore political opportunities.  
 
Both case studies also appear to be uneasy with the way democracy and civil society has been 
promoted. Vetëvendosje has attempted to highlight the mismatch between the policies and values 
associated with the ‘international community’ and the reality found in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje has also 
put forward demands for a more participatory form of democracy and has criticised the neoliberal 
economic policies put forward by the government and international actors. Afghanistan 1400 has 
been weary of using the language of democracy and human rights that is promoted by international 
actors due to public scepticism surrounding these issues and the organisations desire to promote 
Afghan solutions to the challenges in Afghanistan. Thus, the lack of social movement activity in Kosovo 
and Afghanistan, as well as new protectorates more broadly, can be seen as, in part, a result of type 
of democracy and civil society promoted by international actors. 
 
Methods 
The methods chosen to conduct the data collection for this study enabled a thorough overview of the 
role and goals of international actors and the case studies. The interviews provided a vital insight into 
the perspectives of those working for international and civil society organisations, as well as the 
members of both case studies. The case analysis, which covered two different territories, has allowed 
for some broad assumptions to be made about international influence and new protectorate contexts. 
The analysis of both case studies in the previous chapter has compared the two and the type of 
influence in the territories in which they are active.  
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Questions have been raised over the transferability of lessons learnt from the development of states. 
Some authors have argued that historical lessons can be learnt from state development (see Moore 
2004; Tilly 1985), while others disagree (Herbst 2000). Many of these questions are related to the 
utility of comparison in contexts that are not identical (Scott 2007: 9). However, Afghanistan and 
Kosovo, as new protectorates, have experienced an international presence that is unprecedented in 
most territories, making them worthy of comparison. The international presence was extensive in 
relation to most other states and covered a wide range of areas, making it possible to compare with 
other new protectorates, though the international presence did have a notable difference. Kosovo 
experienced an international administration for nearly a decade, while Afghanistan’s international 
presence took a more assistive approach. However, the wide range of areas covered also makes the 
findings of this research relevant to other studies that may consider territories in which international 
influence is prominent in a particular area, such as efforts to strengthen democratic institutions or 
develop civil society. 
 
The comparison of the two cases highlighted the different strategic decisions taken by each case in 
response to the influence of international actors. The fact that the two cases responded quite 
differently to the international presence and have been active at different points in the new 
protectorate, serves to strengthen the comparative utility of the study. Vetëvendosje formed six years 
after the international intervention, though it emerged from the KAN that had been active since 
before that time. Afghanistan 1400 formed over ten years after the intervention and real activity 
began once international actors had announced the withdrawal of significant numbers of troops. Not 
comparing like for like has highlighted how the changing context and fluctuating influence of the 
international presence can affect strategic choices. 
 
Political opportunity framework 
The political opportunity framework was used to guide the analysis of international actor influence on 
strategic decisions. The common features of the new protectorate setting, established in Chapter One, 
were combined with the literature on political opportunities to form an altered version of the political 
opportunity categories to form a new framework. As the political opportunity literature largely 
focused on the state, the new framework attempted to take into account the additional factors that 
the presence of international actors were likely to have on political opportunities. Reflecting on the 
framework in Chapter Seven, it was possible to note the key aspects that should be incorporated into 
a political opportunity framework for new protectorates. Future use of such a framework should 
consider the following additional aspects, in relation to each category of the framework. 
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Openness 
The existing political opportunity literature that considers openness in relation to political 
opportunities is focused on domestic state institutions (Tarrow 1998; Clemens 1997; Koopmans 1996; 
Esman 1994; Tilly 1978; Eisinger 1973). In addition to the consideration of these institutions, the 
framework outlined in Chapter Two stated that the extensive influence of international actors should 
also be considered. This is due to the extensive influence by these actors on the democratisation 
process in new protectorates. This allowed an assessment, not only of the outcomes regarding the 
availability of opportunities, but also the level of influence international actors had on these 
processes. The findings of this thesis confirm that international actors were very influential over the 
creation of democratic institutions and electoral process in Kosovo and Afghanistan, which 
significantly contributed to the opening up of the state.  
 
In addition to this influence, the conduct of the international actors themselves had an impact on 
opportunities. This was most obvious in the case of the international administration in Kosovo. 
Although democratic institutions were created and elections were carried out, UNMIK and its affiliated 
institutions were quite closed. This resulted in a very low level of political opportunities to influence 
or interact with the administration. Therefore, it is also important that the international actors 
themselves are analysed in relation to the levels of openness within the new protectorate, in addition 
to their influence over processes that open up the state. 
 
Coherence of elites 
The existing political opportunity literature generally analyses the coherence of the domestic elite 
within the state and argues that divisions within the elite can create opportunities for movements 
(Selbin 2006; Goldstone 2001, 1994; Goldfrank 1994; Skocpol 1979; Trimberger 1978; Gurr 1970). The 
political opportunity framework outlined in Chapter Two stated that three elements should be 
analysed when assessing the coherence of elites and potential opportunities. These three elements 
were the coherence of the domestic elite, the coherence of international actors, and the relationship 
between domestic and international actors. Analysing these three aspects in Kosovo and Afghanistan 
highlighted that the relationship between international actors and domestic elites had a more 
significant impact on political opportunities than the coherence of either domestic elites or 
international actors, a scenario that is unlikely to feature in other contexts.  
 
When analysing the coherence of international actors in both new protectorates, I found that there 
were disagreements between international actors and criticism of their incoherent approach to 
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civilian and military assistance (Stapleton and Keating 2015; Mayall and Oliveira 2011). However, both 
case studies appeared to perceive the international actors as a coherent set of actors that is 
representative of the international community. Therefore they did not perceive opportunities as a 
result of any divisions within these actors. I argue that this is due to the broad coherence in the goals 
of security, democratisation and human rights. Generally the state actors most heavily involved in the 
new protectorates were from North America and European nations, which promoted values 
associated with the West, and so reducing the potential for broad disagreement. This is likely to be 
the case in other new protectorates. Although the coherence of international actors appears to be 
less significant, the findings of this research do confirm that the relationship between international 
and domestic actors should feature as an important part of a future framework applied to new 
protectorates. 
 
Facilitation and repression 
The majority of the literature on political opportunities considers the ways in which governments can 
facilitate, inhibit or repress of movements (Tarrow 1998; Kitschelt 1986; Marx 1979). The framework 
outlined in Chapter Two stated that international actors also had the potential to facilitate or inhibit 
movement activity and that these actors should be analysed in addition to the domestic government. 
The case study analyses highlighted that international actors did not seek to facilitate movement 
activity specifically. In fact the type of civil society that was developed by international actors ignored 
movement activity. In the case of Vetëvendosje there were incidences of attempts to inhibit 
movement activity by international actors. These actors also had authority over bodies that, on some 
occasions, repressed protest activity. Thus, international actors in new protectorates do have the 
capacity to facilitate or inhibit the activities of social movements, SMOs and CSOs and should be 
considered in addition to domestic state actors.  
 
Allies and opposition 
The political opportunity framework outlined in Chapter Two highlighted that international actors 
could provide significant allies or opposition to movements or CSOs. This proved to be the case for 
both cases in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The findings also highlighted that international actors can 
influence other potential allies and opposition. For instance, the international funding of civil society 
limited the number of allies for Vetëvendosje. Therefore, the direct and indirect influences of 
international actors should be included in a future framework that considered the influence of 
international actors.  
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Although the altered framework was relatively easy to apply to the new protectorate context, there 
are still some limitations, most of which have been addressed elsewhere in the literature, and were 
discussed in Chapter Two (see Koopmans and Statham 2010; Gamson and Meyer 1996). For instance, 
the framework does not account for the agency of members, internal discussions, a lack of resources, 
or influential factors that stem from the historical and cultural background of the territory or the post-
conflict environment. However, the focus of this research was the influence of international actors, 
curbing the impact of these limitations. While the use of the framework did help highlight some of the 
broader political and cultural influences of the international presence, it did not cover them 
specifically. These aspects have been addressed independently of the framework in the analysis of 
both case studies. 
 
It was occasionally more difficult to establish the extent of the influence international actors had over 
some aspects of political opportunities. This was more prominent in the case of Afghanistan, where 
the international presence was considered to be following a ‘light footprint approach’ rather than the 
more extensive international administration present in Kosovo. However, the difficulties experienced 
when trying to establish the influence of international actors was not entirely down to the nature of 
the political opportunity framework. During the data collection process I found that in several 
instances there was little information provided by international actors on their activities within new 
protectorates. Taking the example of UNAMA, the amount of information they provide publicly is 
quite low. UNAMA’s website, for example, provides a couple of paragraphs on each of its activities, 
covering ‘Good Offices’, ‘Human Rights’, ‘Development Coherence’, and ‘Regional Cooperation’ 
(UNAMA n.d.). It also provides transcripts of the SRSG’s quarterly briefings to the UN Security Council. 
These generally consist of only a few pages. The website also provides a quarterly newspaper that is 
largely full of ‘good news stories’ such as meet and greets by UN envoys, and cultural events. None of 
this provides particularly insightful information on what political assistance the UN are really giving to 
the Afghan government. Despite this, it was possible to establish a broad picture of international 
influence on political opportunities from the variety of sources used. 
 
Contributions to the literature 
This study has brought together different fields of literature that are not often considered collectively, 
thus providing a greater insight into the relationships between them. The thesis has sought to address 
a number of gaps in the literature, primarily the lack of literature that considers social movements in 
a new protectorate context and the type of international influence experienced in this context. 
Although Vetëvendosje has been studied by others scholars (see Lemay-Hébert 2013; Schwandner-
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Sievers 2013) this research presents new perspectives. In Afghanistan, although there is growing 
interest and coverage of youth activity (see Nikolic 2014; Hewad and Garett Johnson 2014), this is the 
first academic analysis of Afghanistan 1400. By considering the new protectorate context and the two 
case studies, the findings of this research have contributed to the growing literature that considers 
social movements outside of the traditional regions of focus in Western Europe and the US. This 
research also explores a new context for social movement activity. 
 
Existing research has considered social movements and their relations with international actors (Parks 
2015; Sikkink 2003; Wylie 1999). There is, however, little existing literature that covers the 
relationship between social movements, SMOs, independent CSOs and international actors working 
within the same state. The findings of this research highlight a different aspect of relations with 
international actors. The analysis of these entities within the new protectorate context and the focus 
of international actors has also provided an insight into a different arena in which social movements, 
SMOs and CSOs function and in which political opportunities can be found. To date, most social 
movement studies have focused on the state as the key arena of social movement contestation (Smith 
2015; Marks and McAdam 2000; McAdam 1996: 34), while some have also considered the inter-state 
arena (see Smith 2015; Tarrow 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Although, the state was a key aspect of 
the case analysis of this research, the findings suggest that the state arena was expanded by the 
presence of international actors and their influence. My findings suggest that new protectorates have 
the potential to demonstrate a hybrid arena, combing elements of the state and inter-state arenas, 
and thus encourage further reconsideration of the relationship between movements and the state, 
and inter-state system. 
 
A political opportunity framework has not been applied to a context like a new protectorate before, 
and the framework is rarely applied outside of Western Europe and the US, the areas that have 
received the most attention to date. New protectorates are a feature of the post-Cold War period and 
really came into force with the interventions and international administrations in Kosovo and East 
Timor in 1999 - almost two decades after the concept of political opportunities came into being. The 
political opportunity literature is also focused on the state, though some have found that the global 
arena is also a source of political opportunities for movements (Smith 2015). Again, this research has 
highlighted that the presence of international actors within another territory provides an additional 
arena for political opportunities that is somewhat distinct from the state or global arenas considered 
by other studies. This arena sits somewhere between the two as the international presence seeks to 
influence the state via the state-building process but also brings with it particular socio-cultural, 
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economic and political associations, which have an impact on the discourse and political opportunities 
within that territory. Also, as mentioned above, this research has demonstrated the utility of a political 
opportunity framework in relation to other types of entity, such as independent CSOs. 
 
In addition to bringing together the literature on social movement studies and new protectorates, this 
research has also discussed some of the impacts of donor-funded civil society development on 
movement and grassroots activity. There is very little existing literature that addresses the 
relationship between civil society and social movements, with the exception of della Porta (2014) and 
a small body of literature that considers the effects of NGO-isation on civil society actors, including 
social movements (Choudry and Kapoor 2013). The findings of this research support the findings 
within this literature that states that donor-funded development has the potential to stifle 
contentious, radical and grassroots activism, such as social movement activity. This research has 
highlighted the importance of understanding how donor-funded society works and the relationships 
between different types of civil society actors. 
 
Becoming political parties 
Both case studies have chosen to participate in electoral politics. Vetëvendosje registered as a 
‘citizen’s initiative’ in the 2010 elections and won 13% of the vote. Despite this, Vetëvendosje 
continues its existing activities alongside its institutional ones. Afghanistan 1400 has made the 
decision to form a political party alongside its existing activities in the near future. Here I will briefly 
outline how the insights gained regarding Vetëvendosje’s decision to stand in elections contributes to 
the existing literature on the relationship between social movements and political parties.  
 
Social movements have long been linked to the consolidation of democratic political systems, often 
seen through the relationship between social movements and political parties (see Caruso 2015; 
Johnstone 2012; Tilly 2004a, 1986; Goldstone 2004). Goldstone (2004) cites the 1950s, 60s and 70s, 
as a period which saw party politics in Europe significantly change and ties between political parties 
and movements were increasingly close. This link is thought to have become close enough that social 
movements have become a part of normal politics and that “the boundary between institutionali[s]ed 
and non-institutionali[s]ed politics becomes fuzzy and permeable” (Caruso 2015: 4). Again, these 
studies largely refer to more established democracies in Western Europe and the US. The findings of 
the case analysis in this research demonstrate that this is not yet the case in Kosovo or Afghanistan, 
over fifteen years after the new protectorates began. The relationship between parties and outside 
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groups is less established and movements are not playing the same role as scholarship on movements 
in Western Europe and the US suggests. 
 
However, Caruso (2014: 23) argues that the state, democracy and political parties have changed 
significantly since the 70s, and that relationships have changed as a result. Caruso (2015: 23) states 
that his case studies of local movements in Italy, as well as recent movements against austerity, such 
as Indignados and Occupy Wall Street, show that “political systems and political parties have become 
largely impervious to the demands of movements and to the claims emerging from social conflicts.” 
This analysis seems to be more representative of the situation found in new protectorates. Social 
movements have not yet been a priority for international actors, which may be representative of the 
lack of attention paid to the long-term effects of new protectorates and to democratisation beyond 
the technical aspects. Interestingly this runs contrary to Smith’s (2015) findings related to 
transnational activism, which, she argues, has seen an increase in the engagement of movements by 
international institutions. This has even resulted in some organisations encouraging direct 
engagement, such as the provision of space for activists to converge at UN conferences (see Friedman 
et al. 2005). 
 
Although it seems that the augmented levels of democratisation in Kosovo and Afghanistan have 
increased political opportunities to a limited extent, there are still very few movements emerging in 
either state. It appears that in new protectorates, there is little attention paid to the interactions 
between the centre and rest of the population - a feature of the democratisation process in more 
established democracies in Western Europe and the US. This raises the question of whether the 
Western-liberal form of democracy promoted in new protectorates may itself be less conducive to the 
emergence and engagement of social movements.  
 
The decision by Vetëvendosje and Afghanistan 1400 to form a political party, alongside existing 
activities is one of the key strategic decisions in both cases’ history. The decision demonstrates both 
that the opportunity to become a party is available, but that the opportunities and potential to 
influence political parties has been low. The formation of political parties could have an effect on the 
potential for new relationships between movements and parties. Movements forming parties 
alongside their movement activity is not a new phenomenon. Recent developments in Europe have 
resulted in a number of populist movements that have then had success in elections, such as Syriza in 
Greece, Podemos and Partido X in Spain, the 5 Star Movement in Italy and the Pirate Party in several 
countries. Like these movements, Vetëvendosje, emphasises fundamental differences between itself 
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and other political parties. The case analysis in this thesis provides insightful examples of a movement 
entering democratic institutions that has emerged in a very different context to those often-studied 
in established democracies. 
 
Suggestions for future research 
The findings of this research have raised further questions that would benefit from future research. It 
would be interesting to revisit both case studies and states in a few years’ time to see how the 
situation has changed. Already, since the data collection period, Afghanistan 1400 have furthered 
discussions on forming a political party and Vetëvendosje has continued its movement activities whilst 
also disrupting parliament with other members of the opposition, even using tear gas on some 
occasions (Delauney 2015; Fazliu and Butcher 2015; Morina 2015). Further study of both case studies 
could provide useful insights into the longer-term effects of new protectorates and international 
influence. Further study on Vetëvendosje’s participation in elections and how effective this is, as well 
as how it impacts upon other entities would also provide a useful insight into the relationships 
between movements and political parties. 
 
Future research could also use the political opportunity framework as the basis for considering other 
cases of movements and grassroots CSOs in new protectorates, as well as those in states transitioning 
to democracy. This further research would also test the overall findings of this study to see if they are 
generalisable in these contexts. It would be particularly interesting to see if, after a longer period after 
intervention or after the period of a new protectorate is over, political opportunities and social 
movement activity increase. There are positive signs for emerging movements that warrant further 
research. For instance, Bieber (2013: 37) has stated that “recent protests in Bosnia suggest that social 
movements against the status quo are now reaching the region.” Similarly, in Afghanistan in 2016 
there were protests over electricity provision and the wider rights of the Hazaras by the Hazara 
Enlightenment Movement (Junbish-e Roshnai) (see BBC Trending 2016; Bengali 2016; Mitra 2016; Kerr 
Chiovenda 2014). 
 
Aspects of the framework could also be used to consider the influence of international actors in 
specific areas. For instance, a variety of international actors have attempted to strengthen democratic 
institutions in a range of countries, or provide large amounts of funding to civil society development. 
The effects of donor-funded civil society development on political opportunities and the relationship 
between social movements and civil society would benefit from more in-depth research, further 
bridging the gap between the literature on social movements and civil society. It would also be useful 
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to conduct further study of other examples in Afghanistan and Kosovo in order to see how political 
opportunities affected them. Further research on other new protectorates could reveal other ways of 
improving the political opportunity framework when applied to new protectorates. 
 
Although we have not seen international administrations in the same form since those found in 
Kosovo or East Timor, we have seen international actors intervene in other territories during or after 
conflicts or humanitarian disasters, as well as in transitional states. Significant funding and assistance 
has also been provided by international actors to various civil society groups and development 
programmes worldwide. Based on these precedents, there is strong potential for future new 
protectorates, or similar scenarios in which international influence plays a significant role in the 
shaping of social movement development. Future research could help determine whether the findings 
of this thesis are also likely to be found in these scenarios in places such as Somalia, Congo, Haiti, 
Kashmir, South Sudan and Syria. 
 
This thesis provides the first study that focuses on the influence of international actors on social 
movement activity within a new protectorate context. It is also the first use of a political opportunity 
framework as a guide to analyse social movements, SMOs and CSOs within this context. By considering 
cases in two states with different types of international influence, this research has looked beyond 
the technical aspects of the international influence, such as elections, which are often the focus of 
most studies in this area. It is clear that this influence has occurred in a variety of ways and that, 
despite international actors not specifically focusing on social movements, the influence of 
international actors has shaped them and demonstrates the deeper effects of an international 
presence, including some of the unintended consequences. This research has also sought to bring 
together different aspects of the literature considered within this thesis. 
 
Given the broad range of issues addressed and the continued presence of international involvement 
in the affairs of other states, the findings of this research will be useful to policy-makers, academics, 
and those working within international institutions and civil society organisations. The research 
findings highlight one of the ways in which citizens are organising in new protectorates. Given the 
resources, consequences and goals of international interventions and new protectorates, it is 
important to further consider some of the repercussions for local populations beyond the headline 
issues, especially given that these types of interventions are still occurring and are likely to continue 
to play a significant role in international politics. 
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5 Anonymous International governmental organisation 03/09/2014 Pristina 
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8 Robin Budd Second Secretary, British Embassy, Kosovo 22/09/2014 via email 
9 Besa Luzha Head of Democratisation Programme, Friedrich 
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